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

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LETTERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR OF 1870.

BY

'THE 'TIMES' CORRESPONDENT AT BERLIN.

27433

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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LETTERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR OF 1870.

THE DETHRONED SOVEREIGNS ENDOWED BY PRUSSIA.

Berlin, January 29, 1869.

When annexing some neighbouring principalities after the campaign of 1866, the Prussian Government conferred upon the defeated and dethroned sovereigns pecuniary endowments of no contemptible kind. The King of Hanover received 16,000,000 thalers; the Duke of Nassau 8,500,000 thalers; and the Elector of Hesse about 10,000,000 thalers. In return for these munificent gifts, the royal recipients consented to sign documents differently worded indeed, but all equally tending to secure to the conqueror his new acquisitions. The Duke of Nassau absolutely transferred his royal prerogative to the House of Hohenzollern; the Elector of Hesse entered into a similar engagement, though, it would appear, in less concise language; while the King of Hanover certainly de-

clined to renounce an atom of his sovereign rights, yet by accepting pecuniary indemnification and giving his receipt for the same, was presumed to be tendering an implied assurance that he would abstain from all practical opposition to the new order of things. Combining prudence with generosity, the Prussian Government did not, however, deliver over to the evicted sovereigns the whole of the compensation awarded them, but stipulated that a considerable amount of the moneys should remain in Prussian hands and subject to Prussian control. Notwithstanding this politic precaution, such was their rancour against this Government, that whenever Louis Napoleon in the last three years gave signs of a distant intention to go to war with Prussia, the Elector of Hesse and the King of Hanover incited him to carry out his designs, and punish the country that had deprived them of their ancient inheritance. To promote this end, they carried on a journalistic campaign against this Government, establishing some papers and subsidising others for the sole purpose of representing a French war as imminent and the defeat of Prussia as a mere question of time.

Not satisfied with this, the King of Hanover went the length of helping a few hundred of his former soldiers to run away to France, where he formed them into a legion, placed them under military officers, and had them regularly drilled, for the avowed object of employing them against Prussia in the next war that should occur. The Elector of Hesse, on his part, at a moment when he supposed the French ready to cross the frontier, published a solemn statement of the wrongs sustained by him, and claimed sovereignty over all the Cassel Hessians as the inalienable right of his race. Provoked by these continued acts of hostility, the Prussian Government have at last thought it indispensable to resort to reprisals and sequestrate moneys, which, it was clear, had been awarded to unrelenting enemies. Accordingly the moneys were

temporarily seized. They will, perhaps, be restored on the owners giving sufficient guarantee of good behaviour in the future; but the interest accruing in the interval will be lost under any circumstances, being employed in warding off the attacks of the potentates against whom this stringent measure has been directed. The Duke of Nassau, having observed a more amicable attitude, remains in the undisturbed enjoyment of his pension.

SEQUESTRATION ACCOUNTED FOR.

Berlin, January 30, 1869.

In yesterday's proceedings of the Lower House the painful sequestration business was dilated upon at some length. A royal proposition having been introduced requesting Parliament to confirm the ordinances issued against the property of the late Sovereigns of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, many members availed themselves of this opportunity to inveigh against these dethroned potentates, charging them with the heinous guilt of conspiring with the foreigner against Fatherland. Count Bismarck confirmed these accusations, and himself volunteered the following remarkable statement:

'Notwithstanding peace had been concluded long ago, King George evidently still considered himself at war with this Government. Only lately he offered the French his assistance whenever they contemplated attacking this country. He was, for this purpose, maintaining a portion of his former army numbering 1,400 men, organised as a military body and under military discipline. He had been permitted to locate his legion in different French towns, causing them to be daily exercised, and paying them two francs twenty-five centimes per man per day. The Prussian Government had sent an agent to Amiens, who had won the confidence of the men, and he believed was still among them. From the reports of this reliable person he knew that, though the French Government had promised to dissolve the military organisation of the poor misguided fugitives, all that had been done to this end was to prohibit their carrying arms. In every other respect they seemed to be re-

garded as soldiers, and indeed were inscribed in the official lists of the inhabitants as *soldats Hanovriens*. They had their corporals with them, the officers living at Paris, and going to inspect them in their different homes. The maintenance of this troop cost King George something like 300,000 thalers a year, with which sum the Prussian Government was loath to supply him any longer.'

To be sure, if France will not disperse the legion, Prussia is justified in refusing to defray the expenses. Except in Greece, the conduct of one State sheltering a body of volunteers waiting for a favourable moment to fall upon another, is unparalleled.*

Then, turning against those who object to a mere temporary sequestration of King George's millions because they want to see them confiscated for good and all, the Count observed:

'When paying King George a large indemnity for the loss of his sovereign rights, we were actuated by three several motives: in the first place, we wished to spare the feelings of his former subjects, who apprehended that the last of an ancient dynasty might be exposed to pecuniary difficulties; secondly, we wished to oblige those friendly Courts who had addressed us in favour of the late Sovereign, and whom we had no wish to offend in a matter wherein our interests were not at stake; thirdly, we had been assured by some of those Courts, that though King George could not be prevailed upon to sign a formal act of abdication, still the acceptance of our money would make him feel bound in honour to desist from active intrigues. I remember perfectly well that "bound in honour" (the Count said the words in English) were the exact terms used on that occasion. So we granted an indemnity. As regards the amount accorded, it was large indeed, but worthy of ourselves and the occasion. We inquired what a Duke of Cumberland, living in conformity with his rank among his compeers, would be likely to disburse. We were told about 120,000*l.* a year, and we undertook to find that sum. The ex-King, however, has disappointed us in the way he has laid out his acquisition, and so we cannot go on obliging him. A Prince who does not scruple to conspire with the foreigner with the intent of carrying war and desolation into his own German Fatherland is not a fit subject to be pensioned by the Prussian Exchequer. His intrigues may be as harmless as the petty dynastic object for which they are carried on is contemptible; but this is no reason why we should assist them. In my opinion, even

* The legion was permitted to remain on French soil even after the accession of the 'pacific and constitutional' Ollivier cabinet. (February 1870.)

if we were defeated in a war with France, our calamities could never be so overwhelming as to lead to the re-instatement of King George; still, it is our duty to do what we can to put a stop to the criminal game he is now playing, endangering the prosperity of this great nation and the peace of Europe.'

The Royal Ordinances were then confirmed, with a majority of 256 to 70; the nays proceeding almost exclusively from those in favour of absolute confiscation. If the milder measure of sequestration has been approved, this, I believe, is mainly owing to Government consenting to make the ordinance a law. The two Houses thus becoming supreme in the matter, it is probable that the money will be withheld until formal acts of abdication have been signed. It must not, however, be thought that King George will be pinched in consequence of this stringent measure. The money he took with him on quitting Hanover will, it is computed, yield him an income of 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.*

LIEUTENANT PRINCE FRIEDRICH WILHELM VICTOR ALBERT OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, February 6, 1869.

By way of celebrating the tenth anniversary of his birthday in a manner befitting his rank, 'Prince Friedrich Wilhelm Victor Albert of Prussia'—as the Berlin Official Army-list tells us—'has been appointed Second Lieutenant in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, and been placed *à la suite* of the 1st Battalion (the Berlin battalion) of the 2d Regiment of Landwehr Guards.' On the morning of the eventful day, his royal grandfather and Commandant-in-chief presented the young prince, who is a fine boy for his age, with his first uniform and the insignia of the Order of the Black Eagle. The Prince, having duly equipped himself with the appointments of

his new rank, in accordance with military etiquette reported himself to the King, who was graciously pleased to express his satisfaction at the military bearing of the new officer. A child's party at the Crown Prince's palace concluded the day.

THE LAST WAR AND THE NEXT WAR.

Berlin, February 17, 1869.

THE laws sequestrating the property with which the ex-Sovereigns of Hanover and Hesse were endowed by this Government have been confirmed by the Lords. In the debate that preceded their vote, Count Bismarck delivered one of those remarkable speeches, equally characteristic of the times in which we live, and the man who has been called upon to influence them so signally. Space at this speechifying season not permitting me to render it at length, the next best thing is to supply an abstract containing all that is most interesting in it. The Count expressed himself to this effect:

'When resolving to hand over a large sum to King George, we performed an act of liberality of which, I believe, no parallel can be found in European history. We owed him nothing, yet we determined to endow him with a very large capital. In doing this, we were actuated by motives of generosity, and the wish to treat the representative of an ancient and illustrious dynasty in a way worthy of his descent; but of course we never meant to enable him to intrigue against us. I do not remember to have read that the ancestors of King George, after depriving the House of Stuart of the English throne, gave them money to collect the forces that fought at Culloden. Nor do I remember to have heard that the different branches of the House of Bourbon, whose thrones were subverted by revolutions in France, Spain, and Naples, were endowed at the expense of these countries, or otherwise encouraged to enlist legions and lead them against their victors. I am only saying this to show how little reason our enemies have to feign surprise at the step now taken by us. In sequestrating the property of the ex-Sovereigns, after they have proved themselves unworthy of the gift, we are only doing what all other Govern-

ments placed in a similar position did at once, and without having first tried a generous and conciliatory policy.

But then it is alleged against us that the war we carried on in 1866 having been unjust, the parties defeated are consequently entitled to a different treatment to that ordinarily awarded to the vanquished. In answer to this, I must say that the language adopted by our adversaries in describing the events of 1866 is enough to make one doubt whether there is any such thing in the world as historical truth. Looking at the falsehoods propagated at our expense, when the events to which they refer are only three years old, one is tempted to doubt the truth of all more remote histories. With a certain class of writers it has become a common thing to represent our invasion of Hanover as the act of a wolf breaking into the sheepfold. But what is the truth? Hanover had long begun making ready for the war before Prussia had called out a single man. Hanover was the first of our enemies to respond to the summons of Austria, and prepare for active operations in the field. Hanover was—as indeed were all our enemies—convinced that we should be outnumbered, defeated, and summarily disposed of for good and all. When these are the patent facts of the case, evidenced by so many acts, deeds, notes, and orders, what must be the audacity of those who are now complaining that we fell upon them unawares, and like wolves devoured the innocent unsuspecting lambs! They all imagined they had cleverly caught us, and there would be an end of us. Their own papers, nay their own statesmen, triumphantly announced that the days of reckoning had at last arrived. Prussia, they proclaimed, would be beaten, dismembered, done away with.

We of course were of a different opinion, taking a more favourable estimate of our strength while peace lasted, and doing our best to impress our convictions upon our enemies when war eventually broke out. The confident determination with which we faced the storm is now represented as a sign that we were not only certain of success, but actually began a frivolous war against a number of friendly and amiable sovereigns, who had never given us cause of offence, and were dreaming of anything but hostilities against us. Is it necessary to refute such allegations as these? Are they not of the same calibre as the answer we received from Hanover when we inquired about their armaments, and were told that the troops had been called out in spring because of the bad harvest anticipated in the autumn? And was not the pacific nature of our sentiments towards Hanover manifested by our offering, even after the reception of this puerile reply, to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom, on condition of its remaining neutral should war ensue? The offer was declined, and the 20,000 gallant men composing the Hanover army made ready to operate in our rear. Yet we were the victors. Great as our successes were, we owe it to ourselves to guard against a repetition of the danger. There could be the less doubt as to what we had to do,

as Silesia would not have been our only loss had we been defeated. King George, who, even after Langensalza, believed in the victory of Austria, flattered himself with the hope of reëstablishing the realm of Henry the Lion, and extending the frontiers of the Guelphian kingdom to the left bank of the Elbe. Austria too, from the revelations that have been made in Italy, had very probably given up Venice, even before the war, on condition of receiving an indemnity, either in money or in German territory. In addition to this, both Austria and Hanover, as well as the rest of our adversaries, were determined to force on us the acceptance of a new Federal constitution, such as had been devised at Frankfort by the Kaiser and the assembled minor Sovereigns in 1863. The coalition which we confronted on the battle-field two years ago is the same we have had to combat since the days of Olmütz in 1851. Bad as were the terms granted us there and then, they soon regretted having let us off so easily, and renewed those attacks which ultimately resulted in the memorable campaign that put an end to some machinations, and rendered others less dangerous.

Years before the war, I have had many opportunities of telling King George and his advisers that the only safe policy for Hanover was to be guided in all things by Prussia. Supposing there should be war, I said, and they were fighting on the Prussian side, no evil could befall them. Were Prussia victorious, she would be grateful to her ally; were she defeated, the enemy, however he might wreak vengeance upon us, would yet deem it his interest to preserve a respectable middle-sized State in our rear. So self-evident was the expediency of this course, that unless King George's Government had been blinded by ambition and a selfish love of power, they would have followed the timely advice. But they were resolved to act differently. They were determined to slight the needs of the nation requiring unity instead of disunion; determined to forget the alliance that had united the royal Houses of Hohenzollern and Guelph in the Seven Years' War; determined to overlook the most incontrovertible teachings of the past and present. In vain were our endeavours to attach them to our cause; in vain our solicitations and our threats. Little confidence in the coming victory as our incessant request to join us may have betrayed, we yet spoke in a way which must have prepared Hanover statesmen for all that eventually followed.'

At a later stage of the debates the Count rose again to say a few words on the doings of the ex-Elector of Hesse and his satellites of the press:

'By publishing a manifesto against us after he had concluded a treaty obligatory upon him as well as ourselves, the Elector has taken part in an agitation vigorously carried on against this Government in a certain portion of the European press. You know how widely agitation has

lately extended, and the unscrupulous way in which it is being fostered. You know that the grossest falsehoods are habitually uttered to our hurt in the organs of our detractors, and that the purpose they avowedly pursue is to bring on war between France and ourselves. In my opinion, it is a most criminal proceeding to endeavour to sow discord between two great civilised nations earnestly disposed to live in peace and amity, and who can have no real cause to disturb one another; and it is not only criminal, but contemptible, to push this agitation by means of printed lies, circulated with incessant industry, and at an enormous pecuniary expense. You all must have noticed the attempt that is being made to persuade the French, through their press, that we are preparing to profit by our recovered union to attack our Western neighbours. Not a day is allowed to elapse without a palpable lie appearing in some French paper or other. The French, our enemies calculate, are a sensitive nation; and if they can be talked into the belief that we mean mischief, will be but too ready to anticipate the presumed affront. To bring this about, no end of accusations are being trumped up against us, of fables invented, of calumnies hatched and spread. Nothing is too stupid to be dished up, if it do but serve the purpose of depicting us in an odious light; no falsehood too impudent, if it can but be employed in imbuing some simple mind with the notion that we are at the bottom of all evil, past, present, and to come.

I am sorry to say that the action of these falsifiers of public opinion is not confined to the press of one country alone; but in the last few days South German papers have spoken of a council of the royal family of Prussia, alleged to have been held to discuss the imminent contingency of war; and the Munich *Landes Zeitung* has treated the world to the news that this Government has called upon the South German States to be in readiness by a certain date. The system pursued in circulating intelligence of this ridiculous description is, to make it first appear in some obscure journal, telegraph it to the four quarters of the globe, and then work it in papers enjoying greater notoriety. It is a deplorable fact, that telegrams are still credited by a large portion of the community. People do not reflect that, if a man has money and ill-will enough, he may station persons in half-a-dozen capitals to read all the papers there, extract every morsel of alarming intelligence, however unfounded, and send it by the electric wires day after day to wherever any one can be found to believe it. It is in the interest of Germany and France alike that a stop should be put to these scandalous practices. As to ourselves, we have certainly been mindful of this duty. I am convinced that at this moment all European Governments are animated with pacific intentions, and that the French people more particularly, strong and gallant as they are, cherish equally amicable sentiments with ourselves.

I have been reproached in the German press with a want of diplomatic composure, on account of previous remarks on the same subject.

All I can say in reply is, that a man whose ire is not roused by such infamous conduct has a feeling of national honour differently constituted from mine. If we have to deal with reptiles, we must tread them under foot.'

It scarcely needed the Count's concluding words to justify him in the eyes of his countrymen. If the history of the present times is ever written, it will be a curious task for the veracious author to calculate the amount squandered by the enemies of Prussia in the last two years in representing her as on the point of attacking others or being attacked herself.

Messrs. Kohn, Lazareff, and Müller have received the necessary permission from the Russian Government to survey the country between the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral, preparatory to the construction of a railway. The works are to be set afoot shortly.

THE CRETAN QUESTION SETTLED.

Berlin, February 27, 1869.

THE Envoys at Berlin of the Powers which took part in the Cretan Conference have been instructed by their respective Governments to thank this Cabinet for its activity in behalf of peace both before and during the sittings of the diplomatic assembly at Paris. Count Bismarck's energetic exertions towards an amicable settlement certainly deserve the compliment paid him.

The result of the Conference does not seem to be quite agreeable to all those who apparently helped to bring it about. Scarcely have the Russian Government signified their concurrence in the declaration blaming the conduct of Greece, when the semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* announces that the having done so does not imply any change in their Oriental politics. To-day as ever, we are told, Russia is convinced that the system of government

pursued by Turkey is the main cause of the dissatisfaction prevailing among her subjects, and of the danger arising to Europe therefrom. Greece, it is admitted, ought not to have interfered in favour of her co-nationalists, as her meddling could only complicate the problem without solving it; but that which she is too weak to effect, the Powers ought to demand on her behalf, and, in virtue of the rights accorded them by treaty, force the Turkish Government to concede. The panacea recommended by the *Journal* is a very simple one: the Greek subjects of the Sultan should be allowed a certain degree of self-government, to be gradually enlarged, as circumstances require. There is no doubt that this outspoken article will make the round of the Greek and South Slavonic papers, and be regarded as an assurance that, whatever attitude events may have forced Russia to assume at the Conference, she still continues their well-wisher, and will show herself such as often as she can.*

COUNT BISMARCK'S BIOGRAPHY.

Berlin, March 22, 1869.

THE second volume of Hesekiel's *Life of Count Bismarck* has appeared. It mainly consists of letters and speeches of the Count's, the author contenting himself

* The Cretan commotion began immediately after the Seven Days' Campaign, when a great international conflict seemed to be close at hand. Peace being sooner restored than they anticipated, the Cretans nevertheless continued fighting the Turks, in the hope of profiting by a speedy rupture between Germany and France, rendered probable by the ambiguous attitude of Napoleon III. They were openly supported by Greece, and patronised by Russia. At the end of a two years' insurrection they were, however, obliged to give in. France had not been able to make up her mind, and kindle a universal conflagration; Russia had failed to settle with France; and Prussia, far from promoting an Oriental crisis, as some Powers thought she would, in order to profit by it for the annexation of Southern Germany, had no wish to extend the sphere of her influence, and exerted herself for the consolidation of peace.

with adding a few indispensable comments. Within the limits set to a brief notice, I will follow his example and communicate a few letters, which seem to be peculiarly characteristic of the man, his politics, and his inner life. Many a reader, I daresay, will be surprised to find him a more serious and susceptible being than bold and acute diplomatists ordinarily are supposed to be.

In 1858, when the then Prince Regent, now King William I., inaugurated his reign by the appointment of a Liberal Cabinet, Count Bismarck found himself at Frankfort in the capacity of Prussian Envoy to the Germanic Diet. A Conservative in many points connected with the constitutional propensities of his age, he fully expected to be recalled by the new Administration. His anticipations, however, were not realised. The Cabinet was too temperate in tone to dispense with the services of so useful an agent; and as the Count was moreover known to be deeply imbued with the necessity of establishing a closer confederacy among the different States of Fatherland, the new ministers were the more content to leave him in an office where his politics would mainly agree with their own. The Count, in point of fact, though a Conservative in the domestic concerns of his country, even then differed from the rest of his party, in that he held Liberal tenets respecting the necessity of furthering the establishment of German unity. While still doubting what would be his fate under the new *régime*, he indited the following epistle to an intimate friend:

'*Frankfort, November* 12, 1858.

'I really do not know that I can tell you anything about the new phenomenon in our political horizon that would not be equally applicable to the last comet. Of course, it is a very interesting phenomenon; and I must admit I did not anticipate its appearance, nor can I form an opinion as to its nature and purport. I believe astronomers will find it less difficult to calculate the orbit of the new erratic star than to foretell the career of the ministerial Pleiades. Jane has just arrived here with the children, I am thankful to say, in good health, but not very cheerful.

Having just furnished our house at great expense and trouble, she is not particularly delighted with the prospect of having to leave. She had an idea I should resign, but such is not my present intention. I do not know whether I shall be simply dismissed, or removed to a post of inferior importance, which would force resignation upon me. Before taking any step, I shall wait and see of what stuff the Cabinet is made. If they maintain relations with the Conservatives, and earnestly endeavour to establish peace and concord at home, their foreign policy may have its advantages over the one pursued by their Conservative predecessors. Such a change would be most acceptable to me. Prussia has gone down in the world, without being aware of it. No one is more painfully alive to the fact than I, in my position here.

I suppose Prince Hohenzollern has been placed at the head of the Cabinet to prevent his colleagues from leaning too much on the Left, and establishing a regular party Government. Should I be mistaken in this, or should I be sent away, merely to oblige some hungry candidate for office, I shall retreat behind the cannons of Schönhausen' (the Count's hereditary estate), ' and see whether this Prussia of ours can be governed with the assistance of Liberal majorities. At the same time I shall not omit to do my duty in the House of Lords. Variety is the soul of life, and perhaps I shall feel ten years younger when forced back into the defensive position of 1848 and 1849. Depend upon it, the moment I find the *rôles* of gentleman and diplomatist incompatible, the pleasure or the trouble—whichever it may be—of spending an ambassadorial salary will not for a moment influence my choice. I have enough for my simple wants; and if God preserve my wife and children in good health, as hitherto, I shall say *vogue la galère*, whatever course I may have to steer. After thirty years' political life, it is all the same to me whether I have to play the diplomatist or the squire. The prospect, moreover, of combating my political opponents free from official shackles, and of fighting—as I may say, in political bathing costume—is quite as attractive to me as the continued diet of despatches, truffles, and grand crosses I have been undergoing here. All things must come to an end. More than this, which is my personal feeling, I have not to impart at present. The solving of the ministerial enigma I must put off. In the mean time I am not a little amused by the attitude of the Germanic Diet. Those of its members who but six months ago insisted upon my recall as a preliminary to the establishment of a German unity after their own heart,* now tremble at the thought of losing me. Frightened by our new Cabinet, they are all in a flutter, like chickens at the sight of the hawk. Democracy, barricades, Federal Parliament, and all the other terrible reminiscences of 1848, are revived in their disturbed minds. Mr. NN., so long my adversary in the Diet, is ready to embrace me with touching

* This probably refers to the Austriacanti.

emotion, and but the other day told me, with a convulsive grasp of the hand, "We shall be compelled to fight again on the same side."

The French representative here naturally begins to look upon us Prussians as incendiaries; and the Englishman, too, cannot help sharing the impression. The Russian is afraid that the Czar will be diverted by our disgraceful example from his plans of reform. I try to allay the anxieties of them all as much as possible, and have the satisfaction of knowing that they look upon my continued presence at Frankfort as a guarantee of the maintenance of the *status quo*. The idea that —— might be appointed my successor is too terrible. They have conversed so much about him the last few days, that if his ears do not tingle, all I can say is, the drum must be broken. From the respectable Liberal-Conservative he is, their fancy has actually converted him into a Red Republican, accomplice of Messrs. Kinkel and D'Ester. A certain famous diplomatist of Bamberg reputation may be heard commenting upon a Continental Fire and Life Insurance Company against Prussian murder and arson. We are also threatened with the alliance of three Emperors, another Olmütz, and practical measures. In a word, things begin to look up in the political world. My children are bawling about the house "Pietsch kommt."* Pietsch to us is more than the Great Unknown, for I left at Schönhausen a servant of that name, who has just arrived here. It really seems as though his arrival and the comet were not without a meaning. Farewell; and give my love to Oscar; tell him not to be down in the mouth; it is all chaff.'

The two following letters refer to an earlier period, and paint the man rather than the statesman. In 1851 a semi-Liberal Cabinet held sway in Prussia, and appointed Count Bismarck their Envoy at Frankfort. It was the last chance King Frederick William IV. gave the Liberals, then striving hard to hold their own against the Conservatives. Thus much will suffice to render the following intelligible:

'*Frankfort, July* 3, 1851.

'The day before yesterday I received your letter, and find that you are all well. I am thankful for what you tell me. But do not forget that your letters may be read by spies before coming to hand. If you will go on raving in black and white, you ought to remember that all you say to me will be brought up against me. You are, moreover, unjust towards the people you mention. Be cautious, therefore, and that not only when writing, but in speaking, more especially of individuals. When

* A Berlin popular phrase, of no particular meaning, referring to the appearance of some mysterious stranger.

a man has once become an object of observation, he cannot be too much on his guard. You must be prepared to learn that what you whisper in the closet is proclaimed at Sans Souci, and dished up with *sauce piquante*. Pardon my admonition; but after your last I am really obliged to have recourse to the diplomatic shears. If —— should succeed in sowing discord in our camp, their principal object in causing letters to be stolen and opened will have been attained.

The day before yesterday I dined at Wiesbaden, and with a mixed feeling of melancholy and precocious wisdom looked upon the scene of my former vagaries. I pray God to fill with strong and pure wine this vessel of my soul, in which the champagne of youth effervesced, only to leave tasteless dregs at the bottom. Where are now —— and Miss ——! How many are buried with whom I flirted, drank, and gambled! What intellectual changes have I gone through in the fourteen years which have since elapsed! and how erroneously have I looked upon the varying opinions of the moment as the only correct ones! How much appears small now, that I once considered great! how many things do I now revere, which I then ridiculed! How many more leaves may be destined to grow, flourish, and decay in the garden of my soul in the course of the next fourteen years, and what will 1865 be, if we live to see it? I cannot conceive how a man who reflects on his life, and knows nothing of God, or wants to know nothing of Him, does not find life too dull and contemptible to endure. I cannot imagine how I got on when formerly in this state. Were I to drag on existence now without God, without you, without children, I might as well rid myself of life, as I would of a cast-off garment. Yet nearly all my acquaintance are living thus. Sometimes I set myself to inquire what motives they can have for living and toiling on, for intriguing and plotting; and can come to no adequate conclusion.

Do not infer from my scribble that I am in a particularly black mood. On the contrary, I feel as on a fine September day, when gazing upon the changing yellow foliage, healthy and strong, but with some dash of melancholy, some *heimweh*, some yearning for wood, sea, desert, you, and the children, mingled with sunset and Beethoven. Instead of this, I am obliged to make tedious visits, and read endless statistics on the German men-of-war rotting at Bremerhaven, and swallowing up a good deal of money. I should like to take a ride; but to ride alone is so dull, and the company I have to choose from is equally so. I must now go to Rochow, and see all the *ins* and *offs* that are here with the Grand Duchess Olga.'

'*Frankfort, July* 8, 1851.

'I meant to have written to you yesterday, but was prevented by a press of business. I have just returned from a walk; and in the soft summer-night air, in the moonlight, and amid the rustling of the poplars, have shaken off the dust of my official work. On Saturday I went with

Rochow and Lynar to Rüdesheim, where I took a boat and floated down the Rhine, with eyes and nose just an inch above the tepid surface. There is something dreamy in thus drifting with the tide in the still breathless air, slowly drawn along by the current, and gazing at moon and stars, at the wooded heights and fallen towers, conscious of no other sound but the soft gurgling around your own boat. I should like thus to float every night. When back I drank some very nice wine, and sat long smoking with Lynar on the balcony, the Rhine beneath us. My pocket Testament and the starry firmament led to Christian discourse. I shook the Rousseau-like virtue of his soul, but effected no more than to silence him. When a child he was led astray by tutors and governesses, and imbued with notions similar to those of my youth. He is certainly more satisfied with them than I ever was.

The next morning we took the steamer to Coblentz, lunched there, and afterwards returned to Frankfort, where we arrived in the evening. My real object in undertaking the expedition had been to call on old Metternich at Johannisberg, who had invited me; but I was so pleased with the Rhine, that I preferred steaming on to Coblentz and postponing my visit. On that fine summer morning, and after the dusty tedium of Frankfort, the Rhine has risen greatly in my estimation. I am looking forward with great delight to spending a few days with you at Rüdesheim. The place is so quiet, rural, and cheap, and the people are so good. We shall take a small boat and row leisurely down, ascend the Niederwald, visit some castle or other, and return by the steamer. If we leave early in the morning, we may spend eight hours at Rüdesheim, Bingen, Rheinstein, &c. and be back in the evening.

My appointment to the Frankfort Legation seems certain.'

From the contents there can be little doubt as to the name of the person, and her intimate relation to the Count, to whom the last two letters are addressed. Will there be no English translation of this interesting work?

FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE WORKING OF THE BELGIAN RAILWAYS.

Berlin, March 27, 1869.

ALTHOUGH Prussia has prudently abstained from all interference in the Belgian affair, the papers subsidised by the French Government have been instructed to blazon

forth certain concessions alleged to have been made by Belgium* as a defeat inflicted upon this Cabinet. Without wasting a word on the bad taste manifested in thus making free with the name of this Government, I deem it the more necessary to repeat that, from the beginning of the Belgian controversy down to its present stage, neither the Prussian Foreign Office nor any of its agents have so much as expressed an opinion on the merits of the case.

Less cautiously reserved is Prussia's behaviour towards Austria. The semi-official journalists of the two countries are again at logger-heads. Only a few months have elapsed since the war of quills between Vienna and Berlin was arrested by the intercession of the British Cabinet, and already we find the *Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine* declaring that the attitude assumed by its Vienna contemporaries makes it impossible to continue the armistice. Nay, more: Count Bismarck's organ tells us in so many words that the policy pursued by the Vienna Cabinet being maliciously designed to foment apprehensions of war, Prussia must prepare to meet Austria again as an enemy, and, in fact, is preparing for this painful alternative. Peace, it is sarcastically added, as a matter of course, remains stable as ever, no matter what Austria may be contemplating. From this you may gather the sort of language recently used by the Vienna press. Fortunately this senseless wrangling has long lost the effect it formerly had on the public. Small cause for delight as the people have in witnessing the feelings mutually entertained at Vienna and Berlin, the art of diplomacy has been too much popular-

* The French Chemin de fer de l'Est endeavoured to obtain the working of the three principal railway lines in Belgium. Their action was supported by the French Government, but resisted by the Belgian Cabinet and Chamber, who passed a law rendering the contemplated 'fusion' impossible. The wisdom of the Belgian policy was signally illustrated in 1870, when the Luxemburg railway, having been handed over to the Compagnie de l'Est, was turned to account for the provisioning of the French fortress of Thionville, while besieged by the Germans. This breach of neutrality not a little contributed to bring on a new Luxemburg complication.

ised of late to make them oblivious of the immense difference between semi-official words and official deeds.

For the first time since the formation of the Confederacy, the ordinary summer manœuvres of the Prussian army will this year be extended to the whole of the Federal forces. In accordance with this arrangement, two *corps d'armée* will each separately go through a sham campaign, the rest of the standing army being subjected to a similar course of drill in divisions. To render this practical instruction as general as possible, the entire reserve is to be called out, in addition to which 102 of the reorganised Landwehr battalions of 300 men each will be embodied for a month or so. It is probable that on this occasion fresh experiments will be made with the revolver-cannon introduced into the French army. This new weapon, at first slightingly regarded here, seems to have gradually worked its way into the favour of the military authorities, and I believe has a chance of being ultimately adopted. As a necessary complement to the unremitting endeavours to perfect the art of killing, Government contemplate establishing a special life insurance bank for the officers of the Federal forces. The object in view is to free the gallant gentlemen from the additional rates levied by ordinary insurance companies upon those pursuing their dangerous calling. That this cannot be done without taxing the country to make up the difference, is evident from the careful adaptation of the rules of the existing companies to the ascertained death-rates of the military. Indeed, we are already told that the Government mean to lend the new bank the capital required for commencing operations — a proceeding which, as it requires parliamentary sanction, will cause this interesting, and no doubt in many respects most beneficial project, to be made known in detail.

Mr. Hepworth Dixon's famous book, *Spiritual Wives*, has given rise to judicial proceedings in this country.

Soon after its appearance it elicited replies from some of the persons involved in the dealings of the Königsberg sects. These replies not only criticising the English author, but also censuring certain sentences passed by Prussian courts of law, in their turn gave umbrage to the Crown lawyers, who brought actions for 'hatred and contempt' of the royal authorities' against the writers. Out of the three pamphlets inculpated, one has been seized and committed to the flames. The literary world will be no loser by this unceremonious destruction of one of its numerous children. The defunct sheets contained a defence of Pastors Ebel, Diestel, and other gentlemen of the same questionably sanctimonious hue, against the accusations of the heathen world.

LIBERALISM AND THE NORTH GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Berlin, April 11, 1869.

When the dangers and triumphs of the Seven Days' War had made the Liberals relent in their opposition, Count Bismarck submitted the project of a Federal Constitution, which, though it did not satisfy the hopes of his former antagonists, yet in the accommodating mood of the hour was approved by the many local Parliaments whose assent it required. This Constitution not only did not introduce a more stringent ministerial responsibility than had existed in the individual States, but, dispensing altogether with the appointment of Ministers, and placing the whole executive power of the Confederacy in the hands of one man, the Chancellor, made it even more difficult to exercise parliamentary control over the Government. In ratifying this charter, notwithstanding the objections raised to it, the Liberals, who had the majority in the

Prussian as well as in most of the other local Parliaments, were actuated by the consideration that, at a period such as the latter half of 1866, it was more essential to consolidate the results of the war by clothing them with constitutional forms, than to wrangle about the extension of the public liberties. A hope was also entertained by some that, the reunion of Germany remaining incomplete after all, the Government would endeavour, were it only for safety's sake, to add the Southern States to the Northern Confederacy, when an opportunity should offer for remedying existing defects. Others, less sanguine as to the rapid growth of the new commonwealth, were content to trust to what they supposed to be the irresistible force of Liberal principles, which they were fain to assume would soon overcome all impediments in their way.

Both, however, have thus far been disappointed—the former by the prudent and thoroughly pacific policy of the Government, the latter by the undeniable apathy and indifference in which the people have been temporarily enveloped. Far from being in a hurry to extend the Federal institutions to the South, the Government, on the contrary, in this, as in everything else, are careful to avoid all that could give foreign Powers a specious cause for interfering with the affairs of this country. They have evidently no wish to attempt farther aggrandisement at the risk of provoking the war-party in France and bringing on an international conflict, likely to injure the victor nearly as much as the vanquished. They look upon the advantages to be gained by the embodiment of Southern Germany as infinitely less than the dangers that would have to be encountered in precipitating this desirable consummation; and moreover, with the natural instinct of all constituted authorities, are probably averse to the venturesome experiment of crowding one political change upon the heels of the other. So far, then, as they were based upon the assumed ambitious designs of this Cabinet,

the anticipations of the Liberals have crumbled away completely. They have not fared much better with regard to the assistance expected from the people. Whether owing to the barren excitement of the constitutional quarrel that preceded the war, or some other cause connected with the pecuniary anxieties of the epoch, certain it is that the public mind does not seem to be particularly inclined to devote that attention to politics which would be necessary for the schemes of the Liberal party to prosper. In this predicament, the Liberal members in the Federal as well as in the Prussian Legislative Assemblies seem to have arrived at the conclusion, that the only strategy likely to further their interests is to revive the movement on their own hook, and set the masses an example of what they ought to demand from and refuse to the Government. To insist upon immediate reunion with the South they are themselves too cautious, under the present aspect of foreign politics, and would scarcely deem advisable, even were the Government less firmly determined to negative any such proposition. But internal affairs seem to supply the arena denied them by international politics. For the last few weeks the Liberal papers, some of them inspired by certain eminent gentlemen in Parliament, have been discussing the necessity of developing the Federal institutions, and remodelling the executive on the ordinary pattern of constitutional commonwealths. In other words, the direction of the Federal army, navy, custom-house, and post-office is to be taken out of the hands of the Chancellor, Count Bismarck, to be surrendered to separate Ministers officiating under his presidency. Simultaneously with this change, it is desired that a law department be created to superintend the execution of such Federal statutes as do not refer to military and commercial affairs, some of which have been already enacted, while others are in course of preparation. To this latter category, for instance, belong the poor-law, the passport-law, the right of residence

law, the act providing for a new mode of procedure in civil suits, and others, which, it is alleged, have not always been faithfully executed by the local authorities, and require a special Federal Board to enforce them.

The same reasoning is being applied to the financial affairs of the Bund. As a matter of course, in this nineteenth century of ours, in which no respectable concern exists without debt, the Confederacy had not been established two years before it raised a loan. The Chancellor on that occasion objecting to the creation of a Federal debt department, the Federal Parliament, after a long and rather animated debate, agreed to vote the money on condition of its being handed over to the Board to which belongs the supervision and administration of the Prussian debt. They, however, announced at the same time that, should any more loans be proposed by the Chancellor, they would not again consent to such a makeshift, but insist on the appointment of Federal finance officials, who should be even more strictly responsible to the Federal Parliament than are their Prussian colleagues to the Prussian Parliament. It is this pecuniary side of the case which threatens to complicate matters. The Government being on the point of asking for some more loans and taxes to cover the military expenditure of the Confederacy, the Liberals proclaim that the time for making good their threats has now arrived. As they hold the purse-strings, they are, no doubt, in a position to render themselves disagreeable; and it is probably owing to the power the straitened condition of the Exchequer gives to Parliament, that the papers and political friends of Count Bismarck display a more than ordinary activity in refuting Liberal arguments and canvassing for votes in the House.

In objecting to the subdivision of the Federal Government into many separate Ministries, Count Bismarck's papers profess themselves to be actuated by motives of a diplomatic rather than a Conservative nature. They urge:

'At present we have a Chancellor, a Federal Council consisting of the representatives of the Sovereigns, and a Federal Parliament. The Chancellor representing the Government, and sitting at the same time in the Federal Council, the latter has a guarantee that none but the votes taken by it will be carried out by its executive officer. To appoint Ministers, and make them responsible to Parliament, would be depriving the Federal Council of the supreme control, and justify the minor Princes in charging us with a farther encroachment upon their authority. To expose ourselves to such an accusation would be imprudent under any circumstances, and doubly so at a time when the rearrangement of Germany is quite a recent thing. It would, moreover, be morally wrong, and also altogether unnecessary, as military, commercial, and legislative unity may be secured without it.'

To this reasoning the Liberals reply, that neither unity nor orderly and methodical government can be secured without the appointment of special Ministers, and that the feelings of the minor Princes should not be too much taken into account when providing for the interests of the nation. As yet no agreement had been effected; and as the Liberals, besides wishing to strengthen unity, are no doubt equally anxious so to shape the new Boards demanded as to extend the power of Parliament, the controversy is likely to lead to a lively debate. In a few days, when the budget will be discussed, the contest will begin. I should be tempted to call it the first serious hitch in the working of the Federal Constitution, were it not that, while public anxiety respecting the unsettled state of Europe remains what it is, no dispute between the Government and the Parliament of the new Confederacy is likely to assume grave proportions.

A GERMAN FEDERAL CABINET.

Berlin, April 17, 1869.

As was anticipated in one of my last, the Liberals have turned against the Government, and, aided by a few of the Centre party, become refractory in that very

assembly which, a year ago, considered it as its primary duty to support the powers that be. In yesterday's sitting of the Federal Parliament, the motion to attach a responsible Cabinet to the Chancellor of the Confederacy, and convert the Federal executive into a regular constitutional government, was carried by a majority of 111 to 100. The ayes, it is true, exceeded the nays by only a few votes; but as the Federal authorities deprecated the motion as implying a want of confidence, it is the fact of its being passed at all, and not the numerical proportion of the division, which attracts most notice. The motives of the Liberals in thus deliberately thwarting the wishes of the statesman to whose direction the joint concern was intrusted, at a comparatively recent period, were frankly avowed by various speakers. Some urged that the Chancellor alone, even with Count Bismarck's uncommon powers and industry, could not exercise an effectual supervision over the complicated business of the various Federal departments. So long, therefore, as he remained the only responsible member of the Executive, responsibility would be merely nominal. Others complained that the Chancellor, having surrounded himself for the transaction of Federal business with mere subordinates, and those insufficient in number, Prussian officials and Boards had to be put into requisition to assist in the drawing-up of Federal laws, and the management of Federal affairs generally. If he could be induced to take unto himself a responsible Cabinet, he would no longer have any reason to keep the working staff at so low a figure. Still, others, assuming higher ground, and disclosing one of the principal reasons of their party in pressing the matter, asserted that the responsibility of the Chancellor was a dead letter, unless supplemented by a law providing for the forms of prosecution in case of a dereliction of duty. If in drawing up the Federal Charter they had not urged this point, their reserve was owing to their main object then being

to effect an agreement with the various Sovereigns and Cabinets of Northern Germany; but they now thought it incumbent upon them to return to the charge, and insist upon *bonâ-fide* responsibility, an indispensable condition of which would be a plurality of Ministers. If Prussia, they maintained, if every individual State of the Confederacy, had a responsible Cabinet, it was an anomaly to place the common affairs of the nation in the hands of a single and practically irresponsible agent.

To these arguments, preferred by the various Liberal fractions of the House, another and more universally interesting one was added by the few members of the free Conservative, or Centre, party who had joined the Opposition on this occasion. These urged:

'At present the Chancellor of the Confederacy not only united in his own person the whole Executive—a task no single mortal was competent to undertake—but was also the member for Prussia in the Federal Council, the body which consists of the representatives of the Sovereigns, and prepares and sanctions the laws to be enacted. Of the minor potentates and their deputies in the Council it could not, of course, be expected that they would propose, or very willingly sanction, any laws calculated to tighten the bonds of unity, and gradually extend the action of the Federal authorities over the entire field of internal affairs. The member for Prussia in the Council might, indeed, be able to effect something in that way; but as Count Bismarck was averse to any such measures, the consequence was, that the minor Sovereigns, left in the possession of an undisputed majority in the Council, were actually governing the nation direct, and without so much as the semblance of a Cabinet. The institution of a Ministry would naturally curtail the action of the Council, and reduce its functions to what they ought to be—the mere sanction or rejection of bills. By the very nature of their position, a Federal Cabinet would be driven to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Bund, appropriate more and more power to themselves, and thereby prepare for the day when the present Federal Constitution—a mere make-shift, devised in an hour of peril—might be superseded by some more simple, more liberal, and more thoroughly unifying arrangements. To perpetuate the existing institutions, or even to continue them for any length of time, would not only be injurious to unity, but also to the freedom of the nation.

Not to speak of the many minor Parliaments placed in the like predicament, they had a Prussian and a Customs Parliament, to provide the needful for the War and Foreign Offices, without any corresponding

right to influence the foreign policy of the Federal Government. The latter privilege belonged to the Federal Legislative Assembly; but as this had little or no money to grant, the funds being found by the State Assemblies, the Government, in one of the most important items of political life, were virtually absolute. This would remain so, even though the Federal Government, besides being fed by the contributions of the local Parliaments, in their anxiety to augment the revenue, were now beginning to appeal for taxes to the Federal Parliament likewise. As the major part of the income of the Federal Government would, under the actual laws, be always derived from indirect sources, the voting a supplementary trifle would not render the Federal Assembly any more influential than it was. The real object of the Liberals, therefore, must be to reform the Charter; and to this end the establishment of a Federal Cabinet would be the first step.'

Some gentlemen representing minor Princes in the Federal Council were the first to reply to this charge, in their masters' names. They spoke more temperately than might have been expected, after having been called useless, and worse than that. There was a certain *je ne sais quoi* in their reasonings, as though they were apologising for their existence, and had an indefinite presentiment that the time was drawing near when they would be allowed even less elbow-room than now. But presently came to their aid Count Bismarck, and, in one of the longest and most eloquent speeches ever delivered by him, defended the royal allies of his Sovereign against the accusation of being a nuisance, and only deserving to be embodied and digested by himself, like so many of their equals. From a speech so rich in detail, both serious and witty, it is difficult to make a selection that shall not omit some interesting features. As a mere summary, the following few lines will give you an idea of the style adopted. The Count began by complaining that

'The hundred and two gentlemen whose names appeared under the motion had not thought it worth their while to communicate with him upon the subject. Had they done so, he might have convinced some of the impracticability and injustice of their demand. As it was, he could only look upon their motion as an attempt to remove him from office. He knew he had been charged with arrogating to himself a dictatorship over the Confederacy, and, through the Confederacy, over Prussia; but

he was glad to hear that they did not impute to him any aims and ends at variance with their own, and were merely dissatisfied with the way he set to work to realise their common objects. He was only the executive officer of the Federal Council, and in that Council voted according to the instructions given him by the King of Prussia, in conjunction with the Prussian Cabinet. Was that a dictatorship? If the appointment of a whole Federal Cabinet were required as a means of enforcing the constitutional doctrine, all he could say was, that this *desideratum* was much more fully attained by leaving him the only responsible functionary of the North German Executive. Responsibility divided was never so real as when confined to one. Moreover, it was the most difficult thing in the world to make half-a-dozen responsible ministers agree; and if he had the framing of a new Constitution for Prussia, he would certainly propose to remodel it upon the pattern of the Bund. Especially at a time like the present, when quickness and energy were the indispensable requisites of whatever Administration might be in power at Berlin, they would only be interfering with the exercise of those necessary qualities, were they in his capacity of Federal Chancellor to force upon him so and so many colleagues.

Then, as regarded their wish to extend unity and appropriate one department of legislation after the other for the Bund; did they really believe that by advancing the hands of the clock they were accelerating the march of time? He hoped that unity, both of Northern and Southern Germany, would eventually assume the form best calculated to secure the strength and prosperity of the nation; but he did not think that the time had arrived for improving upon existing arrangements. The minor Governments had made those sacrifices of prerogative most imperatively required; and as they did not wish to go beyond these just yet, it would be most unjust on the part of Prussia to attempt to compel them. Army, navy, commerce, and some portions of the civil and criminal law, had been withdrawn from the individual States, and been handed over to the Federal jurisdiction. This was all that was needed now; and the machinery had worked so well, that the gentlemen on the Opposition benches seemed to feel quite dull at the want of a little break-down now and then, and were about to take out a wheel or two just for amusement's sake. But the minor Governments had loyally coöperated with him in the Federal Council, and he deemed it his duty to vindicate the amount of prerogative allotted to them.

Again, by prematurely or too closely tightening union cords, they would only deter the Southerners from joining the Confederacy. They must take the Southerners as they were, not as they wished them to be. The Bavarians, Franks, and Suabians of the South were so proud of their distinctive characteristics, that the more centralised the institutions of the North became, the less willing they would be to take part in them. If a Federal Cabinet ever became a reality, the South German Govern-

ments would decline to have anything to do with the Bund. Their subjects not only would not urge them to join, but would encourage them to keep aloof; even should they not do so, they would be probably powerless to influence the decision of their princes. The German was a gallant soldier; but he objected to vindicating his politics by rows. There was nothing left for the Liberals but to trust to gradual and pacific development. The House ought not to forget that German patriotism was of a local nature. The villages had their special patriotism, and so had the towns, the provinces, and the other subdivisions of the race. Nay, the various professions, and even the various departments of State, were pervaded with a specific pride, which very frequently made them treat the rest of the world as an enemy that might at any time be legitimately combated. In this country of Prussia, it can occur that a leading post-office official, most conscientious in the fulfilment of his duties, regards all the other departments as his natural enemies, against whom war may, and indeed must, be waged. In such a land of class pride and local self-sufficiency, it will never do to strain unity beyond a certain pitch. And is not decentralisation liberty? Are not the United States satisfied with a moderate degree of union? and has not the old Constitution of the Netherlands—the one most closely resembling our own—been the means of securing freedom and power to Holland for so many happy and glorious years? The political ideal of all Germanic races is local freedom, not centralised power; and in coming into more intimate contact with the minor States, we, the Prussians, have had to acknowledge that their administration, in some respects, was superior to our own. Why, then, deprive them of the right of self-government beyond what the safety of Fatherland requires? But whichever way you may decide, let us all recognise that we are equally patriotic at heart, and that though we may disagree as to the best means to be employed, our ultimate views are substantially identical.'

The Count's speech did not remain without replies, mainly repeating what has been stated in the preceding survey of the Liberal opinions. The motion was then passed. It will not be acceded to by the Federal Council; to avenge which the Federal Parliament will probably refuse the new taxes demanded of it. I believe I am correct in assuming that, but for the uneasiness prevailing with regard to foreign affairs, the above significant vote would not have been taken. Anxious as the party leaders are to revive the Liberal movement among the people, they would scarcely have hit upon an attempt to reform the Federal Constitution two years after enactment, did

not the fears entertained with regard to certain neighbours seem to advise a realisation of the unity programme in its entirety. To set to work in the most effective manner, and invite the South to join, would be running the risk of a war, and therefore finds but few advocates; but to liberalise the Northern Confederacy is supposed to be the next best thing, as it is likely to strengthen the unity movement in the South, and establish virtually that, the formal and outward consummation of which must be left to a future time. As you will perceive from this, the Liberals do not agree with Count Bismarck as to the impression to be produced on the South by their motion and the carrying of it. However, the controversy is not likely to wax very warm. The very thing which has brought it on will act as an antidote. The misgivings with regard to the French-Austrian designs, in which it principally originates, are sure to prevent its assuming a form calculated to interfere with the good understanding that has so long prevailed between the people, the Parliament, the Administration, and the Crown.

THE GERMAN FEDERAL BUDGET.

Berlin, May 6, 1869.

On the establishment of the North German Confederacy in 1867, the strength of the standing army was fixed in the new Federal Charter up to December 31, 1871, the rate adopted being one per cent. of the population, and the expense of maintenance 225 thalers per man. By this proviso the army, for a period of four years, was set down at 300,000 men, and the military budget at 66,000,000 thalers (about 10,000,000*l.*). Add to this the naval budget, varying between 5,000,000 and 7,000,000 thalers; the expense of the Federal Chancellerie, diplomacy, and consulates, amounting to 2,000,000 thalers

more, and some smaller items incurred in the postal and telegraph departments; and you have a sum of about 76,000,000 thalers (11,500,000*l.*), as the annual expenditure of the Confederacy.* To meet this outlay, that portion of the income of the Customs Union which falls to the share of Northern Germany, as well as the yield of the post and telegraph departments, was by the Federal Charter handed over to the Federal authorities. Any deficiency was to be covered by direct contributions from the individual States to the Federal exchequer. In accordance with this arrangement, if the sources of income placed at the direct disposal of the Confederacy yield a plentiful supply, contributions from the State exchequers are either not needed or will be small; in the contrary case, those contributions must be proportionately increased. It so happens that contributions have not only been required from the very outset, but gradually augmented since the creation of the new joint concern. In 1868, the first financial year of the Bund, the Customs and Excise yielded a revenue of 49,500,000 thalers; in 1869, the prevailing stagnation of business has reduced this sum to 48,200,000 thalers; in 1870, the Finance Department expects to derive from the same source 48,500,000 thalers. Following the same downward course, the post, from a net profit of 2,425,000 thalers in 1868, fell in 1869 to 550,000 thalers, the adoption of the groschen postage in a slack year producing this disastrous result. In 1870 the post, it is calculated, will yield only 264,000 thalers. The telegraph revenue, too, has sunk in the three years mentioned from 275,000 thalers to 77,000 thalers. If we

* In addition to this common expenditure, the twenty-three States of the Confederacy spend, under their special budgets, a total of 215,000,000 thalers a year. Of this sum 170,000,000 thalers is given out by Prussia, 13,000,000 thalers by Saxony, 5,500,000 thalers by Hesse, 4,775,000 thalers by Hamburg, 3,780,000 thalers by Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and 17,000,000 thalers by the remaining seventeen States. All these are round figures. The Federal and special budgets together amount to 291,000,000 thalers per annum.

farther take into account that, of the Federal loan voted in 1867, 3,600,000 thalers were spent in 1868, 5,150,000 thalers in 1869, leaving a remainder of only 1,250,000 thalers for 1870, we shall have no difficulty in comprehending how it is that the contributions of the individual States to the Federal exchequer, which amounted to 19,800,000 thalers in 1868, are in the budget for 1870 computed at 25,800,000 thalers.

This budget has just been voted by the Federal Parliament, which, having thus acquitted itself of its duty, would be constitutionally entitled to leave it to the individual States to find the needful. But how are these to set to work? It required an effort on their part to supply the 19,800,000 thalers demanded in 1868. The 6,000,000 more now required clearly represent a deficiency of their special exchequers, or, as five-sixths are to be supplied by Prussia, a deficit chiefly of the latter. Out of the existing taxes this sum could not be met, even had they remained as productive as they were; but as, under the paralysing effect of continued rumours of war, they have likewise undergone a slight diminution, it is the less possible to pay up new liabilities from old sources of income. Fresh loans or fresh taxes have become indispensable.

To use loans as stop-gaps for deficits would be at variance with the prudent habits of this race, and the economical traditions in accordance with which the Prussian finance administration has been so long conducted. The Federal Parliament have not, indeed, objected to vote another loan of 7,000,000 thalers for naval purposes, it having become apparent that the 10,000,000 thalers voted last year will not suffice to give the cuirassed vessels the solidity required after the latest artilleristic experiments. But the same assembly who have just accorded this additional grant with scarcely a dissentient voice would be loath to have recourse to borrowing to make up, it is true, for a small but apparently not quite transient dimi-

nution in the national revenue. Fresh taxes, then, are the only outlet left.

Under the modern arrangements of Northern Germany, the Central Government have at their disposal a great variety of modes of taxing the subject; but, many and different as are these methods, they do not seem to be all equally eligible in the present pinch. To cause a new tax to be voted by the twenty-three local Parliaments of the Confederacy, to cover the wants of the central exchequer, would be a rather slow, and, from the lessening elasticity of the revenue, not over-safe procedure. It is doubtful whether all the minor Parliaments would evince the same readiness to assist the common concern with a good grace; or whether they would not vent their anger by louder and more indignant debates than would be agreeable to ears polite. It would, moreover, not be quite fair to burden the minor States, some of which are poor, with a new contribution, raised according to the number of inhabitants. Ten thousand people in Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt have not, on an average, the same riches at command as the like number in Berlin.

In view of these difficulties the Federal Government have availed themselves of an alternative allowed them by a recent law supplementing the Charter, and have applied to the Federal Parliament for a common Federal tax. The first step in this direction was taken last year, when the Customs Parliament were invited to impose a tax upon petroleum. The suggestion was, however, not acted upon, the Customs Parliament giving it as their opinion that an assembly convened for mere financial purposes, and deprived of all influence over the politics of the Government, must not put fresh money into Ministers' pockets, except in cases of extreme need. Repulsed in this quarter, the Government have now turned to the Federal Parliament, which being the only existing representative assembly for political purposes, is undoubtedly

concerned in supplying the ways and means, and choosing the most practicable and effective method for this end. The Federal Parliament cannot but acknowledge that the military expenditure, for which fresh sums are accidentally wanted, has been sanctioned by the Federal Charter, and is, moreover, rendered indispensable by the political situation of the Continent. By that Charter, by their own previous vote, and a most necessary regard for the safety of the country, the Federal Parliament are alike obliged to find means to make up the unexpected inadequacy of the supplies. If, notwithstanding this threefold claim on their liberality, the Federal Parliament hesitate to acquit themselves of this manifest obligation, their reasons can neither be few nor light. And they do hesitate.

The primary objection of the Liberal members is constitutional in its nature. In Prussia, by virtue of the Prussian Charter, existing taxes can be taken off only with the consent of the Government. Voted once for all, they remain in force, no matter whether yielding little or much, and can be abolished only by special law. If below the estimate, fresh taxes have to be laid on; if exceeding the estimate, a portion of the surplus is reserved for next year's expenditure, another portion being applied to carry out improvements in the Government railways, mines, and domains, thus adding to the enormous value of these properties, and rendering the Government less dependent on parliamentary grants. Till 1866 this peculiar mode of apportioning the public moneys has been steadily adhered to; since then the Government coffers have scarcely been sufficiently well filled for the Finance Minister to indulge in the practice. The Liberals have always regarded this time-honoured procedure as involving an illegitimate curtailment of the financial prerogative of the Parliament, and have insisted upon the concession of the right to vote the taxes, or a portion of them, from year to year. Having been unable to make any impression on

the Crown in this respect, their representatives in the Federal Parliament are now all the less inclined to assist in extending the objectionable principle to the virgin field of Federal affairs.

No less than this is intended in the bills introduced. Had the Government, in coming to the Federal Assembly for a fresh supply, offered to accord to it, and to the Prussian Parliament likewise, the privilege of annual supplies, the chances of the application being favourably entertained would be far greater than they are. Nor has the refusal of the Government to place the Federal administration in the hands of a regular Cabinet, instead of the present practice, which leaves the Chancellor the only responsible officer of the Bund, contributed to pave the way for a Federal impost.

To these reasons urged by the Liberal party are added others common to Liberals and Conservatives. Both assert that the existing taxes are quite high enough to be borne conveniently. Nay, as the yield of them has of late begun to fall off, many pretend to regard this as a proof that they are too high. It is a difficult and most complicated question to decide where over-taxation begins, and I will not plunge into an argument which could only be profitably discussed at considerable length. One fact, however, must be plain to the impartial looker-on. The Germans, and more particularly the Prussian species of them, are economical people, and have been so leniently taxed for many years, that they are even more painfully sensitive than other folks in regard to public calls on their portemonnaie.

Inclusive of all the taxes imposed during the last ten years of extraordinary demands, a man with an income exceeding 150*l.* derived from an agricultural, commercial, or industrial pursuit, is assumed to pay at present from 5 to 10 per cent to the State direct. Incomes below this figure are even less severely taxed; incomes derived from

capital or from the learned professions likewise. The municipal taxes, for the maintenance of the poor, the schools, &c., are also not very heavy, excepting in the larger towns, in some of which, especially in Berlin, they have risen to an enormous height. Can it be really said that this is too heavy to be borne by an industrious and, notwithstanding recent stagnations, upon the whole, prosperous country? Is it, more particularly, too much at a time of national revival, when the people are overcoming the sad effects of prolonged disunion, and shaking themselves free from the control of a whole army of strong, jealous, and angry neighbours?

But whatever may be said on this side of the question, the prospect of new taxes has produced a good deal of grumbling, particularly among the Conservatives, ordinarily the stanch adherents of the Government. Yet the necessity of procuring the sinews of war is obvious. All classes must be equally aware of the fact, though none are willing to come up to the scratch. Each is endeavouring to shift the burden. In this general scramble to evade the dread contingency, the Federal Government seem to think it a delicate task to choose the exact taxes to be laid on at this juncture. Deviating from the ordinary routine, they have determined to leave the responsibility of discovering a new practicable impost to the representatives of the people, and have given the Federal Parliament the choice of seven different modes of bleeding their constituents. A bill raising the excise on ardent spirits has been introduced; other bills taxing gas, petroleum, beer, bills of exchange, shares, and stocks have been announced and will follow shortly. From this delightful variety the Federal Parliament are to take their choice. When the announcement was made, a prolonged ebullition, not exactly of applause, echoed in the House.

However, there is such a thing as dire necessity. As the army must be kept up, *coûte qui coûte*, one cannot but

presume that some compromise will be ultimately hit upon and agreed to by all parties. Should this desirable result fail to ensue, the Federal Government will hold the State Governments responsible for the sums required, when the State Parliaments will be obliged to find the money they have, under the Federal Constitution, engaged to supply. Being bound by their own promises, they will not be in a position to make their grants dependent upon the extension of their constitutional prerogative.

May 12.

To give the Government an earnest of their intention to assist it in its pecuniary embarrassments, provided a counter-concession be made, the Federal Parliament, or, more properly, the Liberals in it, have determined to vote one of the seven new taxes demanded. The one singled out is new only to a small portion of the Confederacy, Prussia and some other States having been already subjected to a similar, though somewhat more lenient, impost in the same line. In the case of these latter it is a slight increase of the stamp-duty on bills of exchange, a mere *bagatelle* to the commercial community; in the case of the petty States as yet exempt from this species of public assessment, it is the imposition of a new and not very sensible tax levied by all European Powers. Together with the abolition of the right conceded to the authorities and numerous personages of semi-official character to have their letters forwarded gratis, it will yield from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 thalers. There are, then, only 4,000,000 thalers more to be covered for a year or two to come. It stands to reason that to a concern of the size and wealth of the North German Confederacy so trifling an amount is a mere flea-bite, and that but for considerations totally apart from the pecuniary administration of the State there would be no difficulty in raising this paltry sum in a variety of ways.

If we look a little closer into the constitutional history of the country, we can easily discover that the contest about prerogative, never entirely allayed, and latterly revived with fresh vigour, is at the bottom of the whole. The Liberals are intent upon availing themselves of the financial needs of the Government to press their old demand of having the right conceded to them of voting the taxes annually; the Government, on the other hand, which, with the taxes voted once for all, as long as the expenditure does not exceed the revenue, is virtually independent of Parliament, endeavours to get out of the mess without having to surrender the old safeguard of the ministerial position. As yet, neither party is likely to yield; and it is probable that all the other taxes proposed by the Federal authorities will be rejected, and, in consequence, an appeal have to be made by the State Governments to the State Parliaments. The latter being constitutionally obliged to furnish the sinews of war during the period the present military budget holds good—*i. e.* till December 31, 1871—they will have to come down handsomely, even though the desired counter-concession be withheld.

Still, as the debates likely to occur on this occasion may pave the way to a more serious and effective campaign a little later, when the military estimates will have to be settled afresh, it is evidently in the interest of the Government to try and bring about some compromise even now. This prospective constitutional importance of the affair invests a deficit of 700,000*l.* with a dignity which, in a country whose Government possesses domains, mines, and railways worth far more than 100,000,000*l.*, it would not otherwise possess. If the financial traditions of the Government were not so strictly economical as to prevent it from touching its working capital, the sale of a very insignificant portion of its enormous property would render it unnecessary for it to appeal to Parliament at all.

TEMPERATE POLITICS OF THE UNITY PARTY.

Berlin, May 22, 1869.

NOTWITHSTANDING the small encouragement given to the Southern Liberals by this Government the last two years, and the furious accusations launched against them by the united Republicans and Ultramontanes, the unity party have very nearly secured a majority in the Bavarian Chambers. At Munich, however, as at Berlin, the unity party must not be understood as desiring an immediate fulfilment of their wishes. While strenuously preparing the ground for the eventual consummation of the popular yearnings, they are on either side of the Main too cautious and easy-going to hurry it on at the risk of a foreign war. For the present, the prevalence of the unity party in any German Parliament means little more than that nothing will be done to undo the grand results of 1866. Neither the jealousy of foreign Powers nor the dilatoriness of the Federal Governments in carrying out certain internal reforms seems to be able to accelerate or retard the movement. It is to be hoped that the prudence with which the one national object is being followed up by the legislative assemblies of Germany will be rewarded by ultimate and well-deserved success.

THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA ON THE PROSPECTS OF HIS POLISH SUBJECTS.

Berlin, May 25, 1869.

THE day before the close of the Vienna Parliament the members had the honour of attending a *soirée* at the Hofburg. On this occasion the Emperor conversed freely with many of the gentlemen present. Addressing, among

others, M. Grocholski, a Pole from Galicia, he hoped that his more immediate countrymen were satisfied with the results of the session as regarded their province. In reply, M. Grocholski regretted that the resolutions of the Galician local Parliament, demanding a sort of Hungarian independence for their province, had not been indorsed, nay, not even discussed, by the Vienna Representative Assembly. To this the Emperor answered, that as the political situation of the moment did not admit of the Galician petition being acceded to, it was perhaps as well that it should not be made the subject of a parliamentary debate. 'Let us hope,' he added, 'that circumstances will have changed by next year, when you are likely to have a better chance.'

This remarkable utterance has created some excitement on 'Change. Berlin merchants are certainly in this present epoch inclined to scrutinise current events a little too nicely; and, imitating the example set them by a famous tactician elsewhere, discover a 'galaxy of dark spots,' as the Irishman said, where the more initiated eye perceives only a clear horizon, with just the ordinary amount of dust and terrestrial exhalations in it. In the present instance, however, it is not unnaturally alleged by the gossips of the counting-house, that for Austria to concede independence to Galicia would be to court collision with her neighbour of Muscovy, whose policy for the last few years has been to crush the Poles into nonentity—at least, as many as he happens to number among his subjects. Such a risk, it is concluded, will be run only for some more ambitious aim than the restoration of Poland, which, in this selfish world of ours, will be scarcely ever attempted by a foreign monarch or people, unless as a stepping-stone to something else.

These reasonings are not very generally shared by those in a position to form a more judicious estimate of the intentions that can be prudently entertained by the great ones of the earth. But, unfortunately, it is not diplomatists, leaders of political parties, and members of Par-

liament on whose industrial activity and confidence in the preservation of peace the yield of the revenue depends. It is the manufacturers, the shopkeepers, and the generality of the working and newspaper-reading classes, whose fears must be set at rest, if they are to carry on business with their accustomed zeal, and enable the State to pay its way. The above incident is not particularly calculated to please this sensitive section of the community. On the contrary, it is one the effect of which would have been felt at any time, and is doubly noticed at a moment when rather disagreeable debates on the deficit occupy the Prussian Parliament and people. But if a Vienna speech affects the amount of the Berlin revenue, Berlin politicians can scarcely afford to look upon it with indifference, however much they might themselves be inclined to attribute friendly and pacific motives to neighbouring sovereigns, and, above all, to his Apostolic Majesty.

JOURNALISTIC INCENDIARIES.

Berlin, June 2, 1869.

It has not escaped observation at Berlin that the French semi-official papers, on the eve of the elections so reserved upon the subject of Germany, have only waited for the result to be announced to begin a new and peculiarly venomous campaign against this Government. The inventions they circulate on the state of the new provinces, the condition of the public cashbox, the health of the King, and a good many other subjects, are truly prodigious. By long experience our politicians have become too familiar with the peculiarities of the Napoleonic *régime* to infer from this change in the journalistic horizon that the Emperor means to take up foreign politics, now that his domestic successes are no longer so signal as they were.

Still, they cannot help being put out by the want of regard shown them and their country in these uncalled-for attacks. Though the Emperor is probably too wise not to be pacific, what other object can he have in suffering those semi-official revilings than to cause his people to fancy themselves offended by a neighbouring Power, and thus divert their attention from internal to external affairs? It may be a useful stratagem to employ, although one would imagine a rather stale one, having been used for three years running; but the worst is, that the industrial classes in Germany, not seeing through the Paris devices, are disquieted by these constantly-recurring taunts, and in consequence are no longer doing the business and paying the taxes they did. For this sober financial reason the statesmen of this country, however confident as to the preservation of peace, are beginning to be angered. Injured in their nearest and dearest interests, by certain parties incessantly conjuring up the unsubstantial phantom of war, the day may arrive when they will find it necessary to retort. I have said this in my last, and from what I see around me am led to think that it cannot be too often repeated.

Here it may not be irrelevant to remark, *en passant*, that in Alsace, where there are a good many Protestants, scarcely an officer of this persuasion has been appointed in the National Guard. Their exclusion is owing to a remonstrance of the Strasburg civil and military authorities, who imagine they have discovered Prussian propensities in the Lutherans among their German subjects,

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THE EGYPTIAN BROTHERS.

Berlin, June 9, 1869.

Ismael Pasha of Egypt, with his son and heir, has arrived at this capital, and been received with vice-regal—

not regal—honours. At the station there were awaiting him the Commandant and the Governor of Berlin, together with some adjutants and military and civil officers of the King's suite. Outside the station an infantry detachment presented arms, striking up some national air as he drove past. At the old palace, where he was invited to take up his quarters, the Crown Prince saluted him in the name of his Royal father, not himself present at this first interview. You have probably noticed that the same polite, though somewhat reserved, ceremonial was also adopted by the Vienna royalties towards the illustrious traveller. For this strict and, perhaps, overscrupulous regard paid to his exact rank, the successor of the Pharaohs has to thank the Turkish Government, who are exceedingly jealous lest their powerful vassal should on his journey be courteously mistaken for an independent sovereign.

The way chosen to intimate the Sultan's feelings on this matter to the continental Courts savours somewhat of the *ancien régime*. As the morning star is the harbinger of day, the Viceroy's arrival in each European capital is preceded by that of his younger brother and disinherited heir, Mustapha Fazyl Pasha. Since his disappointment, through a change in the law of succession, the time of this remarkable Prince has been divided between attempts to curry favour with the Sultan and to run counter to his brother, who, he conceives, has deprived him of his reversionary rights. Adroitly profiting by these antagonistic relations between the two brothers, the Turkish Government have now chosen the younger to direct the attention of the continental Courts to the exact position of the elder. Though not charged with a direct commission, you may easily imagine Mustapha has found means to communicate his message. He came to Vienna shortly before the arrival of the Viceroy; stayed in that city while the latter was there, without once seeing him, and started for

Berlin a day in advance. Here he remained only twenty-four hours, leaving the most westerly station of this capital twelve hours before his brother alighted on the platform of the most easterly terminus. Thus a naively undisguised piece of Orientalism is played off in the sight of our rigorously urbane northern Courts.

Notwithstanding his figuring in this truly Arabian family drama, the Viceroy is visiting this quarter of the globe for a very sensible and highly European purpose. His Highness is sufficiently familiar with modern international law to be acquainted with the neutrality chapter, and to wish to secure for the Suez Canal the advantages exemption from war confers. He has come to Europe chiefly to interest the Powers in an arrangement which, in the event of international collision, is to keep open the canal for merchant ships, but close it to men-of-war. This petition is too obviously fair not to recommend itself at least to some of the parties addressed. Unless neutralised, the canal, owing to its political importance, will become a bone of contention in any conflict extending to the Mediterranean. In such a case, Egypt, instead of profiting by the new thoroughfare, as was hoped, might be converted into a battlefield or a place of encampment, to be alternately occupied by the belligerents. In attempting to benefit the world, Egypt would thus have permanently injured herself. It also seems but right that an artificial strait, equally open to all flags, uncommonly easy of attack from the land, and which by many ships can be reached only after a long voyage, possibly begun in a time of peace, should be protected from the perils incidental to war. Acknowledging the cogency of this reasoning, the Austrian Government is said to have given a favourable, though qualified, reply to the proposals of the Egyptian potentate. Austria does not like to be the first to decide. Prussia is sure to approve, if England does, as is confidently expected. Italy is the same way in-

clined. France and Russia, however, do not seem to see the thing in an analogous light. France, who took such an interest in the sale of the canal-shares, and herself invested largely in the venture, is asserted to have given indications of a tendency to derive some special advantage from her speculation. On second thoughts, this plan will, I daresay, be given up at Paris. A more inveterate opposition is likely to proceed from Russia. Looking upon the East as plastic material, to be remodelled at a fitting moment, Russia does not countenance a measure which would make a portion of the *corpus vile* inviolate. As to the Porte, it does not object to the Viceroy's errand; but should any international agreement be come to, is likely to insist upon its being concluded, not with Egypt, but with herself, the suzerain of that country.

Besides this principal object, Ismael Pasha has another in view in making this diplomatic circuit. He is desirous of abolishing, so far as his dominions are concerned, that ancient privilege of the European States, which exempts their subjects from the jurisdiction of the native authorities in Turkey and her dependencies. I do not think that the German Courts will accede to this request while justice in those parts is being administered by Orientals and in accordance with Oriental laws.

In one of my last Letters I had occasion to remark that the virulent attacks once more launched against this Government by the semi-official papers of France have a visible tendency to unsettle trade. To-day I have the melancholy satisfaction of confirming my statement by the news that, at the wool-markets now being held in the eastern provinces of Prussia—markets of world-wide fame—prices show a considerable reduction compared with those of last year. The finest sort is from five to twelve thalers cheaper; middling, from fifteen to twenty; common, if sold at all, is reduced even lower in proportion. Sheep-breeding being one of the principal agricul-

tural pursuits of this country, this is a blow inflicted upon the whole class of large proprietors, who, from their influential position in the Chambers, may be tempted to make their feelings react on politics. For the present the Government, instead of resenting the peculiar attitude assumed by a professedly friendly Court, is intent upon returning good for evil. In the ministerial press of Prussia the result of the French elections has been actually represented as another victory gained by Napoleon III. A more generous and pacific bearing it would be difficult to conceive.

COUNT BEUST AND PRUSSIA.

Berlin, August 4, 1869.

CARRYING out in his own peculiar way his alleged wish of obliging this Government, Count Beust has issued a Blue-book teeming with sympathy towards France, and accusations open or implied against Prussia. To correctly appreciate the documents therein contained, we should have to review the entire international events of the last nine months; a laborious, and in these sterile times, when so many questions are mooted and so few solved, a thankless task. Fortunately no such comprehensive retrospect is needed to realise the spirit and ascertain the method of the policy portrayed in this interesting volume. If, among the many and heterogeneous despatches divulged, we should happen to discover one or two so important as necessarily to reflect the leanings and predominant tendencies of the Austrian Premier, we may as well dispense with a closer scrutiny of the rest. Whether any such characteristic documents have been vouchsafed to us by their communicative writer, the reader will be able to decide from the following extracts and remarks. By

way of preface I have only to observe, that as, in the present state of the Continent, the Austro-Prussian relations cannot be judged without reference to the Austro-French, I shall be obliged to include the latter in my survey.

On the 7th of May, when the Franco-Belgian railway controversy was still undecided, Count Beust addressed a despatch to Count Wimpfen, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, instructing him to tell Baron Nothomb, the Belgian Minister in the same city, what he thought the Brussels Government had better do to remove the pending difficulty. This circuitous way of advising a foreign Government was at variance with the existing usages of diplomacy. If Count Beust meant to advise the Belgian Government, he ought, in accordance with ordinary rules, either to have spoken to the Belgian representative at Vienna, or through his own Chargé d'Affaires at Brussels to have addressed himself to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs direct. The selecting another and unusual mode of communication indicates a special motive. And, indeed, the nature of the advice given sufficiently explains why none of the ordinary and more responsible forms of conveying it were adopted. In his despatch Count Beust counselled the Belgian Cabinet to allow a portion of their railways to become French property; and did not even think it prejudicial to their independence, should they agree upon a common tariff and excise with France.

I do not pause to inquire whether a neutral State situated between two great military powers could with safety hand over to one of them the control of some of its most important lines. But how about the proposed financial alliance? It is well known that, on some such arrangement being attempted by France years ago, the late King Leopold declined entertaining the idea for a moment. This judicious monarch deemed it a matter about which there could be no dispute, that a small State, if it adopt the same tariff with a much larger State, and

if its manufactures have once been remodelled to suit the needs of its huge customer and ally, dare not deny any political concessions demanded by the latter, as refusal would possibly entail stopping the commercial intercourse. How right he was, we had an opportunity of seeing three years ago. On the morrow after a civil war, the South German Parliaments consented to place their armies under the victor's command, mainly because it was the only means of perpetuating the Customs Union, the sudden dissolution of which would have ruined their respective countries. Is it to be assumed that a statesman of Count Beust's intelligence should have failed to realise the plain axiom laid down by King Leopold, or to remember its notorious exemplification at a crisis in which he himself was so prominently concerned? Supposing such a surmise to be misplaced, we are driven to conclude from the advice tendered by him that he wished to oblige France, even at the risk of rousing the opposition of some other Powers.

However, matters did not get to this pass. Notwithstanding the assistance rendered her by the Austrian Premier, France did not prevail over Belgium. As things fell out, the French Cabinet had to content themselves with exacting a few technical concessions relative to the working of the through trains from Paris to Holland and Luxemburg. Under these circumstances the Austrian Premier naturally had no desire to press his counsel on the small but courageous State, which had come off victorious from the diplomatic *mêlée*. On the contrary, he now thought it expedient to turn off into a different path from the one first trodden. In the before-mentioned despatch of May 7, in which he admonished Belgium to yield, he had written:

'Going even farther than this, I cannot but add, that a close union between France and Belgium in all that concerns the financial and material interests of the two countries does not appear to me in the least to

be fraught with danger to the maintenance of Belgian independence. To prove this I refer to the striking example supplied by the German Customs Union, as it existed from 1834 to 1866.'

Here, then, we have, in so many words, a Customs Union recommended between France and Belgium; we have it recommended as perfectly safe on the strength of the German example, although it is evident that if the Zollverein did not lead to a political reunion of the minor States with Prussia, this was wholly owing to the resistance of the then unvanquished Austria. Yet in a subsequent despatch, dated July 8—*i.e.* at a time when France had relinquished her Belgian aspirations—we find Count Beust thus expressing himself on the same subject:

'Unless the judgment of an individual be strangely warped, he cannot pretend to believe that I have brought forward the example of the German Customs Union for the purpose of recommending to Belgium—whose relations to France are so opposite to those between Prussia and the German States—the conclusion of a Customs Union with France.'

It would seem that the spirit of friendship pervading Count Beust's policy towards France needs no fuller proof than this. His method, too, of displaying it is pretty clear.

In strong contrast appears the policy of Count Beust towards Prussia. Had a Customs Union been concluded between France and Belgium, and thus the way paved to the absorption of the one by the other, the sensations of the Prussian Government would have been far from agreeable. France, whose semi-official papers have in the last three years scarcely passed a day without menacing war to this country, would by such a union have obtained virtual control over the material resources of 5,000,000 of the richest people on the Continent. She would have extended her military position to the middle portion of the Rhine, made Cologne almost her certain prey, and nearly doubled the distance between the German frontier and Paris. Would Prussia have quietly endured such ag-

grandisement of a Power which, three years ago, asked for Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and a portion of the Bavarian Palatinate? which only two years ago claimed Luxemburg, and is still keeping the world in suspense by the ambiguous oratory and decrees of its principal military and political chiefs? It is, indeed, possible Prussia would not have stirred; but the opposite conduct was at any rate on the cards, and then we should all have been in hot water. From all which you may draw your own inferences as to the impression produced here by the Belgian policy of the Austrian Premier.

"Not content with endeavouring to bring on so serious an entanglement, Count Beust, when retreat became necessary, managed to effect it in a way studiously offensive to this Government. The second of the beforementioned despatches, that of July 8th, was not written like the first, for communication to a Belgian diplomatist or the Belgian Government. It went to the Austrian Minister at Dresden, because, as we learn from the text, 'an attempt seemed to have been made to influence to our prejudice the judgment of the Saxon Government respecting our behaviour (in the Belgian affair).' Count Beust, in language already quoted, then proceeds to explain that he never thought of advocating a Customs Union between France and Belgium, and concludes as follows :

'It would be even a more gross mistake to assume that we ever meant to sacrifice the independence and neutrality of Belgium. We do not know whether those questions of compensation which would be the inevitable consequence of an absorption of Belgium by France will be ever mooted; but we shall certainly never have the audacity to bring on combinations fraught with extreme danger to the interests of our monarchy and to the preservation of peace in Europe.'

After what has been said, we need not raise the question whether the statements contained in the latter part of the last sentence fully agree with the rather incautious

proceedings of the Count. But it deserves to be noted that, even when desisting from an enterprise disagreeable and dangerous to this Government, Count Beust did not effect his retrograde movement without firing a last shot at the Power he still chooses to consider as his adversary. In the present position of continental affairs, it naturally suggests itself that Prussia will be the Power to ask for 'compensation,' if France absorb Belgium. And of such 'compensations' Count Beust allows himself to speak to the Saxon Government, the Government of a State which, after the war of three years ago, was on the point of being annexed by Prussia, but has since had its independence guaranteed by her in consequence of the formation of the new Confederacy. Has Prussia deserved such innuendoes of harbouring sinister designs against her present allies? In the last sitting of the Federal Parliament she has, through the mouth of Count Bismarck, defended the independence of the minor States against the rash aspirations of the unity party. By her reserve in the same unity question she has actually forced the Bavarian and Baden Governments to alter their programme, and postpone a nearer connection between North and South to an indefinite time. Taking a wider view, it must be admitted that whenever, during the last three years, clouds were obscuring the political horizon, she has done all in her power to prevent the conflict she must have courted were she bent upon conquest. She has abstained from all interference with the Belgian affair, taking care not to utter a word on this delicate topic, lest she might irritate either party and aggravate matters. In the interest of peace she has evacuated Luxemburg, one of the most important border defences of Germany; deserted Russia at the Cretan Conferences, at the risk of being herself deserted in turn; and generally borne with the most uniform equanimity the provocations offered her by the Vienna and Paris semi-official press, the Vienna

Blue-books, and the pointed speeches of the Vienna, Paris, and Copenhagen Ministers of War.

But Prussia has, perhaps, irritated Count Beust by representing to Saxony, or some other State, his intervention in the Belgian affair as 'a service rendered to France in accordance with preconcerted arrangement'? To judge from Count Beust's obscure yet unmistakable language in the second of the above despatches, such an assumption was his motive for addressing Saxony on a theme otherwise beyond the sphere of a minor State. We have the authority of the Saxon Government itself for asserting he was entirely mistaken in his surmise. No sooner was the Austrian despatch in question divulged in the Blue-book than Herr von Friesen, the Saxon Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote and published a despatch (dated July 18), in which he contradicted the idea of his opinion on the subject having been biassed by any one. Without denying that Count Beust's busy interference has been disapproved by him, Herr von Friesen says that he has taken his estimate of the matter solely from the acts of Count Beust, and not from the whisperings of other men or Cabinets. To this cutting remonstrance, administered by the leading minister of a State he would have liked to protect from imaginary Prussian aggression, Count Beust has replied in a new despatch, dated July 29. His defence is, that in the despatch of July 8 he had not spoken of anybody 'influencing' the Saxon Government, but only of somebody causing it to entertain 'erroneous impressions.' Even were it correct, this reply would be feeble; but it is incorrect, the word 'influence' (*einfluss*) actually occurring in the despatch of July 8. His animosity against this Government must be great, if to justify it he does not hesitate to have recourse to such a style of defence as this.

To enable the reader to pass judgment, two more facts must be laid before him. While commenting upon his

Blue-book in the assembly of the Hungarian delegates, Count Beust observed that he was on very good terms with France, but that Prussia had not thus far met his overtures in an amicable spirit. It is difficult to see in what wise Prussia can have been made cognisant of these alleged overtures. For the last fourteen months the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin has neither asked for, nor, consequently, had a single interview with Count Bismarck.

PRUSSIAN ANSWER TO COUNT BEUST.

Berlin, August 7, 1869.

COUNT BEUST'S three Blue-books failed to induce this Government to divulge a single despatch in reply to the numerous accusations therein preferred. But what all his censorious volumes failed to do, one despatch, supplementing the latest issue of his diplomatic performances, has effected. It has worn out the patience of this Government, and they have answered him. Now that the reply has come at last, it is pretty plainly expressive of the feelings with which the action of the Count has been observed by the Berlin Cabinet during the last three years. It treats him with the blunt candour Cabinets are in the habit of using only towards avowed adversaries, and is couched in language clearly indicating that his unceasing opposition has been noticed, but that the futility of his attempts has likewise not escaped observation. The publication of a document of this painful character by the Prussian Cabinet—one of the most reserved and taciturn in Europe—is such an uncommon thing, that, now the ice is once broken, we must be prepared for farther manifestations in the same tone, should Count Beust deem it expedient to continue this war of quills.

The Prussian despatch was provoked by a communi-

cation which the Austrian Chancellor instructed his representative at this capital to read and deliver here on the 10th ult. Not content with the attacks made upon this Government in the Blue-book, the combative Chancellor, in this last effusion, endeavoured to pick a new quarrel. The complaints he preferred were as strange as the wisdom which makes him so litigious is questionable. His grievance was, that the Prussian Cabinet had imparted to some other Court a despatch received from Prince Gortschakoff, and that the same Cabinet had also informed a third Court of what it thought of the Austrian intercession in the Franco-Belgian affair. 'Although not expressly stated,' it is easy to understand that, according to the surmise of Count Beust, both that Russian despatch and that Prussian expression of opinion were not favourable to him. Whether his various suppositions were correct or not, will be seen from what follows: but, even granting them to be so, it is very doubtful whether on that account he would have been entitled to lay a charge against the Prussian Government.

If Prussia really made an improper use of a despatch of Prince Gortschakoff, it is not Count Beust that has a right to complain. Again, if Prussia has expressed an opinion of the Belgian doings of Count Beust, any Government might have done the same, without overstepping the limits of ordinary diplomatic intercourse. It is, therefore, not very intelligible what reason Count Beust can have had to make a protest against these presumed proceedings of this Government. His sensitiveness, in every way unjustifiable, is especially uncalled for with respect to the second complaint alleged. From recent events there can be little doubt that the utterance on his Belgian dealings, if made at all, was addressed by this Government to Saxony. But Saxony is a member of the North German Confederacy, has handed over to Prussia her right of making war, and therefore is to the latter

not a foreign and independent State; on the contrary, she is an ally, and in some sort a subordinate, of Prussia. How Count Beust could have undertaken to criticise an exchange of opinion between two members of the same Confederacy, standing in this relation to each other, is more than can be explained by the ordinary rules of international law.

For farther details I refer the reader to the text of the Prussian rejoinder, conveyed in a despatch addressed to Herr von Werther, the Prussian Ambassador at Vienna, and signed, in the absence of Count Bismarck, by Under-Secretary von Thile. It is as follows:

Berlin, July 18.

'From your Excellency's confidential communication of the 6th inst. I see that Count Beust has heard and told you that we have given indication of regarding one of his despatches on the Franco-Belgian railway affair in the light of an unfriendly proceeding towards Prussia. Considering the absolute reserve his Majesty's Government observed and enjoined upon its representatives abroad touching this affair—a reserve which has been warmly acknowledged in more than one quarter—I could not but be surprised by the Chancellor's remark to you. Your Excellency at once told Count Beust that you were ignorant of our expressing a complaint of the kind attributed to us; and, in confirmation of your words, I can only add, that the information alluded to by Count Beust seems to have arisen from a misunderstanding. We have had no occasion to give an opinion on that Austrian despatch, which, though much commented upon in the public press, was not transmitted to us by the Imperial Government.

Reverting to the same subject, Baron Münch Bellinghausen, on the 11th instant, read to me a despatch of Count Beust's, calling my attention to the alleged fact of this Government having in two separate instances communicated despatches from other Governments to third parties. This, Count Beust asserts, is at variance with diplomatic usage. The first instance, he says, refers to a certain despatch of Prince Gortschakoff's; the second to the Austrian despatch of May 1, on the Franco-Belgian railway negotiations.

This communication of Baron Münch, and my reply to it, I have made the theme of a memorandum, a copy of which I enclose. To what is therein stated I will append a few remarks.

The Imperial Cabinet may rest assured that we, for our part, should never undertake to criticise any use it might make of despatches, except

such as were addressed to it by ourselves. As regards the use made of communications received by the Imperial Government from third parties, we should never take the liberty of conveying an opinion upon such a subject. Neither can we allow Count Beust to offer official remarks on what treatment communications from third parties receive at our hands. We are at a loss to divine what could have induced the Chancellor to come forward in this matter, pleading in behalf of Prince Gortschakoff, as that Prince is not ordinarily in the habit of making us confidential notifications by way of Vienna. We therefore see no reason to answer the Austrian remarks on this head.

With reference to the Austrian despatch of May 1, the Chancellor will be pleased to remember that he has not caused it to be communicated to us orally or in writing. Hence we were not in a position to commit a breach of confidence with regard to it. We have always acknowledged the absolute duty of making a discreet use of the communications of other Governments, and surely were not likely to violate this principle in a case where none had been vouchsafed. Whether the versions of the contents of that despatch which reached us from other quarters were accurate, we have till now been unable to ascertain. Concerning the way we turned those versions to account, we are responsible to those only from whom we received them.

Circumstances seem to force on us the supposition that the criticisms of the Chancellor refer to a communication he presumes us to have made to Baron von Friesen, his Saxon Majesty's Minister. Were this so, it would be incumbent upon us to declare that we deny, on national and political grounds, his right to offer any criticisms of the kind preferred. Our communications to German Governments are necessarily exempt from the control of foreign Cabinets. This remark refers to our intercourse with all German Governments, and more especially with the Dresden and the other North German Governments, there existing a perfect solidarity between the North German Federal diplomacy.

I request your Excellency to speak to the Chancellor in this spirit, and, if you think proper, to read to him this despatch and the enclosure; but not to leave him a copy.

I am, &c.'

Herr von Thile, then, denies the right of Count Beust so much as to touch upon the subjects he has made a ground of remonstrance, and, in consequence, declines any more direct answer.

It will scarcely contribute to comfort Count Beust that in Saxony—his own home, and the very country

where he endeavoured for so many years to instil hatred of Prussia—the new elections have given the Unity party a majority in the local Parliament.

THE PRAGUE TREATY VARIOUSLY INTERPRETED.

Berlin, August 15, 1869.

More accusations, more refutations! Not being able to keep his temper, Count Beust has renewed his attack, and now charges this Government with an offence which, were it true, would justly expose them to the retributive vengeance of Austria and her allies. His complaint is no less a one than that Prussia has violated the Prague Treaty of Peace. That treaty established the present state of things in Germany, expelled Austria from the ancient Confederacy, and made Prussia paramount in the new. It converted a nation paralysed by internal divisions into a living power, strong alike in its military armaments and the pacific tendencies of its policy. It erected an iron wall of a million bayonets in the centre of Europe, so long a tempting prize and the open battlefield of its neighbours. From the geographical position of Germany, and the moral and material resources of her people, this treaty, while it lasts, is the pivot on which the continental system turns; were it abolished, we should be hurled back into the former chaos of Austro-Prussian rivalry, aggravated by the desire of France and other Powers to fish in troubled waters. And a compact of such immense consequence Count Beust allows himself to declare as having been infringed! More than this, he allows himself the use of alarming language without an adequate motive, or, indeed, any immediate intention of acting upon his words. Were he determined to go to war with this Government in a week, to invade his own German

Fatherland, and plunge Europe into a sea of blood, his denunciations might not even then be justifiable, but would be intelligible; as it is, he has no hope of carrying out his designs, if he really entertain any, except in an indefinite future. If he menaces notwithstanding, we are driven to the conclusion that he simply cannot withstand the temptation of saying his worst against Prussia.

It is to be regretted that, on assuming the supreme direction of Austrian affairs, Count Beust should not have been able to rid himself of the recollection of old German rivalries; but worse than his incessant expostulations, be they unmeaning or pregnant with meaning, is the doubt they are beginning to engender at this capital, as to the possibility of living on an amicable footing with the Power he represents. The story of his last and most serious attack is told in the following Prussian despatch indited a fortnight ago, and published yesterday:

To his Excellency Baron von Werther, his Prussian Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, &c.

'*Foreign Office, Berlin, August* 4.

'In the papers of various European countries reports have appeared of the communications made on the 23d ult. by the Chancellor of the Austrian Empire to the Budget Committee of the Cisleithan Delegation, as also of those made by the same Minister, of the 26th ult., to the section for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegation. Those reports, more or less explicit, agree in this, that they represent the Chancellor to have spoken on the attitude assumed by this Government towards Austria and Southern Germany. As appears from your Excellency's report of the 27th ult., the Chancellor, in a confidential interview, has expressed to you his regret that the delegates should have resolved upon not publishing his communications, the consequence of which was sure to be that they would reach the public in a fragmentary and mutilated form. Although unacquainted with the forms regulating the dispatch of business in the Delegations, and the origin of the resolve in question, we cannot but deem it strange that official utterances about a foreign Government, having for their purpose to inform the deputies and influence public opinion, should have been divulged in a form which led the Chancellor himself to expect a misrepresentation of his words.

Concerning the one topic alluded to by the Chancellor on those occa-

sions—our relations to Southern Germany—we may regard the reports in the papers as accurate, the Chancellor having in his conversations with your Excellency himself confirmed and given his reasons for the words attributed to him. I refer to the Chancellor's statement that in the Delegations he described the Austro-Prussian relations to be unsatisfactory, because we from the very first had infringed (*alterirt*) the Prague Treaty of Peace so far as it affected Austria, by the conclusion of offensive and defensive treaties with the South German States. He added, we had ourselves not disputed at the time, but, on the contrary, all but tacitly admitted, that the treaties in question amounted to an alteration of the Prague Treaty of Peace.

I request your Excellency to direct the Chancellor's attention to the fact that we have hitherto had no occasion to notice his peculiar mode of viewing this matter. The Prague Treaty of Peace contains absolutely nothing which could be used as a pretext for denying to us, or to the sovereign States of Southern Germany, the right to enter upon any compact agreeable to both parties. On the contrary, at the close of the fourth paragraph the Prague Treaty of Peace addresses an express invitation to us and to the States of Southern Germany, to make the establishment of a national connection between Northern Germany and the Southern States the object of a special agreement. Neither for us, nor for the States of Southern Germany, has the Prague Treaty of Peace impaired the sovereign right properly belonging to us of concluding any treaties with each other. Full liberty of action being left us by the plain text of the instrument of peace, we have till now had no occasion expressly to declare as unfounded the Chancellor's statement that the treaties in question are at variance with the treaty of peace. But when Count Beust does not scruple to repeat that statement to your Excellency, it becomes necessary to give an official form to our refutation of it.

According to the papers, the Chancellor in the Delegations adduced yet another reason for what he regards as the unsatisfactory relations of Austria to Prussia. The Vienna *Debatte*, for instance, agreeing with other reports received by us, thus condenses his utterances on this head: "He, the Chancellor, had always honestly striven, not only to preserve peace and amity with us, but also to introduce a more friendly and confidential tone in our mutual relations. But, notwithstanding all his endeavours, he had failed in this, as Prussia did not meet his advances in the same friendly spirit." Another version represents the Chancellor as having compared Austria to a man whose offered hand had not been grasped.

I must confess I have been amazed at these allegations. Although occurring in all published reports of his speeches, not excepting those containing the above-mentioned statements confirmed by himself, it seems to me utterly impossible that Count Beust should have spoken to this effect. I do not know of any the most distant intimation on the part of

the Imperial Cabinet indicative of a wish to meet us in a friendly spirit, much less of any real advances made. We have no call to inquire into the reasons of the reserve marking the policy of Austria, under the direction of Count Beust, towards Northern Germany, and which is characterised by the fact that since the spring of 1868 Count Wimpfen has never expressed a wish for an interview with Count Bismarck, and consequently has had none. It is not to be asssumed that such an entire abstinence from all official intercourse with the chief of our Foreign Department, observed at a time when your Excellency was maintaining regular relations with Count Beust, should not have been directly enjoined by the latter. Nor do I remember noticing in the diplomatic publications of the Chancellor any utterance in regard to ourselves to be interpreted as an advance or a sign of friendly dispositions. Should the Chancellor have intended to make us communications which have not reached us, or should his intentions not have been conveyed to us in their genuine and original form, he will, I think, either avail himself of some opportunity for transmitting to us through your Excellency the expression of his amicable sentiments, which has till now not come to hand, or he will declare that what has transpired concerning his utterances in the Delegations is incorrect. It would, then, become manifest that those false versions must be classed with the attempts recently making, and no doubt as much condemned by the Chancellor as by ourselves, of creating distrust and suspicion between two nations that are pretty unanimous in their desire to live in friendly and peaceful intercourse.

I believe the Chancellor will thank your Excellency for giving him an opportunity of expressing himself in this sense, and I therefore request your Excellency to read to him this despatch and leave him a copy. Awaiting your report as to his reply, &c.

VON THILE.'

To the categorical inquiry contained in the concluding passage of this despatch, no satisfactory answer can have been vouchsafed, or the despatch would not have been divulged. Its publication almost amounts to the Prussian Government charging Count Beust with the intent to kindle war between the two nations, and to lay the onus of it falsely on Prussia. The sarcastic language employed adds to the bitterness of the reproach. Here, then, is a nice mess. Fortunately this Government do not attribute to the Austrian Chancellor an equal amount of power as of spite. In turning against him, after patiently enduring his provocations for a period of three years,

objectionable views have been transmitted. Saxony is a member of the North German Confederacy; and we cannot allow you or anybody else the right to control any exchange of opinion between ourselves and our confederates of Northern Germany, or between ourselves and our permanent offensive and defensive allies of Southern Germany.'

Count Beust's Answer.—None whatever.

3. *Prussian Statement.*—'You, Count Beust, have told our Ambassador at Vienna that the Austro-Prussian relations cannot be amicable on account of our having violated the Prague Treaty of Peace, by concluding offensive and defensive alliances with the States of Southern Germany. We, on the contrary, assert that the Prague Treaty of Peace, in expressly inviting us to establish a national connection between Northern and Southern Germany, made it incumbent upon us to conclude some such treaties.'

Count Beust's Answer.—'As late back as my despatch of March 28, 1867, I told you what I thought of your offensive and defensive alliance with Southern Germany. You have, therefore, no occasion to feign surprise at my still holding my former views. What offended me most was your concluding those treaties prior to signing the treaty of peace, and without telling us of your underhand doings.'

Here it is necessary to recall to mind that in the Austrian despatch of March 28, 1867, quoted by Count Beust, there occurs the following passage:

'The Berlin Cabinet need not fear our couching a protest against its treaties with Southern Germany. But we are, of course, fully aware that we should be entitled to take such a step,' &c.

And in another place:

'The publication of the secret treaties between Prussia and the South of Germany has not failed to produce a deep impression upon the political world. As to ourselves, we were neither surprised (by this disclosure) nor did it augment the regret we experienced at losing, after the catastrophes of last summer, the position former treaties had accorded us in Germany. We fully appreciate and accept the present political situation, the consequences of which are being developed before our eyes.'

Why, then, revert to the old grievance, and make it the cause of fresh bickerings?

4. *Prussian Statement.*—'In sundry sittings of the Delegations, you, Count Beust, have complained that we have not met the friendly advances you have repeatedly made us since the restoration of peace. So,

at least, we read in papers whose reports on other utterances of yours in the Delegations you, in your conversations with our Ambassador at Vienna, have acknowledged as correct. But your complaint is unfounded. We do not remember having received a single friendly communication from you in the last three years. Neither in what you said to ourselves, nor in what you said to others about us, was there the slightest hint of your intention of entertaining friendly relations with us. So far from any overtures being made us, your Ambassador at Berlin has broken off all intercourse with us since the spring of 1868. We have not retaliated, but instructed our representative at Vienna to maintain regular relations with you; and must now ask you categorically to name the occasion on which your alleged advances were made.'

Count Beust's Answer.—'It seems to have accidentally happened that in 1868, when Count Bismarck was ill and obliged to retire to the country, the Austrian Ambassador remained at Berlin, and that when Count Bismarck returned to the capital, the Austrian Ambassador went away on furlough. Somewhat later, towards the end of 1868, the Prussian press became so violent in attacking my policy, that I confess I then recommended Count Wimpfen (the Ambassador in question) to abstain from seeing Count Bismarck. As to your asking me to mention the occasions when I made you friendly advances, I decline to do so, because your knowledge of my having spoken of our mutual relations is professedly derived from mere newspaper reports. If, however, you ask me the same question without reference to newspaper reports, I shall be most happy to enter into an explicit correspondence upon it.'

The attacks of the Prussian papers alluded to in the above were in reality their defence against the charges preferred in the Austrian Blue-book No. 2.

This, then, is the result of the only exchange of opinion that has passed between Austria and Prussia since the restoration of peace. Count Beust maintains the reproaches brought against this Government, and mutual relations remain as inauspicious as ever. Childish as are some of the arguments employed, the quarrel is a bitter one.

Much attention has been bestowed at Berlin upon the attitude of Hungary during this altercation. It is thought to be a peculiar one. In the Hungarian Parliament and Delegation, all Hungarian parties, the Government party not excepted, have deprecated the idea of their ever supporting any anti-Prussian policy that might be pursued

by Count Beust. It is only natural they should do so, as Sadowa was the making of Hungary, and were it ever reënacted with an opposite result would have a tendency to be the unmaking of her. Yet the papers connected with the Hungarian Government continue an ambiguous course, supporting to-day the anti-Prussian exertions of Count Beust, and to-morrow opposing them; yet the Hungarian Government itself is more reticent than may be good. People at this capital are tempted to account for this behaviour by the supposition that the signal services Count Beust has rendered Hungary at the Court of Vienna are rewarded at Pesth by journalistic counter services, calculated to please the said Court, and so strengthen the Count's position there. If this be really so, Hungary pays cheaply for what she has won. In return for the receipt of a solid reality she awakens indefinite hopes in the donor's mind—hopes which she cannot think of fulfilling, as she could not do so without committing suicide.

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS.

Berlin, October 4, 1869.

AUSTRIA having during the last three years aimed at securing a French alliance for a Prussian war, this Government adroitly profited by the illness of the Emperor Napoleon, and the consequent decline of the Austrian hopes, to improve its relations with their unfriendly neighbour. The proposal to take this step was submitted to King William by Count Bismarck during the Pomeranian manœuvres. His Majesty, being as anxious to get on better terms with his imperial relative and former ally as his prudent Premier, immediately approved the plan. A move in this direction may have appeared the more promising, inasmuch as Count Beust happening to be absent on a

mysterious circuit in Southern Germany, there was a chance of the Kaiser answering the proposal without previously consulting that avowed friend of the French, and too notorious enemy of the Prussians. Accordingly, a courtly message went from Berlin to Vienna, announcing that the Crown Prince of Prussia intended to pass through the Austrian capital on his way to the East. The reply proved the Prussian calculations to have been laid with a shrewd appreciation of circumstances. His Austrian Majesty immediately answered, that the Crown Prince was very welcome; and, to show these were not idle words, ordered the most hospitable preparations to be made for the reception of the illustrious guest. After this, and taking all circumstances into account, we are justified in thinking that the Kaiser, from the change that has recently supervened in France, deems it as well to conclude a truce with this Government. The latter, on the other hand, trusting to time and events for the formation of more solid and reliable ties, is happy to effect a preliminary approach towards a Power but yesterday full of sinister purposes. Whether the armistice thus arrived at will ripen into a genuine and *bonâ-fide* peace, or be cut short by a relapse into diplomatic or military warfare, mainly depends on the evolution of things in France. I believe I may say the above few lines contain the essential features of an incident about which so many spurious versions have been set afloat by ill-informed or interested persons.

Slight as is this modification in the Austro-Prussian relations, for the observer of international politics it is not a little instructive to notice the impression produced by it upon the various parties affected. Count Beust at once perceived there was nothing left for him but to conform to his Sovereign's wishes. As the Emperor Napoleon no longer seems above consulting the interests of his people, the prospect of a French attack upon Prussia has clearly

diminished; and though Francis Joseph I., had he been guided by his Premier, would have probably delayed awhile before accommodating his politics to this new phase, still his having done so forced Count Beust to approve what was at once a demand of the times, an order of his Sovereign, and, above all, an accomplished fact. But in doing this, Count Beust had no wish entirely to break off the connection so long the pivot of his policy. He would assume a more conciliatory attitude towards this Government, but stand by France while there was a distant hope of her ruler's recovering lost ground. Hence his Vienna papers, instead of graciously accepting the outstretched hand of Prussia, even now grumblingly assert that Austria's favour will be accorded to this Government only on condition of its renouncing all idea of incorporating Southern Germany. His German organs, harping on the same theme, and varying it according to the approved method employed to veil matters from vulgar ken, represent Prussia as having gone through the process of eating humble pie, given up the South, and thereby regained the goodwill of the Austrian Premier, whose policy is thus crowned with complete victory. He who knows that Prussia since the Treaty of Prague never had the slightest wish to extend the influence she already exercises over Southern Germany, possesses the key to what is mysterious in these asseverations of the Austrian-inspired press. They can have no other object than to nourish a fictitious grievance, to be avenged at some more favourable opportunity, should it ever occur.

Notwithstanding, however, that the Austrian Premier seasons the Prussian leanings of his Court with a vow of unalterable devotion to France, the sensibilities of the latter have been too powerfully excited to overlook the inconstancy displayed. The French semi-official papers are at this moment anything but in love with Austria; and the *Havas Correspondance* goes the length of seeing in her

protestations of unchanging affection hypocrisy aggravated by ingratitude. 'If France,' says this inspired organ, 'had not with her hand on her sword stood sentinel over the Peace of Prague, Austria would soon have realised what were the honest intentions of Prussia, at whom she is now setting her cap.' Bitter as this is, it is scarcely more than might be expected on the first painful loosening of amatory ties. Indeed, if France does not more loudly resent the present behaviour of that Austria who has coquetted with her for a period of three years, the reason must be sought in the remarkable want of decision which for the time being seems to pervade all things at Paris.

Prussia too, despite the advantage she derives from this latest turn of affairs, in one particular is injured. That she has no desire to force Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hesse into the Confederacy, but, on the contrary, has withstood the advances of two of them, and patiently endured the coldness of the two others, is well known to all who have noted the events of the last three years. But if in no hurry to extend the geographical limits of the new Bund, yet she cannot but wish to hold fast the ascendancy possessed over the States already belonging to it. Now, there is in the Federal Charter no very definite distinction made between those departments of legislation apportioned to the Federal Parliament and those retained by the State Parliaments; and if the Confederates see fit to wrangle, opposing views will in many instances be equally well supported by the letter of the law. During the three years that the Charter has existed, this possible ground of quarrel has been happily avoided. However marked the inclination of the Federal Parliament to put the widest construction upon the privilege allotted to it, the unity movement was strong enough to silence particularists, and prevent the minor Governments from complaining. As to the Prussian Government, it has sometimes approved this tendency of the

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Federal Representative Assembly, sometimes tacitly tolerated it, and, in extreme cases, objected to the usurpation of State rights. Henceforth Prussia may have a more uniformly abstemious policy to pursue in this respect. If at all desirous of securing an understanding with Austria, she will be obliged to second the policy of her minor allies more regularly than she has hitherto done. This conclusion the minor Sovereigns have not been slow to draw from the first symptoms of approximation between Vienna and Berlin. In the speech from the throne with which the King of Saxony has just opened his Chambers, occurs a pointed protest against certain endeavours said to be making for the strengthening of the Bund at the expense of the individual States. Four weeks ago the King, who takes pride in being considered as faithful a confederate as he formerly was a troublesome adversary, would have hardly used such phraseology. But Count Bismarck is too practical a statesman to purchase the countenance of a doubtful neighbour by the resignation of any essential right over allies. Only remonstrance on the part of allies is in itself a disadvantage.

This is not the only reaction of the Crown Prince's visit to Vienna on the internal affairs of Germany. From the day that the intention of his Royal Highness was announced, the Conservatives at Berlin and Vienna have held their heads an inch or two higher. In both capitals the Conservatives have long been of opinion that, if concessions have had to be made by their respective Governments to the Liberal demands of the age, they were accorded only because of the necessity the two Cabinets were under of courting popular sympathy on what appeared the eve of an internecine war. As they fondly imagine, a revival of the ancient harmony between the Courts on the Danube and Spree would enable both to discard Liberalism and restore the patriarchal *régime* of the olden times. At Berlin, these anticipations are not

shared by the Liberals, who, on the contrary, expect to promote their own party interests by a change which the Conservatives fancy is all in their favour. In this capital both parties have been alike dissatisfied with the state of things hitherto. The Conservatives used to complain that, from their apprehension of foreign entanglement, the Government were doing too much to oblige the Liberals; the Liberals, on the other hand, fumed and fretted at their inability to insist upon more substantial concessions, while the foreign enemy was at the door. By the new turn of affairs both are therefore tempted to think their prospects improved. The Conservatives are in good hopes that the two great Courts of Germany, when once they have arrived at an understanding, will mercilessly eradicate the cancer of Liberalism; the Liberals are convinced their party will be strong enough to regain former ascendancy when once free from the peril of foreign invasion. Which of the two sides takes the right estimate of the future will be decided by the state of international diplomacy rather than by anything else.

In Austria, where the relation between foreign and domestic politics is similar to what it is in this country, the peculiar position of Hungary deserves a line or two to itself. Hungary had her independence restored to her in consequence of the defeat of Sadowa: should Francis Joseph once more become the ally of William I., the motives which originally caused him to conciliate his trans-Leithan subjects would have ceased to exist. This is the view taken in Germany, and not rejected in Hungary. The Hungarian statesmen and press are anything but delighted with the expected arrival of the future King of Prussia at Vienna.

All these questions raised by the late goings-on in the world of royalty may be summed up in the remark that, to form an estimate respecting their probable solution, we have to watch the progress of events in France. There,

any and everything seems to be possible just now. While the Imperial Government is, since the decline in the Emperor's health, relaxing its domestic authority beyond precedent, General Fleury, the old advocate of an offensive alliance with Russia, is sent to St. Petersburg. Is foreign war, under a novel grouping of alliances, thought of after all?

On his journey to Vienna and the East the Crown Prince of Prussia will be accompanied by Prince Ludwig of Hesse. The two months their husbands intend to be absent Princesses Victoria and Alice will spend at Nice.

DISARMAMENT PROJECTED BY NAPOLEON III.

Berlin, October 27, 1869.

As we learn from Paris, the Emperor Napoleon, at one of the last cabinet councils held at Compiègne, determined to announce a reduction of the army in his next speech from the throne. It is here expected that immediately after being thus publicly advertised, the measure will be notified to the other Powers in such a way as to imply an invitation to go and do likewise. Let us hope that, if this intention actually exists at Paris, it will be abandoned in good time. No good can come of it, but the contrary may. When Count Beust is supposed to be incessantly intriguing against this Government, and when it is only a week since the Emperor Napoleon's own papers have been permitted to threaten Prussia with war, unless the military treaties with Southern Germany are abolished, it would seem a little too early to ask for a modification of this country's military institutions; for nothing less does the word disarmament mean. While those institutions are maintained in perfect harmony with the wishes of the immense majority of the people, there

will be so and so many thousands of recruits coming forward year after year, to drill whom the proper number of regiments must be kept up. The men, indeed, need not remain under arms for the whole term of service; but when that term only amounts to three years, and, in the case of large numbers, is reduced to from two to two and a half years, there is not much latitude left, even for additional furloughs. Thus, while a French request to disarm could have little practical result, the refusal it may be destined to encounter might have much. It is impossible to assume the French Government to be ignorant of these circumstances. If the proposal should be put forward, the world will not leave unnoticed that those who made it foresaw what it must end in.

DISARMAMENT ADVOCATED BY THE FRIENDS OF PEACE.

Berlin, November 6, 1869.

Mr. Henry Richard, M.P., has been lately staying at Berlin with a view to interest political circles in the cause of general disarmament. In consequence of his interview with leading Deputies, a motion has been introduced into the Lower House recommending the measure advocated by him. I need not tell you that the only result will be a debate. While France and Austria are suspected of inimical designs, Prussia will not modify her military institutions. Should the present doubtful attitude of Austria and France be persevered in longer than Prussia can afford to bear the military expenditure imposed upon her, it is more probable that she will go to war in the interests of economy than disarm or allow her financial balance to be seriously disturbed. The Prussian exchequer is certainly not so easily exhausted; still, it is a

fact, which makes many a quiet and contented citizen take an earnest and rather ominous interest in foreign politics, that while the army and navy costs about 75,000,000 thalers a year, the finance minister can make both ends meet only by putting off much necessary and useful expenditure in the other branches of the administration. To advert to one point only: Government itself has often admitted that the civil servants, the clergy, the university professors, and the elementary teachers are wofully under-paid: how long will it be possible to postpone increasing their salaries? For this reason the financial position of this Government, and the quarrels now annually recurring upon the question of supplies, should command more general attention than they do.

When the Austrian Court gave a cordial reception to the Crown Prince of Prussia, this Government, by way of reciprocating this sign of friendly sentiment, determined to recall Herr von Werther from his post as Ambassador at Vienna. This diplomatist, having been there before the war, unfortunately had but too many opportunities of rendering himself disagreeable. But for the hostile manœuvres of Count Beust, he would have received other employment long ago. His present destination is Paris. At Vienna he will be succeeded by General von Schweinitz, hitherto military attaché to the Embassy at St. Petersburg.

PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, November 17, 1869.

The Russian national party pretend to be in good hopes that the arrival of General Fleury at St. Petersburg will be the signal for the conclusion of a Russo-French alliance, such as they have advocated so long. The General

is certainly a confidant of the Emperor Napoleon, familiar with the deepest schemes of his illustrious friend. If at the time of a domestic crisis, when his advice may be so urgently required at home, he of all others is deputed to execute a commission abroad, the inference seems to be justified that his is no common task. Being moreover known to look upon the foreign politics of Russia and France as admitting of profitable combination, we need not be surprised at seeing his appointment to the St. Petersburg Embassy giving rise to speculations of a bold and comprehensive character. According to the designs of the Russian national party, a Franco-Russian alliance would be the means of handing over Germany to Napoleon, and Turkey to the Orthodox interest. Ever since the battle of Sadowa has pitched a warlike and enterprising party in France against Germany, the Russian Nationals have been indefatigable in telling their Government that the Gallic rancour against Fatherland ought to be turned to account to promote their own policy in the East. Often as this counsel has been rejected by the Czar and his immediate advisers, the national party are so strongly represented at Court, and have had so many opportunities for repeating their arguments, that by dint of sheer reiteration they have raised them to the dignity of an acknowledged, and it would almost seem a not impossible, programme. Especially since Prussia declined to support Greece at the Cretan Conference, and to become accessory to raising a commotion in the East, the Russian Nationals have been enabled to exercise a sensible influence on the foreign politics of their Government. Now that the Emperor Napoleon has obliged them by sending General Fleury, their old favourite, to St. Petersburg, and permitting him to indulge in suggestive hints as to the possible results of a mutual intimacy, their hopes have risen higher than ever. The other day their papers actually proposed that the Paris and St. Petersburg Governments should put themselves

in communication with Vienna, and thus securing an irresistible force, by a common authoritative decree compel this rising kingdom of Prussia to relinquish the fruits of its late victories. The least to be demanded in this peremptory ultimatum would be the slackening the ties of the Northern Confederacy, and the complete abandonment of the military treaties with the three Southern States. Having thus obliged Austria and France by contributing to clip the wings of the German eagle, they hope in the East to reap a reward adequate to the magnitude of the service rendered in Europe.

There are those in this city who think that the Czar and Prince Gortschakoff—though calm and prudent politicians, and not likely to forfeit the friendship of their solid neighbour to gain the goodwill of the unstable Gaul—are yet no longer offering the same steady resistance as formerly to the party advocating these venturesome schemes at the Russian Court. By extinguishing Poland, russifying Lithuania, and denationalising the Baltic Germans, the Kirghis, &c., the national party obtained control over the domestic politics of the Empire; recently their influence seems to be extending to the field of foreign politics also. It is quite intelligible in these days, when the nationality movement is making *le tour du monde*, that there must be a bewitching allurement in the promises of an enthusiastic faction, by foreign successes to give the finishing touch to the proud renown of the Russian name, latterly so much enhanced by the complete absorption of their non-Russian provinces. However, the job would not be an easy one; and on the field of diplomacy there is many a seed sown that is not destined to grow up. Sufficiently apparent and uncanny as the symptoms are, people here indulge a hope that those Paris and St. Petersburg parties at the bottom of the scheme will either be prevented by their Sovereigns from carrying it out, or, themselves thinking better of it, as was done some time ago in a similar case,

eventually shrink from the perilous venture of provoking the nation of Germany.

Even should these expectations be disappointed, it is scarcely probable that Austria will consent to be one of the enterprising trio. To the reflecting statesmen of Vienna it must be manifest that if the Russian national party think of allying themselves to Austria, it is only because they believe her too weak to wear Prussia's shoes, if ever Prussia should have them forcibly pulled off. As long as the Russians thought Austria strong enough to interfere with their Oriental politics, that State was the *bête noire* of the St. Petersburg journalists; only now that they imagine they are able to direct the movements of the ancient but struggling empire on their western borders, they have hit upon the happy idea of making it a subservient ally. Their calculations are not so unreasonable. Should the Russian national party, as they intend, aided by France, ever obtain ascendancy on the Balkan peninsula, they could well afford to accord to Austria some territorial aggrandisement on the Danube and dominant influence over the South German States.

By these acquisitions Austria would not gain an atom of real strength. With Germany as her implacable adversary on one side, and the rising tide of Panslavism on the other, she would, on the contrary, consume her power in unceasing contests, until ultimately she might sink under the united pressure. That this to Austria would be the probable issue of a Russian alliance is so visible, that even the Poles, or at any rate a strong party among the Austrian Poles, have realised it. While Prince Czartoryski and the Polish nobility party, notwithstanding all the disappointments they have had in their favourite line of policy, are still clinging to the hope of reëstablishing Poland with the help of Paris and Rome, there has lately risen in the provincial Parliament of Galicia a Liberal middle-class party, who recommend a directly opposite

effort for the attainment of the same end. This party, occupying a very prominent position in their country, are convinced that France, disquieted by the rising star of Germany, will always prefer making common cause with powerful Russia to leaguing with feeble Austria, and that therefore the only chance of the Poles consists in bringing about a reconciliation between the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets. The journal of the politicians taking this view, the Cracow *Kraj*, does not allow any opportunity to escape of enforcing its notions. Just now the indications of a possible *rapprochement* between Russia and France have called forth a leader in it, which, coming from a Polish pen, really seems to deserve quoting:

'There are certain natural conditions imposing alliances against the will of the Sovereigns, nay, against the sympathies of the nations that enter into them. It is one of the great lessons of history, that States morally and geographically divided, and based upon totally different political and social foundations, are frequently bound together by the ties of common interest. The fewer the points of contact they ordinarily have, the more effective is the attraction when a common interest really presents itself. The thing has happened scores of times, without, however, for all that, becoming more comprehensible to the public. To this day people are invariably surprised at its repetition, regarding it as a riddle too difficult for them to solve.

In this very period of ours it is matter of universal wonderment that Russia and America, the homes respectively of despotism and liberty, of progress and mental obscuration, should be on such cordial terms. But a greater contradiction is in store. France is coquetting with Russia, and will perhaps become her partner in a joint undertaking. Is it for the Poles to express astonishment at such a consummation? True, the electric force of sympathy has always drawn the French towards us, not to the Russians. We resemble the French in so many traits of our national character, in our susceptibility to the noble and beautiful, in our chivalrous devotion to the cause we have at heart, that neither can help feeling akin to the other. Still, and although they have no moral predilection whatever for the genuine subjects of the Czar, the French have, to our prejudice, frequently been the allies of Russia. In the days of our independence, as well as afterwards, interest—dry calculating interest—has linked them but too often to the Court of St. Petersburg. The like will occur again, and more regularly, in proportion as the national and natural springs of European progress come into operation. As Europe

is casting her skin and assuming a more perfect and satisfactory aspect, the French and Russian Sovereigns will see their pretensions less generally acknowledged, and in consequence be drawn towards each other for common defence. The present era of continental history almost provokes such an alliance.

In Central Europe great events are preparing. By the side of a Power so compact, so strong in her military, financial, and intellectual resources as Prussia, we see Austria with her internal divisions, her lack of a cementing nationality, her incompetent army, a State without head, body, or legs. A political constellation of this kind has always brought on a crisis. Either the two States, in this relative position, fight each other, or, uniting, fall out with somebody else. If Austria has a grain of common sense left, the latter eventuality will occur in the present instance. Austria, if she wishes to escape annihilation, must comprehend that only hand-in-hand with Prussia can she recover her strength. In point of fact, unless she consents to contribute towards the formation of a strong and solid Central Europe, capable of resisting attacks from east and west, her right to exist is forfeited. From recent events there is hope that she begins to be sensible of her destination. The Kaiser's journey to the East, where he will repeatedly meet the Crown Prince of Prussia, is perhaps an earnest of wise resolves in the future. On the other hand, those two Cabinets, fearing nothing more keenly than the possible creation of a united Central Europe, were visibly disquieted by the mere thought that the old rivalry between Prussia and Austria might be allayed. Russia is alarmed about the Danube, France about the Rhine.

What wonder, then, that the ailing Napoleon should have written to the ailing Alexander, inviting him to meet at Nice or Mentone? Under Italy's beautiful sky the suffering Cæsar proposes to commune with the suffering Czar, and, if bodily strength permit, deliberate on the increase of their common political influence. Fortunately the plan proceeds this time from two men in very bad health; and if the interview occurs at all, it will be long after the meetings of the Emperor of Austria and the Crown Prince of Prussia at Jerusalem and Suez. Heaven grant that in the cradle of Christianity their hearts may be softened, and a reconciliation ensue! At the place whence the religion of love issued eighteen centuries ago, may they learn to forget their old animosities, and realise the wants of modern times, which admit no longer of the promotion of mere dynastic interests, but have rendered the interests of dynasties and nations identical!'

The paper wherein this advice is tendered has the restoration of Poland for its programme, and is friendly only to those whose assistance it believes it will be able to turn to account. It is in the Polish interest that it wishes to

strengthen Austria, and as the only means to this end counsels the Vienna people to shake hands with those of Berlin. However little chance there may be of its ulterior aims being reached, and the red flag of the Polish Republic being unfurled again on Warsaw citadel, even if Vienna and Berlin become friends, there can be no doubt that the advice given by the *Kraj* has for its primary object the making both Austria and Prussia stronger than they are. At this very moment, when the national party on the Neva are anxious to secure the goodwill of the Imperial Court on the Danube, the Russians can so little control their feelings, that their press, the semi-official portion included, are from Panslavistic motives sympathising with the Dalmatian insurgents.

The Russian War Office has informed the St. Petersburg Society for the Promotion of Central Asiatic Commerce, that it will assist them in forming a new caravan road from the Caspian Bay of Krasnovodsk to the Amou Darya. That river, it is well known, is navigable for good-sized ships up to the interior of Northern Afghanistan. Russia was prevented from entering the Amou Darya by Lake Aral because of the shallowness and swampiness of the many branches forming the delta of the river.

To recent Bavarian doings I should like to devote a line or two. As you may have noticed, the last session of the Bavarian Parliament, as soon as opened, came to a standstill. The Liberal and the Ultramontane parties each commanding an exactly equal number of votes in the House, there could be no majority on any measure. After even the election of the speaker had been found a mathematical impossibility, the session was of necessity closed, the House dissolved, and new elections were ordered. Hence the electioneering now going on in the country is uncommonly important to the opposing parties. Should the Ultramontanes triumph, they will, as they are unable to repeal the offensive and defensive

treaty with the North, undoubtedly do all in their power to make it practically ineffective. By refusing additional supplies, they will attempt to impede the reorganisation of the Bavarian troops — a task as yet but half accomplished; by giving the priests fuller rights over the rural schools and the rustic world generally, they will endeavour to augment the influence of the anti-Prussian fanatics; by employing every means, fair and foul, they imagine they will succeed in intimidating their King and Government, bent upon a more sensible course, and perhaps frightening them into virtual if not positive desertion of Prussia. While these are the anticipated fruits of victory floating before their heated imaginations, they are equally goaded on to exertion by the dreaded consequences of defeat. The Bavarian Ultramontanes are aware that if the military treaties between Northern and Southern Germany are suffered to continue, the complete political reunion of the two halves of the nation is but a question of time. In such a case the Bavarian Parliament would be virtually superseded by the Federal Parliament. In other words, the only German representative assembly which has a Roman-Catholic majority would, in all questions of national import, be replaced by an assembly ruled by Protestants. Little as most enlightened Catholics object to such a consummation, the Ultramontanes do.

THE BAVARIAN ULTRAMONTANES.

Berlin, November 27, 1869.

THE Bavarian elections have terminated in the Ultramontanes securing a majority of six in the new Chamber. Long had they prepared for this contest, and zealously will they endeavour to turn its result to account. Fear-

ing that the maintenance of the offensive and defensive treaty with Prussia will eventually bring on the complete reunion of Germany, they have been ever opposed to a state of things they regard as preparatory to a consummation which will some day overthrow all their influence in the country. In a Bavarian Parliament they may hope to have a small working majority: in a common representative assembly of all Germany their votes would probably be swamped by the united Liberals from all parts of the great Fatherland. In a Bavarian Parliament they may, by great good luck, be just numerous enough to cause the purse and the strong arm of the State to be employed in support of the Ultramontane religion; a Germanic Assembly would probably profess those principles on the relations between Church and State so common in these modern times, and so greatly strengthened of late by the provoking ardour of the ultra-orthodox in the Catholic and Protestant Establishments. And what prospect can be more terrible than this to a party who have ever looked upon politics as secondary to their peculiar form of faith, and upon Germany as of less account than Rome? With such perils drawing near, more was at stake for them in the recent elections than the mere obtaining a majority in a Munich Landtag.

Now that they have conquered, it must be expected that by impeding the reorganisation of the Bavarian army, reducing its numbers, and indulging in vehement declamations against all adversaries, their representatives in the Chamber will attempt to render the military treaty with this Government less effective than it might be, and retard the ultimate embodiment of their State with the Confederacy. That their success will be proportioned to the magnitude of their efforts is, however, improbable. Much as they may impair the efficiency of their troops by spiteful retrenchment, the employment of these forces in an emergency is a matter over which they have no

control. This depends on the King, and the general aspect of politics at a given time, which are not likely ever to be favourable to *them*. Even were the Bavarian Cabinet to resign in consequence of the elections, any new Minister would have to regard the wishes of the Sovereign, who looks upon the military treaty with Prussia as the only safeguard of his dynasty amid the ruin of so many ancient and time-honoured States. So firm is the King in this prudent view of his position, that, unshaken by the success of the other party, he has just congratulated the constituency of the small town of Fussen, near his Alpine castle of Hohenschwangau, upon their returning a Liberal member. As the King thinks, so do the officers of the Bavarian army, who have been taught by the events of the late campaign on which side it behoves the petty State forces to fight if they wish to win.

Apart from these important agencies in favour of unity, the triumph of the Ultramontanes in securing a majority of six is scarcely great enough to permit their acting wholly irrespective of the Liberals. Of the eight provinces of Bavaria, the two that are Protestant—the Palatinate and Central Franconia—have returned only Liberals. Another, Suabia, half Protestant, has elected more Liberals than Ultramontanes, while in the rest the Romanist party has gained a small preponderance. Nor ought it to be overlooked that in the capital, Munich, and some of the other large towns, none but Liberal candidates obtained a majority. This is a fresh proof that, even in the old and, comparatively speaking, strictly Catholic portion of the kingdom, it is only the inhabitants of the villages and smaller towns that can be prevailed upon to oblige their priests at the poll. With the army and educated classes on his side, with the North applauding his politics, it may be hoped that the young King of Bavaria will be able to prevent his good ship of State from foundering on Ultramontane breakers.

But, futile as the exertions of the Popery party in the South promise to be in the end, it is yet a matter of considerable interest to watch the unremitting energy with which they swim against the stream. Could there be any doubt as to the vast political and religious importance of the change which will be wrought by the complete reunion of Germany, we should be taught its significance by the resistance offered to the process in its very outset by the sworn opponents to intellectual liberty. The Ultramontanes have a distinct presentiment, that a Germanic Parliament is likely to be neither a reactionary nor a radical, but a liberal and a moderate body. However cunningly the franchise might be arranged, it would never yield a reactionary result; a census would give ascendancy to the middle classes, who are liberal; while universal suffrage, after the admission of the Southerners to the Confederacy, would only redound to the advantage of Radicals *and* Ultramontanes. The latter alternative neither the Prussian Government nor the educated strata of society will submit to for any length of time; there remains, then, nothing but to promote the former. But nothing would more effectively diminish Ultramontane authority than the establishment of a temperate Administration, too liberal not to take an interest in the intellectual advancement of the people, and too independent of radical crotchets to permit haughty sects to abuse religious liberty, and preach the doctrine of intolerance under the protection of laws enacted for the maintenance of the opposite principles. No wonder, then, that the Ultramontanes should be shocked by the shadow of a united Fatherland looming in the distance; no wonder that being, of all its States, influential only in Bavaria, they should move heaven and earth to organise an energetic resistance in this the last remaining stronghold of their German defences. Edged on by a sort of convulsive paroxysm, they have, in those Bavarian elections, shunned no lie, no

calumny, if it did but serve their purpose. Perfectly indifferent to the contempt of all educated people, whom they probably think too far gone for recovery, they have positively wallowed in falsehood, and told the poor misguided field hands who form their body-guard any number of nonsensical enormities on the disadvantages of joining Lutheran and army-ridden Prussia. They have tried to revive religious hatred, to inculcate anew the old and gradually vanishing rivalry between North and South, and, as all this would have scarcely furthered their ends in these enlightened times, actually frightened their subject peasantry with the story that Prussia, to evade bankruptcy, is looking out for their pig-hide money bags. Just to afford a specimen of their achievements in this particular department of rhetoric, I will quote an electioneering article from the Munich *Volksbote*, a famous and favourite organ of theirs, edited for the benefit of the lower classes. Cautioning its readers not to choose Liberal members, this paper thus alludes to the dreadful consequences of a 'pro-Prussian' majority in the Chambers:

'Have you any wish to see your King degraded to the position of a Hohenzollern vassal, a miserable prefect in the pay of the Berlin authorities? Or do you want to see the independence of this ancient and glorious country of Bavaria sacrificed for the benefit of those hungry, impoverished, and half-starved Prussians? Are you at all anxious to have your own officers removed from your own army, and superseded by the pitiful fops called Prussian lieutenants? Have you any desire to witness the transportation of the Bavarian regiments to the backwoods of Pomerania, whose very name cannot be fitly mentioned in decent society, or to famished East Prussia? And would you take delight in having our cities garrisoned by the voracious wearers of the Prussian helmet, sent to regale themselves in our larders, and to propagate Prussian morality at the expense of the honesty of our women? Are our Constitutional liberties to be destroyed by the Prussian cat-o'-nine tails? Is the coarse, brutal, and infamous *soldatesca* that forms the army of our Northern neighbour to infect our gallant troops with its spirit of haughty wickedness? Will you consent to see your pockets emptied to the last penny, and yourselves skinned into the bargain, in order that Prussia may fulfil

its divine mission? And you, inhabitants of Munich, what would you say if your picture-galleries were stripped of their contents, and all the famous works of art, in whose possession you have so long gloried, carried off to Berlin? Are the magnificent monuments adorning your public squares to be pulled down and recast into Prussian guns? Is Munich really to become a provincial town, deserted by your Court, unknown to strangers, the abode of abject misery and penury? Is civil marriage to be introduced into this Christian country? Are your schools to be demoralised and become nests of Paganism? Are your churches to be turned into brothels, where modern Goddesses of Reason are adored by sensual devotees? No, you will not permit these abominations. You will, on the contrary, stand up for Bavaria,' &c.

A nice catalogue of delinquencies to be committed by the Prussians, if ever paramount in Bavaria. But the event is hardly likely to happen to-morrow; and in the mean time it is a good thing that these unscrupulous marauders are degenerate enough to be roused to no more serious emotion than a laugh by prophecies like the above. Instead of resenting the delineation given of their character, the wicked people of this country are actually amused at having reduced the Ultramontanes to a position tacitly admitted to be desperate by the very excess to which these rantings are carried.

The Prussians certainly regret that the Ultramontane majority in the Bavarian Chamber will have the power to render the military alliance between the two countries less practically useful than it might be; but they are also aware that the Ultramontanes will be impotent to annihilate the important treaty, and are perfectly contented for the time being to let the matter rest here. Should the Bavarian army be ever summoned to support the Prussians, it is not the illiterate peasantry of the Bavarian Alps and plains that will prevent it; nor are the clergy of their lonely villages likely to exercise any marked influence on the progress of the world's affairs, when the day dawns on which the general condition of Europe will admit of the complete unification of Germany.

At present, consolidation, not annexation, is the order

of the day at Berlin. I think I have already told you of Count Lippe's attempt in the Prussian Upper House to confine the legislative competence of the Confederacy to those topics expressly mentioned in the Federal charter. The motion of the Conservative Count, thrown out by the Lords, has occasioned a Liberal counter-motion in the Lower House, calling upon the Government to use its influence that the legislative rights of the Bund shall be extended to the field of civil law. Civil law being the principal thing out of the range of Federal cognisance, its appropriation by the Central Parliament would be almost equivalent to the abrogation of the various State Parliaments. Government expressing itself neither for nor against such a change, the momentous nature of which need not be dwelt upon, the motion advocating it was passed by a majority of two-thirds. The idea is pretty sure to be taken up by the Federal Parliament likewise, and, although not destined to be speedily realised, will not disappear from the Liberal programme, now that it has once been started.

RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA. THE ŒCUMENICAL COUNCIL.

Berlin, December 15, 1869.

CERTAIN parties in France having repeatedly endeavoured to get up an intimate connection with Russia, and their 'little game' naturally attracting considerable attention elsewhere, the Czar has thought it advisable to return a public reply to these continued, though only half-uttered, proposals. The warm and cordial language in which, at the anniversary of the military Order of St. George, he alluded to his Prussian uncle as a relative he loved and a Sovereign he respected, was too significant to be misunderstood, even had it not been coupled with a pointed reference to the common campaign against the French in 1813.

So profound was the impression produced at St. Petersburg by the imperial speech, and so uniform was the interpretation everywhere given it, that General Fleury, the French Ambassador, at a grand reception two days after, could not refrain from adverting to the matter, and assuring his visitors that the whole *évènement* was devoid of political meaning, being, in fact, a mere interchange of civilities between uncle and nephew. Certainly nothing more serious need have been made of it, had it not come after the very different remarks on international relations recently dropped at St. Petersburg by influential gentlemen from France. As it was, the Czar, when alluding to his uncle at Berlin, could not but be thinking of what had proceeded from Paris, and, expressing himself as he did, must have meant something.

Could there be any doubt about this, it would be set at rest by a little episode which followed at the royal palace of Berlin. Two days ago King William, to acknowledge his nephew's courtesy, assembled the Generals decorated with his own military Order *pour le mérite*—the same he had sent to the Emperor Alexander in return for the Russian 'George.' The only civilian present was M. d'Oubril, the Russian Ambassador at this capital. Turning to him, the King proposed the toast of the evening, in which he thanked the Emperor for conferring upon him a decoration only bestowed on Generals victorious in great battles. 'He had accepted it,' he said, 'not so much as a distinction accorded to himself as to his army for behaving so admirably in the late campaign.' To this gracious address M. d'Oubril replied in the following terms: 'The Grand Cross of St. George on your Majesty's breast is justly regarded as a new pledge of the ties of friendship existing between the two Sovereigns, the two nations, and the two armies. These ties are in perfect harmony with the interests of both countries and the interests of Europe.'

We have, then, before us the remarkable fact of the Czar's declaration in public that, notwithstanding the exertions made by parties at Paris and St. Petersburg to detach him from his old connections, he will continue in his favourite groove, and not permit himself to be seriously embroiled with this country and Government. That such was his Majesty's will all along no one doubted for a moment; that he will see his commands executed, irrespective of the opposite proposals made from without and the opposite advice tendered by the Russian national party, the St. George on King William's breast is a fresh pledge. Still, the Russian Nationals are anything but discouraged by what has happened. Undaunted by their Sovereign's asseveration to the contrary, their papers continue urging the necessity of a French and anti-Prussian alliance, or, at any rate, of a coöperation which, without involving the responsibilities of a formal league, in the relative position of the two countries, will, they assert, have all the advantages of one. If they have any hope of promoting their wishes at all, it can, in the settled disinclination of the Czar to come to loggerheads with Prussia, be only realised by bringing on such a grouping of the Powers as will further their party interests without appearing to do so.

Between the Emperors of Russia and Austria the St. Petersburg festival likewise occasioned an exchange of congratulatory telegrams. The Kaiser, himself a knight of an inferior class of St. George, telegraphed to express the regret he felt at his inability to attend the anniversary; the Czar, thanking him for this mark of sympathy, on his part vowed he would always remember the 'never-to-be-forgotten' occasion when the Kaiser became one of the fraternity of the Russian George. Never to be forgotten, indeed, by both Sovereigns, though for very opposite reasons. It was during the Russian campaign in Hungary that Nicholas conferred his highest military Order on Francis Joseph.

The Prussian Government have, in a perfectly friendly and confidential way, signified to the Pope that they hope and trust the Œcumenical Council will pass no votes calculated to affect the existing relations between Church and State. Should it be otherwise, it is not likely that any serious consequences will ensue in Northern Germany. Though a full third of the inhabitants are Catholics, there are but a few, and these isolated, districts in which the priests are enough of a power to think of challenging the State. The like may be said of Southern Germany, south-eastern and north-western Bavaria excepted. In those two provinces the priests, being virtually brought up by Jesuits, and having for their parishioners an earnest, pious, and excitable population, must be acknowledged as a living reality. It is but too true that, in those parts, and more particularly in the diocese of Ratisbon, religious and moral instruction in the clerical seminaries, the nurseries of the youthful candidates for preferment, is imparted through the medium of antiquated ecclesiastical primers. I need only mention such a work as Father Gury's *Moraltheologie*—which, recently prohibited by the Government of the canton of Soleure, still obtains in Bavaria—to give those acquainted with the subject an idea of what are the doctrines instilled into the clerical mind, and, through it, filtered into the agricultural populations in the regions around Munich. Luckily, as I said, the doctrine propagated in it is potent only within very circumscribed geographical limits, and even there has small influence except on the lower classes.

A more unsatisfactory spectacle is offered by another country, the immediate neighbour of Germany, and in some respects the home of free and enlightened thought. To a man the Poles have declared in favour of the Œcumenical Council and the pretensions put forward in its behalf by the originators of the venerable assembly. In Europe the Poles are the only nation who, as a na-

tion, are on the side of the Pope. Their papers preach whole sermons on papal infallibility, upon the divine inspiration vested in the Council, upon the heinousness of the sin of doubting the verdicts of Pontiff or Bishop. The Poles have always been good Catholics, and it is probably not wounding their religious feelings to suppose them to be all the more ardently so because Catholicism in Poland is not alone a form of faith, but also a political principle. It would be difficult for the Polish upper classes to inspire the bulk of their uneducated and, politically, rather indifferent countrymen with any very strong sentiment against the German or the Russ; but it is comparatively easy to make even the illiterate—reverential, fiery, and brave as they are—cherish hostility against the Protestant or the Greek Orthodox, if such be the will of the parish priest. In the present instance, the Poles seem to have reason to hope that his Holiness will call upon the Council to make a solemn demonstration in behalf of their Church and nationality, and the treatment they are undergoing at the hands of Russia.

Speaking of Poland, I may add that, as the period for the annual conscription draws near, fugitives begin to make their appearance in this country from the other side of the frontier. The extradition treaty not having been renewed by Prussia, they are safe the moment they have crossed the border ditch; but to hinder their escape, now that recovery is out of the question, the Russian Government threaten to make the communes pay 400 roubles for every runaway. If this stringent decree is really carried out, the disposition of the peasantry will scarcely remain as submissive as has latterly been the case. Having had a considerable number of the nobility estates portioned out among them after the last rebellion, the peasants have not been particularly dissatisfied of late, at least not for political reasons, whatever they may have felt on the score of religion. If, however, the process of heavy fines, so

long confined to the upper classes, is to extend to them also, it would be expecting too much of human nature to anticipate a continuance of their quiescent tone of mind. In all probability, the frontier guard will soon be so effectively increased as to leave but little room for escape, and its subsequent disagreeable consequences to Government and subject.

As we learn from a communication of the Prussian Cabinet to Herr von Forkenbeck, the Speaker of the Lower House, the whole of the interest accruing from the sequestrated property of the King of Hanover and the Elector of Hesse is being spent in warding off the political intrigues and incessant journalistic cannonade kept up by these ex-sovereigns — a rare predicament indeed, entailing payment both for attack and defence. Another and very characteristic item of the sufferings incidental to the position of fallen royalty is the having to receive no end of begging letters from their former subjects. As it is known that George V. and Frederick William I. are striving to retain a party at home, there are, it seems, a good many in needy circumstances in their late capitals who will not scruple to assure them of their abiding loyalty, provided they will but graciously consider their special claim to sovereign munificence. The ex-Duke of Nassau is likewise so overwhelmed with letters of this politico-eleemosynary nature that, having made his peace with this Government, and objecting to be dunned in this way, he has asked the assistance of the parish officers to certify him concerning the deserts of the applicants. By the way, the Hanover Legion, which is still being maintained in France at the expense of King George, and with the permission of the Emperor Napoleon, seems to be on the eve of losing a moiety of its men. Steps, it is said, have been taken by some to obtain a free pardon from this Government.

As young Count Bismarck, whose being wounded in

a duel at Bonn brought his father in haste to Berlin, is doing well, the Chancellor of the Confederacy will not need to proceed to the Rhine country. The duel was not a serious encounter occasioned by a quarrel, but an ordinary students' fight, on the genuine German pattern. Is the reader at all acquainted with the Teutonic custom of duel 'by order of the seniors'? In the German Universities there are divers students' clubs, chiefly for convivial purposes, but without altogether excluding literary pursuits. Some of these, founded centuries ago, and kept up principally nowadays by the sons of the aristocracy, retain the mediæval notion of looking on the duel as the only proper expiation of an offence. To prepare their members for acting up to this chivalrous code, regular attendance in the fencing-school and in other places for muscular exercise is rigidly enjoined. Not content with this, the ancient fathers of the institution, who laid down the rules generations ago, also enacted that no 'youngster' shall be admitted to the dignity of 'full member' unless he has previously fought a certain number of duels, honourably acquitting himself of his obligations in this respect. If early in his University career a youthful member has the good fortune to quarrel with somebody else, the way to promotion is open to him; if not, he must amend hard fate, and, as fight he must, fight without an injury to avenge. Hence the custom has arisen for the young candidates for honours in the various 'corps' or clubs to call each other out in the first or second term, not because of offence given or taken, but merely because both the combatants are under the same necessity of crossing swords. Duels of this description are always fought between members of different clubs, and each club being naturally anxious to have its swordsman come off best, the seniors or heads of the clubs in some Universities take it upon themselves to pair the combatants as best promises to redound to the renown and glory

of the bodies they represent. This is the duel 'by order of the seniors;' and in an encounter of this nature it was that young Count Herbert von Bismarck had his head cut open. As is nearly always the case at such displays, the wound was not dangerous. It, however, became so from not being properly bandaged up at first, in consequence of the 'pedels'—your 'beadles'—being down upon the combatants, causing a premature breaking-up of the *rencontre*. Though of everyday occurrence, these meetings are not strictly legal, and if found out result in some slight penalties to the offenders. In the instance I am speaking of, Count Herbert's adversary was likewise wounded, but has long since recovered.

A RUSSO-PRUSSIAN RAILWAY.

Berlin, December 22, 1869.

Not content with giving the King of Prussia so marked a sign of friendship as was lately mentioned in this Correspondence, the Czar has been pleased to extend his favour to the Prussian people too. After refusing for two consecutive years to permit the construction of a railway between the Prussian town of Lyck and the station of Bialystock in Poland, the requisite concession has been at length vouchsafed by the St. Petersburg Government. This line will preserve a portion of the Polish exports to the province of East Prussia, which, having no import trade in consequence of the Russian prohibitive tariff, was by the contemplated eastern direction of the Russian railways in danger of losing the modicum of international commerce it still possessed. The obliging character of the imperial decision is the more apparent from the Russian

National party having for years done all in their power to hinder the laying down of the Lyck-Bialystock line. If they could have had their way, they would have damaged the Polish export trade by diverting it from its natural outlets, and—an equally weighty consideration with them—would have secured for Russian lines a traffic legitimately belonging to the Prussian.

In Bavaria the Ultramontanes, though boasting a majority of six in the new Chamber, have yet been unable to bring about the resignation of the Liberal Cabinet. Two of the Ministers have, indeed, declined to continue holding office after what has happened; but the rest, and among them those most odious to the clerical party, have been prevailed upon by the King to stay and assist him in maintaining the sensible and patriotic policy he has so long pursued in regard to Prussia and Northern Germany. King Ludwig, and with him his Cabinet, are evidently of opinion that the majority the clerical party will command in the Chamber is too small to enable them to offer any very serious opposition to the execution of the offensive and defensive treaties with this Government.

The 1500 men sent from Petrovsk, on the western shore of the Caspian, to occupy the Bay of Krasnovodsk, on the eastern coast of the same sea, reached their destination on the 19th of November, and established themselves in the valley of Kuvodagh. Measures were immediately taken to form a military and mercantile station at this important point. Thus far the natives, numerously congregating round the famous wells in that neighbourhood, were friendly, and Colonel Stoletoff, the commandant of the expedition, hoped to continue on the same good terms.

In about a month the Kieff-Balta and Kharkoff-Taganrog railways will both be ready for use. These lines are the last links wanting for the connection of St. Petersburg with the Azoff and Black Seas. To render Russia some-

what independent of the foreign article almost exclusively used on her lines, a railway-carriage manufactory is to be established at Revel.

A RUSSIAN NATIONAL-PARTY PAPER ON PRUSSIA.

Berlin, December 29, 1869.

As related in previous Letters, and proved by subsequent events, General Fleury's mission to St. Petersburg was not confined to the urging a proposal of disarmament, but included the more delicate task of effecting a diplomatic *rapprochement* between the Emperors of Russia and France. We have seen how this move was understood by Prussia to imply an attempt to rearrange international relations in a way unfavourable to herself, and how the Czar, after some seeming hesitation, ultimately determined to keep up his old connections, and make a public and unmistakable declaration of friendship to King William I. For the present, then, the personal alliance between the two dynasties being restored will secure a revival of the old cordial intercourse between the two Cabinets. How long this new friendship is to last is another question, and one which, notwithstanding the Czar's affectionate display towards his Prussian uncle, is debated with the greatest coolness in the St. Petersburg press. As a good specimen of the reasonings indulged in on this interesting occasion, I think I had better give you an extract from the *Golos*, a national-party organ, and at the same time connected with persons high in office:

'Outwardly our relations to Prussia have very little changed since the time of the Vienna Congress. Yet there has been a considerable change in reality. On the one hand, Prussia has ceased to permit herself to be taken in tow by our Cabinet—a circumstance which the Rus-

sian people, never much concerned about their foreign influence, have not taken much to heart. Secondly, the Prussians have of late evinced a disposition to interfere in our domestic affairs—an attempt which has been naturally resented by a nation habitually jealous of its independence. Whether justly or not, public opinion in this country insists upon attributing to Prussian influence certain measures disadvantageous to ourselves and very serviceable to the Prussians. Of such measures we will only mention our former tariff, so detrimental to this country and so profitable to our neighbours; the predilection evinced by our custom-house and railway authorities for the Prussian Königsberg rather than the Russian Libau, quite as good a harbour as the other; the permission for the construction of a line between Lyck, in South-eastern Prussia, and Brest Litevski; and a variety of other similar facts.

It is likewise impossible to deny the existence of a Prussian party in our Baltic provinces, and the intrigues engaged in by this party. However much our Baltic Germans may dilate upon their former and present loyalty to the Russian Crown, the fact of their majority being good subjects does not exclude the existence in their midst of a small, high-born, and highly-influential fraction which regards the Esthonian soil it inhabits as a portion of the great Fatherland. This political fraction consists chiefly of noblemen, and is swelled by not a few pastors and scholars, who, by logical deduction, have satisfied themselves that this Russian province ought, and indeed does, belong to the great Germany of their dreams. Now we could well afford to look with indifference upon these paltry machinations, were it not that they are energetically advocated in that Prussia which styles herself a Power friendly to us. But as Prussia, though she was not at all times the champion of German unity, has, since the battle of Sadowa, become the idol of the Germans, and still more so of certain parties who are not Germans, though they consider themselves such, it is only natural that the intrigues of the Prussian party in the Baltic provinces should irritate the Russians against the Prussians; and this the more as we have always disliked those Prussians for their arrogant and haughty manners.

All we have said refers only to public opinion as represented by the masses of the people. As regards the policy of the Cabinet, this of course is altogether a different affair, and, as far as an outsider can judge in the present instance, it does not agree with the popular voice. As yet our diplomatic relations with Prussia are still as friendly as ever. But we are also on excellent terms with France; and there are some who think that to continue friends with both these Powers will not be possible for any length of time. Contemporary events, it is true, do not seem to confirm this anticipation. The dispatch to Russia of General Fleury, Napoleon's particular friend, and the hearty reception we gave him, were regarded as signs of intimacy between the Paris and Petersburg Courts, to be shortly succeeded by the conclusion of a formal alliance.

But, lo, instead of this expected consummation, the Order of St. George of the first class is conferred by the Czar upon the King of Prussia, and, as the Germans will have it, conferred for the King's gallant conduct at Sadowa. After this, all the West European press are at a loss what to make of our policy, and do not know whether we are going to side with Prussia or France. Without pretending to foresee the decisions of our Foreign Office, still we think we may say, that the Vice-Chancellor presiding over this department of the public service, having always come out with all the vigour of youth whenever called upon to vindicate Russian interests, will know how to preserve the independence of our policy, and to keep himself free from all prejudicial engagements until the moment for action arrives. The Russian people certainly sympathise with the French, not with the Prussians; but interests of state, as we are fully prepared to admit, make it desirable for us to live in peace with Prussia too. Should we ever have to choose between these two Powers, we shall in all probability ally ourselves with the one whose assistance can be of the most use to us in the East.'

From the whole tenour of these lines there can be no doubt that the choice of the *Golos*, and with it of the national party, has been already made. The *Golos* avows that it has no sympathy with the Prussians. It calls them arrogant and haughty. It goes the length of asserting that there are people in this country wishing to deprive Russia of her Baltic provinces—people numerous or influential enough to make the dissatisfaction prevailing in those provinces a matter of serious concern to their rulers. This insinuation can only aim at bringing about a rupture between the two neighbouring States. In reality neither here nor in the Baltic provinces has the idea of their absorption by Germany been ever mooted by any one of any notoriety in politics. If I am not very much mistaken, it has never been uttered by any one at all. The unwillingness of the *Golos*, too, to acknowledge that the Order of St. George was conferred for the victory at Sadowa, when the telegrams exchanged on the occasion leave no doubt as to this significant circumstance, shows the determined hostility so often evinced by the Russian national party to this country and its rising greatness.

At present the Emperor Alexander stands between them and the execution of their designs. Should the future see them victorious, it is, perhaps, not certain whether this will redound to the lasting benefit of their country.

DISARMAMENT PROPOSED BY NAPOLEON. RUSSO-FRENCH-EGYPTIAN DOINGS. THE BOMBARDMENT OF LONDON.

Berlin, January 8, 1870.

THE Paris correspondent of the *Golos* thus adverts to my intelligence concerning a proposed disarmament:

'A London telegram tells us that France has entered into negotiations with several Courts with a view to effect a general disarmament. I have been enabled to inform you that the object of General Fleury's mission to St. Petersburg was to pave the way for negotiations on this head.'

In another letter the same correspondent remarks:

'It is said here that General Fleury will not long remain at St. Petersburg, having entirely failed to fulfil his mission.'

On the same subject we read the following in a diplomatic communication to the *Moscow Gazette:*

'The promptitude with which the Court of the Tuileries has caused the report of a proposed disarmament to be contradicted only proves how earnestly the plan was then being pursued at Paris. Perhaps it is so even now.'

Even at an earlier stage of the controversy occasioned by my disarmament news, and before its accuracy was admitted by some inspired organs, the *Cracow Czas* confirmed its reputation for shrewdness by these pertinent remarks:

'From various quarters it is denied that France has made any proposal of disarmament. Of course this does not prove that the proposal has not been made. It is evident that if the proposition has been made and rejected, there may be a disinclination to admit the circumstance, lest the failure it implies renew warlike apprehensions. Not to speak of the other Powers, Napoleon himself, at present, is interested in appearing pacific in the eyes of his subjects, as the Opposition in France looks upon peace as indispensable to develop the new *régime* of constitutional liberty.'

Considering the important interests at stake, it is lucky that the long and complicated transaction of which the above proposal forms only a single episode should by fresh intelligence be rendered more and more intelligible. It has been already stated in these Letters that, when General Fleury first alluded to the advantages of a Russo-French coöperation in the East, the Court of St. Petersburg received his overtures with a marked reserve. Much as influential members of that Court wished to profit by the approaching fulfilment of their long-cherished hopes, the resolve to join France in the pursuit of their comprehensive schemes, and thereby indirectly place themselves in opposition to Prussia, was evidently attended with risk, and rendered caution indispensable. To temporise, therefore, appeared the more advisable, as the Egyptian question opportunely arising supplied a test by which to prove what reliance might be placed on the French. At first things went on smoothly enough. Russia, considering it to her interest to weaken Turkey, supported the Khedive. France, to give Russia an earnest of her friendly intentions, for a time backed this move, and so helped to encourage the ambitious vassal to resist the behests of his suzerain. But when matters came to a climax, and the Sultan threatened to resort to main force, the Tuileries shrunk from carrying on the hazardous game. As the Khedive, moreover, had shown himself incompetent to perform the heroic part assigned him, he found himself suddenly left in the lurch by the party he had principally counted upon. Not altogether to relinquish the cause, though they had abandoned the man, the Tuileries at the same time proposed to the Winter Palace conferences on the Egyptian question. But the Winter Palace did not relish this change of tactics. Declining the conferences, it subjected General Fleury to the same infliction as that sustained by the Khedive. It abruptly broke off negotiations with the discarded diplomatist. The

proposal of disarmament too, which General Fleury at this juncture placed in the foreground, to retain something which might on occasion be made available for resuming his task, was incontinently refused. Russia was sorely disappointed, and would listen to no fresh representations. Objecting to do business in this desultory manner, she gave up France, and a few days after this resolve made the well-known demonstrative declaration of friendship and amity to Prussia. What occurred on the Neva was only the Russian Rowland for France's Oliver on the Nile.

It is more than probable that matters having taken this turn, the Czar sincerely rejoiced at being able to give a token of his respectful affection to his royal uncle at Berlin. The feelings with which Alexander II. has always regarded William I. render, it is well known, a direct rupture between Prussia and Russia impossible, while the destinies of these countries are swayed by their present Sovereigns. Still, the danger of insensibly drifting into antagonism to Prussia by getting intimate with France had, under the circumstances, become too imminent not to make the Czar feel peculiar satisfaction in assuring King William that the dark cloud had passed away and all was right again. Well may it be believed that, though the Czar had thought it a duty he owed to his country to listen to what General Fleury had to say, still, when those suggestions came to nothing, he returned with new fervour to his old connection, and derived real pleasure from sending the Grand Star of St. George to his revered relative.

In Berlin the flattering protestations of Alexander II. were received with the utmost courtesy, all that had preceded being entirely ignored. Only a few days ago, when thanking his Generals for their congratulations on the new year, the King expressed himself as follows:

'As you have alluded to the distinction conferred upon me by his Russian Majesty, it is but fair for me to say that for the high military

Order I have received, as well as the telegram accompanying it, I am mainly indebted to you, who, by conscientiously performing your duties for so many years, prepared the army to fight and win the battle of Königgrätz.'

In its survey of the year's events the official *Provinzial Correspondenz* also alluded to the latest turn in Russian politics:

'The situation of Europe is eminently pacific, the endeavours of all Governments being alike directed to the one aim of preserving the blessings of peace. The North German Confederacy more particularly has from the first been an additional guarantee for the maintenance of international concord, and the various European Powers have become accustomed to the idea of letting Germany organise herself unopposed on the foundation laid in 1866. The latest events in the sphere of international politics have greatly contributed to this end.'

The latest events here alluded to are the Gallo-Russo-Egyptian doings. For the time being their favourable reaction on the safety of this country is indisputable; how long they will continue to exercise this influence is another question. We cannot but note the fact that, not at all discouraged by the recent wreck of its hopes, the Russian press continues to represent an alliance with France as the only rational policy of both Czar and Emperor. France, to be powerful in Europe, wants Russia; Russia, to fulfil her mission in the East, requires France. Such is the monotonous refrain of all their speculations on the state of the Continent. Cato did not more faithfully adhere to his *Cæterum censeo* than the press of the Russian national party—with very few exceptions, the entire press of the country—repeats its settled conviction that Prussia must be thrown overboard on the first favourable opportunity, and France admitted to fellowship. Prussia, to hear them, would have no reason to complain, were Russia to adopt such a course. Having failed to assist Russia in the East, and, by expelling Austria from Germany, directly contributed to augment the Czar's rivals in the coveted quarter, what right has Prussia to expect

amicable relations with her former ally of St. Petersburg? As regards England and her possible interference, the same candid organs are daily assuring France 'she need not hold back from the desired enterprise for fear of the British lion. That whilome dangerous animal was nowadays most effectively kept in check by Ireland and the United States, and entirely incapacitated from protecting Turkey, or, indeed, anybody else. People at New York were perfectly aware that they could solve the Alabama question only by bombarding London, and were only biding their time.'

We will not inquire whether it is in the interest of the Russian people to announce such intentions as these. We are the less inclined to be curious on this head, as we are fully prepared to admit their right to pursue any policy they think conducive to their welfare. But is this speaking like the ardent friends of peace they would wish to appear? Or is it not rather telling France that, notwithstanding all that has come and gone, she may still count upon Russia directly she can make up her mind to assist her through thick and thin? And are we not compelled to attribute a direct and practical significance to these suggestions, made, as they are, at a moment when the Sultan is trying to enforce his demands on the Khedive, and when the Khedive, on his part, is again bent on resistance? Would the Khedive refuse to deliver up his cuirassed vessels and chassepots as the Sultan asks, unless he knew that influential people in Russia even now wish to be able to do something for him?

However this may be, the Russians will have to wait for the fulfilment of their hopes. Whilst General Fleury failed at St. Petersburg, a change of Cabinet was preparing at Paris, and to-day we see France released from autocracy, and in the hands of a Constitutional Government. M. Ollivier as Premier, and Count Daru as Foreign Minister, can have no object in promoting the schemes of the Rus-

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sian national party. Bent on establishing domestic liberty, they require no war to divert their compatriots from the nobler task of civic reform. M. Ollivier, moreover, as appears from his letters published in the *Liberté* in 1867, is an enlightened friend of German unity, and, being convinced that it will and must be completed, will not help Russia in Turkey in order that he may have *carte-blanche* to prevent the consummation of the German hopes. Count Daru, having been selected by M. Ollivier, must be supposed to have the same leanings. His appointment was all the more joyfully hailed by the German press, as the nomination of M. de Lagueronnière, advocated a few days since by some of the Emperor's friends, would, owing to his antecedents, have been regarded as an implied menace against this country. As to Prince Latour, the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs, he, after the experience of the last three months, peremptorily declined to remain in office. But all this is over, and now that matters have taken such a happy turn, we can afford to be comforted by the proverb, 'All's well that ends well.'

Wise enough to let 'bygones be bygones,' the Berlin Government papers offer their best wishes to France on the advent of the new *régime*. That their congratulations emanate from a high quarter may be inferred from an amusing controversy which has just passed between the Berlin police and the proprietor of a much-frequented concert-room. Among the gaieties traditionally provided for the metropolitan public at Christmas there are transparencies, giving a review of the year's events in a succession of comic pictures. For many years past the Emperor Napoleon and his august spouse have been favourite figures in these exhibitions; and if the attitudes in which they were made to appear were not always classic, at any rate they were not without a spice of sarcasm. In permitting these cartoons to be presented to the public eye, the police were probably guided by the consideration, that while

Prussia was in the official Paris press daily treated as the natural enemy of France, there could be no harm in winking at the Berliners' painted retaliations once a year. But nothing is abiding. A fortnight ago the myrmidons of the law appeared at Kroll's, kindly informing the affrighted proprietor, that unless the effigy of the Empress were removed, they would prosecute. In his dismay the landlord offered a compromise, expressing his willingness to change the *outré* evening dress of the imperial lady for a warmer morning costume. With a few bold strokes of the brush this change of toilet was rapidly effected by a skilful artist; but, alas, it did not suffice. The police insisted upon the removal of the Empress altogether, including her husband into the bargain. The imperial couple was no longer to be at the mercy of Prussian caricaturists. Pacific M. Ollivier's accession to office had achieved a victory over the irreverent adepts of the pencil and crayon which all his bellicose predecessors had failed to accomplish.

Although at Berlin, Count Bismarck is still unencumbered with the cares of office. After the expiry of his furlough, a change which has recently occurred in the position of the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will considerably lighten the labours of the distinguished statesman. On the 1st of January the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intrusted with the diplomatic business of the North German Confederacy. At the same time, Herr von Thile, hitherto Under-Secretary of State, was appointed Secretary of State, and charged with the direction of the current business of the department. In consequence of this alteration, Herr von Thile will henceforth receive the foreign diplomatists, and likewise perform all the regular business of a Foreign Minister. The control over the now combined foreign department of Prussia and the Confederacy, as over all other branches of the Federal administration, remains with the Chancellor of the Confederacy,

Count Bismarck. The Count retains the title of a Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the diplomatic representatives of this country are accredited both as Prussian and Federal envoys, although receiving but one set of instructions in both capacities.

IMPROVED NEEDLE-GUNS.

Berlin, February 2, 1870.

FOUR battalions of infantry at Berlin and Potsdam have been armed, two with one sort and two with another of improved *zündnadel-gewehr*. Both patterns introduce the *tête mobile* and the caoutchouc ring of the chassepot into the chamber of the needle-gun; both shut the breech by a more simple process than that hitherto in use; both have a slight reduction in the calibre. Their differences have not transpired, but seem to consist in trifles of a delicate technical nature. Ordinary shots, with their cartridges in the pouch, have fired from twelve to fifteen times per minute with these new weapons, hitting the target at a distance of 400 paces on an average every other time. Practised shots, with the cartridges ranged on a table before them, are said to have reached the *maximum* of twenty-two rounds per minute—of course, without taking aim. Should either of the new weapons stand the proof of the wholesale test now going on, the entire stock of needle-guns will be altered to that pattern. If we are to believe military *savants*, the cost would be very small.

PRUSSIA NOT IN A HURRY.

Berlin, February 23, 1870.

In the speech with which the King a few days ago opened the North German Federal Parliament, there were certain passages which, in a tone of moderate hopefulness, alluded to the possibility of Southern Germany entering some future day into political reunion with the North. Buoyed up by this reference to a contingency unnoticed in last year's speech, the Liberals intended to move for an address which was to reciprocate the royal sentiment, and perhaps recommend that Baden (which might be had for the asking) should be immediately admitted to the national body politic. But they were given to understand, that to carry out this intention would only betray a want of tact. There was no prospect of existing international relations being soon modified in such a way as to permit the great work of reunion to be safely advanced another step. They might, indeed, elicit a patriotic reply from the ministerial benches; but as it would have to be very vaguely worded, why make a demonstration which certainly could do no good, and might do harm? In consequence of this caution, the idea of an address was abandoned.

Once more the Liberals have realised that the Government are in no hurry to complete the work of 1866; that, apart from other motives of a domestic nature, they sensibly prefer the maintenance of peace to accelerating the progress of the national cause at the risk of war; and that, if they speak of coming reunion, they are adverting to a question which—though under favourable circumstances it may be solved shortly—has yet been adjourned *sine die*. I cannot say that the Liberals are very much delighted with this prospect, or that their papers have allowed the ministerial caution to pass unnoticed. Still, as they are too judicious to risk the fruits of preceding victories merely

to hasten farther successes, sure enough of themselves, although perhaps somewhat retarded by prudent reserve, there is no doubt that the ministerial policy will prevail for the present. Now, as ever since the close of 1866, it is only foreign interference that could effect a change in these resolutions.

As appears from the above, the Government are quite as anxious not to provoke the national susceptibilities of the Ollivier Cabinet as they were to allay those of its professionally bellicose predecessors.

THE SOUTH GERMAN STATES NOT YET ADMITTED TO THE CONFEDERACY.

Berlin, March 2, 1870.

As you may remember, the Liberal majority in the North German Federal Parliament, at the instance of Count Bismarck, refrained from recommending to the King, in reply to the speech from the throne, the immediate admission of the Grand Duchy of Baden to the Bund. But, if so far yielding to the wishes of the leading Minister, still they thought it indispensable to recognise the patriotic willingness of the Baden Government and people to join the Confederacy at the first bidding. To give an appropriate expression to their sentiments, a motion was introduced by Herr Lasker, a leader of the moderate Liberals, praising the Baden Government for the truly national attitude adopted by it ever since, and even before, the war. Count Bismarck opposed this motion. At a time when the French Government are more pacifically disposed towards this country than during the last four years, the Count could not refer to the difficulties that might be raised by foreign Cabinets were he to cross the Main. Yet there is little doubt that he is not so very

certain on this head, and that he cannot help reflecting on what France, even in her present more amiable mood, would be tempted to do, should the reunion of all Germany be hurried on, in spite of all the threats formerly launched against the scheme, and but so very recently suspended. Unwilling to allude to this side of the question, Count Bismarck took his stand upon domestic ground. While admitting the desirability of replacing the offensive and defensive alliances which alone bind Northern to Southern Germany by complete political union, he yet contended that the day had not come for the national destinies to receive their final consummation. As to admitting Baden alone to the Northern Confederacy, this, he urged, would be inexpedient. Being the only portion of the South that wished to join, it was much better to leave it *in statu quo*, in order to convert its neighbours to the same way of thinking, than embody it with the North before the rest were ripe.

To this the Liberals retorted, that, the three Southern States having no political connection with each other, and being all equally weak, it was impossible for one of them to compel its neighbours to adopt the like policy with itself. The prevailing disposition in favour of unity, which had so long distinguished Baden, had had very little effect in promoting the same opinions in Würtemberg and Bavaria. On the contrary, the fact that, notwithstanding her readiness to join, Baden was not received into the national commonwealth, had tended to discourage the unity party in the other principalities of the South. But were Baden to become a portion of the Confederacy, the unity party in Würtemberg and Bavaria, which even now included the majority of the educated classes, would soon get the upper hand. The Würtemberg and Bavarian Governments, too, would then become sensible that separation was a thing of the past, and instead of relying for support upon the Republican and Catholic parties, which

were certainly anti-Prussian, but none the less anti-dynastic and anti-national, would be glad to secure another lease of power from the Confederacy, even though that power were somewhat curtailed in the process of adhesion. In addition to these arguments, hints were not wanting that the Government did not like to swell the Federal Parliament with Southerners, as this would make the Liberal majority perfectly overwhelming, and bring on a complete change in the system of government, instead of the gradual and not very numerous reforms at present conceded. After a lengthy oratorical display, Herr Lasker withdrew his motion, the more readily as its object had been partially obtained by the debate.

In the course of the discussion, Count Bismarck owned (what has been repeatedly stated in this Correspondence) that the Baden Government, through Herr Mathy, one of its members, asked for admission to the Bund as far as three years back, but was refused. The suspicion at the same time angrily expressed by Count Bismarck, that the present debate had been inflicted upon him at the request of the Baden Ministers, has since been contradicted in the official *Carlsruhe Zeitung*. However this may be, the debate was a demonstration of the national party in the North intended to raise the spirits of their Southern friends, and assure them of their active coöperation in the common cause. If it had no visible result, it would still be erroneous to set it down as entirely barren. One such exposition of the national yearnings may be impotent to influence the action of the Prussian Government; but if systematically repeated, the sum-total becomes a power in the State.

For such a rhetorical campaign the Liberal party are girding up their loins. It appears that the unity agitation, which had almost subsided since the war, is about to be resumed with a will. Government declining to advance at the pace the public desire, the latter evince a

growing disposition to urge them on. They do not count upon immediate success, and apparently only wish to keep the pot boiling. But whoever remembers that Prussia, not very many years ago averse from unity, was, partly by popular agitation, induced to face Austria at Sadowa, will not look upon such debates as the above as mere empty verbiage. It certainly took the people a twenty years' movement to send the Prussian army to the Bohemian battle-fields; but it will probably require much less time to enable them to accomplish the little that remains to be done for the reunion of 9,000,000 Southerners with 30,000,000 Northerners.

GRADUAL CONSOLIDATION OF GERMAN UNITY. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL PARTY MAKES FRESH ADVANCES TO FRANCE.

Berlin, March 9, 1870.

THE debate in the North German Federal Parliament on the advisability of admitting Baden to the Confederacy has led to an indirect exchange of sentiments between this and the French Cabinets. Count Daru, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, it appears, when conversing upon the subject with some diplomatists, took occasion to remark that, in enumerating the reasons which prevented his receiving Baden into the Bund, Count Bismarck might have as well referred to the Prague treaty of peace as forbidding such an arrangement. This utterance having got into the papers, Count Bismarck had it copied into the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, with a laconic sentence appended, to the effect that he certainly had not alluded to the treaty in question, nor did he think it necessary so to do.

The ministerial declaration is in keeping with all

that has previously issued from this Government. While refraining from any step in the direction of unity calculated to awaken the jealousy of neighbouring Powers, Count Bismarck, ever since the restoration of peace, has still insisted that, did he think it expedient, he would be legally entitled to include the whole of Germany in one body politic. As a question of policy, he has always loudly declared that he has no idea of proceeding to carry the national programme through just now; but as a question of right, he has been equally outspoken in asserting that there is nothing in the late treaties to hinder him. A more moderate platform than this France must not expect to see adopted by any present or future Prussian Minister. Uncommonly strong as his position is, even Count Bismarck's influence with Parliament would be shaken beyond the degree which it would be safe to venture, were he to put another interpretation on the Prague treaty than the one unanimously agreed upon by the German Liberals.

While complete reunion is as yet a mere matter of speculation, the preservation of the defensive and offensive treaties between Northern and Southern Germany is a thing of great immediate importance. On this point it is satisfactory to notice that the attempt of the Ultramontane majority in the Bavarian Chamber to cause those treaties to be virtually set aside by their Government has proved abortive. Prince Hohenlohe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who resigned because he would not do the bidding of the Ultramontanes, has been replaced by Count Bray, so long Bavarian Envoy at Vienna, who entirely approves his predecessor's sentiments on the point at issue. The change of ministry at Munich, then, which had already given rise to so many sanguine hopes at Vienna, and been regarded as a pleasing event even at Paris, does not imply any alteration in the policy of the Bavarian Cabinet. It has been caused merely by the unwillingness of Prince Hohenlohe to expose himself any longer to the denuncia-

tions of the wide-mouthed, but in reality impotent party, who have chanced to obtain a majority of a few votes in the last elections. As King Ludwig is too wise and too patriotic to meditate secession from this Government, and as he has the educated classes as well as the army on his side, the vaunted victory of the Ultramontanes will, after all, have little effect, beyond occasioning some more angry debates in the once so quiet kingdom of Wittelsbach.

Availing themselves of the advantage thus gained, the moderate Liberal, or, what is the same, the unity party in the South, have introduced an interpellation in the Stuttgart Chamber, designed to extend their victory from the Bavarian to the Würtemberg area. This interpellation calls upon Herr von Varnbühler, the Würtemberg Minister of Foreign Affairs, to state whether it is true that on some former occasion he declared the offensive and defensive treaties with the North would be only carried out by him in those wars in which he approved the policy pursued by the Prussian Cabinet anterior to the outbreak of hostilities. To those conversant with Herr von Varnbühler's antecedents, such an utterance cannot mean anything but that he will be guided by his antipathy to Prussia, whenever he is not restrained by his fear of Prussia. The moment of questioning him concerning his relations to this Government is not badly chosen. While there was a chance of his Bavarian colleague being superseded by an anti-unity man, he quietly submitted to the Bavarian Ultramontanes, in and out of their Chamber, attributing to him opinions very much like their own; but as soon as he saw how matters stood in the neighbouring kingdom, he inserted a few roundabout lines in his official organ negativing in ambiguous language that he had ever held the views imputed to him. The above interpellation will now force him to speak out more definitely on a subject the true bearings of which he has always striven to conceal under clouds of obscure and equivocal verbiage. Should he on

the present occasion adhere to his evasive tactics, it is certain that his official career will be at an end the moment the national movement acquires sufficient strength to compel the Prussian Government to insist upon the removal from office of its most inveterate enemies; whereas, in the opposite case, he will have to bind himself by the promise to remain true to the national interests, come what may.

The relentless antagonism King George has thought fit to offer this Cabinet after the restoration of peace threatens to deprive him and his descendants of the one inheritance they might have hoped to secure, even after the loss of Hanover. Irritated by all that has gone before, Prussia seems to be intent upon depriving him of the Duchy of Brunswick, which under other circumstances would have probably reverted to him on the demise of its present sovereign. So much is apparent from a step taken by the Prussian Government in relation to the Duchy in question. The other day the Brunswick Parliament, anticipating that annexation will shortly be their lot, and wishing to prevent the property of their State being swallowed up by the Prussian Exchequer, disposed of their government railways to a private company. But this transaction, to be valid, required the approval of the Prussian Government, the Brunswick railways in various places crossing and recrossing Prussian territory. On being sounded by Brunswick, Prussia at once replied that she had no objection to offer to the proposed transfer, provided the money received for the sale were by law appropriated to purposes which should benefit the country. This answer serves two objects: it strengthens the annexation party, already very numerous in the Duchy, and renders it impossible for the Duke to preserve the proceeds of the sale in the Exchequer. Otherwise the money, it is thought, would on his death have presented an easy way of indemnifying the King of Hanover for the loss of territorial inheritance.

Semi-official and independent Russian papers continue

to assert very pointedly that a Russo-French alliance is drawing near, and that, if concluded, it will lead to the Orient being handed over to the Czar, and Germany to the tender mercies of the Zouave and Chasseur de Vincennes. The most remarkable hint dropped occurs in no less authoritative a paper than the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the semi-official organ of the Russian Foreign Office. While denying that a pamphlet published at Paris on this fertile subject, under the title *L'Impasse Politique*, is the work of a Russian official, as had been stated in the Belgian papers, the *Journal* does not hesitate to express itself in a way calculated to awaken in the reader a conviction that even Prince Gortschakoff would prefer a good working alliance with France to any other connection he may be temporarily obliged to maintain. Improving on this, the semi-demi-official *Golos* hopes that, as soon as the domestic reorganisation of France has been completed, she will be in a position to make the long-desired overtures to her Russian friends. All this, of course, is idle talk for the present, as the future with its unborn events can alone decide upon a scheme of this delicate and comprehensive nature. Still, if such deliberate compliments are paid France so shortly after the explosion of the Fleury proposals, the tendency to come to an arrangement with the military power of the West must, indeed, be very deeply rooted at St. Petersburg.

The Powers have agreed that their Consuls at Scutari shall be commissioned to inquire into the controversy pending between Montenegro and Turkey concerning the right of pasture in the frontier district of Velye and Malo Berdo. We shall probably learn some future day why this dispute, which has been dragging on its tedious length for three consecutive years, has suddenly occasioned a concentration of Turkish troops, and bold announcements of resistance on the part of the Montenegrins, backed by Russian support.

M. OLLIVIER'S MESSAGE TO GERMANY.

Berlin, March 16, 1870.

M. OLLIVIER has commissioned a Paris correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* to publish in that paper a detailed account of the views he and his colleagues take of the present state of the German unity question. The Minister, the correspondent says, having begun by professing the most friendly sentiments for Germany and the fulfilment of her national hopes, continued in this wise:

'He attached the greatest importance to the strengthening of the amicable relations between Germany and France. On coming into office, he had taken care to drop the North Schleswig question, which General Fleury, with certain other matters intended to be utilised against Prussia, had mooted at St. Petersburg. Nor did he and the Cabinet in which he served object to the reunion of Northern and Southern Germany. Yet he felt it incumbent upon him to declare there were a good many people in France not reconciled to the political changes on the other side of the Rhine, and who, if Prussia were to use main force to push the Southern States into the Confederacy, might be strong enough to compel the Emperor to resist such an attempt. Only in the event of the Southern States voluntarily joining the North, would the French Cabinet be in a position to withstand the national demand for interference, and prevent French patriotism from opposing itself to the aggrandisement of the great and powerful Commonwealth on its frontiers. Such being the case, Count Bismarck's recent speech, in which he combated the proposition of the Northern Liberals to admit Baden into the Confederacy had given sincere satisfaction to the French Cabinet. If the German Liberals wished to escape French intervention, they could not be too cautious on this point.'

The French Minister must be thoroughly convinced that his susceptible countrymen will not, without opposition, suffer the unification of Germany to be completed, if he takes the unusual step of personally addressing a foreign nation and cautioning them through the medium of a leading journal. The hint that the admission of Baden might have created difficulties implies that it is not only the compulsory, but also the voluntary reunion of North and South which the French Minister fears might

tempt his countrymen to put in their veto. In the present mood of the Germans there is no danger of the correctness of this anticipation being tested; yet I should not wonder if the unity movement, which is gradually reviving, were to derive some additional impetus from this extraordinary utterance of M. Ollivier's. He does not seem to have considered, that if the French are susceptible, the Germans have a right to be equally so in what concerns their nearest and dearest interests.

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VENICE AND BOSNIA.

Berlin, April 16, 1870.

THE Crown Prince will leave for Carlsbad immediately after Easter. His early departure for the Bohemian spa is accounted for partly by the peculiar efficacy of the medicinal waters in spring, and partly by his wish to keep the summer free for other more agreeable engagements. There is nothing in the Prince's health to render the journey urgent, as has been conjectured in some papers.

Another disclosure has been added to the many previous revelations concerning the origin of the Seven Days' War. Luke Vukalovitch, the Herzegovinese rebel captain, now living under Russian protection at Odessa, has addressed a letter to a Belgrade paper, maintaining that to induce the Kaiser to cede Venice, France offered him Bosnia as a compensation. The Kaiser eagerly accepted the tender, but, by the unforeseen mishap of his defeat, was precluded from profiting by it. This statement, proceeding from a man with chiefly Russian sources of information, must be taken for as much as it is worth; yet it would seem to deserve being quoted. It not only agrees with the language held by certain foreign representatives in Bosnia immediately before and after the war,

but it also reproduces a version which, to judge from the Servian press, seems to be universally credited in those parts.

To the strong note of the Belgrade Government Turkey has returned as resolute an answer. In her reply, Turkey reserves to herself the right of determining the direction of her railways as may best agree with her own interests, without regarding those of her neighbours. If to connect her future railways with Western Europe she prefer a Bosnian line to a Servian one, she will construct it, notwithstanding all that may be advanced to the contrary at Belgrade; nor will she suffer herself to be addressed in such violent language as was used in the Servian note—language which would be improper on the part of a sovereign Court, and is doubly so when coming from a vassal State. Here the matter rests for the present; and the Turkish Government, having failed to get together the capital required for providing their empire with locomotion by steam, there would seem to be no immediate occasion for continuing the correspondence.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN PRUSSIA.

Berlin, April 23, 1870.

THE alteration of the needle-gun recently alluded to has been sanctioned by the King, in consequence of which the two or three millions of rifles in the possession of this Government will be remodelled. The improvements introduced aim at simplifying the loading, and increasing the force and range of the ball. For this purpose the caoutchouc ring of the chassepot has been adopted, which, helping to close the breech by spontaneous action, renders it unnecessary to press the valve down so tightly. In

addition to this the weight of the bullet has been reduced from 31 to 21 grammes, which, with the charge remaining at 4·9 grammes as formerly, augments the propelling force. To fit the reduced bullet for the old barrel, the *zünd-spiegel* has been proportionately enlarged; a proceeding the practicability of which was proved by a similar alteration adopted some time ago, and farther attested by a year's experiments with the weapon in its present form. On the needle-gun being first taken into favour in 1841, it had a bullet of 15·43 millimetres, which the heaviness and consequent want of speed observable in the missile caused to be soon reduced to 13·6 millimetres: this size has now been farther diminished to 12 millimetres. The total weight of the new cartridges being 32 grammes, instead of 40 grammes as heretofore, the soldier can carry 95 instead of 75 cartridges, without experiencing an additional burden. Of other alterations I will mention that the needle is made to move in a narrow hole, into which it fits exactly, instead of the wider one of the old gun, and that a piece of oiled paper is placed at the bottom of the cartridge to clean the needle after each discharge. By these improvements it is hoped to raise the needle-gun, which has the glory of being the first breech-loading rifle ever introduced into an army, to the latest requirements, and make it practically a match for its rivals. Though among these latter there are some with a bullet of only 11 and even 10 millimetres, it is contended that the advantage derived from this small calibre is of no practical use in the field, and that the Prussian rifle, in its new form, fires quite as rapidly and as far as the purposes of warfare require. That the alterations resolved upon are not very costly is owing to the ingenious construction of the *zünd-spiegel*, which admits of a small ball being shot out of a comparatively wide barrel.

While such careful attention is being devoted to the ordnance weapon of offence, the requirements of defence

are not overlooked. To protect the German shores, new forts have been and are being erected at Memel and Pillau. More forts are approaching completion at Graverort, north-east of Stade, at the mouth of the Elbe; at Cuxhaven, on the same river; in a locality called Kugelbank; and at Brinkhof and Langlütjensand, at the mouth of the Weser. The introduction of more formidable artillery has also necessitated the partial rebuilding of existing fortresses; a process to which Cologne and Mayence are to be immediately submitted. At Mayence the cost has been estimated at nine million thalers, four millions of which are covered by the sale of territory occupied by old works, now of no use. At Cologne about twelve millions are to be invested in the military works, part of which it is hoped will be made up from similar sources as at Mayence. That such large sums should be realised by these sales is accounted for by the old works being in the immediate neighbourhood of the places they defend, while the new redoubts, if they are to afford any protection against the modern wide-range artillery, must be constructed at a considerable distance from their respective towns. Expensive as the alteration is under any circumstances, it has this advantage, that populous and flourishing cities, hitherto hemmed in by a close girdle of batteries, will be permitted to breathe freely and extend their area unmolested. Of the two new *têtes-de-pont* on the Middle Rhine, the one at Hamm is nearly finished, while the other at Hochfeld, near Duisburg, does not seem to have made much progress. In Southern Germany, Germersheim, in the Bavarian Palatinate, has just been reinforced by eight new outworks, giving it absolute command of the Rhine; while Rastadt, in Baden, is being provided with rifled artillery, and some indispensable additions to the ramparts. Landau will be no longer regarded as a fortress in the strict sense of the term. Kehl, opposite Strasburg, is left unattended to for the present.

LEGISLATIVE RESULTS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, May 29, 1870.

UNPRETENDING, yet proud, is the speech with which the King of Prussia has closed the debates of the first Federal Parliament. By barely enumerating the laws enacted in the three years of its existence, the King amply proves the remarkable usefulness of the new legislative body. From its action will date a new era of the German polity. Originally established to deal with military and commercial matters, and supply the wherewithal to keep the new Commonwealth going, the Federal Parliament gradually extended its jurisdiction to nearly every department of social and political life. The requirements of German society had long demanded that the laws should become as uniform as the people for whom they were intended; and the Prussian Government, directly the Bund began to work, could not fail to perceive that nothing would so much consolidate it as to make it subservient to the wants of the people, and use the new Parliament for conferring upon them the long-missed benefit of common and effective statutes. Thus everything contributed to fulfil the great desideratum of common German laws, which shall be the same in all the various States of Fatherland, and restore to the nation a boon which, along with so many other valuable possessions, was lost in the religious wars of the seventeenth century.

In addition to this ultimate realisation of long-deferred hopes and the satisfaction it naturally creates, there is another circumstance to recommend the work performed by the Federal Parliament. The laws proceeding from it have not only validity on three-fourths of the national soil, but, what is equally acceptable, they are more liberal

than they would have been if passed by any of the State Parliaments of Northern Germany. The latter are mostly bodies of a Conservative cast, and, from the very nature of their composition, find themselves prevented from ministering to the requirements of this rapidly-progressing age. In Prussia especially, though the Lower House is liberal enough, all attempt at reform is habitually nipped in the bud by the existence of a Conservative body of Lords, who, it is not too much to say, would have sanctioned few, if any, of the important reforms for which the country is now indebted to the Federal Assembly. It is its limitation to one, and this an elective, House, which has saved the Federal representative body from too large an infusion of the stationary element; and it was the desire to do some real work in the interest of unity, and effect an agreement on pending questions, both with Government and the other parties, which caused the Liberals in the Federal Parliament to use their strength discreetly, and inclined them to the compromises unavoidably required in a society of temperate tone and feeling.

Nor have the State Parliaments suffered their authority to pass over step by step into the hands of the common legislative body without making attempts to hold their own; but, as Count Bismarck has given them repeatedly to understand, Prussia has no choice but to pursue the path she has entered on, and develop unity at the expense of local particularism. So the protest of the State Parliaments, alike unheeded by the Parliament and Government of the Confederacy, fell upon deaf ears, and had no power to arrest the natural progress of events. At this moment civil law, school law, and church law, together with the internal administration of the various States, are almost the only subjects left to the undisputed jurisdiction of the local Parliaments. Nearly everything else has been appropriated by the Federal House—a notable result after only three years' labour, and one more cal-

culated than anything else to prove the necessity of unity by the facility with which it is being carried through.

PRINCE LEOPOLD OF HOHENZOLLERN.

Berlin, July 6, 1870.

THE Prince Hohenzollern, mentioned in the Madrid telegrams as a candidate for the Spanish throne, is Prince Leopold, elder brother of the Prince of Roumania, and eldest son of the Fürst Hohenzollern, chief of the South German or Catholic branch of the royal House of Prussia. The Fürst, originally the Sovereign of the principality of Sigmaringen, wishing to promote German unity, abdicated in 1849 in favour of the King of Prussia, and has since resided at Düsseldorf, on the Rhine. He and his sons enjoy the reputation of being intelligent and highly-cultivated gentlemen, of Liberal politics; and as Prince Leopold, apart from his personal merits, is the husband of a sister of the King of Portugal, and has long been thoroughly acquainted with the state of the Peninsula, he seems to possess some of the necessary qualifications required for the occupant of the Madrid throne.

Still, it is very questionable whether he will ultimately accept the offer made him by Marshal Prim. The principal object of Prussian policy being to preserve peace with France, it is easy to foresee that the consent of King William will not be given, unless with the full approval and consent of Napoleon III. Should the latter object to the rule of a Hohenzollern on his southern frontier, when another and even greater monarch of the same dynasty has recently attained such influence on his eastern flank, Prussia is sure to decline the honour intended for one of her royal scions. In its present stage, and after the rebuffs sustained in so many other quarters by Marshal Prim,

the matter seems to resolve itself into the question whether Napoleon prefers the accession of a Hohenzollern to the continuance of the Republic at Madrid. With the exception of the Austrian dynasty, which has not been asked, as it is sure to decline replacing a Bourbon, all reigning families of Catholic faith have been applied to in vain. All this is at the present moment being discussed at Ems, whither the French Ambassador at Berlin and the Prussian Ambassador at Paris have hastened to confer with the King of Prussia. It may not be unnecessary to add, that the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family are very rich.

Austria is about to form a permanent camp in Bohemia, not very far from the Prussian frontier.

THE SPANISH PLOT.

Berlin, July 7, 1870.

PARIS papers, and among them some notoriously connected with official circles, call the Spanish nomination of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern the result of a Prussian intrigue, too bad to be put up with by the imperial Government. It is difficult to account for this language otherwise than by assuming it to be intended to pave the way for representing the failure of Prince Leopold—should failure be in store for him—as a defeat of Prussia by France. In reality nothing can be more foreign from Prussian politics than the idea of supporting Prince Leopold against the expressed wishes of France. Far from anything of the kind being contemplated, it is certain that the Spanish proposals will be accepted at Berlin only if not objected to at Paris. The reasons inducing this cautious reserve are as cogent as they are manifest. For Prussia to run the risk of wounding the susceptibilities of France, where there is nothing to be gained by it but the

placing one of her appanaged Princes on the unstable throne of Spain, would be paying a very high price for a very shadowy advantage.

In estimating the chances of Prince Leopold, it ought, perhaps, not to be overlooked, that although Hohenzollerns by name and descent, the Sigmaringen family are, in reality, nearer relations of the Bonapartes than of the royal House of Prussia. With the latter they have no connection, except by a common ancestor, who died many centuries ago; to the former they are allied by an infusion of Napoleonic blood into the veins of the living members of their family. Fürst Hohenzollern, the father of Prince Leopold, is the son of Princess Antoinette Murat; while the Fürstin, the mother of the candidate for royal honours, is a daughter of Princess Stephanie de Beauharnais, an adopted child of Napoleon I., who married a Grand Duke of Baden. As to the prudence of the Duc de Gramont, in his official capacity as French Minister of Foreign Affairs, using menacing language in his first public allusion to the matter, it would be superfluous to lose a word. Suffice it to say, that the Duke—whose feelings in regard to this country do not seem to have been much modified since the war of 1866, when he filled the important post of French Ambassador at Vienna—is not likely to succeed in complicating a matter which, in Berlin at any rate, is regarded with the utmost *sang-froid*.

I append a few personal details. Prince Leopold, the royal nominee, was born in 1835, and is a Colonel in the Prussian army. Since his marriage with a Portuguese Princess, a lady of great beauty and accomplishments, he has been in the habit of spending the winter at Berlin. For the summer he usually goes to Castle Benrath, his seat on the Rhine. He has three sons and one daughter. Of his three brothers, Charles resides at Bucharest; Anton fell on the battle-field of Sadowa, at the head of a company of the Guards; and Frederick lives at Düsseldorf

with his father. His elder sister was married to the King of Portugal, but died a few months after her arrival at Lisbon; his younger sister is the wife of the Comte de Flandres, the heir-apparent of the crown of Belgium.

The Emperor of Russia has conferred his 'high military Order of St. George' upon Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia for distinguishing himself against the Austrians, and also upon Archduke Albrecht of Austria for struggling in the same famous campaign of 1866 against Italy, Prussia's ally. A more even-handed division of sympathy it would be difficult to imagine.

FRANCE MENACES WAR.

Berlin, July 9, 1870.

SOME months ago, when the crown of Spain was first offered to Leopold von Hohenzollern, the young Prince sought counsel of King William, who advised him to refuse. Quite recently however, on the offer being repeated, the Prince received no similar warning, and, in consequence, accepted. What passed in the interval we know not. As it is the ardent wish of King William to pass the remaining years of his life in peace, the events of the intervening period must have been of a kind to reassure his Majesty as to the consequences of his relative's acceding to a request so urgently pressed upon him.* However that may be, the result of this change of policy has been highly unsatisfactory. Official France is in a ferment. Two of

* Count Bismarck is credibly related to have told many persons that General Prim was encouraged by the French Government to persist in offering the Spanish crown to Prince Leopold. The French Government, on the other hand, contended that they were entirely ignorant of the plan, and that the secrecy with which it had been pursued betrayed malice prepense. The following document, found in the Tuileries after the departure of the Empress

her principal Ministers have been menacing war to this country in a public sitting of their Chamber; and one, M. Ollivier, has actually allowed himself to allude to this terrible emergency while conversing with Prussian and other diplomatists at Paris.

No greater contrast to this injudicious heat can be imagined than the cool and collected attitude observed by the Prussian dynasty, Government, and nation. King William, now drinking the mineral waters at Ems, has simply telegraphed for his representative at the Court of the Tuileries; and instead of sending him back with a cutting reply to the provocations received, only begged him to prolong his stay in the delightful valley of the Lahn. Count Bismarck is quietly rusticating on his estate at Varzine, on the distant coast of Pomerania, giving no visible sign of life except causing his papers to assert that the affair is a purely dynastic one, and does not concern the national interests of Germany in the least. As to the independent press, it is evidently endeavouring to imitate the calmness of their official contemporaries.

'What,' the papers ask, 'does it signify to us whether or not the Spaniards select a Hohenzollern for their King? In no case do we derive benefit from it. If he accepts, he will in his politics have to consult the interests of his people, not our own; if, intimidated by French menaces, he declines, it is ourselves—it is the German nation—that will be taunted by the world with having succumbed to foreign threats. It being equally undesirable to go to war or to pocket an affront on his behalf, all we can hope is, that the Cortes will kindly drop him, and choose a less delicately-situated candidate in his place.'

Regent, and published by the Provisional Government, will enable the reader to judge the truth of this assertion:

'*Paris, November* 17, 1869.

'To the Emperor.—Sire, I have the honour to submit to your Majesty a confidential letter and two documents, discussing various candidatures for the Spanish throne. The writer says he would be satisfied with any intelligent prince, but in reality seems to prefer the Prince of Hohenzollern. The Emperor will, perhaps, think fit to order a report to be drawn up upon these documents.—I am, &c. DROUYN DE LHUYS.'

This is temperate enough, as far as it goes. Still one cannot help noticing the absence of any remarks to the effect, that to prevent a conflict the Prussian Government had better extinguish the whole affair at once by dissuading Prince Leopold from accepting the throne. With so pacific a people as the Germans, the omission of this, the most practicable advice, must have some very cogent ground. We are probably not far wrong in attributing it to the irritating language held by the French Ministers. If they were bent upon aggravating matters, and closing the door to a conciliatory arrangement, the constitutional advisers of Napoleon III. could not have acted with more injudicious rashness than they have done. Instead of showing firmness, if firmness in their eyes were necessary to protect their interests, they have begun by menacing; instead of first trying the effect of private warnings on the Prussian Government, they have been in a hurry to call it to order in the face of the whole world, and leave to it the only alternative of resenting, or submitting to, such imperious treatment. Hence the disinclination of the papers to advocate concessions.

It is to be hoped that, as the danger of a collision increases, the necessity for taking direct measures for obviating it will become apparent to the journals and the public generally; but as yet the press agrees in the opinion that, although the complication is certainly a most unfortunate one, it would be undignified to back out of it by obeying orders from abroad, and restraining the royal nominee from following the bent of his inclinations. A pacific issue of the untoward difference is, however, probable, as the Prussian Government may be credited with too much sense to permit a question of comparatively slight concern to the national honour, and of none whatever to the national interests, to degenerate into a cause of war and bloodshed. Though by persisting in their choice the Spaniards may keep men's minds in agitation for some

time to come, it is morally certain that if France really denies the right of her Southern neighbours to dispose of their crown, Prussia will ultimately content herself with protesting against this unjustifiable conduct, and retaliate by moral argument rather than physical force. Not to speak of what may be expected from the prudence of the Spaniards, then, the prospects of continued peace are based upon the possibility of France's recognising the independence of Spain, and the all but certainty of Prussia sacrificing her *amour propre* to her solid interests. In the mean time the Bourse is excited, but the public are not.

WAR.

Berlin, July 14, 1870.

SELDOM has the general aspect of the Continent undergone a more sudden change than occurred yesterday afternoon. Till twelve o'clock peace was regarded as certain. The King of Prussia, we were told, had caused Prince Hohenzollern to make the requisite concession. The Prince had withdrawn. The stone of offence was removed, and there was an end of the matter. At least apparently so, in the eyes of all just and equitable persons. But the world was out in its calculations. The peace-loving nations of Europe were destined to experience a disappointment than which none more bitter has ever complicated affairs of state. Reverting to the indefinite hints dropped by her representatives in the preceding stages of the negotiation, France declared herself not to be content with the mere retirement of Prince Hohenzollern. She now insists upon a public sanction of his retreat by the King of Prussia. More than that, she has asked the King of Prussia to engage at no future time to allow any member of his family to become a candidate for the throne of Spain.

Extravagant in itself, the way in which this demand was preferred rendered it still more offensive. To acquit himself of the ungracious message he had been instructed to deliver, the French Ambassador thought it decent to stop his Majesty as he was walking in the public gardens at Ems. There, in an alley filled with the pleasure-seekers of a German spa, with fashionable ladies and gentlemen gossiping a few paces off, and the eyes of the whole elegant crowd fixed upon them, the representative of France accosted the King of Prussia. Was he instructed to dispense with the ordinary forms of diplomatic intercourse? Or was the disregard of ceremony so painfully remarkable in his behaviour a blunder inadvertently committed by Count Benedetti, not an insult designedly planned and ordered by his Government? On an occasion of such vital importance, it is difficult to believe that proper respect is waived except by design. However that may be, the King, finding an exorbitant demand put to him in a most unbecoming manner, had to deal with the fact of the offence, not to examine into its cause. He acquitted himself of the duty of the moment in the dignified and gentlemanly manner for which he is noted. Quietly turning round to his adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel Count Lehndorf, who had retired a few steps when he saw the Ambassador approaching, the King said, 'Be kind enough to inform Count Benedetti that there is no reply.' While Count Lehndorf was doing his bidding, the King walked off. The gay crowd around stood aghast. They had seen enough to know that something serious must have happened; yet they were not prepared for the stunning reports that soon began to fly about.

In the afternoon the King sent his adjutant, Prince Radziwill, to inform Count Benedetti that he had just received a written communication from the Fürst of Hohenzollern, the father of the Prince, confirming the Prince's withdrawal from the candidature. Count Benedetti replied

by asking for an audience to reiterate the request of the morning. The King again declined to discuss the insulting demand put forward by the French Government.

The King immediately caused the affair to be telegraphed to Count Bismarck, who lost no time in publishing it. At 9 P.M. newsboys were to be seen in great numbers in the principal thoroughfares of this capital, distributing gratis a special supplement to the *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*. It contained a short paragraph, relating, in unpretending language and without any remark, what had occurred. The effect this bit of printed paper had upon the town was tremendous. It was hailed by old and young. It was welcomed by fathers of families and boys in their teens. It was read and re-read by ladies and young girls, and, in patriotic glow, finally handed over to the servants, who fondly hoped their sweethearts would be on the march by this time. As though a stain had been wiped out from the national escutcheon, as though a burden, too heavy to be borne for a long time past, had been cast off at last, people were thanking God that their honour had been ultimately vindicated against intolerable assumption. There was but one opinion as to the manly and worthy conduct of the King; there was but one determination to follow his example, and take up the gauntlet flung into their face. By ten o'clock the square in front of the royal palace was crowded with an excited multitude. Hurrahs for the King, and cries 'To the Rhine!' were heard on all sides. Similar demonstrations were made in other quarters of the town. It was the explosion of a long-pent-up anger.

The fact is, the French attempts to interfere with their domestic concerns have been strenuously resented by the Germans ever since 1866. The incessant objections of the French Government to the unification of their country could not fail to produce an effect even upon this peaceable and phlegmatic race. The continuous volley of

taunts fired against them by the Paris press necessarily penetrated at last even the impassiveness of the German temperament. True, if the French were ambitious enough to meddle with the affairs of a neighbouring and harmless people, the latter were too sensible to make mere wordy opposition a cause of international quarrel, while they thought they were in a fair way of overcoming it by facts. As long as they were steadily progressing towards unity, the Germans did not care whether their movements had the approval of France or not; as long as the French endeavours to form a league against them were frustrated by the dangers and difficulties of the enterprise, the Germans thought they could afford to overlook the hostile manœuvres in more than one of the European capitals. Yet they were keenly alive to the provocations from the other side of the frontier. Let discretion counsel unconcern ever so strongly, the offence given by the French in asking for the Palatinate, for Luxemburg, and the approaches to the Rhine rankled deep in the national mind. Let disdain struggle ever so much to stifle animosity, the threats persistently uttered in the French Representative Assembly kept the old sores open. Let people try to forget the past, the encouragement of the anti-unity party in the land by French diplomatists gave ever fresh cause of annoyance. After all, though the spirit may be willing, the flesh is weak; and while wisdom suggested reserve, conscious strength would sometimes rebel against the wholesome but somewhat tame advice.

Yesterday's outbreak released the feelings that had long lain hidden under an apparently calm exterior. In the first flush of excitement people absolutely felt relieved at the prospect of circumstances permitting them to fight it out. Thank God! they now could hope to unsheath the sword in a rightful quarrel. Their love of peace, till yesterday faithfully preserved even under the trying events of the past week, had been mistaken for

fear by a nation of an entirely different intellectual type. Their King had been affronted beyond endurance, and had given the only possible reply. The crisis had arrived. They yearned to prove the present error of the French in estimating their national character, to avenge past injuries and to obviate their recurrence, and the constant imperilling of peace, industry, and civilisation for the future. Everywhere last night the same sentiments were uttered, the same resolves announced. In all the clubs and taverns, in many a private house, people remained together nearly the whole night. Visitors would drop in at two A.M., eagerly imparting or asking for fresh intelligence. Only at break of day the streets assumed their usual aspect.

After what has passed, there seems to be little chance of the French Government retracting their excessive demand. They must have foreseen the answer, and been prepared to act upon it. If this be so, on what a slender thread has the peace of Europe been suspended even before this sudden squall! And how very nearly determined must the French Government have been for some time past to join issue with Prussia, if such a studied provocation is resorted to to hurry on the dread event!

It is all but certain that the South German States will stand by Prussia. Bavaria and Baden tendered an all but unqualified promise even before the scene in the Kurgarten at Ems. Würtemberg, which wavered till yesterday, has, after the latest proceedings of France, hastened to give in her unconditional adhesion to Berlin. National feeling is too strong even for the Würtemberg Premier, and that is saying a great deal.

The Crown Prince of Prussia will take the command of the South German armies.

FRANCE AND GERMANY.

Berlin, July 16, 1870.

France has declared war against Prussia.

It was wholly unexpected. With any confidence in the moral faculties of human nature it could not have been expected. However unfavourable an estimate may have been entertained of their character, men shrank from thinking the French Emperor and Cabinet capable of this.

But it is only too true. A race, whose ambition has been always greater than its respect for the independence of its neighbours; a race, whose love of glory has, unfortunately, been fed by the domestic divisions of Germany; a race which, in these latter days, has ventured to resent as an injury to itself the endeavours of this pacific people by reunion to emancipate themselves from foreign dictation—such a race has fallen into the hands of a few unprincipled persons, reckless enough to avail themselves of its foibles and prejudices for the consummation of a great international crime.

No doubt the agricultural and industrial classes of France are averse from war. But the millions are a cipher. They follow the direction of their betters. These, or, at any rate, as many of them as take any perceptible interest in politics, have in thought and speech so many years sinned against the freedom of adjacent countries as to prepare and actively promote the terrible result now before us. Well may they stand aghast at what their rash and arrogant desires have brought about. Well may they repent that, in their inability to maintain any but a military Government, they have tempted the Commander-in-chief of their army by war to secure a fresh lease of that martial obedience on which his greatness rests.

"The Germans will meet them in a spirit becoming the magnitude of the stake. Thanks to the incessant provocations of the French Government they have been thoroughly warmed to the work in hand. Since 1840, when M. Thiers asked for the Rhine frontier, all the successive Governments of France have treated them as a people whose political insignificance must be prolonged at any cost, if France was to be happy. They have long patiently endured the taunts and the wrongs inflicted by their neighbours. As is their habit, they did not much complain, while unable to secure redress. Of late they had hoped that in their steady progress towards unity they had already become too formidable to be wantonly attacked. They were also too confident in the civilised spirit of the age to suppose a self-respecting nation like the French would resort to bloodshed to prevent a neighbour from arranging his own concerns. Seeing that they have been mistaken in both these assumptions, they feel that a day of reckoning has come, and will do their duty with a will. As proud and patriotic men, they are resolved to avenge the past and make the future secure; as peaceful, industrial, and cultivated citizens, they cannot help looking upon the legions assembling on their frontiers as upon barbarians preparing for a *razzia*.

One determination to ward off and punish this crying sin prevails in all parts of Germany. In the North it is a stern desire for action; in the excitable South the feeling is a more fiery one, and if not universal, yet pervades such a vast majority of the people as to impose all but absolute silence upon the Ultramontanes, the Republicans, and other fractions of the anti-union party. Whatever remembrances of 1866 may have been lingering in the minds of the vanquished, they are now submerged in a common hatred of the insulting foreigner. Carried away by the current, the Bavarian, Würtemberg, and Baden Governments have already announced their formal resolution to

stand by Prussia, and join the Northern Confederacy for better for worse.

Napoleon evidently fancied the Hohenzollern affair would be regarded by the Germans as a mere dynastic quarrel, and the public mind would remain indifferent to a dispute affecting the royal family rather than the nation. But this supposition betrays a signal inability to appreciate motives. As though, after all the affronts offered by him to this country since 1866, there could be any quarrel between Napoleon and the King of Prussia which did not extend alike to the nation at large. As though, after an aggressive policy of two centuries, steadily pursued against Germany by the French, there could be war between the rulers, without appealing to the passions and interests of the ruled. It did not require Napoleon's unscrupulous conduct in suddenly jumping from peace to war to prove to the Germans that, though he might challenge their King, it was in reality themselves, their country, their property, and their independence that he aimed at. If anything had been wanting to inculcate this conviction, the insults heaped upon the King must have opened the eyes of the blindest. The scandalous scene at Ems will be long remembered in the world's annals. When Benedetti stopped his Majesty in the public promenade, he committed an offence which he knew to be unpardonable, and which he foresaw must bring matters to a crisis. War was his object, and he adopted most frivolous but certain means to bring it on. He coveted immediate conflict, having secretly armed beforehand, and he perpetrated an outrage sure to be instantly resented by the King, no matter whether his people were ready for the fight, or not.

Even this was not enough. To make assurance doubly sure, and render an adjustment utterly impossible, another and equally insolent act was devised by the French Government. On the 12th, the day before Benedetti's assault, the Duc de Gramont told Baron Werther, the

German ambassador at Paris, that France would not be satisfied unless the King of Prussia wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon, asking his pardon for what had happened. This letter, it was added, would be published forthwith, and must contain no allusion to the near blood relationship between the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family and the Bonapartes, because any such allusion would at the present juncture give great offence at Paris. Of course Baron Werther declined to deliver the message. I leave you to imagine the impression produced here by these exploits of French diplomacy.

Last night, when the King came back from his eventful trip to Ems, he was received with such a hearty ovation as has been but seldom witnessed in these sober latitudes. An aristocratic crowd thronged all the approaches to the terminus. All the way from the Potsdam gate to the palace the streets were filled with an excited multitude. Flags and illuminations increased the animation of the scene. A shower of wreaths and garlands welcomed the royal traveller, an unceasing volley of hurrahs accompanied him to his mansion. All the notabilities of Berlin society were on the pavement, mingling on this stirring occasion with the multitude, and rivalling them in patriotic shouts and other loyal demonstrations.

When his Majesty alighted from the carriage in which he had been seated with the Crown Prince, the hurrahs were deafening. He afterwards appeared repeatedly on the balcony, and on one occasion, it seemed, would have addressed the multitude, if anything like silence could have been restored. But as the National Anthem was intoned at one end of the square the moment the royal carriage was espied, and at its conclusion caught up by the crowd in some other part, there was no possibility of making his voice heard. The King looked majestic as ever, but with a melancholy shade overcasting his features. He had scarcely arrived when tables were brought out and placed

Unter den Linden, and loyal addresses, promising to lay down life and property for the country, signed *al fresco*. As a specimen of the spirit that has seized the masses, I subjoin a translation of one of these *impromptu* effusions:

'May it please your Majesty,—French impertinence has insulted our honour, and menaced, without the shadow of a pretext, the peace of Prussia and Germany. In this hour of peril, we beg to approach your Majesty, and to express the loyal and enthusiastic sentiments with which we face the impending war. As our fathers stood by the father of your royal Majesty from 1813 to 1815, so will we all devote our lives and property to the support and security of your throne. In return, we have but one prayer to offer: we beseech your Majesty not to sheath the sword till French insolence has been chastised and put down beyond the possibility of recovery, and Germany restored to its ancient grandeur.

Our cry is, "With God for King and Fatherland! Hurrah! At them!"

We subscribe ourselves faithfully, respectfully, and with every confidence in the future,' &c.

The above address was covered with many thousand signatures. There were similar demonstrations at Coblentz, Cassel, Göttingen, and other cities through which the King passed on his way home. Glowing addresses have been received from the municipal and mercantile corporations of Stettin, Breslau, Hamburg, and Bremen. The language of the papers in the new provinces, and even in Southern Germany, is quite as emphatic as in the old country. Leading articles in the advanced organs of the Opposition press sing the praises of the King, who has vindicated the national honour, and must be supported to the last drop of blood. Germany at this moment resembles a settlement in the Far West, where politicians of all shades of opinion suddenly waive their crotchets, and congregate at the cry, that a raid is being made against them. What a shame for Europe that such a foray can be undertaken on her Christian soil! What a disgrace for the nineteenth century and its much-vaunted civilisation!

The entire army is being mobilised. It comprises 315,000 Line, 300,000 Reserve, and 330,000 Landwehr,

to which must be added 80,000 Southerners, at the lowest computation. These figures, giving a grand total of 1,025,000 men, represent drilled and practised soldiers, effective and ready for service. The estimates on paper are much higher. The declaration of war has taken Germany by surprise. There can be no doubt that, meditating war for some time past, the French have secretly pushed their armaments. They will, therefore, be sooner ready than the Germans, and it is expected invade this country in several columns before a sufficient defence can be prepared. Thanks, however, to the excellent army organisation of Germany, this advantage will not last long. I am prevented from entering into details. Even if not forbidden by law, a proper respect for the safety of the country would restrain me from imparting military intelligence at the present stage.

The Federal Parliament has been convened for the 21st instant. Government will move for authority to contract a loan. Any amount asked will be forthcoming.

KING WILLIAM'S JOURNEY HOME.

Berlin, July 17, 1870.

FROM yesterday's west-country papers we see that all the way from Ems to Berlin the King's journey was a perfectly triumphal procession. Everywhere the stations were decorated with garlands of oak—garlands of the national tree, symbolical of German strength and solidity. Everywhere townspeople and villagers were assembled in unusual numbers to greet the King, and assure him of their loyal sympathy and regard on this solemn occasion. In many places addresses were presented to his Majesty; in some, where the train stopped long enough, gracious replies were elicited. At Cassel the King told the town-

council, who had come to place the lives and property of their fellow-townsmen at his disposal, that he was happy to meet with so much patriotism in the capital of a new province:

'I am going to Berlin to take the necessary steps to defend our honour and independence. We shall do our duty, and, with the Almighty's assistance, succeed. As long as I can count upon the fidelity of my people and the devotion of my troops, I can face the future with confidence.'

A similar scene was witnessed at Göttingen, where the professors, the students, and thousands of this formerly Hanoverian University lined the platform, and welcomed the royal train with hearty acclamations. In reply to an address of the authorities, the King expressed himself in the following terms:

'Thank you, gentlemen, for your sympathy and cordial assurances. You are right in saying that French insolence has attained to an extraordinary height. Things have, indeed, reached a pitch which renders a decision necessary. These are serious times; but as we cannot brook the treatment to which we have been subjected, we have no alternative but to vindicate our freedom and independence.'

Reports of a like nature reach us from Ems, where the Nassauers vied with the inhabitants of the old provinces in testifying their loyal sentiments; from Marburg and Giessen, where the Hessians, both annexed and unannexed endeavoured to show that, whoever their Sovereign, and whatever the State they belong to, their German patriotism remains the same; from Borsum, where the Brunswickers, arriving by extra trains, gave the King a glorious welcome; from Münden in Hanover, from Burg in Saxony, from Potsdam, and several other cities and villages on the line of route on to Brandenburg, the ancient capital of the province in which Berlin is situate. To augment the satisfaction with which this intelligence is read in the papers, we learn that the Hamburg merchants, assembled on 'Change, have voted a warlike address, accompanied with unanimous shouts of *Ja! Ja! Ja!* Martial ardour

must run high in the commercial emporium on the North Sea for such an outbreak to have occurred.

At Leipzig Dr. Biederman, the editor of a unity paper, was serenaded; and another gentleman of the press, of opposite tendencies, treated with attentions of a very different description. At Munich all the leading journals admire the dignified composure of the North, and preach a common crusade against a race whom, in true Southern style, they regale with epithets far more forcible than polite, such as assassins, cut-throats, and the like. Stuttgart, the centre of the anti-unity party during the last four years, has by the language of nearly all its organs openly espoused the national cause. In Baden, where instantaneous invasion is apprehended, the press is quiet. To make up for this silence, military preparations in that principality are carried on even more vigorously than in the rest of the South. Dresden is as excited as any Prussian town.

Such being the general aspect of the country in these last moments preceding the storm, it is only natural that the capital should not be frigid when the provinces are on fire. The tone pervading all classes in this ordinarily anything but enthusiastic city is truly sublime. I have already spoken of the reception given to his Majesty on his return. Yesterday the town-council adopted a warm address, and granted 150,000 thalers, to be expended in the purchase of horses, over and above the war taxes. Three days before they were called in, the men belonging to the reserve and the Landwehr were clamouring for enrolment at the doors of the army offices. Young men who have not yet attained the regulation age, and men who, having already served their time, might be exempt if they chose, are coming forward by thousands to share the honours of this the last great war the country is ever expected to have. Servants are running away, and tradespeople cannot trust their messengers to come back when

sent out on errands. Hourly trains are conveying their military passengers to the frontier, accompanied by the blessings and the tears of the relatives and friends they leave behind. The reserve and Landwehr being called in from all classes of society alike, business in this industrial city is completely paralysed by these numerous withdrawals.

One trade only flourishes at this moment. A universal change of costume has been made over-night. The uniform has superseded the black garb of the judge, the merchant's overcoat, and the mason's apron. All are engaged in the same sacred task, and the variety of professions is merged in the one engrossing business of the hour. If all families in the country are thus equally affected by the catastrophe, it is a comfort to think that an army composed of such elements has a fairer prospect of victory than the professional soldiers of France. Let parents complain ever so much that their sons have been filled with all the varied lore of a German university merely to face the 'miraculous chassepot,' they are nevertheless proud of contributing all that is nearest and dearest to them towards the defence of the country. Let sisters mourn and brides lament, there are none among them who would prefer to see their beloved ones holding back when so unjustifiable an attack is to be warded off. The more their hearts revolt from the horrors of war, the more do they acknowledge the necessity of crushing a neighbour capable of this.

With all their domestic sorrows weighing them down, the ladies are not idle in this decisive emergency. Already two societies have been formed by them to provide the army with refreshments not included in the ordinary mess, and to assist in the nursing and tending of the wounded. Subscriptions are pouring in. If it must be a melancholy sight for combatants, in the pride of youth and health, to see the hospitals prepared for the reception

of, alas, but too many of them, the anxious solicitude evinced on their behalf yet gives them an inspiriting foretaste of the enduring gratitude of Fatherland.

If Austria ever had any design to join France in the impending campaign, she will find it very difficult to do so now that Southern Germany has unanimously declared in favour of the North. In drawing the sword her only object could be to secure some sort of ascendancy over the South; but if she has first to fight the South, and that in alliance with France, whose very name has become a byword in Germany, no victory can be decisive enough for her to derive any permanent benefit from it. By common consent the war has been declared a national one, and the enemy an enemy of Germany and civilisation alike. What would it avail Austria in such a campaign to fight on the wrong side? By her revolting eagerness to bring on war France has in all probability deprived herself of every chance of Austrian support.

The hotel of the French Embassy here is protected day and night by the police.

All buoys and other sea-signals are being removed on the German shores. As the coasts are flat, and the water shallow, the danger of a hostile landing is considerably diminished by this precaution.

OPENING OF THE NORTH GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, July 19, 1870.

The North German Parliament was opened to-day by King William in person. His Majesty delivered the following speech from the throne:

'Honoured Gentlemen of the Parliament of the North German Confederation,—When at your last meeting I bade you welcome from this

place, in the name of the allied Governments, it was with joy and gratitude that I was able to bear witness to the fact that, by the help of God, success had rewarded my sincere efforts to meet the wishes of the people and the requirements of civilisation by avoiding any disturbance of the peace of Europe. If, notwithstanding this assurance, the menace and the imminence of war have now laid upon the confederate Governments the duty of calling you together for an extraordinary session, you, as well as ourselves, will be animated with the conviction, that in strengthening our national forces, the North German Confederation had no wish to imperil, but only desired to afford a greater protection to universal peace, and that if now calling upon the army to defend our independence, we only obey the mandates of honour and duty.

The nomination of a German Prince for the Spanish throne, both in the bringing forward and withdrawal of which the Confederate Governments were equally unconcerned, and which only interested the North German Confederation in so far as the Government of a friendly country appeared to stake upon its success the hopes of acquiring for a sorely-tried people a pledge for orderly and peaceful government—afforded the Emperor of the French a pretext for a *casus belli*, put forward in a manner long since unknown in the annals of diplomatic intercourse, and adhered to with that disregard for the right of nations to the blessings of peace of which the history of a former ruler of France affords so many analogous examples.

If Germany in former centuries bore in silence such violations of her rights and of her honour, it was only because in her then divided state she knew not her own strength. To-day, when the intellectual and political ties which began to be formed at the time of the Wars of Liberation are gradually joining, the more slowly the more surely, the different German races—to-day, when Germany's armament leaves no longer an opening to the enemy—the German nation has the will and the power to repel the renewed aggression of France.

It is not arrogance that puts these words in my mouth. The confederate Governments are acting in the full consciousness that victory and defeat are in the hands of Him who decides the fate of battles. With a pure conscience we have measured the responsibility which before God and mankind must fall upon him who drags two great and peace-loving peoples into a devastating war. The German and French peoples, both enjoying and desiring the blessings of a Christian civilisation and of an increasing prosperity, are called to a more wholesome rivalry than the sanguinary conflict of arms. Those who hold power in France have, by deliberate falsehood, found means to work upon the legitimate but susceptible pride of our neighbours, for the furtherance of personal interests and the gratification of passions.

The more the confederate Governments are conscious of having done all our honour and dignity permitted to preserve to Europe the blessings

of peace, and the more indubitable it is to all minds that the sword has been thrust into our hands, so much the more confidently shall we rely upon the united will of the German Governments, both of the North and South, and upon your love of country; and so much the more confidently shall we fight for our right against the violence of foreign invaders. Inasmuch as we pursue no other object than the durable establishment of peace in Europe, God will be with us, as He was with our forefathers.'

Previous to the delivery of the speech, on the arrival of the members of the Federal Council, Dr. Simson called for cheers for the head of the North German Confederation; an appeal that was thrice frantically responded to. The King read the speech in a firm voice, but displayed at several passages much emotion. He was often interrupted by loud cheers, especially when he spoke of the no longer divided Germany—a remark understood to allude to the coöperation of Bavaria. The other passages most cheered were the one referring to the peace-loving German people, and the falsehoods propagated to lead the French astray. At the close of the speech Baron von Friesen, the Saxon Minister, called for cheers for King William, which were repeated over and over again.

LETTER FROM THE QUEEN OF PRUSSIA.

'*Coblence, July* 19, 1870.

'To the inhabitants of Coblence!—In the last twenty years I have often resided amongst you. During this time you have by your loyalty proved to the King, our children, and myself by what firm ties we are united. It is always a sincere pleasure to me to return to you, because I appreciate the full value of our magnificent Rhineland. Gladly would I remain with you at the present juncture to aid you to the best of my ability, but serious duties call me elsewhere. In the patriotic enthusiasm of the German people we recognise the voice of God. The remembrance of former trials and of the blessings of the years succeeding them shows us how gracious God has been to this town. Trust in Him is the best safeguard in time and eternity.

Your confidence and the faithful observance of your duties will never fail. You know that in spirit we shall remain together. Therefore, with the help of God, we shall meet again.

AUGUSTA.'

THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM.

Berlin, July 18, 1870.

THE calm before the storm continues. No news as yet from the frontier. Though we know military trains to be traversing the country in every direction, nothing is heard or seen of the movements. Even to bid the soldiers farewell is impossible, owing to the rapidity and secrecy of their departure and transport. Not a battalion is observed marching in the streets, not a battery rattles over the pavement. Berlin at this moment of suspense is very still, very ignorant of what will occur next. Nearly all strangers have left post-haste; nearly all Berliners have returned from the watering-places and other rural resorts they are wont to frequent at this time of the year. But, full as the town is again of its wealthy and fashionable inhabitants, there is no visible indication of their presence. The Park is deserted; and where in ordinary summers a continuous line of elegant equipages is to be seen rolling past, not a wheel now breaks the silence of the leafy solitude. On Sunday, a day when pleasure-seekers usually abound in the environs of the metropolis, the sudden cessation of outdoor life was noticeable everywhere. Times are too serious for diversion, and people have withdrawn to their homes, to prepare for the eventualities of the war.

While such is the outward appearance of the capital, the tone of the public mind is getting more heated every day. No one who remembers Berlin this month four years ago can fail to notice the immense difference between the state of public opinion then and now. In 1866 there was a general disinclination to go to war with Austria, from a lingering feeling of relationship and the reminiscences of old alliances; at present scarce a person is to be found who does not long for the commencement of hostilities to avenge former injuries and recent affronts. 'In 1866,'

military officers will tell you, 'we did our duty because ordered to do it; in 1870 our hearts will be in the work, and we shall endeavour to do more than is asked of us.' The citizens, looking upon the quarrel from a moral rather than a military point of view, are still more exasperated than the professional defenders of the country. It is natural that it should be so. The remembrances of the past and the experiences of the present have alike contributed to bring about this result. However little a German may know of the history of his race, there are few unaware of the circumstances which gave rise to French ascendancy.

When, in the cause of Protestantism, Germany, 250 years ago, engaged in the most sanguinary war recorded in history, France stepped in and preyed upon the nation divided against itself. When, listening to the Jesuits, a popish Kaiser led his Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, and Slavonian subjects against the Protestants in his German provinces and those of his princely feudatories, France availed herself of the opportunity, and tore province after province from the body of the dilapidated realm. The disintegration of the German Empire consequent upon this internal conflict has now lasted 200 years. Nominally reunited at the close of the war, Germany has remained a divided country ever since. Broken up into a number of virtually independent territories, each strong enough to prevent joint action, but too weak to resist foreign attack, it became a football for its neighbours. Some appropriated portions of its territory; others were content with the gratification of humiliating so large yet so helpless a commonwealth. Impotent in the sphere of politics, it found difficulty even in developing trade and obtaining commercial treaties from more favoured nations; and such was its dependence on foreign influence in matters essentially domestic, that on more occasions than one Austria was able to stay the progress of its constitutional

life, while Russia, in a notorious instance, forbade all attempts at reunion.

Prussia, the largest of the German States, has certainly been a great and redoubtable Power for the last century. But still she was too much hampered by the jealousy of her petty allies to be able to improve the sorry condition in which the nation found itself. Notwithstanding Prussia's solidity, Germany remained a loose conglomeration of ill-connected States. Instead of thanking Prussia for the protection they had from her, many of the minor Sovereigns opposed and injured her whenever they could. Four years ago, things having become unbearable, Prussia at last cut the Gordian knot. Ejecting the all but foreign Austria, who had originally caused the split, she, amid the applause of patriotic Germans, united the *disjecta membra* of the nation into a compact whole. Hence the animosity of France. Was she to allow a change interfering with the delightful consciousness so long enjoyed by her of being the strongest? If France defeated divided Germany in the days of Napoleon I., was she now to permit an innovation which would for ever prevent a recurrence of that glorious success? And though the Napoleonic campaigns never brought her any tangible advantage, and ultimately resulted in defeat to herself, did she not experience the intoxicating sensation of victory, for a while at any rate? What matters a rout, if preceded by ever so short-lived an ascendancy?

It is a remarkable fact, and one curiously illustrating certain tendencies of the French national character, that though France has of late derived small practical advantage from the division of Germany, the mere idea that her reviving neighbour was no longer at her mercy so nettled her as to render the present attack possible. But the lessons of past and contemporary history have not been thrown away upon the Germans: they have realised the nature of their position, and are yearning for a change

which shall emancipate them for ever. The eruption must have come some day. By dint of continual teasing and taunting, there has long been formed in the German mind a latent substratum of anger. The events of the last few weeks have set this underground volcano in motion. Restless for several years, but hitherto content with emitting indignant puffs of smoke, it is now pouring forth its stream of liquid fire. If religion originally divided the Germans, patriotism has reunited them. If Catholic Austria kept them asunder, the sword of Protestant Prussia has forced out the wedge. If the centralised power of other neighbours formerly obstructed all attempts to gather the scattered forces of the country under one head, a sufficient stride on the road to unity was accomplished in 1866 to give a fair chance of completing the distance in the impending struggle. This latter contingency will be materially promoted by the appointment of the Crown Prince of Prussia to the command of the South German armies. It is a high honour conferred upon the Southerners, and will rouse them to do their best; it is a politic measure, which by placing one so much superior in rank above them will remove all petty jealousies between the generals; and it is a political move in the highest sense of the term, as it naturally paves the way for a closer reunion of North and South, should the issue of the war admit of it.

A report of Prince Radziwill, one of the King's adjutants, on the recent occurrences at Ems has been officially published. It mainly confirms my previous intelligence. There is, however, one interesting detail related in it which was previously not known — at least, not authentically. After the scene in the Kurgarten, Count Benedetti applied again for an audience, but received through Prince Radziwill the oral reply that the King had no wish to renew the discussion. Undeterred by this rebuff, the Count—but this is a fact not mentioned

in the report—was present on the platform when the King left. His Majesty responded to his salute without speaking.

Am I to continue the list of popular demonstrations given in my last, and lengthened by each arriving mail? Am I to recount that the Darmstadt official journal declares against France in the strongest possible expressions? that the papers of Cologne, Trèves, Aix-la-Chapelle, and other towns in the Rhine country denounce 'the criminal act of Napoleon in trying to piece together his tottering throne with foreign blood'? that the students of Kiel University have volunteered in a body? that at Hanover the Governor-General has been serenaded? and that at Bremen a merchant who dared to open his mouth against the King of Prussia has had his house demolished? In the old and new provinces, in Rhineland, Hanover, and Holstein, as well as in Brandenburg, Pomerania, and the far east, one idea has seized all classes of the population —that of securing rest from the alternate molestations and assaults of the French. So intense is the feeling, that even at Munich, the seat of Ultramontanism, the editor of a Romanist and anti-unity journal has had a narrow escape from being chastised by the mob. But it would occupy too much space to convey the entire catalogue of similar manifestations. If the Emperor Napoleon has somebody who veraciously informs him of what is going on at this moment in the country he intends to invade, he cannot be in a very hopeful mood as to the success of his enterprise.

According to the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, Strasburg is being armed, and furnished with enormous stores of munitions and victuals. The Emperor himself will probably take the command of the army of the Rhine, and have under him Marshals M'Mahon and Bazaine. Metz is likewise being armed, and maps of the country on the left bank of the Rhine are printed by reams in the War Office.

'The mouth of the Weser is being closed by sunken hulks. The export of arms and every variety of warlike material, including horses, coal, coke, hay, and straw, has been prohibited by the North German Confederacy. Like measures are expected on the part of the South German States. French merchant-ships will not be molested during the war. Those in Prussian harbours have been allowed six weeks' anchorage for discharging and receiving cargoes.

The following is the translation of an address to the German ladies by a Berlin ladies' committee, under the patronage of H.R.H. the Crown Princess Victoria:

'The hereditary enemy of Germany is on the point of once more invading our land. To destroy our honour and our property, our family life and our national existence, is his aim.

Ladies of Germany, the war before us will be a truly national war. The enthusiasm which animated our fathers in 1813 has been kindled again. Fathers of families relinquish wives and children, the son tears himself away from his mother and sister, and the lover from his bride. Whoever can carry a weapon follows the standard of his country, ready to enter the bloody strife, with God for King and Fatherland.

While our armies are taking the field, elated by the consciousness of a just cause, it is our duty to prepare to heal the wounds inflicted, and to relieve the destitution ever attendant upon war.

The permanent Committee of the Victoria Bazaar solicits the co-operation of the German ladies for this noble purpose. To take care of the wounded and to support the wives and families of the Landwehr men shall be the object of our exertions. We request subscriptions and donations of every kind.

We shall only be victorious, if we bestir ourselves; we shall only succeed, if the entire nation aids in the task. Let us be up and doing, and God will bless our labours.'

Committees in behalf of the wounded have also been formed in Bremen, Hamburg, Cologne, and other cities.

The Berlin official *Provincial Correspondence*, in an article upon the declaration of war, says:

'The paltry lying reasons given for this act show the wilful arrogance and thoughtlessness with which France has determined upon war. The Great Powers sought to restrain that country from its unjustifiable enterprise, while all foreign nations condemn the course she is pursuing. The

Prussian and German armaments are being carried on calmly, but diligently; and the German armies will very shortly march out ready for battle. Although the arming of the French has been going on for a long time, this advantage, thanks to the effective organisation of the Prussian army, will soon be counterbalanced. It is possible that the French will endeavour to secure a momentary triumph; but a first success will not decide the war. Germany may place full confidence in the leadership of her Commander-in-chief and his advisers. We intend to avoid all vaingloriousness, but we have no cause to be despondent.'

ADDRESSES.

Berlin, July 19, 1870.

MEETINGS have been held in several parts of Germany with a view to express popular opinion on the subject of the war. Abhorrence of the crime perpetrated by a foreign dictator, and the resolution to withstand this unprecedented act of aggression, were unanimously manifested at these gatherings. If you come to look a little closer at the names of the localities at which the meetings came off, you will have no difficulty in discovering why the towns in question should have been more eager than others to give a public and demonstrative utterance to their patriotism. It is worth noting that, with a few exceptions, the meetings were confined to places in which the anti-unity party muster in considerable strength. Thus the list contains Hanover, where the most aristocratic as well as the most humble inhabitants of the *ci-devant* capital cherish a lingering predilection for the old *régime;* Schleswig, where local interests are ever uppermost in men's minds; and Munich, whose ancient and justifiable pride revolts at the idea of being absorbed by a larger State and reduced to the position of a provincial town. The more notorious these places for the strength of the anti-unity party within their walls, the more anxious they were in

the present emergency to testify to their love for the common Fatherland. In Munich 15,000 people, nearly the tenth part of the inhabitants, went to the palace to thank the King for siding with the North; in Hanover the Guelphian party, called together by the leading paper of their decaying denomination, passed a vote repudiating the assistance of the foreigner for the realisation of their peculiar programme; in Schleswig the Particularists, in Brunswick the Socialists, and in Stuttgart the Republicans, were likewise prompted to declare that, though opposed to the present political arrangements of the country, they will not be outdone by any other party in defending its independence against all comers.

It is this marvellous concord between the various local and political fractions which will constitute the strength of Germany in the impending crisis; it is this political unity, already established before the first shot has been fired, which will render it exceedingly difficult for the enemy to effect his object, and restore that dismemberment so advantageous for his interests, so flattering to his vanity. Never, since the days of the Hohenstaufens, has the like been witnessed in the history of the land. National feeling may have been strong long after that date, and remained a living force down to the threshold of the modern times, when it evaporated in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: but there never existed such a willingness to merge local in common interests, and obey the dictates of the leading Sovereign, as in this memorable summer of 1870. By his mere declaration of war Napoleon has done more towards unifying Germany than in the ordinary course of things could have been accomplished in a generation or two. Having failed to draw the opponents of unity over to his side, his only hope of victory lies in the application of brute force, or, as M. Rouher more elegantly puts it, '*l'épée de la France.*' To ward off attack there is cer-

tainly something more needed than the mere resolution of those attacked to punish an iniquitous foe; but if the temper of the soul is an element of victory, as well as the temper of the blade and the mechanism of the rifle employed, the Germans have a fair chance of prevailing without a long and checkered struggle.

By way of illustrating and confirming the above remarks I will give you the text of some addresses and other utterances made public in the last few days. Energetic as may be the language in some of them, they faithfully reflect the tone of the hour. Yesterday the town-council of Berlin waited in a body upon the King to present to his Majesty the following address:

'Most powerful King, most gracious King and Lord,—During the past week the inhabitants of this city learnt, first with astonishment and subsequently with growing indignation, what occurred in the capital of France and in the rural retreat whither your Majesty had withdrawn for relaxation from the cares of State. At a moment of the most intense excitement your Majesty returned into our midst. We hastened to salute our beloved Sovereign on his arrival, and to thank him that he had visited with fitting reproof an unprecedented attack upon the dignity and independence of this nation. Immediately afterwards the news spread that war had been declared by France. We felt relieved at the reception of this intelligence. Following the manly example of our King, we made up our minds to face the events of the future and do our duty with firmness and fidelity. However distressing it may be to an industrious people, prizing the benefits of culture, to be torn away from the labours of peace to the sanguinary work of war, no sacrifice will be too great to ward off this assassin-like attempt on the independence of the nation and the integrity of its soil. Two nations, who might live harmoniously side by side, and rival each other in developing their institutions and increasing their prosperity, have been forced to a duel by a Government which cannot bear the idea of a united Germany on the borders of united France.

While lamenting the enormous crime perpetrated by the French Government, your royal Majesty and the German people may await the judgment of Heaven with a pure conscience. Once more Prussia and her German compatriots are called upon to engage in a war forced upon them with the same insolence as the one which many years ago united the German tribes for the accomplishment of a glorious feat of arms. But if long-suffering was then required to weld the German tribes toge-

ther, we may to-day justly congratulate ourselves upon meeting the first appearance of danger with a united front. Confidence in the solidity of the national commonwealth which we have at length established; confidence in your Majesty's direction of our united forces will inspirit our warriors as well as those who cannot enjoy the happiness of participating in the coming struggle, and must content themselves with aiding and assisting those in the field. We are prompted by our hearts at this critical moment to assure your Majesty that the citizens of your Majesty's capital are filled with a high sense of the duties incumbent upon them, and that they will face the future with courage, resolution, and the most patriotic willingness to make all sacrifices that may be required. Without indulging in any undue conceit respecting the future, we include our wishes in the one prayer—

God bless the King!
God preserve the Country!

THE BURGOMASTERS AND TOWN-COUNCIL.

Berlin, July 16, 1870.'

The King's reply was as follows:

'I thank you, gentlemen, for this sign of true civic patriotism, so comforting to my heart in these sad times. Your address contains all that it is right to call to mind on the eve of impending war. The struggle to which I have been forced by most unblushing demands will be a severe one. It is terrible to contemplate what we have before us. But God will protect the right. Though we cannot hope to have done with it so speedily as in the last two wars, we may yet have every confidence in our troops, whose patriotism as well as military skill has been tested on two previous occasions. Alas, many sacrifices will be required. With God's blessing we shall prevail. Let me thank you again and again for the manifestation of your loyal and courageous sentiments.'

While uttering these words his Majesty was moved to tears. Did the aged warrior remember the horrors of Sadowa while speaking to his lieges of Berlin? Did he recollect the ghastly sights of the field called glorious by the world, but which was sickening to those that have seen it? On more occasions than one in the four years that have intervened since that terrible day the kind-hearted old King has expressed himself to the effect that he would never go to war again, if he could possibly help it. Conscious of his pacific intentions, he hoped that his

determination to keep the peace would exempt him from the necessity of unsheathing the sword again. Along with the rest of the world, he has been mistaken. He had not realised the character of his principal adversary, and now finds himself driven to take up arms in self-defence. Is it to be wondered at, that the tears should have rushed into his eyes as he thought of the stern duties before him? that he should have cried aloud as he thought of the word of command which in a day or two he will be obliged to give—the dread word that will let loose the thunderbolt of war and unfetter all the dormant furies of the human breast? Is not a king a man? And in such an emergency as the present can he help remembering the men he has seen dropping down in the ripening fields, or writhing under hedges, and creeping in the last agony towards some distant brook? Must we not respect him if, instead of dwelling upon the pride and glitter of war, he recollects the heaps of corpses, the graves wide and yawning as an abyss, and, worst of all, the horrors of the hospitals and ambulances? Well may a king find it impossible to conceal his emotion with such prospects before him! Well may he be tempted to use strong language with regard to one who has left him no alternative but to surrender the independence of his people or to march them to the shambles! But the decision is drawing near.

The following is a fair specimen of the many addresses issued by public and private societies, corporations, &c. The Committee of the National Liberal party—the most numerous in the Parliament as well as among the people—have published a 'Proclamation to our Countrymen,' which runs thus:

'War has become inevitable. From the plough, the workshop, the office, and the study our brothers congregate to ward off an enemy that menaces the highest treasures of the nation. The army whose onslaught they are going to encounter is differently composed from our own. It

consists of mercenaries and conscripts, without any educated and well-to-do people among them. For this reason it is liable to be made a tool of by an unjust and frivolous Cabinet. Ever since the nephew of the Corsican obtained the throne of France by conspiracy, perjury, and every description of crime, his only means of concealing domestic decline has been to engage in foreign adventure. The French nation, humiliated at home, had to be reconciled to its fate by martial triumphs, flattering to its national vanity. Through cunning and force France was to be raised to an artificial supremacy over the rest of the world. To disturb the peace of Europe has ever been the only policy of Bonapartism, the vital condition of its existence. Since Louis Napoleon has ascended the throne, all his hypocritical assurances of pacific sentiments have never sufficed to give any one a firm confidence in the continuance of peace; since he has been reckoned among Sovereigns war has always been considered a mere question of time, and the utmost exertion of the industrious classes has been barely sufficient to cover the military expenditure of the various States. There is no country in Europe with which he has not meddled. He has quarrelled with all, menaced all. Even if a State allied itself to him, it was not safe from his treachery, as Italy experienced to her cost. The Poles were encouraged by him to rebel, only to be left to their terrible fate when it no longer suited him to play the part of patron. Neutral Belgium, German Luxemburg, and even some cantons of Switzerland, that tower of peace erected between contending nations, have at various times been the objects of his cupidity, and were only saved by the vigilance of the other Powers and their instinctive opposition to the immorality and mendacity of the Napoleonic politics.

As long ago as the Crimean war Napoleon looked out for a pretext for occupying the Rhine province. While we were fighting Austria he again had his eye upon the Rhine, and if we had not so quickly conquered, would have been down upon us and kindled universal war. Is it necessary to enumerate other instances of his disgraceful interference? Italy had to pay with two of her provinces for the French alliance; and at his hands, besides suffering many other indignities, was destined to provide the human bodies which first attested the efficiency of the "miraculous" chassepot. In Spain, French influence has long been the strongest impediment in the way of progress; and although the independence of nations has ever been pompously paraded by him, Napoleon assisted the slave-breeders in America, invaded Mexico, and in Germany calculated upon Austria being victorious. That he has been mistaken in this latter calculation, that the German people have at last found and are steadily marching on their way towards unity, makes him perfectly restless. It was no very becoming act on the part of French diplomacy, when we had defeated Austria, to come to us begging for a small douceur in the shape of a province or two to reward them for their evil-disposed neutrality; nor was it very honest on the part of the same

worthies to attempt to deprive us of our Italian ally by bribery and deceit. Again, it was France who, by her perfidious intermeddling, prevented us from imposing such conditions of peace upon Austria as would have extended the ties of national unity to the Southern States. In thus keeping them out from the Confederacy Napoleon hoped to make the Southern Sovereigns tools in his hands and traitors to Fatherland.

We submitted to his arrogance on all these occasions, as also when the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet, because we hoped to be able to avoid war. But his latest demands, and the manner in which they have been preferred, exceed everything that has gone before. To mask his domestic embarrassments, to save his throne, which would otherwise succumb to the hatred and contempt of his own subjects, the sanguinary adventurer has embarked in his last military job. In taking up the gauntlet thrown down to us we are actuated by a sense of honour, and also by a desire at last to free ourselves from the dangers and solicitudes of the fictitious peace we have endured so long. More injurious than open war, the armed peace we have submitted to has exhausted our resources, undermined our industry, stopped the advance of our culture, and, worst of all, kept us in constant dread of the sword suspended over us by a hair. In contending against the execrable system of Bonapartism, we shall be fighting, not only for our independence, but for the peace and culture of Europe. Unknown to the Germans is the lust of conquest; all they require is to be permitted to be their own masters. While protecting our own soil, language, and nationality, we are willing to concede corresponding rights to all other nations. We do not hate the French, but the Government and the system which dishonours, enslaves, and humiliates them. The French have been inveigled into war by their Government misrepresenting and calumniating us; but our victory will be their emancipation also. We are firmly convinced that this will be the last great war the German nation is destined to undergo, and that the unity of our race will be the result of it. The God of justice is with us. The insolent provocation of the French despot has done away with our internal divisions. The Main is bridged over even now. Party divisions are extinct, and will remain so as long as our united strength is required to overthrow the common enemy, the enemy of Germany and humanity alike. Inspired by the magnitude of the task before us, we are all united; a people of brethren, who will neither tarry nor rest until the great object has been accomplished.'

Not a few passages in the above document would make the reader imagine it proceeded from a Radical source. But its authors, the National Liberals, are the most temperate section of the Liberals in this temperate country, and, for the most part, include the wealth and

rank of the nation. If a class of politicians, whose sobriety has become proverbial in Germany, is moved to the epithets recorded above, you can readily judge what the language of the more advanced parties and of the entire press is likely to be. But is there need to refer to unofficial utterances, when to-day's speech from the throne is about the most candid and plainspoken document of the kind known to history? It was received with thunders of applause. There is no sum that the King may demand towards the expenses of the war that will not readily be granted to him by the Federal Assembly. Only yesterday the Hamburg State Parliament led the way by granting twice as much as was asked by the Senate.

General Fabrici, the Saxon Minister of War, has waited upon King William, to solicit for the Saxon army the honour of forming the van of the German forces. Only four years ago, in the campaign of 1866, the Saxon army was the most dangerous of all the enemies of Prussia.

THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

Berlin, July 20, 1870.

EXACTLY a week has elapsed since M. Benedetti stopped the King of Prussia in the Kurgarten at Ems. Still, contrary to common expectation, not a shot has yet been fired by the French. One would have imagined that a Sovereign resorting to such extraordinary means for bringing on war would have completed his preparations beforehand, and would have been ready to follow up the bark by the bite. Such, in fact, were the intentions of Napoleon; and if he desisted from them, his hesitation is due less to a fault in his original plan than to a sudden fit of caution. From information received here, there can be

no doubt that the Emperor immediately after the rupture meant to hurl the troops of Châlons into Central Germany, thus separating the North from the South, and rendering it more easy for the disaffected elements in the latter to side with him. But the marvellous rapidity with which a Prussian force was concentrated on the Rhine, and the cry of indignation which resounded from one end of Germany to the other when the news of his latest *coup d'état* in telegraphic terseness spread from city to city, from district to district, prevented him from carrying out his design.

It is well for Prussia that he has hesitated, and left her time to arm. The first troops hastily got together from the garrisons of the province were on the peace footing, with 400 men to the battalion instead of 1000. A week has passed, and no more than a fortnight is required to mobilise this Spartan land. Already a sufficient corps has been drawn together between Mayence and Cologne to meet the invader and stop his progress until the rest of the army can be put in fighting order. In a few days the last arrangements for the defence will be perfected, when the numbers continuing to pour in without intermission will soon enable the generals in command to assume the offensive, and turn the tables upon the enemy. In addition to this, the Army of the Rhine—another powerful host—is being drawn together in Southern Germany, chiefly consisting of Bavarians, Würtembergers, &c., but flavoured with a strong Prussian admixture. Provision will be also made against a landing, as well as against the diminutive gun-boats the French mean to float on the Rhine.

Respecting the movements of the French, their main body seems to be concentrated between Châlons, Metz, and Diedenhofen (Thionville). Near Saarbrück their patrols are seen in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier, and in some instances have already trespassed on German

ground. Yesterday they opened hostilities by capturing two custom-house officers stationed in a lonely guardhouse at Solsterhöh. On the two railway lines from Saarbrück across the frontier—the one to Forbach, the other to Saargemünd — trains have ceased running. Another French army, but which to a spectator on the German side of the Rhine has not yet attained such tangible reality as the first, is infesting the vicinity of Strasburg and Bitsch, with reinforcements approaching from the south-eastern departments. A smaller force is supposed to be collecting on the shores of the Channel, preparatory to embarkation for the Baltic.

The Prussian navy, being so very much inferior in strength to the French, will have to use the greatest caution in venturing to participate in the war. Four days ago three cuirassed frigates seem to have had a very narrow escape in the Channel. They were lying at Cadiz when the rupture occurred, and, being telegraphed to in good time, hastened home. Though awaited by the French, who knew they were coming, the swift vessels managed to thread their way through the Channel unperceived, and have safely arrived at Wilhelmshaven, on the Oldenburg shore.

Now that the declaration of war has been formally transmitted to Berlin, as many of the French Ministers to the minor Courts as have not yet taken their departure have had their passports delivered to them. The French Consuls resident in localities where military movements can be advantageously observed have been likewise requested to withdraw. Such, for instance, has been the case at Stettin. At the same time, another more serious measure has been taken by the Government. Having ascertained that the French Government is engaged in collecting a number of vagabonds of German extraction, such as may be picked up on the pavements of Paris, Lyons, and New York, and that these mercenaries are to act the part

of a Hanover legion, the Chancellor of the Confederacy has published a decree, commanding all North Germans serving in the French army to return home without delay. Those not obeying the summons, if taken prisoners, will be shot. The proclamation applies equally to German volunteers in the Algerian force—a class not very numerous, but which has never been entirely wanting since the first landing of the French in Africa. South Germans will experience the like treatment at the hands of their respective Sovereigns.

The Hanoverian masquerade is not to be the only farcical ingredient in the coming tragedy. A proclamation to the people of Germany will be issued by Napoleon III. upon crossing the border. In it that Sovereign, who has already done so much to develop the liberties of his people, will present himself to the world in the novel capacity of the emancipator of Germany. Ever disinterested, ever generous, his only object in taking up the cudgels is—so he will tell us—to free Germany from the terrible oppression of Prussia. In the tenderness of his heart he has not been able to endure any longer the sight of the cruel tyranny exercised so near his own happy land. He has girded his loins, buckled on the sword of righteousness, and come forth to smite the armies of the aliens. It is a fact that a document to this effect is being printed at Paris. It must also be a fact that the Emperor is either not informed of the state of Germany, or that he thinks he has no choice but to shut his eyes to existing realities, to stop his ears against the voice of the outer world, and take a leap in the dark. The Emperor Napoleon was brought up in Germany, and reads the language like a native. Let him take up any paper he chooses, and, with the exception of perhaps a dozen of the thousands published, he will find his politics, his government, and his personal character condemned in the strongest terms. Regardless of the possibility of imminent invasion, none

are more virulent than the journals of Cologne, Frankfort, and the Rhineland generally; none more determined than those of Hanover; none more plainspoken than those of the South, the very portion of the country he hoped would jump at the opportunity of destroying the North, and with it the bugbear of unity under a Hohenzollern.

The journals engaged in this crusade it would be impossible to enumerate: their name is legion. To mention those on the other side two lines will suffice. One published at Leipzig was discontinued yesterday, because the editor was in danger of being 'lynched.' Three others at Munich, all Ultramontane, and intended for the lowest classes of the population, are being continually seized by the police, and treated as beneath contempt by the rest of the Bavarian press. Three or four others, appearing respectively at Augsburg, Mayence, and Stuttgart, scarcely dare avow their sentiments, lest they should share a similar fate. And such a people a Napoleon is going to address and patronise into sedition! A people happy in the enjoyment of the liberties they already possess; sure to secure those they lack in the steady progress rewarding the labours of a manly and temperate race; and withal too proud and too sensible to expect the fruition of their wishes at the hands of a foreign potentate, and that potentate a Napoleon! It is an incredible but nevertheless an incontrovertible fact, that the Louis of 1870 mistakes the Germans of the present day for the innocent enthusiasts their grandfathers were at the time of the Napoleon of 1790.

Not wishing to weary you with details, I will confine to-day's patriotic catalogue to a few remarkable items. The Oldenburg Chamber has just been opened with a speech expressing the confidence of the Grand Duke that the unity of Germany will be secured by the present war. The towns of Thuringia have sent a common address to the King, placing the lives and property of

their inhabitants at his disposal. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce, including the wealthiest and most noted merchants of Rhineland, has assured the King that there is not a man in their province but will help to cure France of the insolent assumption that they would prefer becoming French subjects. The professors of Kiel University, but lately subjects of Denmark, are vying with the provincial Parliament of another annexed province, Nassau, in protesting their fidelity to the throne and country. At Cassel, only four years ago evacuated by one of the oldest dynasties of Germany, the Prussian battalions have become more popular than ever, and are greeted with acclamations whenever they show themselves. At Dantzic and Königsberg, though they are exposed to the danger of a hostile landing, the local corporations have assembled to contribute their quota to the addresses. At Halle the students have volunteered in a body; at Berlin, those too young to serve in the field are forming companies of ambulance men and hospital attendants. Nüremberg has raised its venerable voice; Iburg, a small place in Hanover, has offered a prize of a hundred thalers to him who seizes the first French standard; and Leipzig, the great emporium, has, through its Chamber of Commerce, petitioned King William to put down a neighbour whose jealousy and restless animosities will not permit industry to prosper. In addition to all this, and as an earnest of the resolutions expressed, considerable donations are flowing into the Federal chancery.

OPENING OF THE NORTH GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, July 19, 1870.

To-day the North German Reichstag was opened by his Majesty the King with the following speech from the throne:

"Honoured Gentlemen of the North German Reichstag, — When I bade you welcome the last time you assembled in this place, I expressed my cheerful thanks that my efforts to realise the wishes of the nation and satisfy the necessities of civilisation by preserving unbroken peace had, under God's blessing, been crowned with success. If a menace of war has now imposed the duty on the North German Governments of summoning you for an extraordinary session, you will fully share our conviction that the Confederacy has not sought to develop the power of the German people with a view to endanger the interests of peace; and that if we are now obliged to invoke the national strength to shield our independence, we are only obeying the commands of honour and the requirements of duty."

The Spanish candidature of a German Prince, the appearance of this Prince on the scene, and his subsequent withdrawal, are matters with which the Federal Governments had nothing to do; our interest in the affair being limited to the fact that the Government of a friéndly and much-tried country saw in this candidature the guarantée of a peaceful and orderly Government in Spain. The Government of the Emperor of the French has made these events a pretext, in a manner long unknown to diplomacy, for declaring war against Germany. Even after the original pretext has been removed, the Emperor's Government abides by this resolution with a contempt for the right of nations to enjoy the blessings of peace, of which we find analogous examples in the history of former rulers of France.

If Germany in former centuries silently bore such outrages on her rights and honour, she only did so because, disunited as she was, she did not know her strength. Now, when the ties of an intellectual and constitutional union, first knit by the war of liberation, are drawing the various States of Germany more and more closely together—now, when the defences of our country leave no loophole for a foreign foe to creep in — Germany has both the will and the power to repel the renewed insults of France.

It is no vainglorious feeling which induces me to speak thus. The Federal Governments and I myself act in the full conviction that victory and defeat lie in the hand of the God of battles. We have carefully weighed the responsibility which, before the judgment-seat of God and the tribunal of history, must fall upon the head of him who drives two peaceable nations, in the very heart of Europe, into a destructive war. The peoples of Germany and France, who both equally enjoy and desire the blessings of Christian civilisation and increasing prosperity, are called to a nobler emulation than the bloody rivalry of arms. Those who rule in France, by deliberately misleading the great nation which is our neighbour, have known how to profit by the justifiable, but sensitive patriotism of that country for the gratification of their own personal interests and passions.

The more deeply the Federal Governments feel that they have done everything compatible with honour and dignity to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and the more apparent it is to all impartial observers that the sword has been forced into our hands, the more confidently do I—supported by the unanimous approbation of all the Governments of Germany, of the South as well as the North—appeal to the patriotism of the people of Germany, and summon them to defend their honour and independence. In fighting for our freedom and our rights against the insolence of foreign invaders, we shall be following the example of our fathers. We have no other aim in this war than to secure a lasting peace for Europe. God will be with us, as He was with our fathers.'

PRUSSIAN REPLY TO THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR.

Berlin, July 20, 1870.

I SUBJOIN the Circular dispatched by Count Bismarck, immediately after the reception of the French declaration of war, to all the representatives of the North German Confederation:

'*Berlin, July* 19, 1870.

'The imperial Government of France have presented through their *chargé d'affaires* a document, of which you will find a copy enclosed, containing the declaration of war. This is the first and only official communication we have received from the French Government on the subject which has engrossed the attention of the world for the last fortnight.

The motives for the war declared against us are stated to be: his Majesty's declining to pledge his word that the elevation of a Prussian prince to the Spanish throne shall at no time hereafter take place with his consent; and the alleged notification to the Cabinets of our refusal to receive the French Ambassador and to negotiate farther with him.

To this we briefly reply: his Majesty the King, with perfect respect for the independence and autonomy of the Spanish nation, and the right of the princes of the House of Hohenzollern to decide for themselves, has never thought of trying to place the hereditary Prince on the Spanish throne. The demand of assurances from his Majesty with regard to the future was arrogant and unjustifiable. The assumption of a mental

reservation, or any hostile intention on the part of the King towards France, is a totally gratuitous invention.

The alleged notification to the Cabinets never took place; nor did we refuse to negotiate with the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French. The Ambassador never attempted to enter on official negotiations with his Majesty's Government on this subject. He merely introduced the question in personal and private conversations with his Majesty at Ems.

The German nation, within and beyond the Confederation, has come to the conclusion that, in preferring these demands, the French Government wished to subject us to a humiliation which the country cannot endure; and that, contrary to the desire and intentions of Prussia, war has been forced on us by France.

The whole civilised world will acknowledge that the grounds for war assigned by France do not exist, and are nothing but pretence and invention.

The North German Confederation and the allied Governments of South Germany protest against this unprovoked attack, which they will resist with all the means that Providence has placed at their disposal.

You are requested to give a copy of this despatch and the enclosures to the Government to which you are accredited.

BISMARCK.'

THE FIRST SHOT.

Berlin, July 21, twelve o'clock, 1870.

ON the 18th inst., the day on which the two custom-house officers were taken prisoners at Solsterhöh, a French patrol fired at a Prussian patrol near Forbach. Both these places are situated in the Saar country north of Metz. So the stone has been set rolling and the war begun. Who can tell where the last shots will be fired in the impending campaign? Where, when, and after the loss of how many victims?

In the mean time parliamentary, financial, and military preparations are in full progress. Yesterday the Federal Parliament unanimously voted an address in reply to the speech from the throne. As I find the telegraph can no

longer be depended upon for the complete transmission of documents of any length, I append a translation of the one in question. Calm, but resolute, the address runs as follows:

'Most powerful King, most gracious King and Lord,—The solemn words which your Majesty, in behalf of the allied Governments, has addressed to us find a responsive echo in our hearts. One thought, one resolve, pervades all Germany at this grave juncture. With proud satisfaction has the nation witnessed your Majesty's dignified attitude in rejecting a demand of unprecedented arrogance put forward by the enemy. Disappointed in his hope of humiliating us, the enemy has now invented a sorry and transparent pretext for levying war.

The German nation has no more ardent wish than to live in peace and amity with all nations that respect its honour and independence. As in 1813—in those glorious days when we freed the country from foreign aggression—we are now forced again to take up arms to vindicate our rights and liberties against a Napoleon. As in those well-remembered days, all calculations based upon human frailty and faithlessness will be destroyed by the moral energy and resolute will of the German nation.

That portion of the French people which by envy and selfish ambition has been seduced into hostility against us, will, too late, perceive the crop of evil sure to grow out of sanguinary battle-fields. We regret that the more equitably inclined in France have failed to prevent a crime aimed no less at the prosperity of their own country than the maintenance of amicable international relations in this part of the world.

The German people are aware that they have a severe and portentous struggle before them. We confide in the gallantry and patriotism of our brethren in arms, in the indomitable resolve of a united people to sacrifice life and treasure rather than suffer a foreign conqueror to set his foot on German necks. We confide in the guidance of our aged and heroic King, who, when a young man, more than half a century ago, warred against the French, and who, in the evening of life, is destined by Providence decisively to terminate a struggle he then began. We confide in the Almighty, whose judgment will punish the bloody crime perpetrated against us.

From the shores of the German Ocean to the foot of the Alps the nation has risen as a single man at the call of its allied Princes. No sacrifice will be too heavy for it to make.

Throughout the civilised world, public opinion recognises the justice of our cause. Friendly nations are looking forward to our victory, which is to free some from the ambitious tyranny of a Bonaparte, and to avenge the injury he has inflicted upon so many others. The victory gained,

the German nation will at last achieve its unity, and on the battle-field, held by force of arms, with the common consent of its various tribes, erect a free commonwealth, which shall be respected by all peoples.

Your Majesty and the allied German Governments see us and our brethren in the South ready to coöperate for the attainment of this object. The prize of the war is the protection of our honour and liberty, the reëstablishment of peace in Europe, and the promotion of the prosperity of nations.

With profound respect and in loyal obedience,
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERACY.'

Immediately after the passing of this address, and as an incontrovertible proof of its being more than mere words, a loan of 120,000,000 thalers was voted by acclamation. In neither case was there a discussion. As the sum granted is equal to a fourth of the whole Prussian debt, there is a significant eloquence in these figures which ought not to be overlooked by the observer of contemporary events. Smaller grants, but which in the aggregate reach nearly a third of the Federal loan, have in the last two days been likewise devoted to military purposes by the various State Parliaments and Governments of Northern and Southern Germany. In addition to this, there are the contributions of horses, cattle, and every description of corn and fodder incumbent upon the counties, and the burdens of the billeting system. Were it possible to ascertain the exact amount of these several items, the sum-total would be found to reach a tremendous height even now. Years of peace and the labours of generations will be required to replace the treasure so lavishly expended.

The same sitting of the Federal Parliament was made memorable by Count Bismarck giving a *résumé* of the late negotiations with France. Referring to a collection of documents which he said would be immediately laid before the House, the Chancellor of the Confederacy expressed himself to the following effect:

'Rarely, gentlemen, has any important event occurred in European

history where the documents have been of so scanty a description. From the French Government we have received but a single written communication in the entire course of the proceedings, and that was the declaration of war. (*Groans, hisses, and hurrahs.*) To bring matters to the pitch they have now attained, Count Benedetti had recourse to private conversations, which I need not tell you were a mere confidential interchange of opinion, and, from an international point of view, without any binding force. Apparently engaging in friendly chat with his Majesty, Count Benedetti endeavoured to extract declarations which, even had they been given, would never have had any official validity unless subsequently confirmed and ratified by the King in his capacity of Sovereign. But the firmness of his Majesty's character prevented any such declarations being made.

As to the documents to be submitted to you, No. 1 is a telegram to our diplomatic representatives abroad, in which we recounted what had passed at Ems on the 13th. It is the same telegram which has appeared in the public press. You are aware that this telegram has been represented by the French Cabinet, in a communication to the Legislative body, as a Note, and as a Note issued to announce our rupture with France. This telegram, the French Cabinet have actually told their Legislative body, constituted and proclaimed a breach of peace on our part, so that there remained nothing for them but to accept the challenge and go to war. After all that has preceded, you will scarcely expect me to comment upon this audacious perversion of facts. Suffice it to say, that the telegram was a mere statement of what had occurred, without a single remark appended. Nos. 2 and 3 are the reports of his Majesty's Adjutants respecting occurrences at Ems. They too have already been made public through the press. No. 4 is a report of Baron Werther, our representative in Paris, dated July 12. In it Baron Werther speaks of a conversation he had with Messrs. Ollivier and De Gramont, who asked him to communicate to me their demand, that his Majesty should write a letter of apology. My reply to our Ambassador (No. 5) was, that he had no doubt misconceived the meaning of the French Ministers, and that he had better desire them to put their demand down in writing and have it communicated to us, through their Ambassador at Berlin. No. 6 is a letter from Lord Loftus, the British Ambassador here, in which, in the name of a friendly Government, he kindly offered me his good offices in mediating. No. 7 is the German translation of No. 6; and No. 8 my reply, likewise in German. As this latter document has not yet been published, and as it will show that we were moderate and pacific to the last, I will read it to you at once:

"*Berlin, July* 18, 1870.

"I have hastened to bring to his Majesty's knowledge your Excellency's letter of the 17th, suggesting that Prussia and France should

request the good offices of a friendly Power for the maintenance of peace; and stating the readiness of the British Government to take such mediatory steps, should they be desired. His Majesty commanded me to express to your Excellency his sincere gratitude for your friendly and humane endeavours to avert from two nations the calamity of a war which must become alike injurious to the prosperity of all Europe. His Majesty desires me to add, that his sincere love of peace, so well known to the British Government, makes him ever disposed to enter upon negotiations calculated to secure the maintenance of peace on a basis compatible with the honour and national self-respect of Germany. Were France to declare her readiness to enter upon such negotiations, we should be happy to avail ourselves of your Excellency's proposal. France has taken the initiative for war, and has held to it even after the first complication had, in the eyes of England, as well as in our own, been virtually removed. After this, and considering the intense excitement caused in Germany by the French menaces, were we to take the initiative for the negotiations intended to be set on foot, our motives would be liable to be misunderstood. Our strength lies in the resolve of the nation to vindicate its honour, its rights, and its national dignity; as to the French Government, it has proved itself tolerably independent of any such feeling among its subjects. Thus acquitting myself of his Majesty's commands, and requesting your Excellency to bring his Majesty's views to the knowledge of her British Majesty's Government, I avail myself of the opportunity, &c. BISMARCK.

"His Excellency Lord Augustus Loftus."

The French Government declined to entertain the British proposal of mediation. No. 9 is the French text of the declaration of war, already known through the public journals. Then follow two circulars of the Federal Government to its representatives abroad, giving a brief account of the events which have led to war. The whole collection is already in the printer's hands, and will, I hope, be forthcoming at once.'

These communications were received with alternate laughter, groans, and cheers, according to the import of their varied contents. Though there was little new in them, yet to hear from the lips of the leading statesman this account of one of the strangest transactions that has ever occurred necessarily produced a deep impression upon the House. A similar, but more circumstantial, account has been laid by Count Bismarck before the Federal Council, and fully approved by the latter.

France has addressed an *ultimatum* to the States of

Southern Germany. It leaves them the option between neutrality, in which case their territory is not to be touched, or war, when they will be treated with the utmost severity. The Emperor also protests that he has only gone to war for the benefit of Germany, and without any selfish wishes for aggrandisement. In reprinting this modest assurance the *Darmstadt Gazette*, the official organ of the Hesse Government, feels itself called upon to add that only 'a born idiot' (*gimpel*) would trust the Emperor of the French. For the authorised organ of a royal Government this is strong language to use with respect to another Sovereign; but it only reëchoes public opinion, and is a verdict alike approved by peasant and king in this country. I do not know whether the Southern Governments have thought it necessary to return any answer to the summons received. Having formally declared their adhesion to Prussia, and that they will remain true to the offensive and defensive alliance permanently binding them to the latter, there was hardly any occasion for them to answer a query the mere preferring which was a slur on their good faith.

The official *Provinzial Correspondenz* says:

'The armament of Prussia and the whole of Germany is proceeding with as much quiet confidence as zeal, and it will soon be sufficiently advanced to permit the German armies to take the field either for attack or defence. France, which had long been preparing, seems for the moment to be in advance of us; but it is to be hoped that the excellent organisation of our army will soon enable us to overtake her. It is possible that the French may endeavour to gain a few cheap successes from their momentary advantage; but these will have hardly any effect on the results of the approaching war. The Germans may confidently depend on the cautious leadership of their Commander-in-chief and his experienced counsellors.'

Seven o'clock.

The Germans never having been excited by so unanimous a feeling as at present, it is only natural that their press should utter the same sentiments. North and

South, Radical or Conservative, Prussian or Suabian, whatever paper you may take up, you find the like tone prevailing in its articles. Intense hatred of Napoleon and his supporters, mingled censure and compassion for the French, and the determination to put an end to a state of things which exposes to the periodical recurrence of massacres a pacific, industrious, and highly-cultivated race—such are the contents of the thousands of leaders that have been composed on the distressing topic of the day. To my thinking these articles are a sign of the times, and should be noticed by politicians. All being pitched in the same implacable key, they may be said to reëcho the outcry of an entire people.

By the most strenuous exertions, Rastadt, Mayence, and the other fortresses on the Rhine have been rapidly armed, and though perhaps not entirely ready, may now be considered safe. Troops leave Berlin daily, and volunteers continue to come forward out of those sections of the population either too old or too young to be amenable to conscription, or passed over in the more lenient days, when armed peace had not yet become an institution of the land.

With an eye to future events, it may not be superfluous to notice that the Poles openly sympathise with the French. Fanciful and hasty as their politics have ever been, the Poles have rarely committed a greater or a graver error than in the present instance. Without benefiting France in the least, they expose themselves to the resentment of the Germans, and at the same time irritate Russia, by once more advertising their 'dreams.' Is not the Czar's '*Pas de rêves, Messieurs,*' enough for them? Must they needs court a repetition of the same crushing phraseology from another quarter? French emissaries are continually cropping up everywhere, and not a few of them in Posen.

ROYAL PROCLAMATION RESPECTING THE OBSERVANCE OF A DAY OF FASTING AND PRAYER.

'In consequence of a wanton attack, I am forced to draw the sword, and shall resist the enemy with all the forces at the disposal of Germany. It is a great comfort to me, before God and man, that I have not in any way provoked this catastrophe. I am conscious of being innocent of this war, conscious of the justice of our cause. It is a hard struggle that awaits us, and one which will impose heavy sacrifices on my people and the whole of Germany. But I prepare for the battle lifting my eyes up to the omniscient God, and praying for his omnipotent assistance. I have cause to bless his name for the unanimous feeling which, since the first warlike rumours, has pervaded all German hearts—a feeling of indignation at the unjustifiable aggression perpetrated, and of joyful confidence that God will give the victory to the just cause. My people will stand by me in this struggle as they stood by my father, now resting with God. They will bear with me every sacrifice, in order to restore peace to the nations. From my youth I have been taught to believe that all depends on the blessing of God. In him I trust, and I call upon my people to have confidence in him. I humble myself before God in acknowledgment of his mercy, and I am sure that my subjects and countrymen will do the same with me. I appoint Wednesday, the 27th July, as a special day of prayer and devotion in the churches, with abstention from all worldly occupation and work, so far as the pressing necessities of the times admit. At the same time I order that a particular prayer be offered to God, during the progress of this war, whenever divine service is performed, that God may bless our arms and grant us his grace; that we may treat our enemies as Christians ought to do; and that he may lead us to a lasting peace, by which the honour and independence of Germany shall be insured.

WILLIAM.

Berlin, July 21, 1870.'

SPEECH OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

On July 21 the Emperor received the members of the Legislative body for a final audience. The President, M. Schneider, addressed his Majesty as follows:

'Sire,—The Legislative body has terminated its labours, after voting all the subsidies and laws necessary for the defence of the country. Thus the Chamber has joined in an effective proof of patriotism. The real author of the war is not he by whom it was declared, but he who rendered it necessary. There will be but one voice among the people of both hemispheres, throwing the responsibility of the war upon Prussia, which, intoxicated by unexpected success and encouraged by our patience and desire to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, has imagined that she could conspire against our security, and wound with impunity our honour. Under these circumstances France will know how to do her duty. The most ardent wishes will follow you to the army, whose command you assume. Anticipating the duties of a maturer age, your son will learn by your side how to serve his country. Our army, accustomed to carry the noble flag of France, is backed by the whole nation ready to recruit it. Leave the Regency without anxiety in the hands of our august Sovereign the Empress. To the authority her great qualities command will be added the strength of the liberal institutions so gloriously inaugurated by your Majesty. Sire, the heart of the nation is with you and with your valiant army.'

The Emperor replied:

'I experience the most lively satisfaction on the eve of my departure for the army at being able to thank you for the patriotic support which you have afforded my Government. War is justifiable when waged with the assent of the country and the approval of the country's representatives. You are right to remember the words of Montesquieu, that "the real author of war is not he by whom it is declared, but he who renders it necessary." We have done all in our power to avert the war, and I may say that it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decisions. I confide to you the Empress, who will call you around her if circumstances should require it. She will know how to fulfil courageously the duty which her position imposes upon her. I take my son with me; in the midst of the army he will learn to serve his country. Resolved energetically to pursue the great mission which has been intrusted to me, I have faith in the success of our arms; for I know that behind me France has risen to her feet, and that God protects her.'

FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

THE following is a complete translation of the official Circular just issued by the Duc de Gramont to all the diplomatic representatives of France in foreign countries:

'*Paris, July* 21, 1870.

'Sir,—You are already acquainted with the series of facts which has brought us to a rupture with Prussia. The communication which was made by the Emperor's Government on the 15th of the present month to the great bodies of the State, and of which I have sent you the text, acquainted France and Europe with the rapidly succeeding steps in a negotiation in which, in proportion as we increased our efforts for the maintenance of peace, the secret designs of our adversary determined to render them impossible became evident. Whether the Cabinet of Berlin considers that war is necessary for the accomplishment of its long-cherished plans against the independence of the German States, or whether, not satisfied with having established in the centre of Europe a military Power formidable to all its neighbours, it desired to profit by the strength thus acquired to disturb definitively and for its own advantage the international equilibrium, the premeditated determination to refuse to us the guarantees most indispensable for our security as well as for our honour has been plainly manifest in the whole of its conduct.

This, without doubt, has been the plan devised against us. An arrangement mysteriously prepared by unacknowledged agents would, had it not unexpectedly come to light, have brought affairs to a point at which the nomination of a Prussian prince as a candidate for the throne of Spain would have been suddenly revealed to the assembled Cortes. A vote carried by surprise, before the Spanish people had been allowed time for reflection, would, it was hoped, have declared Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern the heir to the sceptre of Charles V. Thus Europe would have had to face an accomplished fact; and speculating upon our deference to the great principle of popular sovereignty, it was calculated that France, notwithstanding a passing displeasure, would yield to the ostensibly expressed wishes of a nation for whom its sympathies are so well known.

Immediately upon becoming informed of the danger, the Emperor's Government did not hesitate to denounce it to the representatives of the nation, as well as to foreign Cabinets. Against this manœuvre public

opinion became its most legitimate auxiliary. Impartial minds everywhere have not failed to comprehend the real state of things. They have quickly understood that, if we were deeply affected at finding ascribed to Spain, for the exclusive benefit of an ambitious dynasty, a part so little in harmony with the loyalty of that chivalrous people, so little in conformity with the instincts and traditions which unite it with us, we could not entertain a thought of departing from our constant respect for the independence of its national resolutions. It was felt that the unscrupulous policy of the Prussian Government was the sole cause of action. It was that Government, in fact, which, not holding itself bound by the common law, and despising the rules to which the greatest Powers have had the wisdom to submit, sought to impose upon hoodwinked Europe so dangerous an extension of her influence. France has taken up the cause of maintaining an equilibrium—that is to say, the cause of all nations—threatened as she is with the undue aggrandisement of one royal House. In acting thus, is she, as it is sought to impute to her, acting in contradiction to her own maxims? Assuredly not. Every nation, we declare it with pleasure, is the mistress of her own destinies. This principle, strongly maintained by France, has become one of the fundamental laws of modern politics. But the rights of each nation, like the rights of each individual, are limited by the rights of others, and it is not permissible that one nation, under the pretext of exercising its own sovereignty, should menace the existence or the security of a neighbouring nation. It was in this sense that one of our great orators, M. de Lamartine, said, in 1847, that when the choice of a Sovereign was to be made by our neighbours, we had never the right to assert claims, but had always a right to exclude pretensions.

This doctrine has been admitted by all Cabinets in circumstances analogous to those in which we were placed by the pretensions of the Prince of Hohenzollern, and notably in the Belgian question of 1831, and the Greek questions of 1830 and 1862. In the affair of Belgium the voice of Europe has spoken, for it has been the great Powers which have decided upon it. The three Courts which took in hand the cause of the Greek people, being animated by a regard for the general interest, agreed, among other points, that the throne of that country should not be accepted by any Prince of their families. The Cabinets of Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, represented at the Conference of London, imitated that example, and laid it down as a rule to govern the conduct of all Powers which should be engaged in a negotiation that might affect the peace of the world, thus rendering a solemn homage to that great law, the equipoise of strength, which forms the basis of the European political system. In vain did the national Congress of Belgium, despite the resolution, persist in electing the Duc de Nemours. France adhered to the engagement she had entered into, and refused to accept the Crown brought to Paris by the Belgian depu-

ties. But in her turn she insisted upon others practising the same abnegation as herself, and required the exclusion of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, who had been proposed as a rival candidate to the French Prince. In Greece, on the occasion of the last vacancy of the throne, the Emperor's Government opposed the election either of Prince Alfred of England or of another Duc de Leuchtenberg. England, recognising the weight of the considerations adduced by us, declared at Athens that the Queen would not authorise her son to accept the throne of Greece. Russia made a similar declaration respecting the Duc de Leuchtenberg, although, by reason of his birth, that Prince could not be absolutely considered as a member of the imperial family. Finally, the Emperor Napoleon spontaneously applied the same principles in a note inserted in the *Moniteur* on September 1, 1860, disavowing the pretensions of Prince Murat to the throne of Naples.

Prussia, which we have not failed to remind of these precedents, appeared at one moment disposed to yield to our just demand. Prince Leopold withdrew his pretensions, and there was reason to hope that peace would not be disturbed. But this hope soon gave place to renewed apprehensions, and subsequently was superseded by the certainty that Prussia, without seriously withdrawing any of her pretensions, simply sought to gain time. The language, at first hesitating and then decided and haughty, held by the head of the House of Hohenzollern, his refusal to pledge himself to maintain in the future the renunciation he had sanctioned in the past, the treatment of our Ambassador, who was by a verbal message denied all farther communication for the furtherance of his mission of conciliation, and finally the publicity given to this most unusual proceeding by the Prussian journals and by the notification of it that was sent to all the other Cabinets,—all these successive evidences of aggressive intentions have removed all doubts even from the most prejudiced minds. Can there be any illusion when a Sovereign who commands a million of men declares with his hand upon his sword-hilt that he chooses to be guided by his own judgment and circumstances?

We were thus brought to that extreme point which a nation, conscious of what is due to herself, cannot pass over with due consideration to her own honour. If the later incidents of this lamentable controversy do not sufficiently cast light upon the projects conceived by the Cabinet of Berlin, there is one circumstance, little known until now, that gives a decisive significance to its conduct. The idea of placing a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern upon the throne of Spain was not new. Already, in the month of March 1869, it was mentioned by our Ambassador at Berlin, who was immediately instructed to make Count Bismarck understand in what manner the Emperor's Government would regard such an eventuality. Count Benedetti, in several interviews which he had upon the subject both with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation and with the Under-Secretary of State charged with the direction

of Foreign Affairs, never permitted it to be doubtful that we could never allow a Prussian Prince to reign across the Pyrenees. Count Bismarck on his part declared that we had no reason to trouble ourselves about a combination which he himself deemed to be unrealisable; and during the absence of the Federal Chancellor, at a moment when M. Benedetti was impelled to show himself incredulous and pressing, M. de Thile pledged his word of honour that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not and could not become a serious candidate for the crown of Spain.

If the sincerity of such positive official assurances could be suspected, diplomatic communications would cease to be a pledge of European peace, and would become nothing but a snare and a danger. Thus when our Ambassador forwarded these declarations, under all reserve, the Emperor's Government thought it proper to receive them favourably. It refused to doubt their good faith until the day came when of a sudden the combination of which they were the striking negation became obvious. By thus violating her pledged word, without even attempting in any way to release herself from it, Prussia addressed a defiance to us. Looking at the value attaching to the most solemn protestations of Prussian statesmen, it now became our imperious duty to protect our loyalty against future deceptions, and to require a positive guarantee. We therefore were bound to insist, as we did in fact insist, that a renunciation which hitherto had been surrounded by subtle distinctions should at last be definitive and substantial.

In history the Court of Berlin will bear the responsibility of this war, which it had the means of preventing, but which it determined to make against us. And under what circumstances has the Berlin Court sought this conflict? France, during four years, has given proofs of the greatest moderation; France has abstained, perhaps with too much indulgence, from invoking against Prussia treaties concluded through the mediation of the Emperor himself—treaties from the wilful forgetfulness of which have arisen all the acts of a Government which considered itself released from these obligations at the very moment of subscribing to them. Europe has been the witness of our conduct, and has contrasted it with that of Prussia. Let Europe now pronounce upon the justice of our cause. Whatever may be the fate of battle, we await without uneasiness the judgment of our contemporaries, as well as that of posterity.

GRAMONT.

FRENCH NON-OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

On July 23d a French correspondent sent the following letter to the *Times:*

'The Emperor's proclamation to the French people, which appeared this morning in the *Journal Officiel*, does not, and could not, furnish any new light. It is just the kind of composition that was to be expected from him under present circumstances; and yet it is difficult to read it without deep emotion; and it will go far, I fancy, to sober many among us who, up to this time, have hardly realised the importance of the struggle on which France is entering. Animosity against Prussia had vented itself so long in words; it had become such a constant habit with Frenchmen of all classes to speak of some future day of reckoning with our upstart rival as a matter of necessity; the provocation of our Government had been so hasty after all, and the impulse to applaud it so irresistible among the majority, that even after war had been officially declared, the dire importance of the fact scarcely came home to most minds.

Never were the destinies of a nation staked so lightly. When M. de Gramont informed the representatives of the French people, in that memorable sitting of the 15th, that France was going to war, one might have supposed from his tone and attitude that he was asking Parliament for a grant of a few thousand pounds to carry out some artistic work, or make some new boulevard. With one hand in his pocket, and without a trace of emotion disturbing his handsome features, this docile servant of the Empire announced the rupture of the peace of Europe. With scarcely more apprehension of its importance was the reckless deed applauded by the Parliament and the press. It afforded relief to a very strong national feeling, and little else was thought of at first. Most Frenchmen had been fighting Prussia in imagination for the last four years, and giving her the lesson her presumption deserved; the imagination, the longing, had been so strong, and the reality for some days was so intangible, that the transition from the one to the other was scarcely felt. Moreover, incredible as it may appear to English readers, though a fight with Prussia for military supremacy was not only admitted but desired, war with united Germany—a battle of nations—was never contemplated by the vast majority of Frenchmen.

There was an all but universal impression—which even the Government appears to have shared—that we should find allies in Southern Germany and in those provinces which Prussia so violently annexed. A trace of this belief will be found in that paragraph of the Emperor's pro-

clamation which speaks of the desire of France to respect and promote the independence of the German peoples. Napoleon must know now that these are empty words; but in this respect, as in another of which I will speak presently, his proclamation is a remarkable embodiment of national feelings and national delusions.

It is almost incredible, as I said, that on a subject like the state of public feeling in Germany, on which it was so essential to be accurately informed, such universal ignorance should have prevailed here. Now and then, indeed, a paper with German affinities, scientific or religious —such as the *Temps*, for example—has warned the public not to trust to German quarrels for furnishing French alliances in the hour of need. But the information thus furnished has been quite powerless to destroy the pleasing delusion that an invading army would be hailed as liberators. In vain it was urged that a few Ultramontanes in South Germany who hated Prussia, especially as a Protestant Power, or a few Radicals,' &c.

THE FIRST DEATH.

Berlin, July 23, 1870.

THE first death has rapidly succeeded the first shot of the campaign. On the exposed strip of territory south of Saarlouis a German sentinel, on the morning of the 21st, was fired at by a French vedette. Having missed, the Frenchman stepped back and reloaded; but before he could discharge his second shot, the Prussian ball had put a stop to his farther participation in the campaign.

Respecting the advance of French cavalry on German soil some more interesting particulars have been received. On the same morning of the 19th, a little before dawn, the alarm was given at Saarbrück. A battalion of the 4th regiment of infantry and three squadrons of the 7th Lancers immediately hastened to the frontier in support of the pickets on patrol. They found a regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique established on this side the border ditch. No sooner did the French espy the Germans than they

began advancing at a slow pace, firing from a distance too great to be dangerous. The Germans let the enemy approach a little nearer, when, forming two squadrons into a column of attack, they charged at a gallop. On this the enemy, who had been hallooing all the while, turned round, and effecting a hasty retreat, was pursued a good distance into France. Though the encounter was bloodless, the troops who had the honour of effecting this first repulse were greeted with loud acclamations on their return to Saarbrück. Two Zouaves have been taken prisoners in the same neighbourhood.

As you may remember, the French declaration of war was addressed to Prussia exclusively, the Paris Government not condescending to notice the fact of the permanent national alliance subsisting between Prussia and the other States of Germany. This oversight has been corrected by the parties slighted. All the Southern States, themselves taking the initiative, have declared war against France, on the ground of her attacking the national territory, which they are by treaty bound to defend. The Northern States, forming members of one commonwealth with Prussia, will, without any special declaration, consider themselves at war with the enemy of their principal associate. In consequence of these steps all the French Legations have left Germany.

In Berlin some of the members of the Embassy asked for permission to stay during the war. It was of course refused. A day or two before his departure Baron Stoffel was assaulted in the streets, and but for the interference of the police might have received serious injury. There is a report current in the town that Baron Stoffel has had not a little to do with the outbreak of the war. In his capacity as military *attaché*, he is said to have urged the Emperor to undertake the raid before the improvement of the needle-gun, now going on, was effected.

As regards the disaffection the French suppose to prevail in the annexed and minor States, it would be useless to lose a word after the events of the last week. The mention of to-day's items will be sufficient. In Bavaria, a Chamber with an Ultramontane majority has voted a loan of 6,000,000 florins, to be expended in supporting Prussia and in equipping the Bavarian army for fighting under Prussian command. A similar vote is about to be given by the Würtemberg Chamber, the leader of the Republican and anti-Prussian party in the House having in yesterday's discussion declared it a patriotic duty to waive all domestic controversy and combine against the foreign foe. Both at Munich and Stuttgart monster meetings have been held to thank the respective Sovereigns for espousing the national cause without delay, and thereby preventing Napoleon from executing his original plan of invading the country the day after the scene with King William at Ems. Another meeting, convened to indorse a glowing address of the local town-council to King William, is reported from Dresden. Whoever knows what the bitterness of public feeling against Prussia was at Dresden four years ago, will regard this address and this meeting as striking proofs of the change that has occurred. Whatever their domestic dissensions, the Germans for many years past never for a moment doubted that foreign attack would find them united. The Emperor Napoleon now experiences the truth of this anticipation to his peril; though if he had had any one among his numerous servants really conversant with the state of this country, he might have learnt all about it without making the *experimentum crucis.*

In one province alone there exists a class of 'Irreconcilables.' In Hanover a few noblemen have been arrested on the charge of high treason. Though the large majority of Hanoverians have long espoused the national cause with which Prussia is identified, some brave but romantic

men remain attached to the former Government, and will act up to their convictions. Besides the two Hanoverian noblemen arrested at Weimar and Strelitz, three more supposed conspirators have been detected and handed over to the judicial authorities at Hildesheim, Bremerhaven, and Osnabrück. The prisoners are all said to be persons of the highest respectability. It is asserted, though I do not know with what right, that the prisoners have been in correspondence with the French Government on the subject of a landing on the North Sea. If they counted upon a popular rising, the futility of their designs may be perceived by a glance at the Hanover press. The papers, of all shades and hues of opinion, the Guelphic not excepted, protest against the misdirected loyalty of the accused.

In several parts of Holstein French spies have been taken into custody. At Ludwigshafen, in the Bavarian Palatinate, a lady likewise attracted the attention of the police, and on closer examination was discovered to be a French officer.

Quiet and tranquil as Northern Germany must appear to the superficial observer at this critical juncture, its real state of mind is a very ardent one. There is certainly no hallooing, hurrahing, and resorting to the beer-shops as a fit preparation for the battle-field; but if determination and resolve, if a longing for the war that is unavoidable, coupled with a melancholy thought of the horrors it will bring in its train, may be said to constitute excitement, the country must be pronounced in a fever heat. It is a sort of intense feeling, which, though the reverse of indifference and unconcern, is yet perfectly compatible with outward composure. It is a sentiment which not only strengthens the will, but actually elevates the morals of the people. Never were the taverns emptier than now; never was the number of crimes and offences smaller than during the last agitated week. While human frailty is thus checked and to a certain extent purified by

the serious character of the times, acts of patriotic devotion multiply in proportion. I will not allude to the addresses sent in by nearly every town of any consequence. Books might be, and indeed are being, filled with them. But look at the following incidents, recounted in the papers of a single day. No less than 400 young men, nearly all just below the regulation age, have asked permission to volunteer in one regiment at Berlin—the 1st Dragoons. The Greifswald and Marburg Universities have had to be shut up because of the students volunteering in a body; a resolution taken also by very many at Bonn, Berlin, and Giessen. The movement which converts incipient scholars into warriors extends even to the first form of the grammar-schools. In Glogau alone fifty 'Gymnasiasten' have left Sophocles for the stern realities of life; at Berlin, Trèves, Cologne, &c., many more have flung Cicero into the corner and put on the spiked helmet, in proof that the lessons of civic virtue inculcated into their ripening minds by the classics have not been thrown away upon them. For that part of the population physically incapacitated from taking the field, but financially able to contribute to the expenses, the establishment and support of relieving societies have become an earnest and well-observed duty. In every town, nay in every street, offices have been opened for the reception of pecuniary contributions, as well as of the thousand-and-one articles which an army in the field, or a soldier in the hospital, may stand in need of. Wine, coffee, extract of meat, lint, linen, stockings, and cigars, seem to be the principal commodities brought forward. To regulate and control the action of the local societies established for this purpose, some central committees, all coöperating with each other, have been set afoot in Berlin. One is under the direction of the 'Johanniter Ritter' (Knights of St. John); another is the Central Frauein-Verein, exclusively formed by ladies; a third, another Central Verein, with Messrs. Schickler, the

well-known bankers, for treasurers. To give a tangible reward to courage, at least fifty gentlemen have offered prizes to soldiers who may capture French flags and cannon.* The sums held out for this purpose vary between 50 and 1000 thalers. I am afraid the task may prove more difficult than is expected, the French carrying less than a third of the standards borne by the same number of Germans. In this country each battalion has its own colours; in France this distinction is conferred only upon whole regiments.

The extraordinary session of the Federal Parliament is at an end. The proceedings were confined to the voting of an address already communicated; to the granting of a loan of 120,000,000 thalers; and to the creation of a new kind of paper money, called 'Darlehns-Scheine,' of which 30,000,000 thalers are to be issued, to assist the mercantile community in tiding over the crisis. Under the act any one giving a guarantee in merchandise, stock, or other collateral security may receive a proportionate loan of Darlehns-Scheine for a period of three months, and be thus enabled to meet his obligations at a time when business is at a standstill. The rate of interest exacted will be the same as that demanded by the Bank on similar security. A discount company for local needs has been also established at Hamburg, with a capital of one million marc banco. These are certainly not very large sums; but as German commerce in the period immediately preceding the war was not in a flourishing condition, having for years past suffered from the French menaces, it is supposed that larger amounts will not be required.

By order of the Government, no foreign officers will be permitted to join the Prussian head-quarters and witness the events of the campaign as privileged lookers-on. As appears from a communication in the *Nord Deutsche Zei-*

* Before the Vosges were crossed by the German troops, nearly a thousand prizes had been offered by private persons.

tung, "Government thinks the war too serious to permit any of its own officers to place themselves in the position of host to guest.*

July 24.

The combination of activity and composure which characterises Prussian institutions has been particularly remarkable during the last few days. Immense numbers of troops are daily leaving or passing through Berlin without a company being seen in the streets. Only yesterday an English gentleman, who lives close to one of the principal stations, told me he could not comprehend how on earth it was done. He knew some thirty trains had left within the last twenty-four hours at a few paces from his house, and the only noise he had heard proceeded from the engine shutting off its steam. But although secret, preparations are none the less vigorous, and in a week or so the Prussians will be in full strength on the Rhine. Even now their posts are numerous enough for all purposes of defence. In the last few days the fortresses of Saarlouis, Rastadt (Baden), and Germersheim (Bavarian Palatinate) were made ready. Those of the inhabitants who could not lay in a sufficient stock of provisions to stand a siege were compelled to leave. Bad as it is, this calamity has befallen but few, the provinces which are likely to witness the first outburst of hostilities being among the richest and most fertile of Germany. I daresay you have learnt through telegrams that skirmishes begin to multiply in the Saar country. In most instances it is nothing more than an interchange of shots between vedettes without damage. Sometimes reinforcements come up, look at each other, and after a little galloping here and there retire. On one of these occasions another Frenchman, this time a Chasseur d'Afrique, was killed by a Prussian rifleman, so that the French have now two deaths against

* Foreign officers were admitted after the first two or three engagements.

one Prussian wounded. According to the latest advices, the imperial uniform is also showing itself a little farther north, at and near Perl, in the Trèves district. The harbour of Kiel has been closed; that of Stettin will follow in a few days.

The following are the principal military appointments. The King, attended by General Moltke, will have the command-in-chief. The three west-country armies will be commanded respectively by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince, his Royal Highness Prince Frederick Charles, and General Steinmetz. The Crown Prince will again have Lieutenant-General von Blumenthal as chief of his Staff, as at Sadowa; Prince Frederick Charles will have with him in like capacity Colonel von Stiehle; General Steinmetz, the fighting veteran of the old school, will be advised by Major-General von Sperling. The North Sea Army will be commanded by General Vogel von Falckenstein. The commandants of the individual army corps of the North German line are as follows: Guards, General Prince Augustus of Würtemberg; First Army Corps (East Prussians), General Baron Manteuffel; Second Army Corps (Pomeranians), Lieutenant-General Fransecki; Third Army Corps (Brandenburgers), Lieutenant-General von Alvensleben II.; Fourth Army Corps (Prussian Saxony and Thuringians), General von Alvensleben; Fifth Army Corps (Poseners), Lieutenant-General von Kirchbach; Sixth Army Corps (Silesians), General von Tümpling; Seventh Army Corps (Westphalians), General von Zastrow; Eighth Army Corps (Rhinelanders), Lieutenant-General von Göben; Ninth Army Corps (Schleswig-Holsteiners), General von Manstein; Tenth Army Corps (Hanoverians), General von Voigts-Rhetz; Eleventh Army Corps (Hessians and Nassauers), Lieutenant-General von Bose; Twelfth Army Corps (kingdom of Saxony), H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. The Landwehr and Southerners are not included in this list.

July 25.

The military preparations going on in Austria have drawn Russia into the field. From yesterday's paragraph in the *St. Petersburg Gazette* there is no doubt that, should Austria come forward as an ally of France, Russia will join Prussia and Germany. 'The Czar is determined to observe neutrality towards both belligerent Powers as long as the interests of Russia remain unaffected by the eventualities of the war.' The meaning of this announcement is plain. As Russia's interests in the imminent crisis can be touched much more easily by Austria and France, her competitors in the East, than by Prussia, who has always been comparatively indifferent to the affairs of the Levant, it is evident that the victory of the two former Powers must be more prejudicial to her than the triumph of the latter. Such an interpretation of the official paragraph, conclusive enough of itself, is moreover supported by direct intelligence from the Russian metropolis. This frees Prussia from danger in the rear, and leaves her at liberty to ward off the attack in front. Nor has the Czar been long in giving an earnest of his present intentions. As a reply to the Austrian decree which prohibits the export of horses, and to the measures taken for establishing a camp near Pardubitz in Bohemia, Russian troops will be concentrated on the southern confines of Poland.

French men-of-war having shown themselves off the Hanover coast, the inhabitants of Wangeroog have been transported to the continent to prevent their being impressed as pilots. On the other islands, which are too populous to be entirely cleared out, the inhabitants have been cautioned against holding any intercourse with the enemy. Hostile ships wrecked on their shores may not be rescued until hoisting a white flag, and then only if the crew consent to leave their arms behind them.

Congratulatory telegrams and promises of assistance continue to flow in from German Americans. The day

before the Federal Parliament closed, the Germans at St. Louis telegraphed to Speaker Simson they would send him a million dollars as their contribution to the expenses. Other telegrams from Nashville, Memphis, &c. to Speaker Simson, Count Bismarck, and the King himself, evince like sympathy with the trials of the mother country. In Berlin the collection of pecuniary and other contributions is the order of the day, and offers an opportunity of usefulness not overlooked by the gentler sex. In East Prussia a number of landed proprietors, disapproving the irregular contribution system, propose that an extra income tax should be voluntarily paid at once by all subject to the usual assessment, and, as far as themselves were concerned, have carried the project into immediate execution. Their action is the more gracious, in that it proceeds from avowed Radicals, who have been declared members of the Opposition for many years past. But party differences have ceased. The injury inflicted upon the nation is too manifest, and the peril to which it is exposed too imminent, for any German to be anything but a German for the time being.

LETTER OF HER IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCESS.

Berlin, July 25, 1870.

Her Imperial and Royal Highness the Crown Princess, to whose benevolent initiative the country is indebted for many a useful and charitable institution, has in this trying hour addressed the following letter to the committee of the Victoria Society for the relief of wounded soldiers:

'Once more the country calls its sons to the standards to fight for all that is nearest and dearest to us—the honour and independence of Ger-

many.'' An enemy whom we have not offended grudges us the fruits of our victories, and strives to prevent us from completing our great national rank through the labours and the steady progress of peace. Affronted and insulted in its most sacred feelings, the whole people—the only army we have—takes up its well-tried arms to protect their hearth and their families. Thousands of wives and children are thus being deprived of their bread-winners. We cannot remove the sorrow weighing down their hearts; but we may guard them against distress. In all parts of the world the Germans gave brilliant proofs of patriotic devotion to their country, when, a short time ago, we appealed to them to alleviate the sufferings consequent upon the struggle we had then undergone. We hope that this noble example will be repeated, and that charity will again step in to relieve the families of those who are prepared to sacrifice life and health in our behalf. Let us give speedily and bountifully, that the defenders of our sacred national rights may take the field in the comforting consciousness that the future of their beloved ones is secure in kind hands.

I request the Committee of the Victoria Institution for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers to devote themselves to this charitable work, and to open subscriptions and direct their application.

VICTORIA.

New Palace, Potsdam, July 19.'

This request of her Imperial and Royal Highness has been immediately attended to by the Committee. Herr F. W. Krause, the well-known banker, is the treasurer of the Victoria Institution.

NAPOLEON'S PROCLAMATION TO THE FRENCH NATION.

ON July 25th, the *Journal Officiel* of Paris published the following Proclamation to the French people:

'Frenchmen,—There are solemn moments in the life of peoples, when the national sense of honour, violently excited, imposes itself with irresistible force, dominates all interests, and alone takes in hand the direction of the destinies of the country. One of those decisive hours has sounded for France. Prussia, towards whom, both during and since the war of 1866, we have shown the most conciliatory disposition, has taken no account of our good wishes and our enduring forbearance. Launched on the path of invasion, she has provoked mistrust everywhere, necessi-

tated exaggerated armaments, and has turned Europe into a camp, where reigns nothing but uncertainty and fear of the morrow. A last incident has come to show the instability of international relations, and to prove the gravity of the situation. In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia, we made known our protests. They were evaded, and were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts. Our country resented this treatment with profound irritation, and immediately a cry for war resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains to us to leave our destinies to the decision of arms.

We do not make war on Germany, whose independence we respect. We wish that the peoples who compose the great German nationality may freely dispose of their destinies. For ourselves, we demand the establishment of a state of affairs which shall guarantee our security and assure our future. We wish to conquer a lasting peace, based on the true interests of peoples, and to put an end to that precarious state in which all nations employ their resources to arm themselves one against the other. The glorious flag which we once more unfurl before those who have provoked us is the same which bore throughout Europe the civilising ideas of our great revolution. It represents the same principles, and will inspire the same devotion.

Frenchmen! I am about to place myself at the head of that valiant army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It knows its own worth, since it has seen how victory has accompanied its march in the four quarters of the world. I take with me my son, despite his youth. He knows what are the duties which his name imposes upon him, and he is proud to bear his share in the dangers of those who fight for their country. May God bless our efforts! A great people which defends a just cause is invincible.

NAPOLEON.'

THE PROJECTED TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

ON July 25th, the *Times* published the following draught treaty, proposed to Count Bismarck by Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, in 1867:

'His Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, judging it useful to bind closer the ties of friendship which unite them, and so confirm the relations of good neighbourhood which happily exist between the two countries, and being besides convinced

that to attain this result, which is, moreover, of a kind to insure the maintenance of the general peace, it is for their interest to come to an understanding on the questions concerning their future relations, have resolved to conclude a treaty to the following effect, and have in consequence nominated as their representatives the following persons, viz.

His Majesty, &c.
His Majesty, &c.

who, after exchanging their full powers, which have been found in good and due form, have agreed on the following Articles :

Art. I. His Majesty the Emperor of the French acquiesces in and recognises the gains made by Prussia in the course of the last war waged by her against Austria and that Power's allies.

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Prussia engages to facilitate the acquisition by France of Luxemburg; and for this purpose his Majesty will enter into negotiations with his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, with the view of inducing him to cede his sovereign rights over the Duchy to the Emperor of the French, on the terms of such compensation as shall be judged adequate or otherwise. The Emperor of the French, on his side, engages to assume whatever pecuniary charges this arrangement may involve.

Art. III. His Majesty the Emperor of the French shall raise no opposition to a Federal union of the Confederation of North Germany with the States of South Germany, excepting Austria; and this Federal union may be based on one common Parliament, due reservation, however, being made of the sovereignty of the said States.

Art. IV. His Majesty the King of Prussia, on his side, in case his Majesty the Emperor of the French should be led by circumstances to cause his troops to enter Belgium or to conquer it, shall grant armed aid to France, and shall support her with all his forces, military and naval, in the face of and against every Power which should, in this eventuality, declare war.

Art. V. To insure the complete execution of the preceding conditions, his Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the Emperor of the French contract, by the present treaty, an alliance offensive and defensive, which they solemnly engage to maintain. Their Majesties bind themselves to observe its terms in all cases when their respective States, the integrity of which they reciprocally guarantee, may be threatened with attack; and they shall hold themselves bound, in any like conjuncture, to undertake without delay, and under no pretext to decline, whatever military arrangements may be enjoined by their common interest conformably to the terms and provisions above declared.'

COUNT BISMARCK ON THE PROJECTED TREATY.

Berlin, July 28, 1870.

THE *Official Gazette* contains the following:

'Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone declaring in the British Parliament that they relied upon explanations being given by the two Governments concerned in the projected treaty recently published, the Chancellor of the Confederation has telegraphed the following to Count Bernstorff, the North German Ambassador in London, promising at the same time a complete documentary exposition of the matter:

"*To Count Bernstorff.*

Your Excellency will be good enough to communicate the following to Lord Granville:

The document published by the *Times* contains one of the proposals which have been made to us since the Danish war by official and unofficial French agents, with the object of establishing an alliance between Prussia and France for their mutual aggrandisement. I will send the text of an offer made in 1866, when France proposed to aid Prussia with 300,000 men against Austria, and to permit Prussia's aggrandisement by six or eight millions of subjects, in return for the cession to France of the district between the Rhine and the Moselle. The impossibility of agreeing to this course was clear to all except French diplomatists. On this proposition being rejected, the French Government began to calculate upon our defeat. France has not ceased to tempt us with offers to be carried out at the cost of Germany and Belgium. In the interests of peace, I kept them secret. After the Luxemburg affair, the proposals dealing with Belgium and South Germany were renewed. M. Benedetti's manuscript belongs to this period." It is not likely that M. Benedetti acted without the Emperor's sanction. Finally, the conviction that no extension of territory was attainable in conjunction with us must have matured the resolve to obtain it by fighting us. I have even grounds for believing that, had not this project been made public, France, after our armaments on both sides were complete, would have proposed to us jointly to carry out M. Benedetti's programme against unarmed Europe, and to conclude peace at Belgium's cost. If the French Cabinet now repudiates aims, for our participation in which it has uninterruptedly laboured since 1864, either by demands or promises, this is easily to be explained by the present political situation.

COUNT BISMARCK."'

The *North German Gazette* of to-day, alluding to the

late revelations in reference to the draught treaty between France and Prussia, says that other revelations are imminent, M. de Benedetti's draught not being the only document of the kind. Negotiations of a similar character were commenced here by Prince Napoleon, who pointedly spoke of Swiss cantons in which the French language prevails, and begged to observe that in Piedmont it was impossible to distinguish where French ended and Italian commenced.

BENEDETTI AND BISMARCK.

Berlin, July 28, 1870.

THE predatory treaty, in the good old-fashioned style of the seventeenth century, which M. Benedetti proposed to this Government has taken no one by surprise. Too accurately had the character of the French autocrat and his associates been appreciated in this country for any one to wonder at these disclosures. If there is a startling feature at all in the thing, it is the simplicity with which M. Benedetti allowed himself to be entrapped and caught in the act. In Count Bismarck he had certainly to deal with a quick and resolute adversary. Still, unless blinded by covetousness, this cunning emissary of the Tuileries would have been too cautious to place himself in the unenviable position in which he now stands. The following is the true version of the story, which, were it not for its disgraceful aspect, would be as good as a comedy:

In the course of the last few years M. Benedetti repeatedly hinted at the necessity of some compensation being made to France to induce her to acquiesce in the rise of a great German power on her borders. Count Bismarck's replies were politely worded, and seemingly based upon the supposition, that in preferring such an

extraordinary request France could not possibly be in earnest. Thus tempering refusal by courtesy, the Prussian Premier declined what it was impossible to accord; yet, at the same time, remained on tolerable terms with a Government whose dangerous proclivities he knew, and which he had no wish to provoke. In 1867 the French demands were pressed with a pertinacity which augured ill for the maintenance of peace. Finding himself assailed again and again with these modest suggestions, the Count at length could no longer shut his eyes to the contingency that all his ingenuity might not suffice to ward off a rupture. With this possibility before him, it was plain what he had to do. He foresaw that if Louis Napoleon was bent upon war, he would avail himself of some pretext which apparently had nothing to do with the acquisition of territory or the independence of neighbouring States. He would pick a quarrel on ground entirely distinct from his previous demands, and, while pushing it forward, in reality aim at the satisfaction of his guilty appetites.

Under these circumstances, the one thing Count Bismarck determined to secure was proof of the insidious proposals so repeatedly urged. When therefore, not long after the Luxemburg affair, M. Benedetti reverted to the delicate subject, the Count quickly told him that he had thought over the matter, and that, if it were laid before him in a tangible shape, he would submit it to the King. In his greed, Benedetti did not perceive the trap. Anxious to oblige his master, and delighted to see his overtures for the first time entertained, he engaged to draw up a treaty, which he said would meet the exigencies of the case. The following day he brought his nice little manuscript to the Foreign Office. Soon after he had placed it in the hands of Count Bismarck, the latter was called out of the room, and, on coming back in a few minutes, told his charmed visitor that he was accidentally summoned to the palace, and would avail himself of the opportunity for

taking his *chef-d'œuvre* with him. In a thrill of hopeful exultation M. Benedetti left. But, alas, his joy was but short-lived. Not many hours had elapsed when he received a friendly note from Count Bismarck, informing him that the King had not approved the proposed treaty. Upon this M. Benedetti immediately demanded the return of the too-candid document. It was in vain. Count Bismarck did not think fit to part with this precious piece of evidence. It was too valuable to be preserved in any hands but his own. It would undeceive the world as to the nature of the French policy. It would certainly have to be concealed while peace lasted, lest it should provoke war; but it might be usefully published if France sought a peg to hang a quarrel upon. As we have seen, the Count's anticipations were but too speedily fulfilled; and to-day M. Benedetti's handiwork is actually exhibited in the Berlin Foreign Office for the inspection of all whom it may concern.

I need not tell you how gratified the Berliners are that Benedetti should have been overreached, and overreached by their able Premier. Indeed, if men of the Benedetti stamp are to be found in the ranks of European diplomacy, one cannot sufficiently congratulate oneself that there is a Bismarck to unmask and show them up. In the history of Count Bismarck's career this diplomatic feat will be recorded as one of the cleverest, and, let us hope, as one of those that have most thoroughly opened the eyes of us all to the existing policy of France. The proposed treaty aimed at three several objects, each alike unprincipled. It was to mar the just and righteous cause of German unity by mixing up with it Napoleonic intrigue; it was to rob Belgium and Luxemburg of their independence, and subject them to the yoke of a foreign master; and last, not least, it was to secure the assistance of Germany for France, should the Powers that have guaranteed the independence of Belgium object to

the completion of this unblushing design. Such was the purpose. Since the days of Napoleon I. the world has not seen the like of it. It is probably not too much to say that in it has Louis Napoleon's policy reached its acme.

Before leaving the subject, I have to supplement the above by a detail on a par with what has preceded. I am in a position to assert that M. Benedetti's cupidity has not been confined to Belgium and Luxemburg, but extended to the French-speaking cantons of Switzerland. In conversations with distinguished members of the North German Parliament, that truly Napoleonic Ambassador has more than once alluded to the expediency of satisfying 'les vœux légitimes de la France.' On one occasion he expressed himself pretty much as follows:

'We shall have to accustom ourselves, you know, to see Prussia paramount in Northern and Southern Germany; but I daresay you will only think it right that France should not be a loser in the game. Would it not be a capital arrangement to give us Belgium, Geneva, Le Pays de Vaud, Fribourg, and, in fact, all the French districts of Switzerland?'

Thereupon the other party to the conversation replied:

'I don't think there is any analogy between the unification of Germany by Prussia, and the conquest of Belgium and Switzerland by France. In unifying Germany, we remain within our own frontiers; in conquering Belgium and Switzerland, you would have to go beyond your boundary.'

Thus refuted, M. Benedetti changed the subject. Whatever may be his future employment, I don't think he is likely in an official capacity to revert to those topics that have interested him so deeply.

We have cheering intelligence from Holland. The Dutch, who four years ago began to fear that Prussia would not always content herself with the acquisition of German territory, have at last perceived they have more to dread from the West than from the East. Comparing the moderate policy of the Berlin Cabinet with the disrespect for foreign independence so prevalent at the Tuileries, they have determined to afford the latter no faci-

lities in the impending war. They will vindicate their neutrality against all comers, and, apprehending no invasion from this side, have so disposed their army as to be ready to repel a landing of the French. The headquarters of the Dutch troops at this moment are at Haarlem and Utrecht, with advanced guards on the Yssel line and in the south-western provinces. Caution is the more necessary as they remember the advice given to the Emperor Napoleon by the late Marshal Niel. This able soldier had always insisted that a German campaign should be inaugurated by the landing of a force at Helvoetsluys, south-west of Rotterdam, and the marching of another corps straight upon Mayence and Berlin. It is with a view to prevent the realisation of some such design that the 55,000 men of Holland have been called out. If necessary, they will fight manfully. Public feeling in Holland has latterly taken a direction which puts hearty resistance beyond a doubt.

The Belgian and Swiss armaments may be regarded as nearly complete. Though France has formally promised to respect the neutrality of these countries, the only object they had in calling out their troops evidently was to protect themselves from a breach of this engagement. The Swiss troops are stationed in the north-western extremity of Switzerland, to prevent the French from attacking Baden *viâ* Basle and Aargau; the Belgians, after tearing up the rails on some of the lines in communication with France, are likewise waiting the progress of events in the western provinces of their territory. Neither of them thought it necessary to guard against invasion from Germany; neither doubts the assurances from Berlin. In Switzerland scarcely a journal sides with France; in Belgium, however, the Ultramontanes are bold enough, even in the present emergency, to betray a wish for absorption by a despotic Government which has so largely contributed to make the Pope infallible.

A Cologne telegram in the Prussian papers, which I think I am right in tracing to an official source, complains that the British Government does not interfere with the supply of war *matériel* to France by some of their subjects. The telegram asserts that certain Birmingham firms have contracted to furnish 300,000 chassepot cartridges per week; that Newcastle skippers have undertaken to coal the French squadron in the German Ocean; and that great numbers of horses for the French artillery and cavalry are being bought in England.

COUNT BISMARCK'S CIRCULAR DESPATCH ON THE PROJECTED TREATY.

Berlin, July 29, 1870.

COUNT BISMARCK has addressed the following circular despatch to the representatives of the North German Confederation in the neutral States:

'The expectation expressed in Parliament by Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, that farther explanations on Count Benedetti's draft of an alliance between France and Prussia would be volunteered by both the parties interested, I have already partially fulfilled by a telegram addressed to Count Bernstorff on the 27th instant. My explanation by telegraph was necessarily brief, and I now proceed to complete it in writing.

The document published by the *Times* is far from containing the only proposal in the same direction made to us by France. Even before the Danish war, attempts were made by official and unofficial French agents to influence me in favour of an alliance between Prussia and France, with a view to extend the frontiers of both.

It is almost superfluous to observe, that the belief of a French Government in the possibility of such a compromise with a German minister, who owes his position to his carrying out the national aspirations of the German people, can only be accounted for by the ignorance of French statesmen concerning the essential conditions of the political life of other nations. If the agents of the French Cabinet had been able to appreciate the political condition of Germany, the illusion would never have been cherished in Paris, that Prussia could undertake the settlement of Ger-

man affairs with the aid of France. You are, no doubt, as well aware as myself of the ignorance of the French in everything concerning Germany.

I have been cognisant since 1862 of the efforts of the French Government to carry out, with the aid of Prussia, its greedy designs on Belgium and the Rhine frontiers; that is, I knew them before I took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. I do not consider it my duty to bring forward such communications as were of a purely personal character; and I believe I must suppress some interesting letters and conversations which would elucidate the matter. The tendencies of the French Government were particularly observable in its influence on European policy and the attitude it assumed to our advantage in the Germano-Danish dispute. The ill-humour which France soon afterwards exhibited towards us, on account of the Treaty of Gastein, arose from the apprehension that a consolidation of the alliance between Prussia and Austria would deprive the Parisian Cabinet of the fruits it hoped to derive from the policy it had adopted.

As far back as 1865 France already calculated on a war between us and Austria; and she approached us of her own accord when it was evident that our relations with Vienna began to be unsatisfactory.

Before the beginning of the campaign of 1866 proposals were made to me, partly by relatives of the Emperor of the French and partly by confidential agents, the continual purport of which was, the attainment of an understanding on the subject of territorial accessions to both France and Prussia. At one time Luxemburg was spoken of, or the frontier of 1814 with Landau and Saarlouis; on another occasion French Switzerland, and the question *where* the limits of the two languages should be drawn in Piedmont, formed the topics of conversation.

In May 1866 these pretensions assumed the form of an offensive and defensive alliance, of which the following extract has remained in my hands:

1. En cas de congrès poursuivre d'accord la cession de la Vénétie à l'Italie et l'annexion des duchés à la Prusse.
2. Si le congrès n'aboutit pas, alliance offensive et défensive.
3. Le Roi de Prusse commencera les hostilités dans les dix jours après la séparation du congrès.
4. Si le congrès ne se réunit pas, la Prusse attaquera dans trente jours après la signature du présent traité.
5. L'Empereur des Français déclarera la guerre à l'Autriche dès que les hostilités seront commencées entre l'Autriche et la Prusse (en trente jours 300,000).
6. On ne fera pas de paix séparée avec l'Autriche.
7. La paix se fera sous les conditions suivantes. La Vénétie à l'Italie. A la Prusse les territoires allemands ci-dessous (sept à huit millions d'âmes au choix) plus la réforme fédérale dans le sens prussien.

   Pour la France le territoire entre Moselle et Rhin sans Coblence ni Mayence; comprenant 500,000 âmes de Prusse, la Bavière rive gauche du Rhin; Birkenfeld, Homburg, Darmstadt 213,000 âmes.

8. Convention militaire et maritime entre France et Prusse dès la signature.
9. Adhésion du Roi d'Italie.

The strength of the army with which the Emperor, according to art. 5, proposed to assist us, was given in written explanations as 300,000 men; the population which France was desirous of obtaining was estimated, though not correctly, as 1,800,000 souls.

Any one acquainted with the secret diplomatic and military history of 1866 will detect in these clauses the same policy which France simultaneously pursued towards Italy, with which she also conducted secret negotiations, and which she somewhat later adopted towards both Italy and Prussia. When we declined this projected alliance in June 1866, notwithstanding several menacing admonitions, the French Government reckoned on the triumph of Austria, and the heavy price we should have to pay for French assistance after our final defeat; a consummation which French diplomacy zealously laboured to bring about.

That the congress mentioned in the above treaty, and afterwards proposed a second time, would have resulted in our three months' alliance with Italy expiring without profit to us, and that France endeavoured, by farther stipulations regarding Custozza, to prejudice our position, and, if possible, bring about our defeat, is known to you. The "patriotic anxiety" of M. Rouher furnishes an index to what followed. From that time forward France has not ceased to tempt us by offers made at the cost of Germany and Belgium. The impossibility of accepting any proposals of the kind was clear to me from the first; but I thought it useful, and in the interest of peace, to leave the French statesmen their favourite illusions as long as possible, without giving them even my verbal assent. I assumed that the destruction of the hopes entertained by France would endanger peace, which it was the interest of Germany and Europe to maintain. I did not share the opinion of those politicians who believed that no great efforts should be made to avoid a war with France, because they looked on it as inevitable. None can read with such perfect accuracy the designs of divine Providence; and I look on even a successful war as an evil, because it should be the object of a Government to spare the blood of the people. I could not overlook the possibility of a change in the constitution and policy of France which might do away with the necessity of a war between the two great neighbouring nations; and this hope was strengthened by every postponement of the cataclasm. For this reason I kept silence regarding the demands made, and pursued a dilatory course, without making any promises.

After the failure of the negotiations with his Dutch Majesty for the purchase of Luxemburg, the proposals of France, which embraced Belgium and South Germany, were renewed. To this period Benedetti's manuscript belongs. That without the approbation of his Sovereign the French Ambassador should have drawn up these proposals in his own

handwriting, should have handed them over to me, and repeatedly discussed them with me, rectifying some parts of the text to which I demurred, is a statement quite as improbable as that other one, that the Emperor did not approve of a demand for the cession of Mayence; made by the imperial Ambassador in August 1866, with a menace of war in case of our refusal.

The different phases of French ill-humour and desire for war, through which we passed from 1866 till 1869, coincided pretty closely with the more or less inclination for negotiations of this nature which the French agents imagined they discovered in me. At the beginning of the Belgian railway complication, in March 1868, it was hinted to me by an eminent personage, who was no stranger to the previous negotiations, that, in case of a French occupation of Belgium, *nous trouverions bien notre Belgique ailleurs.* In a similar way I was given to understand, on some former occasions, that France, if a solution of the Oriental question were impending, would not seek *her* field of action in the distant East, but in immediate proximity to her own frontiers.

My impression is, that the conviction at length dawning upon the Emperor, that no extension of the French boundaries would be attainable with our assistance, has led him to the resolution of attempting it despite our opposition. I have even reason to believe that, if the publication of the draft treaty had not taken place, a proposal would have been made us by France—after the completion of the armaments of both countries—to execute conjointly, at the head of a million of trained soldiers, and in the teeth of an unprepared Europe, the plans that had been previously submitted to us; that is, we should have been invited to make peace before or after the first battle, on the basis of Benedetti's proposals, and at the cost of Belgium.

With regard to the text of the projected treaty, I will farther observe, that the draft in our hands is, from beginning to end, in the hand of Count Benedetti, and is written on the paper of the French Embassy. The Ambassadors or Envoys of Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Würtemberg, who have seen the original, have recognised the writing. In art. 1, Count Benedetti, the first time he read it to me, withdrew the last passage, and enclosed it within brackets, after I had observed to him that it involved an interference on the part of France in the internal affairs of Germany which I could not even concede in a secret document. He made, of himself, in my presence, a less important correction in art. 2, on the margin. I verbally informed Lord Augustus Loftus, about the 24th July, of the existence of the document in question; and when he expressed his doubts, I invited him to examine it personally. This he did on the 27th July, and convinced himself that it was in the handwriting of his former French colleague. If the imperial Cabinet denies the efforts it has unceasingly made since 1864 to convert us to its own way of thinking, either by threats or by tempting offers, this is very intelligible in the present state of things.

BISMARCK.'

THE EXPLANATION OF M. BENEDETTI.

THE Paris *Journal Officiel* of July 30th contained the following:

'The publication of a so-called treaty between France and Prussia having given rise to a controversy in which there is some risk that the real facts may be distorted, the Emperor's Government has thought it right that the following letter, addressed by Count Benedetti to his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, should be published:

'*Paris, July* 29, 1870.

Monsieur le Duc,—However unjust they may have been, I did not consider it proper to contest the accuracy of the criticisms of which I was personally the object when it became known in France that the Prince of Hohenzollern had accepted the Spanish crown. As was my duty, I left to the Emperor's Government to deal with them. I cannot maintain the same silence when I see the use which Count Bismarck has made of a document to which he desires to attribute an importance which it never possessed; and I request your Excellency to let the exact facts be made publicly known. It is a matter of public notoriety, that Count Bismarck, both before and during the last war, made offers to assist in reuniting Belgium to France as a compensation for the aggrandisements which he was ambitious to obtain, and which he has obtained, for Prussia. Upon this point I may invoke the united testimony of European diplomacy, which was acquainted with everything. The Emperor's Government constantly declined these overtures; and one of your predecessors—M. Drouyn de Lhuys—is in a position to give certain explanations upon this subject which would leave no possibility of doubt.

At the time of the conclusion of the peace of Prague, and being aware of the sensation which had been caused in France by the annexation of Hanover, electoral Hesse, and the city of Frankfort to Prussia, M. Bismarck again manifested the strongest desire to restore the equilibrium that had been destroyed by these acquisitions. Various combinations respecting the integrity of the States bordering upon France and Prussia were put forward; they became the subject of many interviews, in the course of which M. Bismarck always sought to obtain the adoption of his personal ideas. Upon the occasion of one of these conversations, and in order to obtain an exact statement of his combinations, I consented to write them down in some sort at his dictation. The form not less than the substance shows clearly that I confined myself to the reproduction of a scheme conceived and developed by him.* M. Bismarck kept that draft (*rédaction*), desiring to submit it to the King.

* In 1867, when the *projet* was drawn up, Count Bismarck had secured

On my part, I related in substance to the imperial Government the communications which had been made to me. The Emperor rejected them as soon as they were brought to his knowledge. I ought to say that the King of Prussia himself appeared to be unwilling to accept the basis; and from that time—that is to say, during the last four years—I have never again exchanged ideas with M. de Bismarck upon that subject. If the initiative of such a treaty had been adopted by the Emperor's Government, the draught would have been prepared by the Ministry, and I should not have had to produce a copy of it written by myself. It would, moreover, have been framed in a different manner, and it would have given rise to negotiations, which would have been carried on simultaneously at Paris and at Berlin. In that case, M. Bismarck would not have contented himself with indirectly procuring the publication of the text, especially at a moment when your Excellency was rectifying, in despatches published in the *Journal Officiel*, other errors also attempted to be propagated. But in order to attain the object which he had in view—that of misleading public opinion, and publishing indiscretions inadvertently committed by us—he has had recourse to this expedient, which relieves him from the necessity of specifying at what moment, under what circumstances, and in what manner this document was written. He evidently flattered himself that, owing to those omissions, he could suggest conjectures which, removing all personal responsibility from himself, might compromise the responsibility of the Emperor's Government. There is no necessity for characterising such proceedings. It suffices to point them out, and to leave them to be appreciated for what they are worth by public opinion.

Accept, &c. V. BENEDETTI.'

M. OLLIVIER EVADES THE QUESTION OF THE TREATY, BUT OWNS TO THE DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL OF JANUARY 1870.

THE following letter was published in the *Times* of July 28, 1870:

'*Paris, July* 26, 1870.

'My dear Friend,—How could you believe there was any truth in the treaty the *Times* has published? I assure you that the Cabinet of the

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supremacy over the North, and far from wishing to extend it to the South, resisted the attempt of some minor Governments to establish complete unity, openly declaring it as premature. Sufficient proof of this will have been found in the preceding Letters.

2d of January never negotiated or concluded anything of the kind with Prussia.*

I will even tell you that it has negotiated nothing at all with her. The only negotiations that have existed between us have been indirect, confidential, and had Lord Clarendon for their intermediary. Since Mr. Gladstone slightly raised the veil in one of his speeches, we may allow ourselves to say, that the object of those negotiations, so honourable to Lord Clarendon, was to assure the peace of Europe by a reciprocal disarmament. You will admit that this does not much resemble the conduct of Ministers who seek a pretext for war.†

You know the value I set upon the confidence and friendship of the great English nation. The union of the two countries has always seemed to me the most essential condition of the world's progress; and for that reason I earnestly beg you to contradict all those false reports spread by persons who have an interest in dividing us.

We have no secret policy hidden behind our avowed policy. Our policy is single, public, loyal, without after-thoughts (*arrières-pensées*); we do not belong to the school of those who think might is superior to right; we believe, on the contrary, that right will always prevail in the end; and it is because the right is on our side in the war now beginning, that, with the help of God, we reckon upon victory.

Affectionate salutations from your servant,

EMILE OLLIVIER.'

NAPOLEON'S PROCLAMATION TO HIS ARMY.

ON July 29th, the following Proclamation was issued by the Emperor to the French army:

'Soldiers,—I am about to place myself at your head, to defend the honour and the soil of the country. You go to fight against one of the best armies in Europe; but others which were quite as efficient have been unable to resist your bravery. The same thing will occur again at the present time. The war which is now commencing will be a long and severe one, since it will have for the scene of its operations localities

* Count Benedetti's proposal, dating as far back as 1867, M. Ollivier had nothing to do with it. The second sentence of M. Ollivier's letter, therefore, gives no answer to the question raised in the first.

† It was the conduct of Ministers, who some of them did not know what was coming, while others probably knew it, and thought it all the more advisable to try and disarm Prussia before the fray. But Prussia declined the proposition.

teeming with fortresses and other obstacles; but nothing is too difficult for the soldiers of Africa, the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico. You will again prove what the French army, animated by the sentiment of duty, maintained by discipline, and inspired with love of country, can perform. Whatever may be the road we take beyond our own frontiers, we shall everywhere find glorious memorials of our fathers. We will prove ourselves worthy of them. All France follows you with her ardent wishes, and the eyes of the world are upon you. The fate of liberty and civilisation depends upon our success.

Soldiers! let each one do his duty, and the God of armies will be with us. NAPOLEON.

The Imperial Head-quarters, Metz, July 28.'

PRUSSIAN ANSWER TO COUNT BENEDETTI.

Berlin, July 30, 1870.

To-DAY Baron von Thile, the Prussian Secretary of State, forwarded to the Chancellor of the North German Confederation the following remarks on the account given by Count Benedetti of a conversation he professes to have had with the Prussian Minister, on the question of the Spanish succession:

'I take the liberty of sending your Excellency a despatch of Count Benedetti relative to a conversation he professes to have had with me on the 31st March 1869 on the question of the Spanish candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern, which has been published in the *Journal de Paris*, and I seize the opportunity of adding the following remarks:

I may begin by stating that I was first informed of the intention of the Spanish Government to offer the crown to the Prince of Hohenzollern about the middle of March 1870, and that since then the question has never been referred to between Count Benedetti and myself.

I cannot remember having had any conversation with Count Benedetti on the candidature of the Prince, either in March 1869 or at any former time; but I will not undertake to say that no such conversation occurred, as I am daily obliged to have numerous interviews with the representatives of foreign Powers; and since the matter then was merely an idle report, and had therefore no special interest for me, it may have escaped my memory in the course of sixteen months. If such a conversation really occurred, my part in it must have been confined

to the statement that I was completely ignorant of the candidature in question, since, as I have above stated, I did not hear of it till a year after the interview is said to have taken place. It seems to me highly improbable that I should have employed any particularly solemn expression in assuring him of my ignorance of the matter, as I am not accustomed to make use of such asseverations. In conclusion, I may call your attention to the fact, that Mr. Rances, who is mentioned in the despatch, and who was at that time the Spanish Ambassador at Vienna, during his visit to Berlin in March 1869 warmly and frequently advocated the candidature of the Duke of Montpensier, in the political circles of this city.'

Some surprise has been expressed that the draft of the treaty proposed by the French to the Prussian Government was not sooner published. It will, however, be remembered that the English Government in a similar case acted in the same way. The despatches in which Sir Hamilton Seymour related his conversations with the Emperor Nicolas with respect to Turkey, were not published till after the Crimean war had begun. In either case, reticence arose from a wish not to expose, and thereby provoke, the party who was meditating war.

KING WILLIAM'S PROCLAMATION TO THE PRUSSIANS.

'*To my People.*

'To-day, on the point of setting out for the army, to fight for the honour of Germany and the defence of all we most highly prize, I desire, considering the unanimity and resolution of my people, to issue an amnesty for political crimes and misdemeanours. I have instructed my Ministers to prepare a decree to this effect.

My people know, like myself, that on our side there were no hostile intentions and no desire to interrupt the peace of the world.

Since, however, we have been challenged, we are resolved, like our fathers, to brave the combat and save our country, with the assistance of the Almighty.

WILLIAM.

Berlin, July 31, 1870.'

FRANCE IGNORANT OF THE STATE OF GERMANY.

Berlin, August 1, 1870.

WHEN leaving for the seat of war the Emperor Napoleon, significantly enough, did not think it advisable to pass through the streets of his loyal city of Paris. He had doubtless good reasons for this first piece of strategy in the campaign. However martial an aspect the French capital may have borne during the last few weeks, the Emperor was not at all certain of the reception he would have in setting out for his dangerous journey eastward.

It was different with the King of Prussia. Through a dense crowd of enthusiastic subjects, through a continuous line of shouting, bowing, and saluting well-wishers, William I. drove yesterday afternoon from the Palace to the Potsdam station. With him went the Queen, graciously responding to the cheers of the public, and unable to repress her tears at the thought of the journey her husband was about to take. At the terminus, which was decorated with flowers, and occupied by an immense multitude, the King was received by Moltke and Bismarck, his military and his diplomatic Premiers. As on several preceding occasions of a similar nature, the well-matched couple are his companions in the present trip. It was a moving scene when the King embraced his Queen, when all voices were hushed while the two were shaking hands for the last time. The hurrahs, which had momentarily ceased, thundered forth again directly his Majesty had taken his seat in the carriage. Count Bismarck and General Moltke likewise became the heroes of a perfect ovation before they could enter the car. Repeated '*Hochs*' marked the moment of departure. With ladies waving handkerchiefs and muttering blessings, with men pressing forward to get a parting look at the King, the train began to proceed slowly on its way. It carried the leaders of Prussia to the field

whereon her destinies will be decided; but it left a nation behind no less capable of enduring reverses, if reverses are in store, than of compelling success, if courage and ability can insure it.

His Majesty's parting proclamation is short, unpretending, and truthful. It holds the enemy responsible for the horrors of the war, announces the determination of King and people to defend the country, and grants a full pardon for political crimes. Though the number of persons affected is very small, this amnesty has produced a good impression.

Count Bismarck's explanatory telegram to Count Bernstorff has been speedily succeeded by a circular note to the North German representatives at the neutral Courts. The second despatch is an amplification of the first, and gives a detailed account of the proposals which France has persistently urged upon this Government for the last four years. Both as regards the nature of the contents and the candour with which they are imparted, a more remarkable document cannot easily be imagined. What a revelation it is! Ever since the first symptom of a coming rupture between Austria and Prussia, France, Count Bismarck tells us, has been indefatigable in acting the tempter's part. She encouraged Austria to withstand the endeavours of Prussia to establish German unity; but she at the same time offered to assist Prussia in unifying Germany, if black mail were paid her in the shape of land and subjects. The reasons prompting this conduct are intelligibly hinted at by Count Bismarck. Ignorant of the condition of Germany, France could not comprehend that in identifying herself with the unity movement Prussia was not acting a conqueror's part, but ministering to the will of an entire race. France had evidently no idea that, if Prussia had been charged by the nation with restoring to it the boon of a united commonwealth, this was a sacred trust which would be withdrawn the moment Prussia ceded

an inch of German territory to the foreigner. France simply took the grossest view possible of the case, and looking upon Prussia as a mere usurper, offered to assist her in this capacity, on condition that they should 'go halves.'

Not to speak of her mistaking the character of William I., France was blind to the fact that the King of Prussia, if he connived at anything of the kind, would have had his foreign policy opposed and denounced by the most respectable portion of his subjects; that from friends and supporters coöperating with him for a common object, he would have converted the people of the minor States into the most inveterate enemies; and that in a country like the Germany of the present day, potentates deem it natural to recognise the demands of public morality, and cannot afford to adopt the peculiar species of politics known to the world as Napoleonic. Instead of realising these manifest truths, France actually imagined that the petty objections to unity emanating from this princelet or that political party indicated a tendency on the part of the Opposition to betray their country to foreign enemies; that because the Ultramontanes were clamorous against Prussia, they were also strong; and that as the Liberals had not yet all their demands satisfied, they would welcome Napoleon, instead of standing by their King. In short, France looked only at the many symptoms of division in Germany, and having no perception for the spirit of honour, patriotism, and national coherence underlying the whole political structure of the land, fancied that the unity movement was a romantic sham, and that Prussia, if she wished to profit by it, would be obliged to purchase foreign consent.

Acting upon these delusions, France made those insulting propositions now divulged and shown up by Count Bismarck. In her public acts a protector of nations, she in her private communications to the Count unblushingly avowed herself a conqueror; a friend of peace in so

many manifestoes and speeches from the throne, she for four long years gave Prussia unmistakably to understand that war could be obviated only by the satisfaction of her grasping demands. This latter circumstance is one of the most notable facts related in Count Bismarck's circular. The Prussian Premier has not the slightest hesitation in owning that for a long time past he did not think it politic to meet French importunities with absolute refusal, as this might have endangered the continuance of peace. He tells us frankly that he kept France in play, hoping that some change would take place in her constitution, or some other event occur which would remove the danger of a rupture. At any rate, he wished to put off war, and by the mere fact of the delay render it less and less probable. At last, however, France perceived his game, and becoming aware that she would not get anything out of him, determined to try her luck without and even against him. Then the conflict, on the very brink of which Europe had been hovering for the last four years, became unavoidable, and the Spanish nomination pretext was seized upon.

By way of supplement to the above, Count Bismarck adds his conviction, that if he had not exposed the French intrigues in the present document, he would, before or after the first battle of the impending campaign, have seen a French emissary in his room with offers to renew negotiations on the old basis. I think we may congratulate ourselves upon his resolve to prevent such a contingency. He has long enough defended his country single-handed, and may well change his tactics now that he has been obliged to call a million warriors to his aid. If he has shown his wisdom by keeping his terrible secret such a length of time, he deserves equal praise for publishing it to the world the moment the bloodshed he wished to avoid was ruthlessly forced upon him. What a time he must have had of it these four years! And how well one can now understand that his health should have repeatedly

required a prolonged stay in the country, when his return to the capital was sure to bring the modest Benedetti with the old song and some new draught treaty into his study!

RESULTS OF THE BENEDETTI DISCLOSURE.

Berlin, August 2, 1870.

I NEED not tell you how patriotic feelings have been intensified in the South by the disclosures concerning the Benedetti draught treaty. Even her worst enemies cannot now deny that, independently of being the strongest of the German States, Prussia is also in every other respect worthy to be at their head. After what has transpired, they must admit that although Prussia may have dethroned some Sovereigns incorrigibly opposed to the national unity politics, she yet scorned the idea of aggrandisement at the expense of more faithful allies, and with the help of a foreign dictator. It must be likewise plain to all that, had not the Southern States in the present emergency remained true to their alliance with Prussia, the latter, in case of defeat, might have found it difficult to save them from the grasp of the French. As these are facts too patent to be contradicted by any one, even the most rabid Ultramontanes and Republicans cannot help swimming with the stream, and suspending for the time being their rantings against the State they so bitterly hate as the prop of Protestantism and monarchism in this part of the world. As to the dynasties and the vast majority of the people in the South, they are sincerely grateful to Prussia for her honourable behaviour in repudiating the disreputable overtures of the French Government. They thank Prussia for preferring supremacy to annexation, and rejecting the selfish aid of Bonaparte, who, from a protector and ally of her sister States, would fain

have converted her into a mere conqueror like himself; and they congratulate themselves upon the nation being saved both by the uprightness of its Central Government and the dutiful conduct of its constituent States.

It is the fact of fidelity and advantage going hand in hand for the nonce which has resulted in an overpowering impression upon the minds of men. The South declaring for Prussia on the first appearance of danger, and Prussia immediately afterwards proving herself deserving of their attachment by making these startling revelations, has filled all parties with mutual trust in each other. It certainly had been hoped on all sides that no German tribe or dynasty would ever revert to the practices of the past, and bargain with the foreigner at the cost of his compatriots; but, however firmly this conviction may have been entertained, it has only now received the sanction of actual experience, and been converted from sentiment into fact. After this, if Germany succeeds in defeating France, the extension of the unity institutions to the South will be greatly promoted by the increased respect which Prussia and the States on the other side of the Main cannot fail to entertain for each other in consequence of recent events.

Respecting the attitude of neutral Powers, that of Russia seems to become more and more favourable to this Government. Adverting to M. Gramont's despatch of July 21st, the semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* ridicules the idea of any one believing in anything put forward by French diplomatists. More doubtful are the intentions of Austria, who is negotiating a loan of twelve million florins with some Vienna bankers, to cover the expenses of her incipient military preparations. After the declarations made by Russia, it is, however, pretty certain that only a severe reverse sustained by Germany will bring Austria into the field. Without this preliminary it would be too dangerous. A similar conduct is observed by Italy, who is likewise awaiting the issue of the first battle or two

to decide which side she will take. The policy of a first-rate and a second-rate Power being thus marked by signal caution, it is scarcely to be expected that Denmark, a third-rate State, will be more forward in joining the French. Once more, therefore, as has so often been the case in the course of the last three centuries, the destinies of Germany are intrusted to the care of her good sword. Without an ally to assist her, she is attacked by one neighbour, questionably supported by another, and watched with anything but amicable feelings by all the rest. Should she be defeated by France, it is not the latter alone that will try to benefit by the victory. But Germany thinks she has a fair chance of success. Trusting to what has just been enunciated by the Duke of Oldenburg in his speech from the throne, that United Germany has never yet been beaten, she faces the future, if not with sanguine anticipations, at least with confident hopes.

By order of the Government, the official intelligence from the seat of war will be regularly posted up in all the more important towns of the kingdom. As far as we have hitherto had the opportunity of testing the accuracy of the official telegrams, by comparing them with foreign or private intelligence, they are strictly correct.

Throughout the country, from the Rhine to Berlin, and farther east, the most careful preparations have been made for the reception and transport of the wounded. As, to prevent typhus and other epidemic diseases, the sick and wounded have to be distributed over a wide area, it is necessary that everything should be in readiness for their conveyance from spot to spot. For this purpose localities have been hired in the towns on the route, and converted into hospitals or temporary resting-places for the sufferers. How extensively this system has been carried out you may infer from the fact that hospitals for several thousands are being formed at Berlin, at a distance of nearly 600 miles from the battle-fields, and that all the way from

Saarbrück to this capital the rooms in which the unfortunate travellers will rest are already fitted up and waiting their arrival. To inform any doctor who may treat an invalid of the view taken of his case by the medical man who saw him first, a label will be attached to the sufferer's neck, describing symptoms, &c. In addition to this, every soldier in the army has a sort of ticket on his person containing the name of his regiment, battalion, and company, with a number by which his identity can easily be ascertained. It must be owned that if the instruments of destruction have become more effective, so have the means of cure and the solicitude displayed in their application.

August 3, 1870.

Neither public opinion nor the Prussian Government have been satisfied by England limiting her veto concerning the export of coal to cases of direct supply to French men-of-war. Coal, under the present conditions of naval warfare, being as indispensable as powder and shot, the Germans insist that to supply a belligerent with this necessary material, no matter whether directly or indirectly, is to arm him for the destruction of his enemy. If it is told them that they are quite as welcome as the French to purchase any commodities they please in the English market, they reply, that, being unable to hold the sea, they cannot avail themselves of the facilities offered them, and therefore must regard the conduct of England as one-sided and partial. Their soreness is increased by the conviction, prevalent in these parts, that in fighting France Germany is not only vindicating her own independence, but also rendering the like service to Belgium and the Powers that have guaranteed its existence among the States. They had half hoped that the recent revelations concerning the policy of France would bring the Powers chiefly interested in the preservation of Belgium into the field: if instead of this, they have seen the statements of their

Premier slighted by some and accompanied with suspicious commentaries by others, you may easily imagine the state of mind with which they approach the coal question, and the niceties of international law, touching the obligations of neutrals. The student of history is doubtless aware, that in critical periods like the present people are apt to be peculiarly susceptible, and that feelings and prejudices created amid danger and general excitement sink deep into the national mind, and long outlive the impressions which first engendered them. It were much to be regretted if, notwithstanding the sympathies so generously manifested by England at the outbreak of the war, the progress of events should seem to afford the Germans cause, real or imaginary, of lasting discontent.

I am assured that England has inquired of Austria whether she would be inclined to join her in defending the independence of Belgium.

Russia is arming. Orders have been given to place the artillery in Poland on a war footing, and to lay down, as quickly as possible, a large number of sidings on the Polish and west Russian lines. In some places—as, for instance, between Dubno and Kalkuhnen, on the Warsaw line, and between Josli and Etkan, on the Prussian frontier—a second set of rails is being fixed. At the same time, 750,000 roubles have been set apart to purchase a fresh supply of cars for the Western Government lines, and orders given to the Riga-Dünaburg line to complete its rolling stock.

King George of Hanover does not relent in his opposition to this Government. He has thought the present an appropriate moment to accredit Count Breda, a Frenchman by birth, as his Envoy to the Court of the Tuileries. To advise the new Minister on military matters, Major von Adelebsen, late of the Hanover army, has been attached to him. It is a pity the dethroned King should have no perception for the realities of his case. The

Guelphian papers in Hanover have not one-tenth the readers patronising the pro-Prussian press of the province; and even those they have are not sufficiently enthusiastic to approve the politics of their ex-Sovereign. While King George does not hesitate to show that he continues on friendly terms with France, one section after the other of the Legitimist nobility in his former realm are coming forward, and offer King William their services against the hereditary enemy of the nation. In all Hanover the number of persons arrested for betraying opposite tendencies does not exceed a dozen.

In the Saar country the old game is going on as briskly as ever. Reconnaissance succeeds reconnaissance, and patrol chases patrol. If any inference can be drawn from these petty incidents of the last few days, it is this—that the French, at the lowest estimate, are firing a hundred shots before one takes effect. Thus, for instance, on the 30th of July Lieutenant von Voigt, who had the watch between Brebach and Blittersdorf, was fired at for several minutes by a party of thirty Frenchmen, yet escaped unhurt. On the day before, two Lancers fell into a French ambush near the hunting-lodge on the road from Blittersdorf to Saarbrücken. Though exposed to the fire of thirty chassepots for full ten minutes and at a very short distance, only one of them was killed. The other, returning home, gave the alarm, upon which a Prussian company turned out, and caught the invaders just in time to inflict a severe lesson upon them. The task was not an easy one, as the French kept in the wood, and the Prussians, to get at them, had to traverse open fields. Yet, though hundreds and hundreds of cartridges were expended by the enemy, their entire loss consisted of but one dead soldier and two wounded horses.

On the 30th the Emperor visited the camps at Forbach and Saargemünd, when the ordinary amount of drumming, which had long excited the mirth and wonder of the Ger-

mans, was redoubled in his honour. Tremendous shouts of '*Vive l'Empereur!*' were distinctly audible to the Prussian sentinels. On the same day the French restored some bridges over the Saar, inquired for fords, and gave other signs of an intention to assume the offensive. But on the 31st the scene suddenly changed. The camp at Forbach was deserted, the division which had been quartered there drawn off to Saargemünd, and a line of earthworks begun at the latter place. The offensive, then, had been suddenly abandoned for the defensive. Whether this resulted from *ruse*, or the adoption of a new plan, remains to be seen. It is only fair to add, that the French have scrupulously paid for the victuals they have hitherto had in German villages.

Of the two English officers mentioned in the reports, the correct name of the one killed in Alsace was Winslow. Though an Englishman by birth, he was in the Baden service, and wore the Baden uniform, when he met with his premature death. He belonged to the adventurous band of three officers who, with three dragoons, penetrated about thirty miles into the enemy's territory, until at last they found themselves face to face with a whole regiment of hussars. One, the Englishman, was shot; another, a German, killed two people and was taken prisoner, slightly wounded; the third, also a German, cut his way through, and got home to tell the tale. The other Englishman figuring in the German papers is Captain Seton, of her Majesty's 102d Fusiliers, attached to the 7th company of the 40th Fusiliers; a South German troop recruited from the principality of Hohenzollern. Captain Seton has written to the editor of the *Cologne Gazette*, to state that he makes the campaign as a spectator, not as a combatant. To remain true to his character, he carries no arms, though he wears uniform. I am told that a good many more English gentlemen have been lately roving about near the lines in search of excitement and adventure. The German

officers are delighted to have their company, but politely declined to be responsible for their safety. In correction of a former statement, I may be permitted to add that the number of cartridges the Prussian soldier carries in the present campaign is not seventy-two, but eighty.

As yet no notification of the blockade of the Elbe and Weser has been received. Ships continue to enter both rivers by stealth, notwithstanding the enemy's vessels posted at their mouths. But three days ago the German man-of-war Arminius arrived safely at Hamburg, after having been chased by superior forces. We have not heard of any merchantmen captured up to the present time.

Although patriotic demonstrations have long become too numerous for me to attempt anything like setting them down in chronological order, the mentioning of a few recent remarkable instances may not be out of place. If there was any town in Germany where a hostile feeling was kept up against this Government, it was Frankfort. Yet this city, where the French hoped to find partisans enough to enable them to enact the old comedy of liberating one part of Germany from the alleged yoke of the other, is now amongst the most forward to show her hatred of the invader. On the Senate of the city asking the town-council for 100,000 fl. to defray certain local expenses incidental to the war, the council voted twice that sum, and offered to bear any other burdens that might be required. All the officers of the late Frankfort troops who resigned on the annexation of the city have asked permission to rejoin the service; and there is no place where Prussian troops when marching through are more hospitably received and entertained by the inhabitants than the old imperial town on the Main. An equally striking example of loyal devotion to the common country is furnished by Hadersleben, the most northerly town of Schleswig, whose burgomasters and council have sent a very warm address to the King.

Again, at Munich, the old stronghold of the Ultramontanes, so many students have volunteered as to obtain the permission of the military authorities to form a battalion of their own. As a German battalion numbers 1000 men, it follows that more than a third of the students must have exchanged the pen for the sword. But what, perhaps, is more notable than anything else, the German students in Austria have shown themselves the warmest sympathisers with the national cause. At Vienna, the spokesmen of the three Burschenschaften, or patriotic students' societies, have waited upon the Prussian Ambassador, and applied for leave for themselves and colleagues to enter the Prussian army. The Ambassador regretted his inability to oblige them until they had obtained the requisite permission from their own Sovereign. A similar demonstration has emanated from three other Burschenschaften at Graz, who have voted an address to their brother students in Germany, which is, perhaps, the most anti-Napoleonic and the most determined unity manifesto published in the present juncture. Surely unity is no longer confined to the romantic, but rather effervescent, atmosphere of the patriotic *Lied*.

THE FRENCH REPLY TO COUNT BISMARCK.

THE Duc de Gramont has addressed the following circular to the diplomatic agents of France at foreign Courts:

'*Paris, August* 3, 1870.

'Sir,—We now know the full meaning of the telegram addressed by Count Bismarck to the Prussian Ambassador in London to announce to England the pretended secrets of which the Federal Chancellor alleged that he was the depository. His despatch adds no material fact to those which he has already put forth. We only find in it a few more impro-

babilities. We shall not attempt to point them out. Public opinion has already passed judgment upon assertions which derive no authority from the audacity with which they are repeated, and we regard it as completely established, notwithstanding all denials, that never has the Emperor Napoleon proposed to Prussia a treaty for taking possession of Belgium. That idea is the property of M. de Bismarck. It is one of the expedients of that unscrupulous policy which we trust is now approaching its end. I should have abstained from reverting to assertions which have been proved false, if the author of the Prussian despatch, with a want of tact more marked than I have ever before noticed in a diplomatic document, had not mentioned relatives of the Emperor as having been bearers of compromising messages and confidences. Whatever repugnance I may feel at being compelled to follow the Prussian Chancellor and to engage in a task so contrary to my habits, I overcome that feeling, because it is my duty to repudiate perfidious insinuations, which, directed against members of the imperial family, are evidently intended to apply to the Emperor himself.

It was at Berlin that M. de Bismarck, originating ideas the first conception of which he now seeks to impute to us, solicited in these terms the French Prince, whom, in defiance of all customary rules, he now seeks to draw into the controversy. "You desire," said he, "an impossible thing. You wish to take the Rhenish provinces, which are German. Why do you not annex Belgium, where the people have the same origin, the same religion, and the same language as yourselves? I have already caused it to be mentioned to the Emperor; if he enters into my views, we will assist him to take Belgium. As for myself, if I were the master and I were not hampered by the obstinacy of the King, it would be already done." These words of the Prussian Chancellor have been, so to speak, literally repeated to the Court of France by the Comte de Goltz. That Ambassador was so little reticent upon the subject, that there are many witnesses who have heard him thus express himself. I will add, that at the period of the Universal Exhibition the overtures of Prussia were known to more than one high personage, who took note of them and still remembered them. Moreover, it was not a mere passing notion with Count Bismarck, but truly a concerted plan with which his ambitious schemes were connected; and he pursued his attempts to carry them out with a perseverance which is amply attested by his repeated excursions to France, to Biaritz, and elsewhere. He failed because of the indomitable will of the Emperor, who always refused to connect himself with a policy that was unworthy of his loyalty.

I now quit the subject, which I have touched upon for the last time, with a firm intention of never again recurring to it; and I come to the really new point in M. de Bismarck's despatch. "I have reason to believe," he says, "that if the publication of the projected treaty had not occurred, France would have made us an offer—after our mutual

armaments had been completed—to carry out the proposition which she had previously made to us, as soon as we found ourselves at the head of a million of well-armed soldiers in the face of unarmed Europe—that is to say, to make peace before or after the first battle, upon the basis of M. Benedetti's propositions at the expense of Belgium." The Emperor's Government cannot allow such an assertion to pass without notice. In the face of all Europe, his Majesty's Ministers defy M. de Bismarck to adduce any fact whatever to justify a belief that they have ever manifested, directly or indirectly, officially or by secret agency, an intention of uniting with Prussia to accomplish together in respect of Belgium the deed she has consummated in respect to Hanover. We have opened no negotiation with M. de Bismarck either concerning Belgium or any other subject. Far from seeking war, as we have been accused of doing, we besought Lord Clarendon's intervention with the Prussian Cabinet, with a view to a mutual disarmament; an important mission which Lord Clarendon, through friendship towards France and devotion to the cause of peace, consented confidentially to undertake. It was in these terms that Comte Daru, in a letter of the 1st of February, explained to the Marquis de Lavalette, our Ambassador in London, the intentions of the Government:

"It is certain that I should not mix myself up with this affair, nor should I ask England to interfere in it, if the question was one simply of an ordinary and purely formal nature, intended only to afford M. de Bismarck an opportunity to repeat his refusal. It is a real, serious, positive proposition, which it is sought to act upon. The principal Secretary of State appears to anticipate that M. de Bismarck will at first manifest dissatisfaction and displeasure. That is possible, but not certain. With that possibility in view, it will be well to prepare the ground in such a manner as to avoid at the outset a negative reply. I am convinced that time and reflection will induce the Chancellor to take into his serious consideration the proposition of England. If at first he does not reject all overtures, then the interests of Prussia and of all Germany will speedily speak out sufficiently to lead him to modify his opposition. He would not be willing to raise against himself the opinion of his entire country. What, indeed, would be his position, if we took away the sole pretext upon which he relies, that is, the armament of France?"

Count Bismarck at first replied that he could not take upon himself to submit the suggestions of the British Government to the King, and that he was sufficiently acquainted with the views of his Sovereign to foretell his decision. King William, he said, would certainly see in the proposition of the Cabinet of London a change in the disposition of England towards Prussia. In short, the Prussian Chancellor declared "that it was impossible for Prussia to modify a military system which was so closely connected with the traditions of the country, which formed

one of the bases of its constitution, and which was in no way abnormal." Comte Daru was not checked by this first reply. On the 13th of February he wrote to M. de Lavelette:

"I hope that Lord Clarendon will not consider himself beaten nor be discouraged. We will shortly give him an opportunity of returning to the charge, if it should be agreeable to him, and of resuming communications with the Federal Chancellor. Our intention is, in fact, to diminish our contingent. We should largely have reduced it, if we had received a favourable reply from the Federal Chancellor. We shall make a smaller reduction, as the reply is in the negative; but we shall reduce. The reduction will, I hope, be 10,000 men. That is the number I should propose. We shall affirm by acts, which are of more value than words, our intentions—our policy. Nine contingents each reduced by 10,000 men make a total reduction of 90,000 men. That is already something; it is a tenth part of the existing army. The law upon the contingent will be proposed shortly. Lord Clarendon will then judge whether it will be proper to represent to M. de Bismarck that Prussia alone in Europe makes no concession to the spirit of peace, and that he thus places her in a serious position, because he furnishes arms against her to all the world, including the populations which are crushed beneath the weight of the military charges which he imposes upon them."

Count Bismarck, closely pressed, felt it necessary to enter into some farther explanations with Lord Clarendon. These explanations, as far as we are acquainted with them, from a letter from M. de Lavalette, dated the 23d of February, were very reserved. The Chancellor of the Prussian Confederation, departing from his first resolution, had informed King William of the proposition recommended by England, but his Majesty had declined it. In vindication of the refusal, the Chancellor pleaded the fear of a possible alliance between Austria and the States of the South, and the ambitious designs that might be entertained by France. But in the foreground he especially placed the anxieties with which the policy of Russia inspired him, and upon that point indulged in particular remarks respecting the Court of St. Petersburg which I prefer to pass by in silence, not desiring to reproduce injurious insinuations. Such were the pleas which Count Bismarck opposed to the loyal and conscientious entreaties several times renewed by Lord Clarendon at the request of the Emperor's Government. If, then, Europe has remained in arms; if a million of men are about to be hurled against each other upon the battle-field, it cannot be contested that the responsibility for such a state of things attaches to Prussia; for it is she who has repudiated all idea of disarmament, while we not only forwarded the proposition to her, but also set the example. Is not this conduct explained by the fact that, at the very time when confiding France was reducing her contingent, the Cabinet of Berlin was arranging in secret

for the provoking nomination of a Prussian Prince? Whatever may be the calumnies invented by the Federal Chancellor, we have no fear; he has forfeited the right to be believed. The conscience of history and of Europe will say that Prussia has sought the present war by inflicting upon France, while she was engaged in the development of her political institutions, an outrage which no high-spirited and courageous nation could have accepted without meriting the contempt of nations.

Agréez, &c.

GRAMONT.'

ANOTHER FRENCH JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR.

ON August 4, the Paris *Journal Officiel* published the following article in place of its weekly political bulletin:

'It is not with Germany we are at war: it is with Prussia, or, more properly, with the policy of Count Bismarck. Duly respecting patriotic sentiments and the principles of nationality, the Emperor and his Government have never assumed towards the great German race any but the most friendly attitude. When arresting at Villafranca the victorious march of our troops, his Majesty was influenced by a desire to spare himself the regret of being compelled to fight Germany in order to liberate the Peninsula. When, in June 1860, he visited Baden, he met King William, then Prince Regent of Prussia, the Kings of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Hanover, and Saxony, the Grand Dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Saxe-Weimar, and the Dukes of Coburg and Nassau, and by tendering them the most cordial assurances, he offered loyally to those princes his friendship and that of France. When King William, in 1861, visited Compiègne, he received a cordial and courteous welcome. A short time before Sadowa the Emperor wrote to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, a letter which sketched out the programme the most favourable for the prosperity of the Germanic Confederacy and the aspirations and rights of the German nation.

To accord to Prussia everything compatible with the liberty, the independence, and the equilibrium of Germany; to maintain Austria in her great position among the Germanic populations; to assure to the minor States a closer union, a more powerful organisation, and a more important position—such was the plan proposed by his Majesty. The realisation of those ideas, so consistent with the desires and the interests of all the German populations, would have been the triumph of right and of justice; it would have spared Germany the misfortunes of despotism and of war.

Let us compare the Emperor's programme with the theories which

Count Bismarck has succeeded in carrying out. For many years profound peace had existed among all Germans. For that peace, the Prussian Minister substituted a war which broke up the Germanic Confederation, and created a yawning abyss between Austria and Prussia. By excluding from Germany a monarchy which was one of its principal sources of strength, M. Bismarck was a traitor to the common country. In order to augment Prussia, he sensibly diminished Germany; and the day is not far distant when all true patriots across the Rhine will reproach him bitterly for it. Not content with destroying the bonds which connected Prussia with the Germanic Confederation, he has not shrunk from brutally despoiling princes whose only crime was their fidelity to Federal duties.

Let the countries which have been annexed to Prussia compare their present lot with their situation before 1866. Tranquil, rich, honoured, lightly taxed, they presented a pattern of moral and material prosperity. Popular dynasties established an intimate relationship between the people and the Government. To-day those countries deeply regret the loss of their princes. Crushed under the weight of excessive taxation, with their commerce and manufactures ruined, with agricultural work left to be done by women; they are now required to lavish their gold and their blood for a policy whose violence is hateful to them. Hanoverians, Hessians, inhabitants of Nassau and Frankfort! it is not enough that you should be the victims of M. Bismarck's ambition;—the Prussian Minister desires that you should become his accomplices — you are worthy to fight in a better cause.

It is lamentable to behold to what lengths a monarch may be led, who, instead of listening to the dictates of his heart and mind, places himself under the control of an unscrupulous Minister. How far distant is the time when King William said, upon accepting the Regency, "Prussia should make none but moral conquests in Germany"! If that Prince, whose intentions were loyal, and who had a respect for right, had then been told that a day would come when, without cause or pretext, he would violently dispossess the most respectable princes of Germany, or that he would seize not only the crown but the private fortune of a Sovereign so irreproachable as the King of Hanover, or that in the ancient free city of Frankfort he would give a slap in the face to the long-established glories of Germany,—he would never have credited such a prediction. Will he, then, not distrust a Minister who only yesterday dared to reproach him for giving a courteous reception to the representative of France, and who maintained to the English Ambassador at Berlin that that conduct had provoked general indignation throughout Prussia?

If we have witnessed with sorrow the excesses committed against the princes of North Germany, we have not been less grieved at the treatment to which princes of Southern Germany have had to submit. Can the peoples of Southern Germany have any ground of resentment towards

France? Bavaria, immediately after Sadowa, did she not beseech us to preserve the integrity of her territory? and did we not hasten to help her? Who was it that demanded for the States of the South an independent national existence? Who was it that desired that the Sovereigns of those countries, instead of being transformed into crowned prefects, should preserve all the prerogatives of real sovereigns, so as to be able to protect the independence and liberty of their States? Full of respect for the qualities of those fine populations, honest and laborious, we knew that, ready as they might be to take part in a truly national war, it would sorely afflict them to be called upon to join in a purely Prussian war. Our traditional sympathies with the States of the South survive even in the present war; and we hope that the hour will come when the people of those States will perceive that we were their real friends. The Emperor has said so in his proclamation. He desires that the nations which compose the great Germanic race should freely dispose of their own destinies. To deliver Germany from Prussian oppression, to reconcile the rights of Sovereigns with the legitimate aspirations of the people, to put an end to incessant encroachments which are a perpetual menace to Europe, to preserve the Danish nationality from complete ruin, to compel an equitable and lasting peace, based upon moderation, justice, and right—such is the general idea which governs the present contest.

The war now beginning is not on our part a war of ambition—it is a war of equilibrium. It is the defence of the weak against the strong, the reparation of great iniquities, the chastisement of unjustifiable acts. Far from being influenced by motives of rancour or hatred, we enjoy that calmness which arises from the performance of a duty, and we appeal in full confidence to public opinion, the arbiter of peoples and of kings. We desire that Germany, instead of placing her strength at the disposal of Prussian egotism and ambition, should reënter the paths of wisdom and of prosperity. The future will prove the elevated views which govern the imperial policy, and the Germans themselves will unite to render justice to the loyalty of France and her Sovereign.'

The official organ of the French Empire presumes to teach the Germans how they ought to act, if they would secure happiness. The Germans demand unity, but the *Journal* extols the former divided condition of the country. The German liberal and progressive party have charged Prussia with reforming the Federal institutions; but the *Journal* pretends to look upon Prussia as a mere ambitious schemer and conqueror. Either the *Journal* is ignorant of the real condition of Germany, or it has determined to ignore it.

BELGIAN SPEECH FROM THE THRONE.

THE Belgian Chambers were opened on August 8th by the King in person, who delivered the following speech:

'Gentlemen,—At the moment when events abroad inflame our hearts with exalted feelings of love for our common country, I longed to see the nation's representatives assembled around me. I hope that the tide of war will not ensanguine our soil; that Belgium, inoffensive and a well-wisher of all, may not have that neutrality violated which is imposed upon her and guaranteed by each of the five great Powers of Europe. The Emperor of the French has written to me that it is his firm resolve to conform to his international duties, and respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time, his imperial Majesty expressed to me his desire to be reassured that Belgium would herself make her neutrality respected by all the means in her power. In my reply I was happy to be able to state that the Emperor had not been misinformed as to our intentions. The Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia was equally eager to assure me, in writing, that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected by him so long as it should not be violated by the other belligerent Power.

Among the friendly evidences which I have received from foreign Powers, I am pleased to mention, with a gratitude which all the country will share with me, the solicitude of the Government of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain for the interests of the Belgian neutrality, and the generous support with which those sentiments were received in the Parliament and also by public opinion in England.

Belgium, for her part, in the position in which she has been placed by international law, does not misapprehend what is due to other States or to herself. During the war she will know how to preserve to her conscientious neutrality the loyal and sincere character which she is always obliged to give to her relations during peace. In conformity with the wishes of the belligerents themselves, she will hold herself ready to defend it with all the ardour of her patriotism and all the resources which a nation draws from the energy of its will. Already my Government has taken on its own responsibility those measures which the circumstances require, and for which the approbation of the two Chambers will not be wanting.

In the midst of these anxieties, which so naturally are prominent in our minds, the Government will not lay before you in this extraordinary Session any bills excepting those which are urgent, and the passing of which cannot be postponed until another time.

Belgium, gentlemen, has already undergone more than one perilous trial; but never one of so grave a nature as that which we are undergoing at the present time. Her prudence, her loyal sentiments, and her firm patriotism will enable her to overcome it in a manner worthy of herself, worthy of the esteem in which she is held by the other nations, worthy of the prosperity which her free institutions have secured for her.

The Belgian people are profoundly conscious of their right. They know the value of the advantages which for forty years they have so happily acquired and honourably possessed. They are not likely to forget how to preserve them at the present time, nor will they forget what it is they have to preserve—their well-being, their liberty, their honour, and even the very existence of their country.

All Belgian hearts unite for a sacred cause. People and King in the fulfilment of such duties can have but one cry, "Long live independent Belgium! May God watch over her and protect her right!"'

The speech was warmly applauded. The words referring to England were received with enthusiastic shouts of *Vive l'Angleterre!*

FRANCE CALLING EUROPE TO HER ASSISTANCE.

On August 4th H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Prussia defeated the French at Weissenburg. On August 6th he beat them again in a pitched battle at Wörth. On the same day H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles achieved a victory at Spicheren and Forbach. On August 8th the weekly bulletin of the Paris *Official Journal* contained the following:

'There occur in the life of nations solemn and decisive moments in which God gives them an opportunity of showing what they are and of what they are capable. That hour has come for France. It has sometimes been asserted that, though intrepid in the dash of success, the great nation supports reverses with difficulty. What is now passing before us gives the lie to this calumny. The attitude of the people is not one of discouragement; it is one of sublime and patriotic rage against the invaders of France, who in France must find their tomb.

All Frenchmen will rise as one man. They remember their ancestors and their children. They look back upon centuries of glory, and forward to

a future that their heroism shall render free and powerful. Never has our country been better prepared for self-devotion and sacrifice. Never has it shown in a more imposing and magnificent manner the vigour and pride of the national character. It shouts with enthusiasm, "Up; to Arms!" To conquer or die is its motto.

While our soldiers heroically defend the soil of France, Europe is uneasy at the successes of Prussia. People ask themselves to what lengths the ambition of that insatiable Power would carry her, if she were intoxicated with a decisive triumph.

It is an invariable law of history, that any nation, which by inordinate covetousness disturbs the general equilibrium, turns all other countries into opponents. This truth cannot fail to be again demonstrated. Who is there interested in the resurrection of the German Empire? Who is there that desires the Baltic to become a Prussian lake? Can it be Sweden, Norway, or Denmark—countries that a Prussian triumph would annihilate? Can it be Russia—Russia, which is more interested than any Power in preserving the equilibrium of the North from German covetousness? Can it be England, which, as a great maritime Power and as the protector of Denmark, is opposed to the progress of the Prussian navy? Can it be Holland, already so much threatened by the audacious intrigues of Count Bismarck?

With regard to Austria, the restoration of the German Empire to the advantage of the House of Hohenzollern would be the most fatal blow, not only to the dynasty of the Hapsburgs, but to the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Prussia will certainly attempt to make promises to the Cabinet of Vienna, but it is well known what faith can be placed in Count Bismarck's promise. Can any pretended guarantee ever be stronger than the ties which united Prussia to the Germanic Confederation, and which Prussia, contemning all her duties and obligations, so violently tore asunder? The decisive victory of the Hohenzollerns would not be less fatal to Italy than to Austria. A Germanic Empire would, at any price, try to acquire a line of sea-coast. It would want one in the South as well as in the North, and would demand Venice and Trieste, as well as Kiel and Amsterdam. Thus the regeneration of Italy would be compromised.

We appeal with confidence to the wisdom of Governments and peoples to root Prussian despotism out of Europe, to aid us, either by alliance or sympathy, in saving the European balance of power. There are favourable symptoms apparent in England. Great Britain is fully satisfied with the declarations we have so categorically and loyally given with regard to Belgian neutrality, protecting, as it does, our northern frontier. Great Britain shows herself ready to defend Belgium, should Prussia wish to violate that country's territory. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark show an attitude trembling with patriotism. The Emperor of Russia honours our Ambassador with his particular goodwill, and the

best-authorised organs of the Russian press hold a language unfavourable to the Prussian cause. Those Vienna journals which at first timidly manifested some sympathy for Count Bismarck are compelled to give way before public opinion, and now speak in terms harmonising with the true interests of Austria. The Emperor Francis Joseph, the King of Italy, and their Governments manifest dispositions more and more satisfactory towards us. Austria and Italy are actively arming. The Ministers of Vienna and Pesth obey a united impulse, and the moment approaches when Prussia will encounter from that quarter the most serious and grave embarrassment. Our diplomacy will not be less active than our army. France is making a supreme effort, and our patriotism rises equal to every danger. The more serious the circumstances, the more will the nation be energetic. All divisions cease, and the French press unanimously express the most practical and most noble ideas.

The coöperation of the Senate and Legislative body is about to lend fresh strength to our troops, and the France of 1870 will show the peoples of Europe that we have not degenerated.'

Up to the insertion of the above article, the French Government never declared against the idea of German unity, which it knew to be equally cherished by people north and south of the Main. On the contrary, it sometimes extolled unity as a necessary and most satisfactory consummation of a great historical law; or if declaring against it, restricted objections to the mode in which the German destinies were being fulfilled by Prussia, contrary to the wishes of the Republican and Ultramontane parties. The above article is pitched in a different key. Diplomatic phraseology having been rendered useless by the events of the war, France now openly declares German unity to constitute a danger to every country in Europe. If this be the real opinion of the French Government, it must be permitted to doubt their sincerity in assuring us, only a fortnight ago, that they had no wish to bring on war, but would have been delighted to see Germany accomplish her allotted task.

On the same day the following Proclamation, signed by all the French Ministers, was posted up throughout Paris:

'Frenchmen!—We have told you the whole truth; it is now for you to fulfil your duty. Let one single cry issue from the breasts of all—

from one end of France to the other. Let the whole people rise, quivering, and sworn to fight the great fight. Some of our regiments have succumbed before overwhelming numbers, but our army has not been vanquished. The same undaunted spirit still animates it; let us support it. To a momentarily successful audacity we will oppose a union which conquers destiny. Let us fall back upon ourselves, and our invaders shall hurl themselves against a rampart of human breasts. As in 1792 and at Sebastopol, let our reverses be the school of our victories. It would be a crime to doubt for an instant the safety of our country, and a greater still not to do our part to secure it. Up, then, up! And you, inhabitants of the centre, the north, and the south, upon whom the burden of the war does not fall, hasten with unanimous enthusiasm to the help of your brethren in the east. Let France, united in success, be still more united under trial; and may God bless our arms!'

FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE WAR.

Berlin, August 9, 1870.

UNLESS the plaintive telegrams of Napoleon and the all but despairing proclamations of his Ministers reflect the excitement rather than the realities of the hour, the position of the Emperor must be much worse than the Germans thought it. He has certainly been defeated three times within four days. But what then? From 100,000 to 150,000 of his troops cannot yet have been under the enemy's fire, and even those that have encountered the onslaught are, the greater part of them, bodily intact. If, then, there is any ground for those anxious appeals to the army and the nation at large, it must be that the troops are either in a state of perfect consternation, or that the Emperor and his associates consider their condition as more melancholy than it really is. The event has certainly surprised all of us by its astounding celerity. However prepared the Germans were to see the war produce the downfall of their august adversary, they

cannot understand how one so imperious only a week ago should have so utterly changed his tone after the loss of a battle or two. If his risks were so great and his power of endurance so slight, why, it is asked on all sides, must he needs court our enmity so long, and at last so eagerly promote a war? Those who thus ask know little of the intoxication of success, especially if begotten by dictatorial means. In the mean time people here are intensely gratified at finding the work before them easier than anticipated.

In the interest of truth, it is perhaps as well to remark that no more than thirty persons have been arrested in Hanover and Northern Schleswig. Even these are for the most part only 'suspects,' and will be set at liberty at the end of the war. One of them, a lady of high rank, was released three days ago, her husband having given his word of honour that, though she might share his legitimist sentiments, neither she nor he had ever been implicated in any unlawful enterprise against the new *régime*. The husband, a well-known Hanoverian nobleman and adherent of King George, recently retired to Heligoland to escape the fate that has befallen his wife. It was from his island refuge that, in a letter to the Governor-General of his native province, he pledged his word for the innocence of his spouse. He by this means obtained her liberation; but declaring at the same time that, though no conspirator, he would never fight for the King of Prussia, he was pointedly 'advised' by the Governor, the famous General Vogel, to remain where he was, even if nothing could be proved against him.

In the city of Hanover the news of the German victories was received with tumultuous rejoicings. The same is reported from Dresden, Mayence, Altona, Stuttgart, Breslau, Leipzig, &c., where the streets were illuminated, and the military and civil authorities serenaded by excited crowds. In all these places, as also in many German

and half-German towns of Austria, the joyful intelligence was read at the theatre amid the applause of the audience. That the Germans at Prague, Gratz, Klagenfurt, Schöneberg, Pilsen, and other towns in Austria, are giving their sympathies a practical vent by opening subscription-lists for the wounded, deserves likewise to be mentioned. In Berlin voluntary contributions of all kinds continue to pour in for the benefit of the army. Other exertions too are being unremittingly made to support the Government during this trying period. Of the war-loan of 100 million thalers, 69 millions have been taken up by the public; the rest, if wanted, will be disposed of through bankers. In addition to this, the Government is empowered to issue treasury bonds to the amount of twenty million thalers, and also to exhaust the reserve funds kept, in accordance with law, at thirty million thalers.

A curious and somewhat irregular contribution to the exigencies of the war has just been made by certain adventurous gentlemen at Torgau, on the Elbe. It appears there was a tradition in that neighbourhood, that in 1813 a French detachment, while retreating before the Prussians, had sunk its money-chest in the river. The story had long dwindled down to the uncertain outlines of a mere legendary tale, and was regarded as one of the many interesting anecdotes with which imagination has enlivened the history of those memorable times. Somehow or other, however, some Torgauers, reminded of it by present events, determined to institute a search, which, wonderful to relate, resulted in the discovery of the treasure. The whole of the money, amounting to several thousand thalers, has been handed over to the Government, and will now furnish ammunition against the grandsons of its former owners.

Another humane improvement has been introduced to lessen the horrors of war. By order of the Postal Department, letters to soldiers who die in the war will be returned

to the writers, not by the ordinary postmen, but by the civil authorities. The latter are charged in each case to prepare the writers for the melancholy intelligence they have to impart.

PRUSSIAN PROCLAMATIONS RESPECTING THE TREATMENT OF FRENCH CIVILIANS.

I.

'We, William, King of Prussia, address the following to the inhabitants of the French districts occupied by the German armies. The Emperor Napoleon having by land and sea attacked the German people, who desired, and still desire, to live in peace with the French nation, I have assumed the command of the German armies to repel this attack; and by the events of the war I have been led to cross the French frontiers. I carry on this war against French soldiers, not against the citizens of France. Accordingly, the latter will continue to enjoy perfect security of person and property, *so long as they do not themselves deprive me of the right of granting them protection, by hostile undertakings against the German troops.* The generals commanding the several corps will, by special decrees with which the public shall be made acquainted, determine what measures are to be taken against the municipalities or individuals who shall violate the usages of war; they will likewise arrange everything relating to the requisitions deemed necessary for the provisioning of the troops: they will farther fix the value of French and German money, in order to facilitate the intercourse of the individual soldier with the inhabitants.

WILLIAM.

St. Avold, August 11th, 12 o'clock noon, 1870.'

II.

'Soldiers,—In the pursuit of an enemy whom we have forced back after several bloody combats, a great part of our army has already crossed the frontier. Several corps will enter French territory to-day and to-morrow. I expect that the discipline for which you have been hitherto distinguished will be equally well observed in the enemy's territory. We wage no war against the peaceful inhabitants of the country; it is, on the contrary, the duty of every soldier who regards his honour to protect private property, and not to suffer the good repute of our army to be stained by individual cases of bad conduct.

I count on the good spirit which pervades the troops, as well as on the strictness and vigilance of all the commanders.

WILLIAM.

Headquarters, Homburg, August 8th, 1870.'

'PROCLAMATION.

'Nous, Général commandant la 3me Armée Allemande,—Vu la proclamation de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, qui autorise les Généraux commandant en chef les différents corps de l'armée Allemande à établir des dispositions spéciales relativement aux mesures à prendre contre les communes et les personnes qui se metteraient en contradiction avec les usages de la guerre, relativement aux réquisitions qui seront jugées nécessaires pour les besoins des troupes, et de fixer la différence du cours entre les valeurs Allemande et Française, avons arrêté et arrêtons les dispositions suivantes, que nous portons à la connaissance du public.

1. La juridiction militaire est établie par la présente. Elle sera appliquée dans toute l'étendue du territoire Français occupé par les troupes Allemandes, à toute action tendant à compromettre la sécurité de ces troupes, à leur causer des dommages ou à prêter assistance à l'ennemi. La juridiction militaire sera réputée en vigueur et proclamée pour toute l'étendue d'un canton aussitôt qu'elle sera affichée dans une des localités qui en font partie.

2. Toutes les personnes qui ne font pas partie de l'armée Français et n'établiront pas leur qualité de soldat par des signes extérieurs et qui (*a*) serviront l'ennemi en qualité d'espion; (*b*) égareront les troupes Allemandes quand elles seront chargées de leur servir de guides; (*c*) tueront, blesseront, ou pilleront des personnes appartenant aux troupes Allemandes, ou faisant partie de leur suite; (*d*) détruiront des ponts ou des canaux, endommageront les lignes télégraphiques ou les chemins de fer, rendront les routes impracticables, incendieront des munitions, des provisions de guerre, ou les quartiers des troupes; (*e*) prendront les armes contre les troupes Allemandes,—seront punis de la peine de mort. Dans chaque cas, l'officier ordonnant la procédure instituera un conseil de guerre chargé d'instruire l'affaire et de prononcer le jugement. Les conseils de guerre ne pourront condamner à une autre peine qu'à la peine de mort. Leurs jugements seront exécutés immédiatement.

3. Les communes auxquelles les coupables appartiendront ainsi que celles dont le territoire aura servi à l'action incriminée, seront passibles dans chaque cas d'une amende égale au montant annuel de leur impôt foncier.

4. Les habitants auront à fournir ce qui est nécessaire pour l'entretien des troupes. Chaque soldat recevra par jour 750 grammes de pain, 500 grammes de viande, 250 grammes de lard, 30 grammes de café, 60 grammes de tabac ou 5 cigares, $\frac{1}{2}$ litre de vin, ou 1 litre de bière, ou 1-10 d'eau-de-

vie. La ration à livrer par jour pour chaque cheval sera de 6 kilogrammes d'avoine, 2 kilogrammes de foin, 1½ kilogrammes de paille. Pour les cas où les habitants préféreront une indemnité en argent à l'entretien en nature, l'indemnité est fixée á deux francs par jour pour chaque soldat.

5. Tous les commandants de corps détachés auront le droit d'ordonner la réquisition des fournitures nécessaires à l'entretien de leurs troupes. La réquisition d'autres fournitures jugées indispensables dens l'intérêt de l'armée ne pourra être ordonnée que par les Généraux et les officiers faisant fonctions de généraux. Sous tous les rapports, il ne sera exigé des habitants que ce qui est nécessaire pour l'entretien des troupes, et il sera délivré des reçus officiels pour toutes les fournitures. Nous espérons, en conséquence, que les habitants ne feront aucune difficulté de satisfaire aux requisitions qui seront jugées indispensables.

6. A l'égard des transactions individuelles entre les troupes et les habitants, nous arrêtons que 8 silbergros ou 28 kreutzer équivalent à un franc.

Le Général commandant en chef de la 3me Armée Allemande,
FREDERIC GUILLAUME, Prince Royal de Prusse.

Août 11, 1870.'

PRUSSIAN ANSWER TO COUNT BENEDETTI'S EXPLANATION.

Berlin, August 17, 1870.

NOT content with reprinting in the *Official Gazette* the *projet* which appeared in the *Times* of July 25, Count Bismarck has communicated it to the Powers, and added a fresh revelation. The note containing it is as follows :

'*Berlin, August* 10, 1870.

'My telegraphic despatch to the Ambassador of the North German Confederacy in London, respecting the draught treaty published in the *Times* of the 25th ult., has induced Count Benedetti to give his version of the origin of that draught in the *Journal Officiel de l'Empire* of the 30th ult. In my despatch of the 29th ult. I have given a more detailed account respecting the said draught and its bearing upon French politics generally; since which the circular despatch of the Duc de Gramont, dated the 3d of August, has been communicated to the world at large. In adverting to these French utterances I have no intention to give any reply to them, the abundant matter they afford for criticism having been fully ventilated by the press of all countries, France not excepted. The only object of the present communication is to transmit you a fresh piece of evidence, and to request you to bring it to the cognisance of the

Government to which you are accredited. If I have not made use of it before, this was owing to my reluctance, even in a state of war, to drag the person of a monarch into the discussion of the acts of his Ministers and representatives, and also because, considering the form of Government which avowedly existed in France up to the 2d of January last, I was not prepared to hear that the draught treaty, and the other proposals and arrogant demands alluded to in my despatch of the 29th, should have been submitted to me without the knowledge of the Emperor Napoleon.

But certain statements which appear in the latest French utterances necessitate my having recourse to a different line of conduct. On the one hand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs assures us that the Emperor Napoleon has never proposed to Prussia a treaty having the acquisition of Belgium for its object (*que jamais l'Empereur Napoléon n'a proposé à la Prusse un traité pour prendre possession de la Belgique*); on the other, Count Benedetti gives out that the draught treaty in question emanates from me; that all he had to do with it was to put it on paper—writing, so to say, from my dictation (*en quelque sorte sous ma dictée*), which he only did the better to apprehend my views; and that the Emperor Napoleon was made cognisant of the draught only after its completion at Berlin. Statements such as these render it indispensable for me to make use of a means at my disposal calculated to support my account of French politics, and to strengthen the supposition I have previously expressed respecting the nature of the connection between the Emperor and his ministers, envoys, and agents.

In the archives of the Foreign Office at Berlin is preserved a letter from Count Benedetti to me, dated August 5, 1866, and a draught treaty enclosed in that letter. Copies of both are appended to the present communication. The originals, in Count Benedetti's handwriting, I shall submit to the inspection of the representatives of the neutral Powers, and I will also send you a photographic facsimile of the same. I beg to observe that, according to the *Moniteur*, the Emperor Napoleon did pass the time, from the 28th of July to the 7th of August 1866, at Vichy. In the official interview which I had with Count Benedetti, in consequence of this letter, he supported his demands by threatening war in case of refusal. When I declined, nevertheless, the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet; and after the failure of this little business came the more comprehensive proposal relative to Belgium embodied in Count Benedetti's draught treaty published in the *Times*. I request you to read this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to transmit to him a copy or a translation of the same, as also a copy of the documents enclosed. You will also be good enough to lay before him the photographic facsimile directly it comes to hand.

On behalf of the Chancellor of the Confederacy,

VON THILE.'

The above-mentioned letter from Count Benedetti runs as follows:

'Mon cher Président, — En réponse aux communications que j'ai transmises de Nikolsbourg à Paris à la suite de notre entretien du 26 du mois dernier, je reçois de Vichy le projet de convention secrète que vous trouverez ci-joint en copie. Je m'empresse de vous en donner connaissance afin que vous puissiez l'examiner à votre loisir. Je suis du reste à votre disposition pour en conférer avec vous quand vous en jugerez le moment venu.

Tout à vous,

Dimanche, 5 Août 1866.' BENEDETTI.

'*Article* 1. L'Empire Français rentre en possession des portions de territoire qui, appartenant aujourd'hui à la Prusse, avaient été comprises dans la délimitation de la France en 1814.

Article 2. La Prusse s'engage à obtenir du Roi de Bavière et du Grand Duc de Hesse, sauf à fournir à ces Princes des dédommagements, la cession des portions de territoire qu'ils possèdent sur la rive gauche du Rhin et à en transférer la possession à la France.

Article 3. Sont annullées toutes les dispositions rattachant à la confédération Germanique les territoires placés sous la souveraineté du Roi des Pays-Bas, ainsi que celles relatives au droit de garnison dans la forteresse de Luxembourg.'

Fortunately for the reputation of diplomacy, a controversy such as the above can but seldom occur; but if it does occur, it is as well that those who deserve it should have such crushing proofs brought to bear upon them as in the present instance. It is almost a work of supererogation to add a word to a matter so fully, and at the same time so painfully, exposed by the hand of the most competent party. But to enable them to realise the Napoleonic game in its whole intensity, I may be permitted to remind your readers, that while the above demands were being incessantly pressed at Berlin, the Emperor in several speeches from the throne declared himself highly gratified by the changes in Germany, and actually dwelt on the disinterestedness with which he had allowed them to be completed without interfering. He evidently hoped to flatter the Berlin Government into endorsing his demands.

If it be not considered too bold in me to connect a personal affair with matters of such vast importance, I would also avail myself of this opportunity for reverting to an incident which I was not at liberty to explain fully at the time it occurred. In the second half of December 1869 I telegraphed to you that a general disarmament had been proposed by Napoleon III. The statement elicited an indignant denial from the Paris Cabinet, and was but feebly supported in other quarters. It exposed one of the many intrigues which preceded the present war. It was accordingly contradicted by the party planning mischief, and left unnoticed by those bent upon averting it. But the time for revelations has at last arrived; the ice is broken, and there is no occasion for farther reticence. You remember the allusion made to the disarmament scheme but a week ago in Parliament; you have seen it admitted in the recent exculpatory despatch of M. de Gramont; and to-day the Berlin semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* states in so many words that the proposal was really made at the beginning of this year, that it was submitted here through Lord Clarendon, and that—though this was unknown to the late British Secretary for Foreign Affairs—it was intended to render Prussia defenceless at a time when war had been already resolved upon at Paris. In its journalistic aspect, the story well illustrates one of the difficulties with which a chronicler of current events has to deal.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE.

Berlin, August 21, 1870.

THE present relations between Germany and France are made the subject of a remarkable article in the official *Provincial Correspondenz:*

'The way the French behave after sustaining defeat in the field has

justly excited the attention and wonder of Europe.* France at this moment offers the spectacle of a social and political disorganisation, which could not have supervened so soon unless the people had been morally corrupt long ago. So rapid a transition from insolence to timidity, from the proudest anticipation of victory to the most desperate search for the means of escape, could not have been expected of a people which for centuries had the presumption to regard itself as greater and better than others. The experience of the last few weeks will go far to do away with these arrogant claims. It is true, France has held an eminent and, in many respects, predominant position among nations for the last 200 years. For this proud privilege it was indebted partly to the geographical position and fertility of her soil, partly to certain qualities of her inhabitants, and last, not least, to the fact that sooner than all other nations of Europe she succeeded in absorbing mediæval divisions, and uniting the different States from which she has sprung into one organic and powerful whole. While in Germany political divisions and subdivisions increased from day to day, and the number of petty States became greater and greater, France was at an early date converted into one centralised kingdom, and easily lorded it over the disunited forces of her neighbour. Even after French arrogance in the days of Napoleon I. had succumbed to a league of the other Powers, the jealousy prevailing among the latter resulted in leaving France in possession of her former influence. Since then, whatever changes of Government have occurred in France, her influence always remained equally powerful; her Government as well as her people were persistently convinced that they had the right to predominate in Europe and to make their decisions, whatever the questions at issue, final and conclusive. The Second Empire more particularly revived the claims of the old Napoleonic policy, and by first allying itself to one and then to another Power succeeded in weakening all, and strengthening the authority and preponderance of France in proportion.

By the reviving power of Germany this overweening superiority of one State is at last to be reduced to its proper limits. Had Napoleon III. had the slightest inkling that the policy of the present Prussian Government would lead to the unification of Germany, he would, no doubt, have made the greatest exertion to stop us from the very outset. But he thought that we should never be able to effect anything very tangible, and that, far from reorganising the nation, we should be only weakening ourselves and Austria in the vain attempt to establish unity. When these calculations were upset by the events of 1866, and a solid political and military unit had been created in this part of the world, France immediately endeavoured by secret negotiations to gain an increase of terri-

* On August 14th, 16th, 18th, the French were beaten at Courcelles, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte.

tory at the expense of Germany or Belgium. But this hope was likewise destined to be disappointed; and from the moment this fact dawned on Napoleon, he has done his utmost to undo the work of 1866, or at any rate prevent the extension of German unity from North to South. The Emperor Napoleon, as well as the nation of France, had a very distinct presentiment that their preponderance in Europe would be at an end, if Germany, united at last, were to recover her proper position in the world. They have acted upon this conviction ever since the unity movement began, and they have now gone to war with us to stop its progress. By two errors of judgment they were encouraged to make the unwise and criminal attempt of preventing the progress of our national movement by force of arms. In the first place, they knew nothing of the strength national and patriotic feeling had attained in Germany. They never dreamt that by interfering with our domestic concerns and wantonly provoking war they would only add fuel to the flame, and rouse an outcry against them from one end of Germany to the other. And, secondly, they were so vain and self-conceited, that they never realised the truth that, even in the present incomplete state of unity, it would be a difficult task for them to fight Germany. There was such an absolute belief in the superiority of France in military art, skill, and every description of intellectual development, that to doubt that certain and speedy victory would reward their efforts was considered almost tantamount to high treason. In a state of perfect intoxication, the French Government and people entered upon the war.

Events which have recently occurred could not but arouse them from their dreams. Yet the same giddiness, the same deficiency in moral sense, which have conjured up the evil, are noticeable in their conduct. Even after the serious reverses they have undergone, neither in the Government, nor in the Chambers, nor in the people is there any calm and unprejudiced perception of the position they have created for themselves. Nowhere is there any earnest and patriotic enthusiasm. Mutual recriminations between the various political parties, and odious, arbitrary, and overbearing measures, are the only fruits of the defeats sustained. The Government evidently despair, at this early date, we must say, of making good the defence of the country. What has surprised us most is the precipitation with which extreme measures are adopted by the Ministry and sanctioned by the Chambers. Steps which in great and well-ordered States are, as a rule, only resorted to in the last extremity, we find resolved upon after a few preliminary disasters. This betrays a state of corruption and internal rottenness more intense and more comprehensive than one could have imagined to exist. Not by her misfortune in war, but by her pitiable self-despair, France has forfeited the prestige she so long regarded as her due. A people which so easily and so rapidly can lose all confidence in itself does not stand at the head of civilisation, and will scarcely contrive, by mendacity and insol-

ence, to deceive the world any longer as to its real and proper place among nations.

The political decline of France is mainly to be attributed to her social immorality. For a long time past piety and moral earnestness, the only sure foundations of national greatness, have been much shaken in French society. From the highest to the lowest strata the cancer of frivolity and immorality has eaten into the very heart of the people. The existing Government more particularly has committed the unpardonable sin of promoting political frivolity, and thereby sapping the very basis of public life. It now reaps the harvest it has sown.

The German nation may hope, at the termination of the present war, at last to assume the position which it ought to have had long ago. We don't think it will be disputed any more. The spirit in which the Germans have risen against the French is one of self-reliance and conscious strength based upon piety, humility, and the love of liberty. We trust that we shall always remain true to our principles, and remember the lesson so loudly taught by the present fate of France.'

For an official organ this is a strong article to insert. Yet it reflects the views not only of the Government, but of the educated classes at large—views which are as firmly rooted as they are sure to be acted upon in the ensuing stages of the conflict. In the semi-official organs nearly every utterance of the French Government relating to Germany is nowadays simply designated as 'a lie.'

GERMAN LOSSES. ALSACE AND LORRAINE.

Berlin, August 22, 1870.

At length the first official lists of losses in the field have been made public. They fulfil but too completely the melancholy anticipations with which we saw the troops going out to the war. Although restricted to officers, and referring only to a few introductory engagements, they contain figures which will not easily be erased from the minds of men. I will just give you a few examples. As you may be aware, a Prussian regiment on a war footing

has 3,006 men with 69 officers. Of these 69 officers the 74th Regiment (Hanoverians) lost no less than 30 in killed and wounded at Weissenburg. The 77th (also Hanoverians) on the same occasion lost 25 officers; the 39th (Rhinelanders), 26; the 82d (Hessians), 19; the 95th (Thuringians), 16; the 83d (Hessians), 14; the 53d (Westphalians), 11; the 88th (Nassauers), 9; the 80th (Hessians), 8, &c. Still worse was it at Wörth, where the Prussians were for five mortal hours opposed to the French, who were stationed on the hills and could not be dislodged until taken in flank by Würtembergers and Bavarians. There the 58th Regiment (Poseners) had 32 dead and wounded officers; the 59th (Poseners), 23; the 7th (King's Grenadiers—Lower Silesians and German Poseners), 35; the 47th (Lower Silesians), 29; the 46th (Lower Silesians), 33; the 57th (Lower Silesians), 30; the 6th (Westphalians), 28; the 37th (Westphalians), 25, &c. What terrible conclusions as to the number of casualties among the rank and file must be derived from these statistics in respect of the higher grades I need not say.

But the most frightful carnage of all in the earlier part of the campaign was at Spicheren, whose steep and precipitous heights, defended by a tearing fire from cannon, mitrailleuses, and chassepots, were thrice assaulted in vain, and at last carried at the point of the bayonet. On this spot 10,000 Prussians, gradually increased to 27,000, struggled against 40,000 French. Though the official list does not yet extend to this sanguinary encounter, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the private intelligence forwarded me, which gives the total of the losses as 2,297, of whom 811 are dead and 1,486 wounded. Every 12th man, then, was killed or wounded. Some companies left nearly one half their men on the spot, as, for instance, the 5th company of the 48th (Rhinelanders), which went with 250 men into the fire and came out with 129, and the 1st company of the 8th (King's Own — Branden-

burgers), which on the evening of the battle consigned 107 comrades either to the grave or the hospital.

Passing on to the tremendous three days' battle near Metz, we have private intelligence, and this only referring to individual detachments; yet we know enough to imagine the rest. On the 14th, in the action named from the village of Pange, or Courcelles, the 48th (Rhinelanders) lost 32 officers and 891 rank and file; in other words, about one-third its complement. A rifle battalion in the same locality was by the enemy's fire deprived of nine of its officers and 270 rank and file—*i. e.* of a third of the officers and a fourth of the men. On the 14th, as well as on the 16th—the latter being the battle of Mars-la-Tour, or Vionville—the losses of the Prussians were comparatively greater than those of the French, the former being on both occasions greatly outnumbered, and holding fast the enemy with a bulldog's tenacity, to give their main force time to come up. At Mars-la-Tour the best blood of the country was spilt like water. Within a few moments, by the unexpected unmasking of a mitrailleuse battery, Count Westarp, Count Wesdelen, Baron Kleist, Henry VII. Prince of Reuss, Baron Grimm, Baron Witzleben, and many other noblemen of high rank and position were killed. The grand finale at Rézonville, or Gravelotte, on the 18th, where the Prussian hosts, at last assembled in strength, are said to have suffered a loss of 18,000 combatants, was worthy of the beginning. Nor did the French suffer less. In the three actions near Metz they had nearly 15,000 dead, and 50,000 dead, wounded, and prisoners together.

Well may it be asked what has made these battles so unusually bloody. Different circumstances have combined to work out the awful result. The valour of the German and French soldiery, and the exasperation of the Germans at the sufferings they have for centuries endured at the hands of their neighbours, are among the primary reasons

of the extreme bitterness of the strife. So rarely have the Germans been sufficiently united to be able to cope with France, and so long have they accordingly had to pocket invasion and affront, that now, when the time for paying her off has at last arrived, every man in the army is incited by a personal desire for revenge, and is in earnest about the work in hand. Not to dwell upon other more serious injuries, the speeches of M. Thiers and his associates, the imprudent articles of French newspaper writers, and the whole tone of French literature since 1840 have kindled the fire which is now consuming France. The terrible efficacy of modern weapons and the strategy employed by the opposing parties have been superadded to the animosity of the combatants. Standing always on the defensive, the French were at liberty to choose their battle-ground, and the use they made of this privilege has been deadly to their adversaries. Scarcely ever in the course of the entire campaign have the French met the Germans in the open field. They were either posted on hills high and difficult of ascent, or concealed in rifle-pits of enormous length and systematic continuity. At Spicheren they were on an isolated rock, rising abruptly out of the valley. Wörth found them on the top of a semicircular ridge, and concealed in the vineyards and hop-gardens of the adjoining slopes. At Weissenburg they fought partly behind ramparts, and partly on the summit of the Gaisberg. At Pange or Courcelles they had dug themselves into the earth; Mars-la-Tour was in the open fields, but the Prussians being one to four or five suffered terribly; and of Rézonville or Gravelotte the official telegram says that the entire army of the enemy was stationed in a fortress-like position, being disposed in woods and on precipitant cliffs. The Prussians having to charge an enemy so advantageously posted, always lost a large number of men before getting at him. In many instances they were the more easily pelted with every description of missile,

as the ground from which they had to attack had been designedly cleared of trees and other cover. But if the French were formidable on the defensive, the Germans proved none the less so in the attack. The German tactics in the present war do not seem to have admitted of shunning any difficulty, however tremendous. From the very commencement of the campaign, the moment the helmeted hosts descried the enemy, they rushed to the conflict, and, undeterred by the greatest sacrifices, by dint of sheer prowess succeeded in forcing him back.

It is not difficult to divine the motives inspiring this prompt but costly style of warfare. At the commencement of the campaign rapid and decisive successes were absolutely required to check those of Germany's neighbours who were beginning to arm and preparing to attack her rear in case of defeat. Later, when this, the first object of the Commander-in-chief, had been accomplished, an expeditious progress of the operations was desirable in order to sever the two French armies from each other, and batter, shatter, and demolish the old and tried soldiery of France before the new levy *en masse* could be carried out. Had the professional troops of the line been permitted to give them courage and support, the recruits and Garde Mobile might have been formed into a respectable body, which, though scarcely capable of long resisting the Prussian legions, yet might have kept them at bay for a time, and materially prolonged the war. At present, when Bazaine is cut off from Trochu, and has had his army discomfited in three successive engagements, these new levies are no longer considered very dangerous. Shut up at Metz, Bazaine will find it difficult to get off, and will probably have to surrender for want of provisions; Trochu has only 150,000 line left—a force inadequate to give a soldierly attitude to his new recruits, even if he had the six weeks' time—the very least required—for drill. But he has nothing like it, as the Crown

Prince will in a few days make his appearance again on the stage, and either attack or mask Châlons. No wonder that with these cogent reasons for expedition the Prussians should not have been sparing of blood; no wonder that they should have incurred any losses rather than run the risk of prolonging the war, and perhaps losing more eventually.

But although this massacre has now lasted for a fortnight, and although they are not professional soldiers, but civilians in uniform, the pith and flower of the country, that are being slaughtered in these murderous contests, I have not yet heard any one advocating a pause. Now, as ever, the general cry is to 'put down France,' to 'cripple France,' and, by enfeebling her entire position, render it impossible for her to indulge again in those 'military promenades' for which she has evinced so enduring and so morbid a proclivity. Strange to say, it is the very fact of the Prussian army consisting of civilians which renders it so martial in the present emergency. As, being civilians, they cannot afford to go to war very often, they wish to establish peace on what they suppose to be a secure basis, and are resolute to push their advantage to the utmost. Well aware that what they are going to demand of France will never be conceded unless she is utterly at their mercy, they simply prepare to crush her entirely before mentioning terms. This was the programme of the war before the first shot was fired, and when the issue could not but be doubtful. Now that they have prevailed over their adversary, the nation are all the more likely to stick to their original designs, and to assist the Government in carrying them through. They are shocked at this frightful bloodshed, exasperated at the untold miseries it entails upon families, yet as determined as ever to finish the affair in accordance with the plan deliberately laid down before it commenced. Though the total of the German dead and wounded cannot after the last battles be estimated at less

than 50,000, though the German armies have in a single fortnight been literally decimated, there is no flagging, no wavering in the tone of the public mind observable.

After what has transpired within the last few days, I need scarcely observe that the cession of Alsace and the northern or German portion of Lorraine is considered here the only safe guarantee for the good behaviour of the French in the future. I do not think there are very many people in Germany who want these territories back because they originally belonged to this country, and are to this day inhabited by men of their race; at any rate, those advocating re-annexation on mere historical and linguistic grounds are not sufficiently numerous, nor would they be sufficiently influential, to make any very sensible impression upon public opinion, were their longings not assisted by people of a more sober and practical turn. It is the coincidence of the ancient ethnographical boundary of Germany with the line of the Vosges mountains, that causes the clamour for Alsace and North Lorraine. It is because people have for the last fifty years been told by their military writers, including the ablest generals they had, that the recovery of the Vosges frontier would make Germany all but unassailable by France, that they insist upon acquiring this alleged panacea for the chronic insecurity of their western boundary. Had not the French unjustly and unwisely demanded the Rhine, few people here would have desired to remember Alsace and her ancient relations to the Germanic Empire. Alsace was an old sore which the Germans did not like to speak of, as they thought it incurable. But by hankering after fresh conquests the French have themselves reminded Germany of former losses; by levying war for territorial aggrandisement they have evoked the general passionate shout that, with such a neighbour, peace can only be secure when protected by hills, defiles, and fortresses.

I think I may venture to assert that, if the Germans

thought they might hope for a change in the spirit of French international politics after the unexpected experience forced upon their neighbours in the last fortnight, they would even now resign all idea of acquiring a more easily defensible frontier, and be content with having their war expenses refunded them. But this is the very thing they will not believe. They insist that all successive Governments of France—Bourbons, Orleans, Bonapartes, and even the various republics—have evinced and patronised in the people aggressive sentiments, and that therefore it behoves them to have some stronger pledge for their safety in the future than can be found in treaties and promises. The fact of there being scarcely a single politician in France who denounces the present war as unjust, however many may have called it imprudent, is over and over again adduced to prove the necessity of harsh measures.

As to the French predilections of the Alsatians, they are considered of no consequence, as the peace and prosperity of all Germany are supposed to depend on Alsace being wrenched from France. It seems moreover to be anticipated that, like the southern Palatinate, which was also French for a considerable time, and has yet evinced such ardent patriotism in the present war, the Alsatians will soon alter their politics, if they once become German again. If the Frankforters have become loyal Prussians in a fortnight, why, it is asked, should not the Alsatians listen to the voice of nature now that the weakness and confusion of ancient Germany, which originally made them hail absorption by France, has become a thing of the past? If the Alsatians were delighted to be French while their only choice lay between being invaded by France or else belonging to France, what is there to prolong this forgetfulness of their German origin now that Germany is strong enough to protect them and herself? Should Alsace be destined to revert to Germany, the habitual obedience to

Ultramontane dictates of a large portion of her inhabitants will prove a stronger impediment to amalgamation than is anticipated. Alsace is an old-fashioned country, and has had none of the German literary and scientific schooling.

ANTI-MEDIATION MEETING.

Berlin, August 31, 1870.

Some neutral Powers having shown an inclination to mediate,* a meeting was yesterday called by leading politicians and other eminent gentlemen of all political parties to protest against any one's coming between Germany and the object of her wrath. After some energetic speeches, the meeting voted the following address to the King:

'Most gracious King and Lord,—When, a few weeks ago, war became inevitable, the nation hastened to give your Majesty and your Majesty's allies its unanimous support. The nation vowed to persevere in the struggle for the security, unity, and greatness of our German Fatherland. God has blessed the just cause, which our troops defend with unsurpassed bravery. We are approaching the goal of our exertions more rapidly than we expected; but the blood of our sons and brothers has been poured out like water, and great efforts are still before us. The German people are prepared to make every sacrifice to promote the great national objects in view; but while we are determined to defend our rights, we are disquieted by the ever-recurrent reports that foreign Powers, although they did nothing to obviate the horrors of this terrible war, are at present endeavouring to restrict the prize of our struggles according to their pleasure. The recollection of what occurred after the glorious uprising of our forefathers against the French in the beginning of this century is still vivid in our memory, and admonishes us not to permit anybody to interfere with our interests. We therefore approach your Majesty, and beg to assure your Majesty of our resolve to hold out until your Majesty's wisdom, unhampered by any foreign interference, may succeed in bringing about a state of things which will guarantee more effectually than hitherto the pacific

* I may here observe, that the Blue Book issued in February 1871 contains the most valuable information on the diplomatic history of the war.

behaviour of our neighbours, and establish on an unassailable foundation the unity and liberty of the German realm. With sentiments of enduring fidelity, we remain, &c.'

With a view to obtaining as many signatures as possible for this address, the meeting likewise voted the following appeal to the German people:

'While the armed portion of our people ward off foreign attack, and mark their victorious career with their hearts' blood, the diplomatists of some foreign Powers are preparing to impose upon us their own conditions of peace. You all are aware that, after the glorious wars of 1813, '14, and '15, we were by foreign jealousy cheated out of the prize of our victories and the fruition of some of our most ardent desires. To a degree he had never been bold enough to anticipate was the defeated enemy spared and favoured in those unfortunate days. The German frontiers, impaired by the former conquests of the French, remained as open and insecure as they had been made by them; and instead of the unity of a German Empire, we were forced to put up with the weakness and confusion of the old Confederacy. The sins of diplomacy have been visited upon us and all Europe by the infliction of a state of armed peace for half a century. Now, when the like perils are menacing us, the German nation must not remain silent; the world must know that the German Governments and nation are determined to secure what they were denied in 1815—a free and united commonwealth and safe frontiers. Having expressed these sentiments in an address to his Majesty the King, we hope that signatures from every part of Germany will testify to our having accurately rendered the feelings of the entire people.

'*Berlin, August* 30, 1870.'

Both the address and the appeal are signed by Herr von Unruh, the late Speaker of the national Parliament; Herr von Bernuth, late Minister of Justice; Herr von Holtzendorff, the well-known Professor of International Law; Herr Lasker, the representative member of the National Liberal party in the Prussian and Federal Parliaments; Herren Braun, George von Bunsen, Virchow, Lowe, Delbrück, Hardt, and other members of Parliament; Mommsen, the historiographer of Rome; Seydel, the Burgomaster of Berlin; Kochann, the Speaker of the Berlin town-council; &c.

In to-day's papers the contents of this address and

appeal are dilated upon with no little emphasis. Lengthy and vehement as are the arguments put forward, they may be condensed in a very few words:

'When, in 1815, self-respect and the necessity of acquiring a safe line of frontier recommended the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, the demand raised by the Prussian Government was resisted by all other Cabinets. Austria, indeed, at first supported Prussia, in the hope of securing the new acquisition for herself, or, at any rate, for a member of her dynasty. When this became impracticable, she grew indifferent, and subsequently rather opposed Prussia than otherwise. Russia and England, being jealous of Germany, would not hear of her re-annexing her ancient provinces: they insisted that to irritate France by reducing her territory would be to perpetuate war. They also pretended to believe that to subject the Bourbons, who had just been reinstalled, to the disgrace of a cession of territory must necessarily shake their throne, and in course of time bring on another French Revolution and consequent international war. It was this latter argument more especially which made an impression upon Prussia, and ultimately induced her to relinquish her demand, albeit against the advice of Blücher, Gneisenau, Humboldt, Hardenberg, and all her other generals and statesmen. But what happened? Instead of being satisfied by the generosity shown her, France immediately after entered into negotiations with Russia which were to give her the Rhine. Polignac and Charles X., who had got up this intrigue, were sent away by their own people, the Orleans coming in. Before ten years had elapsed, Louis Philippe and M. Thiers were on the point of making war for the identical object of conquering the Rhine, and could be restrained only by the Quadruple Alliance. Then came the Republic, which wanted Belgium and Savoy, and was on the point of collecting a revolutionary host at Strasburg, when the quarrels between the democratic and socialistic parties breaking out in the nick of time, prevented the execution of aggressive designs.

Of Napoleon III., who succeeded the Republic, it was needless to speak. He attacked Germany on a wanton pretext, and in his famous proclamation actually owned to an intention of interfering with her domestic concerns and crippling Prussia, from whom alone unity could proceed. He had repeatedly asked for the Rhine, and was now making war for it assisted by beastly Turcos and savage Zouaves. Having, in an official communication to the Baden Government at the beginning of the war, announced that he would spare neither man, nor woman, nor child, should he succeed in occupying German territory, he was now forcing this country to sacrifice the pith and flower of her citizens in order to prevent the execution of his threats. He and his subjects had always agreed to hate Germany, and could be no longer trusted

by this country. The only sensible policy for Germany was to handcuff them. Even were her soldiers not taken from every class of society, the highest not excepted, while those of France were either illiterate people or vulgar professionals, Germany could not afford to go to war as often as the ordeal was forced upon her by her turbulent neighbours. France loved *gloire*, Germany industry; France, to gain the admiration of the world, would make any sacrifice; Germany wanted to be let alone. The Vosges and Lorraine would give Germany a material guarantee against future attacks. They would therefore have to be taken, even if they were not originally German. They would be defended against every comer. Let neutrals beware. If Germans knew how to die for their country, they were not so stupid as to let other nations dictate the terms of peace. In a very few days they would be ready to hurl an army or two in another direction than against France.'

As far as I can see, these opinions are universal. They are more than mere phraseology, and in case of need will certainly be acted upon. They sound almost a little too stern for this smooth modern age; but they are only the reflex of the furious rage which has seized people since they have learnt who and how many have fallen on those dreadful fields of Spicheren and Metz. They are strong at Berlin, stronger in the army, and strongest at the royal head-quarters.

FIRST OFFICIAL DEMAND OF ALSACE AND LORRAINE.

Berlin, September 1, 1870.

To-day we have to register the first official demand for the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. It is contained in the following article of the *Provincial Correspondenz:*

'The rapid progress of events at the theatre of war, and the confidence prevailing in large circles that we shall soon be in a position to dictate the terms of peace, naturally make people reflect on the nature of our future relations with France. In our opinion these speculations would be premature but for the manifest disposition in certain foreign quarters to interfere with our rights. Having given our sons and brothers to be slaughtered on the battle-field, *we* will decide on all that is connected with the termination of the war. From the day when Ger-

many unanimously arose to defend her hearths against the infamous menaces of her hereditary foe, a hope began to be entertained that it might be reserved for the present generation not only to avenge the latest crimes of France, but also to punish her for former misdeeds, perpetrated at our expense. The speedy defeat of the enemy, and the conquest by our victorious arms of Alsace and Lorraine, two ancient provinces of the German Empire, confirmed us in the intention of expiating the sins of the past, and reuniting with reviving Germany those territories of which we were once deprived by violence and malicious intrigue. Such at present are the purposes of the German people; and although we do not as yet know how far they will be adhered to when negotiations for the conclusion of peace are opened, it does not seem to be too early to explain the meaning and demonstrate the justice of these our national demands.

Not to Germany can be attributed the guilt of bringing on this sanguinary war. By the basest and most criminal attack she has been compelled to take up arms in self-defence. While engaged in the pacific work of developing our institutions we were suddenly disturbed by an act of wanton aggression. All thoughts of conquest, of national aggrandisement were foreign to us, and we were only intent upon cultivating amicable relations with our neighbours, when France surprised us by a diplomatic assault, which soon resolved itself into a military invasion. What has since come to light must have convinced every one that, to secure the preponderance she has been so long and so anxiously striving for, France will not tolerate by her side a reunited and powerful Germany. Longing for territorial acquisitions, she cast her eyes not only upon the neutral States on her borders, but also upon the German provinces on the middle course of the Rhine—Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish Hesse, and Prussian Rhineland. The confidence of France that she would have no difficulty in defeating Germany was principally based upon the strategically advantageous position which she holds in the territory of which she formerly robbed us. Alsace and Lorraine, with the mountainous ridges of the Vosges, and the formidable fortresses of Metz and Strasburg, in the present instance, as on so many previous occasions, were to form her base of operations against Germany. It is a painful, but none the less manifest fact, that a portion of our own territory, torn from us by the most unjustifiable means, has long been the point from which we could be, and indeed have repeatedly been, attacked with comparative impunity.

Such being the case, it is only too natural that, when those provinces have been wrenched from the conqueror at the cost of so much blood and treasure, public opinion should insist upon their being kept in our possession for evermore. It is natural for the conviction to spread, that our honour as well as our safety demand that this old blot on our national escutcheon, which permits German land to be made the

means of attempting the subjugation of Germany, should be wiped out at last. Deeply as we always felt the loss of our westernmost districts, no one in Germany would have thought of recovering them, had not the excess of French insolence displayed in the most recent period of our history compelled us to form such a purpose. But this eternal intermeddling with our concerns, this disgraceful breach of peace, and the undeniable perils to which it exposed Southern Germany, could not but direct our eyes to Alsace and Lorraine, and revive in our minds the memory of past outrage and present danger. Not the lust of conquest, nor the wish to extend our frontiers, nor any intention to punish and dismember France, is at the bottom of the cry for Alsace and Lorraine. What we want is to have some satisfaction for the blackguardly affront offered to our national pride, and, by the recovery of our national and natural frontiers, to protect ourselves more effectually than hitherto against the recurrence of these French forays. Considering what has occurred in the last few weeks, this demand is so reasonable, that we do not think any one will attempt to oppose the national will of united Germany on this score. By their conduct in the preceding stages of the struggle the European Powers have shown their reluctance to interfere in the war between Germany and France. As they made no effort to obviate war, although disapproving the French pretext for it, so they have been passive spectators of its progress. True to the neutral attitude adopted by them, they will, no doubt, refrain from every attempt to oppose the results of the conflict, unless, indeed, any material interest of Europe should be violated.

In asking back its ancient possessions, the German people, far from hankering after an ambitious preponderance over other peoples, only wants a sure guarantee of that lasting and durable peace which it is anxious to secure for itself and other nations against the old disturber of Europe. When in 1815, at the close of the great Napoleonic wars, certain parties objected—as they do now—to any territorial curtailment of France, General Gneisenau, Blücher's chief of the Staff, in just anger wrote these words:

"So the integrity of France is to be preserved! That means, that the restless French nation is to remain at liberty to invade, from its excellent strategical base, the territory of its weaker neighbours as often as it pleases. If Germany, by great good luck, succeeds in repulsing a French attack, all that France has got to do is to withdraw her armies, conclude peace, and wait for a better chance. As to her territory, it is not to be touched. She is free to conquer, but never herself to be exposed to loss. Is this not absolutely tempting her to war?"

So far the official organ, whose reasonings are seconded by innumerable leaders and letters in every paper of the country. Of the warnings addressed to foreign Powers

by these jealous champions of Fatherland, a disproportionately large number are directed against England. Not that they suppose England to be particularly forward in forcing unpalatable advice upon them; but that, wishing to be on good and even intimate terms with her of all others, they are especially impatient of unwelcome counsel on *her* part. England, it is argued, having preserved the most friendly relations with Napoleon, although he went to war for the avowed purpose of remodelling Germany according to his own interests, has no right to find fault with the Germans for turning the tables upon their adversary. It is added, that as England is supplying the French with arms at the very moment when thousands of Germans are being shot down by those deadly chassepots, she can scarcely expect to be listened to at all. I refrain from following up these angry and excited reasonings. It is to be hoped they will soon be replaced by a revival of the more amicable sentiments which have subsisted so long between, and are so natural to, the two countries.

THE CAPTURE OF NAPOLEON RELATED BY THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

THE following letter was sent by his Majesty the King to Queen Augusta:

'*Vendresse, to the south of Sedan, September* 3.

'You already know the whole importance of the event which has happened. It seems like a dream, even when one has seen it passing before one's eyes hour by hour. When I consider that, after a great and successful war, I could not expect anything more important to happen during my reign, and that now this great historical era has followed, I bow in gratitude before God, who has chosen me, my allies, and my army to do what has been done, and has made us the instruments of accom-

plishing his will. Only in this light can I understand current events, and in humility I acknowledge the dispensations of God, and praise his grace.

I will add a short sketch of the battle and its results.

The army had taken up the appointed position on the evening of the 31st August and the morning of the 1st September. The Bavarians lay with their left wing near Bazeilles on the Meuse, the Saxons were beside them towards Moncelle, and the Guards still on the march towards Givonne. The 5th and 11th corps stood in the direction of St. Menges and Fleigneux. As the Meuse makes a sharp turn here, no corps were drawn up between St. Menges and Donchery. In the latter village, however, Würtemberg soldiers were placed, who at the same time protected our rear against attacks from Mezières. Count Stolberg's cavalry division formed our right wing on the plain of Donchery, and the remainder of the Bavarians were in front, in the direction of Sedan.

In spite of a thick fog, the battle began near Bazeilles early in the morning, and by degrees the engagement became very fierce, as house by house had to be taken. This lasted nearly the whole day, and Schöler's Erfurt division (4th corps Reserve) had to assist. At eight o'clock, when I arrived at the front before Sedan, the great battery began to open on the fortifications of the town. A great artillery conflict commenced at all points, and lasted for hours, during which our troops gradually gained ground. The above-mentioned villages were taken.

Deep and wooded ravines rendered the advance of our infantry difficult, and favoured the defence. The villages Illy and Floing were taken, and the circle of fire grew gradually closer round Sedan. We had a splendid view from our position on a commanding height to the right, behind the battery I have mentioned, and before the village of Frenois above St. Forcy. The violent resistance of the enemy gradually began to diminish, as we could see from the broken battalions which hastily ran from the woods and villages. The cavalry endeavoured to attack some battalions of our 5th corps, which behaved excellently. The cavalry rushed through the space between the battalions, and then returned the way they had come. This was repeated three times by different regiments, so that the whole field was covered with the dead bodies of men and horses, all which we could distinctly see from our look-out. I have not yet been able to learn the number of the brave regiment.

As the retreat of the enemy had in various places become a flight, and infantry, cavalry, and artillery crowded into the town and its immediate neighbourhood, while no sign was shown that the enemy intended to free himself from his desperate position by a capitulation, nothing remained but to bombard the town with the above-mentioned battery. In about twenty minutes' time the town caught fire, which with the burning villages made a terrific impression. I ordered the cannonade to cease, and sent Lieutenant-colonel von Bronsart with a flag of truce, to summon

the army and fortress to surrender. He was met by a Bavarian officer, who informed me that a French flag of truce had been hoisted over the gate. Lieutenant-colonel von Bronsart was admitted, and on asking for the General *en chef*, he was unexpectedly led to the Emperor, who at first wished to give him a letter to me. When, however, the Emperor had asked what was his mission, and had been told, "to summon the army and town to surrender," he replied that General de Wimpffen, who had just succeeded to the command of the severely wounded Marshal MacMahon, was the proper person to arrange the matter, and that he should now send General Adjutant Reille with the letter to me. It was seven o'clock when Reille and Bronsart came. The latter was somewhat in advance, and from him we first learned with certainty that the Emperor was present. You may imagine the impression this made upon all, and on me most of all. Reille sprang from his horse, and gave me his Emperor's letter, adding that he had no farther commission. Before I opened it I said, "But I demand, as the first condition, that the army lay down their arms." The letter begins, "*N'ayant pas pu mourir à la tête de mes troupes, je dépose mon épée aux pieds de votre Majesté*," leaving all the rest to me.

My reply was, that I regretted the manner of our meeting, and requested a plenipotentiary might be sent to conclude the capitulation. After I had given General Reille the letter, I spoke some words with him as an old acquaintance, and so the episode ended. I gave Moltke full power to negotiate the capitulation, and requested Bismarck to remain there in case political questions should be discussed. I then rode to my carriage and drove here, greeted on the road by the loud hurrahs of the advancing troops, who were singing the national hymn. It was very affecting. Every one had a light, so that at times we drove through an improvised illumination. At eleven o'clock I was here, and drank, with those around me, to the health of the army which had gained so great a success.

As I had received no communication from Moltke concerning the negotiations which were to be carried on at Donchery, I drove to the battle-field at eight o'clock, and, as before agreed, met Moltke, who was coming to obtain my approval of the proposed terms of capitulation. He informed me that the Emperor had left Sedan at five o'clock, and had come to Donchery. As the Emperor wished to speak to me, and there was a small castle with a park in the neighbourhood, I chose that place for our interview. At ten o'clock I reached the heights before Sedan. At twelve o'clock Moltke and Bismarck appeared with the capitulation signed. At one o'clock I and Fritz set out, accompanied by an escort of cavalry belonging to the Staff. I dismounted at the château, and the Emperor came to meet me. The visit lasted for a quarter of an hour. We were both deeply moved. I cannot describe what I felt at this interview, having seen Napoleon only three years ago at the height of his power.

After the interview, I rode from half-past two till half-past seven through the whole army before Sedan. I cannot describe the reception given me by the troops, nor my meeting with the Guards, who have been decimated. I was deeply affected by so many proofs of love and devotion.

And now I bid you farewell, with a heart full of emotion, at the conclusion of such a letter.

WILLIAM.'

KING WILLIAM'S LETTER TO NAPOLEON.

THE following is the reply of the King of Prussia to the Emperor Napoleon's letter at Sedan:

'Monsieur mon frère,—En regrettant les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous rencontrons, j'accepte l'épée de votre Majesté, et je la prie de bien vouloir nommer un de vos officiers munis de vos pleins pouvoirs pour traiter de la capitulation de l'armeé qui est si bravement battue sous vos ordres. De mon côté j'ai désigné le Général Moltke à cet effet. Je suis de votre Majesté le bon frère

GUILLAUME.

Devant Sedan, le 1 *Sept.* 1870.'

THE CAPTURE OF NAPOLEON RELATED BY COUNT BISMARCK.

THE Chancellor of the Confederation, Count Bismarck, has addressed the following report to his Majesty the King:

'*Donchery, September* 2, 1870.

'I came here yesterday evening, in accordance with your Majesty's commands, to take part in the negotiations respecting the capitulation. Negotiations were soon after interrupted until one o'clock in the morning, on account of a request made by General de Wimpffen for time to consider the matter. General Moltke had declared that no conditions would be granted but a full surrender, and that the bombardment would recommence at nine o'clock in the morning, in case the capitulation were not concluded by that time. This morning at six o'clock General Reille was announced, who told me that the Emperor desired to see me, and was already on

the way from Sedan. The General immediately returned to inform his Majesty that I followed him; and shortly afterwards I found myself in the presence of the Emperor, near Frénois, about half-way between this and Sedan.

His Majesty was in an open carriage, with three officers of high rank, and the same number were on horseback beside him. Among these I recognised as personal acquaintances Generals Castelnau, Reille, Baubert, and Moskowa, whose foot seemed to be wounded. On arriving at the carriage, I dismounted, approached the side near which the Emperor sat, and asked what were his Majesty's commands. The Emperor expressed a wish to see your Majesty, apparently supposing your Majesty were at Donchery. Upon my reply that your Majesty's headquarters were at present at Vendresse, three miles distant, the Emperor asked whether your Majesty had fixed a place to which he was to go, and if not, what my opinion on the matter was. I answered that I was completely unacquainted with the neighbourhood, as it was quite dark when I arrived, and I placed the house I occupied at Donchery at his disposal, offering to remove from it at once. The Emperor accepted the proposal, and drove slowly towards Donchery, but stopped at a solitary and retired cottage, some hundred paces from the bridge over the Meuse which leads into the town, and asked me if he could not remain there. I requested Count Bismarck-Bohlen, who had followed me, to inspect the house. When he had reported that the interior was very small and poor, but free from any wounded, the Emperor dismounted, and invited me to follow him into it.

I had there an interview with him of about an hour's length, in a very small room, which contained a table and two chairs. His Majesty especially expressed a wish to obtain more favourable conditions for the capitulation of the army. I declined to negotiate with his Majesty on the matter, as it was a purely military question, which must be settled by General von Moltke and General de Wimpffen. I asked the Emperor if he was inclined to enter into negotiations for peace. He replied that, being a prisoner, he was not in a position to do so; and on my asking farther by whom he considered the sovereignty of France was at present represented, his Majesty referred me to the Government existing at Paris.

After this point, which could not be determined with certainty from the letter sent by the Emperor to your Majesty yesterday, had been cleared up, I perceived that the situation to-day was the same as it had been yesterday, and that none but military results could be at this moment obtained. Nor did I conceal my views on the subject from the Emperor. I insisted on the necessity under which his declaration had placed us of obtaining, by means of the capitulation of Sedan, a material guarantee for the military successes we had achieved.

Last evening, I considered with General von Moltke whether it was possible, without injury to the interests of Germany, to spare the feelings

of an army which had fought bravely, and offer it more favourable conditions than those proposed. After a conscientious consideration, we were both obliged to reply in the negative. When, therefore, General von Moltke proceeded to lay before your Majesty the wishes of the Emperor, this, as your Majesty is aware, was not done for the purpose of supporting them.

The Emperor then went into the open air, and invited me to seat myself beside him before the door of the cottage. His Majesty then asked me whether it would not be possible to permit the French army to cross the Belgian frontier, that it might there be disarmed and interned. I had considered this alternative with General von Moltke, and for the reasons above given did not enter into a discussion of the question. Nor did I take the initiative in touching on the political situation; and the Emperor only did so in so far as he lamented the misfortune of the war, and declared he had not desired war, but had been forced into it by the pressure of public opinion in France.

By inquiries in the town, with the help of the officers of the Staff, we learnt, between nine and ten o'clock, that the château of Bellevue, near Frénois, was suitable for the reception of the Emperor, and that it had not as yet been occupied by any wounded. I informed him of the fact by stating that I should mention Frénois to your Majesty as a fitting place for the interview, and therefore left his Majesty to decide whether he would proceed there at once, as the little cottage was an uncomfortable place to remain in, and he might perhaps require some rest. His Majesty willingly consented, and I accompanied the Emperor, who was preceded by a guard of honour from your Majesty's cuirassier regiment, to the castle of Bellevue, where we found the rest of the suite and the equipages of the Emperor, the arrival of which seemed till then to have been considered doubtful.

General de Wimpffen being also there, the negotiations broken off yesterday were resumed, in expectation of the return of General von Moltke, by General von Podbielski, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel von Verdy, and the chief of the Staff of General de Wimpffen, both of whom drew up a protocol. I only took part in the introductory proceedings by explaining the political situation in accordance with the communications made me by the Emperor. Immediately afterwards I was informed by Count von Nostiz, at the request of General von Moltke, that your Majesty did not wish to see the Emperor until the capitulation of the army had been concluded; an announcement which deprived the opposite party of every hope of obtaining other conditions than those proposed. I then rode to Chéhery, in the hope of meeting your Majesty, and informing your Majesty how matters stood. On the road I was met by General von Moltke, who had the text of the capitulation approved by your Majesty. On our return to Frénois, it was signed without opposition.

The behaviour of General de Wimpffen, like that of the other French generals the night before, was very dignified; and this brave officer could not refrain from expressing to me the deep grief he felt at being called to sign a capitulation so fatal for the French arms forty-eight hours after his arrival from Africa, and half a day after he had undertaken the command; yet the want of provisions and ammunition, and the absolute impossibility of offering farther resistance, made it his duty as a general to disregard his own personal feelings, since a farther sacrifice of men could in no respect alter the situation. Your Majesty's assent to the release of the officers on parole was received with the warmest thanks, as a sign of your Majesty's desire not to hurt the feelings of troops which had fought bravely any farther than was necessary to secure our military and political interests. General de Wimpffen afterwards gave expression to the same feeling in a letter in which he thanked General von Moltke for the considerate form in which he conducted the negotiations.

COUNT BISMARCK.

Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army.'

PUBLIC OPINION IN GERMANY AFTER THE FIRST SUCCESSES.

Berlin, September 4, 1870.

I WILL not occupy your space with any of the articles published on the surrender of the Emperor of the French and his army. The reflections suggested to the Germans by this most impressive event can be too easily imagined to require to be rendered *verbatim*. The contrast between the overbearing attitude of the French Government only a fortnight ago and its present sorry predicament is too glaring to inspire anything but gratitude and satisfaction in those who, but for the bravery of their troops, would have by this time seen their cities in the hands of the Turcos, and the Constitution of Germany remodelled on the plan of Monsieur de Cassagnac. Suffice it to say, that, even in the glorious elation of the hour, nobody

in this country thinks of retaliating upon the French by meddling with their private concerns. Whatever ruler the French may be pleased to give themselves, it will be a matter of indifference to the Germans, who only want security against future attacks, and consider this a question entirely independent of the form of government prevailing in France, or of the persons intrusted with administering the same. If the Germans take any interest in the political arrangements of the neighbouring and defeated country, it is that they naturally wish to see a stable and recognised power established at Paris with which to negotiate and settle the terms of peace. But, whatever may befall, there can be no doubt that both the war and the negotiations which must precede the restoration of peace will be conducted with an energy on a par with the magnitude of the interests at stake. For the good of the French, therefore, one can only wish them to accept the situation as it is, and not complicate matters by spasmodic outbreaks, which, while powerless against the victor, will only prolong the occupation of the country and add to the losses of the war. In the present state of German feeling against France there are few measures of coercion this Government might not adopt with the full approval of our public.

That the exasperation kindled by the war does not for a moment relent will be seen from the following article, which I extract from the official *Staats Anzeiger:*

'A number of captured guns and mitrailleuses have been brought here and placed in the courtyard of the Old Palace. The blood of the victors and the defeated is still visible on these instruments of destruction. Thousands were in the streets to see them enter the capital, but all were silent and serious, as befitted the occasion. With what mad enthusiasm would Prussian cannon have been welcomed by the populace of Paris! How gratified they would have been thus to slake their thirst for *gloire*—that infernal *gloire*, which is almost the only tie binding the antagonistic parties of the unfortunate country together! It is different with us. We cannot help feeling the solemn import of such an occasion.

We cannot help remembering the dead when seeing their trophies before us. We reverence their memory here, as their surviving brethren do in the camp and on the battle-field. Our departed heroes were proud to die for the great destiny of their race, and we gratefully appreciate the spirit which made them court an early grave. But that restless nation on our western borders, which every now and then succumbs to the wild passions possessing its soul, and which once more has steeped Germany in such unutterable woe, is, after all that has occurred, scarcely sensible of the fact that it has been defeated, not by our skill, not by our weapons, but by the moral sense which animates our troops. While we are what we are, the most perfect breech-loaders and the most savage soldiery will not prevail against us. The flower of our middle classes, the flower of our nobility, are readily offering themselves as so many victims to the enemy's guns. They are incited by the consciousness of what is at stake. They have to save our country from the *grande nation*, and the baneful influences which, politically and socially corrupt as it is, it longs to exercise over our destinies. Themselves in a state of decay, the French are rapacious in their relations with other peoples, and would imperil all that is dearest to us, were we not in a condition to ward off their attacks.

In Prussia we have for many generations been taught by our fathers to respect God, and to do our duty by honest toil and sincere devotion to the country. On this solid foundation we have established a commonwealth and organised an army. As yet French frivolity has been impotent to enervate the moral base of our institutions. Strong and self-sustaining, their substantial character has been often proved and been manifested again in these latest achievements of our troops. We have the satisfaction to observe that the other States of Germany, so intimately related to ourselves, recognise the efficiency of our arrangements and the agencies at work in them. By their own fault, a prey to lie and deception, the French people, in giddy insolence, have plunged into a war which their Government had long secretly planned and prepared. Though the final catastrophe is fast approaching, they continue to deceive themselves, and to-day, as formerly, indulge the illusion of invincibility. Though they have given themselves a sovereign of their own choice, and sworn fidelity to him ever so often, they begin already to ignore his existence, and the turbulent populace of their capital is on the point of once more determining who is to be the hero and dictator of the day. Though pretending to be more civilised than others, they are disgracing themselves by despoiling and expelling pacific foreigners with a ruthless barbarism which reminds one of bygone ages. In the same spirit they set aside and disown the humane stipulations for the protection and tending of the wounded enacted by solemn treaties binding all Europe. Their entire army delights in contravening international usages. Not only those of their troops whose character unites native savagery with every description of vice, but all their various regiments, are in the habit of firing on

flags of truce, shooting at the wounded and ambulances, and destroying open and defenceless towns by igniting grenades. And while these facts are patent before all Europe, French emissaries and French money are still sufficiently influential to instigate other peoples against us, and create an artificial hatred of Prussia and Germany in but too many quarters. Already they have so far succeeded in their shuffling intrigues as to induce certain parties to menace us, caution us, and tell us we must not weaken the great nation of France, lest it should become incapacitated for its grand civilising mission, to preserve which is demanded by the interest of the entire world.

For our part, we are confident that this war, in which our dearest possessions are at stake, and which we have been carrying on at the sacrifice of the best blood in the country, will yield us some lasting results, and secure our future against a recurrence of these wanton attacks. As surely as the world is governed by moral laws, so surely will truth prevail over falsehood, right over wrong, and civilisation over rottenness. Not for nothing have we sacrificed the strongest and the noblest of our present generation. Not to make a resultless war have we taken up arms. Our object was and is a higher one than to crush our hereditary foe for the moment. We shall exact a pledge which will exempt future generations from a peril like that which we have undergone ourselves. We fully rely on the wisdom and energy of our royal Commander-in-chief, who in the evening of his life has had this great and difficult task imposed upon him by the Almighty. The Lord will bless him, and by farther victories enable him to conduct the great work to a happy conclusion. His Majesty is at the head of a loyal people, who are identified with their army, and who unanimously adhere to our old glorious motto, "Our God is a tower of strength."'

Addresses in a similar spirit are being sent up to the King from the town-councils of every important city in Germany, Prussian and non-Prussian. By Mayence, Leipsig, Dresden, Bremen, Cassel, Königsberg, &c. the King has been petitioned in the most urgent language to vindicate his own terms of peace 'against every comer.'

Yesterday's telegrams from Sedan have called forth jubilant demonstrations in every town of Fatherland. In many places royal salutes were fired, the bells rung, and sermons preached in the public thoroughfares.

Wilhelmshöhe, where Napoleon has been directed to take up his residence, is one of the grandest palaces of Germany. It is situate near Cassel, and, with its cele-

brated park, adjoining châteaux, and horticultural wonders, is an abode fit for an Emperor in the acme of his prosperity and greatness.

GERMAN EXPERIENCE OF THE CHASSEPOT.

Berlin, September 5, 1870.

HAVING been incessantly fired at from the chassepot for a period of five weeks, the German troops are now only too competent to form an idea of the merits of the French ordnance rifle. Before the war the Germans did not think very highly of the chassepot. Nor was what they saw of its efficiency during the first fortnight after the opening of hostilities of a kind to alter their opinions. In the numerous skirmishes at Saarbrück which preceded the more serious conflicts, the chassepot proved anything but a very formidable weapon. The French fired much, but hit rarely. Such being the case, what did it matter if they fired at almost inconceivable distances? Whether they let fly at ranges which rendered it impossible to take aim, or whether they proved indifferent marksmen even in closer proximity, the result was equally inoperative in either case, and could not but inspire their adversaries with renewed pride in their own needle-gun. With these impressions the Germans confronted the enemy in the first pitched battles at Forbach and Weissenburg.

But here they unexpectedly discovered how much they had been mistaken. There is a difference between battle and skirmish. The Germans had been right in thinking that to crack away at random at a single man, as the French vedettes had invariably done, was a very harmless pleasure, not likely to interfere with the live target's

reaching a green old age. But if the French had not had the requisite steadiness to do much execution as *tirailleurs*, things assumed another aspect when line stood against line, and whole battalions were trying their worst against each other. Then marksmanship became of less importance, the number of the rounds discharged and the size of the object aimed at rendering a certain proportion of effective shots morally certain, no matter how bad the firing. The amount of bullets directed against the enemy in such a case of itself implied success, and, accuracy being no longer intended, rapidity was the only thing wanted. But this is the very quality in which the chassepot excels; and as its range is so very great that an enemy can be fired at the moment he is seen, the period during which he finds himself attacked is prolonged as much as possible, and the capacity of the weapon for continuous discharges turned to the utmost account. It is this combination of quickness and long range which, in shooting at large bodies of men, constitutes the excellence of the chassepot; it is this capacity for hurling a perfect hailstorm of lead in a given direction, and prolonging the time during which an enemy can be thus pelted to the utmost practicable limits, which, taken together, counterbalances all deficiencies arising from bad aiming or no aiming at all.

If, as is really the case, a thousand Frenchmen fire five thousand balls per minute, it matters little if forty-nine out of fifty fail to take effect. It perfectly answers all their purposes if a thousand men can kill or disable a hundred of the enemy per minute. Imagine this process extended over a period of ten minutes—the least time required for an enemy to traverse the 1,800 paces at which the chassepot tells—and the number of discharges with which a French battalion meets the attack of a Prussian battalion is by arithmetical evidence proved to be no less than 50,000. Of these, as we have seen, about 1,000 may be regarded as hitting the mark, which gives

exactly one bullet for every one of the assaulting force. Of course this calculation of probable casualties exceeds the reality, as an attacking column rarely advances over 1,800 paces of open ground, but in most instances avails itself of some intermediate shelter to cover its front and thin the ranks of the enemy before proceeding on its way. Still, the figures mentioned sufficiently account for the dreadful losses of the Germans in the present campaign. It is a curious but well-authenticated fact, that many German soldiers only in the hospitals saw what the French look like, having been wounded at distances where all they could discern of the enemy was a dark indefinite mass.

Peculiar circumstances contributed to bring the strong points of the chassepot to bear with fatal effect upon the Germans. The best mode of combating the fire of so destructive a gun would be to stand on the defensive, hide behind walls and trees, and, armed with some equally murderous weapon, to return an equivalent for what is given. But the German infantry were not in a position to adopt these tactics in the present campaign. Unless the war was to be indefinitely prolonged, and an opportunity given the numerous ill-wishers of this country to join the French, the German troops must attack the enemy wherever they found him, and, by rapid victories, deter others from making common cause with their principal adversary. Not the defensive, therefore, but the offensive was the order of the day. As to replacing the Prussian needle-gun by its improved imitation, the chassepot, the war occurred just a little too early to allow of completing the change already resolved upon by this Government. It is well known that Colonel Stoffel, the military attaché of the French Embassy at Berlin, repeatedly urged his Sovereign, if he wished to go to war at all with Germany, to do so before the Prussian rifle had by certain alterations been made a match for the French. Very probably his representations had much to do with

precipitating the catastrophe, as only 60,000 Prussian rifles had been remodelled when the war broke out.

Whatever may be thought of the justice of the Emperor in taking up arms eight weeks ago, he estimated correctly the relative value of the German and French breech-loaders, and, the Prussian Government having formed a similar opinion on the subject with himself, he had no time to lose. Thus diplomatic circumstances combined with the inferior mechanism of their gun to the disadvantage of the Germans. Diplomacy demanded that they should assume the offensive in every encounter, though the arm they were going to face rendered such bravery extremely dangerous; while as regarded Dreyse's original invention, specimens of which they held in their hands, it had been surpassed by Chassepot; and there was nothing left but to offer themselves to be slaughtered, without being able, at least in the introductory stages of the fight, to reciprocate to the same extent.

Among the many memorable facts of the campaign, it will no doubt be duly chronicled by history, that the range of the chassepot being 1,800 paces, and that of the needle-gun only between 600 and 700, the Germans in all their charges had to traverse 1,200 paces before their arm could be used to any purpose. Their gallantry in this is the more conspicuous, as the French, knowing the superiority of their fire, and relying entirely upon it, nearly always awaited them in strong and sheltered positions, which, being difficult of attack, necessarily prolonged the time during which the Germans were exposed to the bullet-shower poured upon them. As a rule, the French were in ditches excavated in the upper part of a mountainous slope; or they were in rifle-pits and behind earthworks in the open field; or they took advantage of the stone houses and stone walls abounding in the villages of their eastern provinces. All these positions being selected with the greatest ingenuity, were fortified with the skill of accom-

plished engineers. In many cases they had cleared the ground around them, and marked distances on trees or otherwise.

Only the strongest moral incentives could have induced the Germans to cope with so many disadvantages, and take the bull by the horns again and again, after they had once realised the peril incidental to the act. Only the most manly valour, the most perfect indifference to death at duty's call, could have brought their helmeted hosts to march right into the jaws of death, after they had once become aware of the dreadful probability there was of one half of them being shot down. But their *morale* overcame all obstacles; and fighting battle after battle, irrespective of losses, ultimately prevailed over a most deadly rifle, in competition with which they had apparently no chance. It was this moral element in their character which the French Government had left out of calculation in forming their plans. They knew what Moltke's strategy was, and in estimating their prospect of victory could not but have taken into account the sagacious moves to be expected of him on the chessboard of war. If they were nevertheless sure of success, they must have fancied that human flesh and blood could not stand their projectiles. And it was certainly no easy task, even for the stout-hearted men that undertook it, to convince them of their error. Who knows whether the Germans would have succeeded without the coöperation of their artillery? In this arm they beat the French, their guns being as good and their practice superior. It was German cannon which frequently threw into confusion the French infantry, or silenced those dreadful mitrailleuses, which, when united in batteries so as to command a large extent of ground, added a shocking intensity to the fire of the chassepot, and were all but unapproachable. A single mitrailleuse is not especially formidable, as it covers only a small extent of ground, the bullets all going together in

a compact body to the object aimed at; but ten or twenty of these infernal machines placed together command a wide space, and may mow down whole companies in a very short time. Employed in this way, as they were in the last battles, they became fearfully effective. Concerning them the Germans intend to take a leaf out of the book of the French. After the experience they have had of this novel engine, the Prussian generals, who formerly thought it would only do for the defence of fortresses, are, I am told, likely to recommend its adoption for field purposes.

If, notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Germans laboured, their losses are about a third less than those of the French, this is accounted for by the wholesale slaughter the latter underwent when retreating from one rifle-pit to the other, and also when drawing off in confusion, as was the case at the end of each battle. In the other stages of the fight it was the Germans who suffered most.

TRIUMPH. SOUTHERN GERMANY DEMANDING REUNION WITH THE NORTH.

Berlin, September 6, 1870.

THIS indeed is a time of triumph and jubilation. We are absolutely overwhelmed with festive intelligence pouring in from every corner of Germany. In all the larger cities, the moment the capture of Napoleon and his army became known, the population rushed into the streets and assembled in the churches, townhalls, and other less solemn places of public resort. Schools and workshops were closed and offices shut up. In some cases even the courts of justice, whose business brooks no delay, seem to have risen, leaving criminals and suitors to themselves for a day or two. Kindled up by the grand event, few were so cold as

to be able to go on with the ordinary drudgery of life. For the moment all had been converted into politicians, and realised the honour of belonging to a nation which, after many vicissitudes, has at last recovered her independence, security, and general position in the world. With these feelings buoying them up, all felt an instinctive desire to discuss the news of the day, or hear it discussed by some one more competent than themselves. Isolated as the German ordinarily lives in his house, there was on the spreading of the gratifying intelligence a universal impulse to gather together with others, and by joining a meeting or crowd fully indulge in the satisfaction engendered by this notable self-assertion of the race.

Everywhere the bells were rung, and, if cannon could be procured, royal salutes fired in honour of the day. In many towns meetings were improvised on the market-place, which began with the singing of religious hymns, and wound up with the national anthem. Among the speakers addressing enthusiastic audiences were more than one clergyman, who directed public attention to God's gracious assistance in the great danger through which the country had passed, and were reverently listened to. In other places a regular service was celebrated in the churches to give the parishioners an opportunity of quieting their excitement by prayer, and chastening joy and pride by emotions of a loftier character. Rarely were the churches so full as on that Saturday and the ensuing Sunday. All the various capitals had their processions, which formed on the spur of the moment, and with flags and music went to cheer the local Prince or some eminent dignitary. Nor was there any lack of congratulatory telegrams to the King of Prussia and the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony, under whose special command those decisive battles were fought in the neighbourhood of Sedan. The most substantial part of the demonstrations consisted in the passing of fervent and politically important addresses to King

William. All these addresses include three points. They thank his Majesty and the army for their achievements in the field; they insist upon the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine as the only means of securing Germany from future attack; and they recommend the immediate reunion of Northern and Southern Germany, as a measure which will make the nation free and strong, and enable it to bear with equanimity the ill-will of so many of its neighbours.

The importance of the present juncture will justify my subjoining an abstract of some of the more remarkable manifestations of feeling. At Munich a jubilant procession paraded the principal streets of the city, and, swelling as it went, proceeded to the Palace and to the North German Legation to pay homage to the Kings of Bavaria and Prussia. The North German Envoy thanked the happy crowd in a few appropriate words from the balcony of his mansion. Illuminations and patriotic displays in the theatres closed the day. Stuttgart sang chorales in front of its principal church, and went to the Palace to send up a deputation to the King. The schools having got a holiday, the released boys thought they could make no better use of their unexpected liberty than by repairing in force to the house of the North German Envoy and hurrah with all the might of their young voices. Herr von Rosenberg kindly came down into the street to thank his young Suabian friends for the attention shown him. In the evening a monster meeting resolved itself into another march to the Palace, followed by the singing of national songs and a banquet in the Lieder Halle. Frankfort signified its sense of the day by a torchlight procession in honour of Herr von Madai, the Prussian President of the town, who reminded the joyous throng how much they were indebted to King William for increasing the army while it was time. At Hanover a similar distinction was conferred on General Vogel von Falckenstein. In Weimar the Grand Duke

was serenaded by the citizens. Breslau made the commanding General the centre of a like display. Meiningen and Nuremberg held meetings in the market-place, and choral unions in the evening. Nuremberg and Leipzig threw open their churches. At Bremen and Hamburg the merchants assembled on 'Change to celebrate victory in halls usually devoted to pacific pursuits. Hamburg also had a torch-light procession in honour of Herr von Magnus, the North German Minister, and Bremen a large and imposing meeting in a public square. Meetings and fireworks are reported from Carlsruhe, Darmstadt, and Dresden, at which latter place the King drove through the town to show his sympathy with the exultation of the masses. In Cassel all shops were shut. A triumphal ceremony united the whole population in front of the Government offices. Kiel, Stettin, Emden, and Aurich held banquets, fired guns, and lit bonfires. In many of the cities mentioned the *Te Deum laudamus* was sung by thousands in the open air. The houses were covered with flags, and in the evening brilliantly illuminated. But I am afraid I am tiring your patience with a monotonous list of celebrations, which, as all were pervaded with one thought, closely resembled each other in the different localities. I will only add, that, to be complete, my catalogue ought to be considerably extended, and that all classes of society combined to make this a truly national ovation.

As regards the addresses, they claim a more enduring importance than the singing, cheering, and speechifying of a day of rejoicing. Especially those that have proceeded from Southern cities merit attention. It would almost seem as though the sunshine of victory had suddenly matured the long-ripening fruit of German unity. Ever since 1866, when the North became practically one, it has been an axiom with its Government and its various political parties that a proposition to join must proceed from the South. The South being the weaker side, and in

some respects jealous of its independence, the North was anxious to avoid anything that could be interpreted as intended to exercise a pressure, and force the yet separate States into the Confederacy. Trusting in the gradual spread and ultimate victory of the unity programme, the North contented itself with the military alliance binding the two halves of Fatherland together. Its hopes seem to be destined to be earlier fulfilled than was expected. The present war has too forcibly demonstrated the advantages of a strong Central Government for any one any longer to deny its being desirable. In view of the brilliant triumphs accomplished, people at Munich and Stuttgart actually shudder at the thought of what would have become of them if, instead of supporting Prussia, as in duty bound, they had listened to the whispers of the Ultramontanes and Republicans among them, and stood aloof from the national struggle. Taught by recent experience, they want to remove the bare possibility of secession in the future: and what other way is there of effecting this than by subjecting themselves to the Central Government of the North, and becoming flesh and blood with the already consolidated portion of the country? Can there be any objections strong enough to outweigh the benefits sure to be derived from such a step? If Ultramontanes and Republicans resist reunion with Protestant and monarchical Prussia, should this deter the rest of the population? Was not Southern antagonism to the North based upon a supposed difference of feeling in matters social and political, which in the present daily intercourse of their armies is shown to be a mere sentimental prejudice? Such questions are asked in the South. From what follows it will be seen how they are answered in influential quarters.

Of the four Southern capitals, three have in the last few days petitioned for their respective States joining the Northern Confederacy. Munich, the capital of the largest

and coyest State on the other side of the Main, set the example in an address from its town-council to its King. Stuttgart spoke through a monster meeting, called by the most distinguished of her political leaders. To give voice to Carlsruhe, its burgomaster and town-council united in an appeal requesting signatures to the Berlin address to the King of Prussia. The local representatives of Darmstadt are silent as yet; but Mayence, the largest town in the principality of which Darmstadt is the capital, has sent a glowing communication to King William. In it the town-council of the ancient city, which suffered so much from French invasion in years past, present to the King the expression of their gratitude for protecting them from the Turcos, and insist upon immediate reunion as the sole means of keeping Germany strong and free. As an additional guarantee against future attack, they, as good Southerners, who are even more eager on this head than the Northerners, insist upon the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. Of other South German towns, the Berlin address has been subscribed to by Nuremberg, Heidelberg, Lindau, and a number of less prominent places. By all these cities, subject though they are to other Sovereigns, King William is even now addressed as the patron of all Germany; and although it is certain that, when the danger of war and the joy of success are over, priestly and democratic opposition will revive and once more endeavour to sow tares among the wheat, yet when so many important centres of the South have once come out in this wise, the fulfilment of their wishes and the reëstablishment of a German Empire cannot be very distant.

In the North, Königsberg, Hamburg, Bremen, Breslau, Leipzig, Dresden, Hanover, Liegnitz, Görlitz, &c. have, partly through their town-councils, partly through respectable meetings, approved the Berlin address.

Russia contemplates proposing a Congress for restoring peace. Prussia is sure to decline.

Prussia will probably ask Austria to explain the object of her armaments.

CIRCULAR OF M. JULES FAVRE ANNOUNCING THE PROCLAMATION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

THE following is the full text of a circular addressed on September 6th to the French diplomatic agents abroad by the Vice-President of the Government of the National Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs:

'Sir,—The events which have just taken place in Paris are so well explained by the inexorable logic of facts, that it is useless to dwell on their meaning and bearing. In ceding to an irresistible impulse which had been but too long restrained, the population of Paris has obeyed a necessity superior to that of its own safety. It did not wish to perish with the criminal Government which was leading France to her ruin: it has not pronounced the deposition of Napoleon III. and of his dynasty; it has simply registered it in the name of right, justice, and public safety; and the sentence was so well ratified beforehand by the conscience of all, that no one, even among the most noisy defenders of the power that was falling, raised his voice to uphold it. It collapsed of itself under the weight of its faults, and amid the acclamations of an entire nation, without a single drop of blood being shed, without any one individual being deprived of his personal liberty. A thing unheard of in history, we have seen citizens whom the popular voice called upon to fight and to conquer spare political adversaries who but the day before threatened them with execution.

It is by refusing to their adversaries the honour of any sort of oppression that they have shown them their blindness and their impotence. Order has not been disturbed for a single moment. Our confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the National Guard and of the whole population permit us to affirm that it will not be disturbed. Rescued from the shame and the danger of a Government which has proved a traitor to all its duties, each one now comprehends that the first act of the national sovereignty, reconquered at last, must be one of self-control—the seeking for strength by respecting right. Moreover, no time must be lost; the enemy is at our very gate; we have but one thought—their expulsion from our territory.

But this obligation, which we resolutely accept, we did not impose

upon France. She would not be in her present position if our voice had been listened to. We have energetically defended, even at the cost of our popularity, the policy of peace. We still maintain the same opinion. We are broken-hearted at the sight of these human massacres, consuming the youth of two nations, whom a little good sense and a great deal of liberty would have preserved from such frightful catastrophes. We cannot find any expression capable of expressing our admiration of our heroic army, sacrificed by the incapacity of the supreme commander, but showing itself greater in defeat than in the most brilliant victory. Despite the knowledge of the faults which compromised its safety, the army immolated itself with sublime heroism, and in the face of certain death redeemed the honour of France from the stain cast upon it by our late Government. All honour to the army! The nation loves the army. The imperial power wished to divide the two. Misfortune and duty join them in a solemn embrace, sealed by patriotism and liberty. This alliance renders us invincible.

Ready for any emergency, we look calmly on the position of affairs, brought to this pass not by us, but by others. I will explain our position in a few words, and submit my statement to the judgment of my country and of Europe. We loudly condemned the war, and, while protesting our respect for the rights of peoples, we asked that Germany should be left mistress of her own destinies. We wished that liberty should be at the same time our common tie and our common shield. We were convinced that these moral forces would for ever insure peace, but we claimed arms for all citizens, and the election of leaders. Then we should have remained invincible on our own soil. The Government of the Emperor, which had long since separated its interests from those of the country, opposed that policy. We revert to it, with the hope that, taught by experience, France will have the wisdom to put it into practice.

The King of Prussia has declared that he made war, not against France, but against the imperial dynasty. The dynasty has fallen. France is free. Does the King of Prussia wish to continue an impious struggle, which will be at least as fatal to him as to us? Does he wish to give to the nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two nations destroying one another, and, forgetful of humanity, reason, and culture, heaping corpse upon corpse and ruin upon ruin? He is free to assume this responsibility in the face of the world and of history. If it is a challenge, we accept it. We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses. A disgraceful peace would mean a war of extermination at an early date. We will only treat for a durable peace. In this our interest is involved that of the whole of Europe, and we have reason to hope that, divested of all dynastic considerations, the question will thus present itself to the Cabinets of Europe.

But even should we be alone, we shall not yield. We have a resolute

army, well-provisioned fortresses, a well-established *enceinte*, and, above all, the breasts of 300,000 combatants determined to hold out to the last. When they piously lay crowns at the feet of the statue of Strasburg, they do not obey merely an enthusiastic sentiment of admiration—they adopt their heroic *mot d'ordre*, they swear to be worthy of their brethren of Alsace, and to die as they have done. The forts taken, we have the ramparts; the ramparts taken, we have the barricades. Paris can hold out for three months and still conquer. If she succumbs, France will start up at her appeal and avenge her. France will continue the struggle, and the aggressor will perish.

This, Sir, is what Europe ought to know. We have not accepted power with any other object; we will not keep it a moment, unless we find the population of Paris and the whole of France determined to subscribe to our resolutions. In the presence of God who hears me, in the face of posterity which shall judge us, I briefly sum up our resolutions. We wish for peace; but if this disastrous war, which we have condemned, is continued, we shall do our duty to the last, and I have the confidence that our cause, which is that of right and justice, will triumph in the end. It is in this sense that I wish you to explain the situation to the Minister of the Court to which you are accredited, and in whose hands you will place a copy of this document.

Accept, Sir, the expression of my high consideration.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Sept. 6, 1870.' JULES FAVRE.

THE PROBABLE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR.

Berlin, September 7, 1870.

ACCORDING to our politicians, the establishment of a Republic in France is not likely to accelerate the restoration of peace. An Emperor, or even the President of a solid Republic, were it only from motives of self-interest, could not but have wished to bring this unfortunate war to a close as soon as possible: but a Government such as the one now controlling France naturally exempts its members from that judicious regard for their own position in the State which ordinarily exercises so great an influence upon the actions of ruling personages. With

little hope of retaining office upon the advent of a more sedate period, the present Ministers will in their actions probably reflect the excitement of the moment, and resistance to the knife will become the motto, if not of the people, at least of its leaders. For men who have little chance to continue in their present functions for any length of time, it will be only too natural to prefer the halo of a useless heroism to the less brilliant but more practical merit of submitting to an overpowering fate. After what has happened, I believe I am right in thinking that, whatever military operations the enthusiastic policy of the new Ministers may result in, it is not very likely that the remnant of the French forces will prevail against the foreign victors. With 120,000 Frenchmen prisoners, another 100,000 shut up at Metz, and at least a third 100,000 buried or in the hospitals, the issue of the war cannot be doubtful.

But, under the circumstances, two or three more defeats need not necessarily terminate the war. Even the capture of Paris is no guarantee of immediate peace. In their stern addiction to principle, the new Ministers will perhaps choose to retire to a distant part of the country, and migrating from county to county, and from town to town, put off a settlement indefinitely. If they are very Spartan, they may decline to sign a humiliating treaty, even should they fall into the conqueror's hands. These contingencies are at this moment much speculated upon in Germany. Should either of them occur, it is probable that the German armies will keep the principal towns and fortresses occupied, and ultimately exact submission by the imposition of enormous tributes. As another means of coercion, the destruction of Cherbourg harbour and arsenals, which I believe cost forty million pounds, has been mentioned in my presence. The Germans are evidently intent upon having done with France at the earliest possible date, and, short of shedding the

blood of civilians, will recoil from no measure of compulsion, however severe.

What has strengthened these stringent resolves is the attitude of the Republican Government during the first few days of its existence. In this country it has been noticed with feelings of unmitigated resentment, that in their proclamations to the people the provisional Government adopt the same tone as their predecessors. Like MM. Ollivier and Palikao, the provisional Government represent the Germans as foreign invaders, with whom there can be no parley, and who must be ejected and crushed at any sacrifice. They entirely ignore the fact that Germany is fighting in self-defence. They have hardly a word of blame for the Emperor and those exponents of public opinion whose inordinate ambition has conjured up this homicidal war. While admitting the war to have been popular from the very outset in France, they represent the Emperor as the only guilty party, and refuse to make it up to the Germans in any way. They scarcely hint at the possibility of satisfying the just susceptibilities of Germany, and offering the *amende honorable* for what has been sinned against her, if not by themselves, at least by the man and the armies that have governed them so long.

Such being the broad facts of the day, the Germans cannot help summoning up the memories of the past. They cannot help calling to mind that only a few months ago MM. Jules Favre, Cremieux, and other leading members of the Cabinet, signed a programme bitterly complaining of the Emperor's having omitted to avenge Sadowa. Was this not fomenting war, even though they may have had nothing to do with its actual outbreak? Provoked by these extraordinary Republicans, whose principles seem to include liberty for themselves and subjugation for others, the Germans are confirmed in the opinion that, whatever their political bias, Frenchmen of all parties are equally

hostile to them. Louis XIV., they say, wanted the Rhine, and seized a portion of it. The Republic insisted upon a larger share. Napoleon I. entirely appropriated the river. Charles X. but a few years after the restoration of the Bourbons intrigued with Russia in order to get more of the beautiful stream than, on the banishment of Napoleon, had been left to France by the generosity of the London and St. Petersburg Cabinets. Louis Philippe, his successor, could only be restrained by the Quadruple Alliance from going to war on this score. The Second Republic—Lamartine's Republic *des gens honorables*—assembled a revolutionary host near Strasburg to cross the much-contested boundary-line. Napoleon III. finally did what we all have seen him do; and his successors, honest democrats though they be, but the other day did all they could to goad on the fated Emperor to action.

Considering the peculiar eloquence of these events, it will be understood why the feelings of the Germans have been only intensified by the latest intelligence from Paris. The few who had ventured to hope that, if Napoleon could only be superseded, an understanding might be more easily established between the contending countries, find they have deceived themselves, and, their disappointment combining with the anger of the less sanguine portion of society, the result is that exasperation increases. It is one of the most melancholy features of the war that the passions attending its rise have been strengthened with every successive battle. Not to speak of the French, the Germans, the more they hear and see of their enemies, are more and more fortified in their design to make them innocuous. Before the war there were a good many in this country unable to conceive that a civilised race should yearn for conquest for the mere sake of conquest, and without any moral or adequate material object in view. To these the vapourings of French orators, journalists, and other representative men, appeared as a peculiar sort of

national poetry, very high-flown and intoxicating indeed, but never meant to be acted upon in these sober and civilised days. But now that large numbers of Germans are gaining a practical acquaintance with the people and their intellectual habits, they seem to find that all classes are alike infected with the strange tendencies observable in their literature, and would not object to conquest at the expense of Germany, could it be had without too trying an effort. Hence the Germans begin to think it imperative to make provision against the realisation of these sickly hankerings; and the language held by Frenchmen after their recent defeats is not particularly calculated to modify their views. To give you German public opinion at this moment in a nutshell, I cannot do better than translate the following passage from the *Kreuz Zeitung*:

'Of course M. About's perorations against us are supremely ridiculous. Yet we have every reason to think that, with more or less intensity, his views will be held by the generality of his countrymen for the next fifty years. For God's sake, then, don't let us evince any sentimental weakness in view of what foreigners begin to call the sorry misfortune of France. In all that concerns ourselves we have for a long time to expect no sensible reasonings, no equitable sentiments from the French; generosity on our part would be simply foolish. We can have no other object in view than that of thoroughly humbling our wicked neighbour, and reducing him to such a plight that his venomous hatred may be doomed to exhaust itself in impotent rage.'

It would be wrong in me not to emphasise the fact that these views strongly predominate in every part of Germany. They are indorsed by high and low—by the Cabinet Minister, who has seen his son die on the battle-field, and the poor artisan's widow with her three unprovided children, whose husband was buried at Rézonville or Gravelotte. Both want to shield themselves from similar calamities in the future. All have the utmost distrust of the French, and refuse to consider themselves safe unless their enemy, whose motives and actions strike them as alike unreasonable, is 'handcuffed' or 'placed in a strait-

jacket.' Such is the language held by more than one paper.

There is reason to think that the proclamation of a Republic in France and the determined attitude of Prussia have shaken the intention of Russia to propose the convocation of a Congress.

The Austrian War Office, after learning the capture of Napoleon, has suspended the purchase of horses. The prisoners taken and surrendered at Sedan, in number 100,000, will be sent to North and South German fortresses, and their transport has begun.

In accordance with the recent orders of the King, the second and third reserve armies are being concentrated near Berlin and Glogau. A fourth reserve army will shortly assemble in the South. It will consist of the garrisons of Raştadt, Germersheim, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt (which, with the French thrown back far into France, need be no longer kept in their several places), of South German Landwehr, and the Bavarian dépôt battalions. The three North German reserve armies have been likewise formed of released fortress garrisons, with a strong admixture of Landwehr. The theatre of war having been removed to the neighbourhood of Paris, there are no troops needed in the strongholds of the Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

In a military essay on the armaments preceding the war, I find it authoritatively stated that by the 26th of July, being the eleventh day after the issue of the mobilisation order, 118,000 North Germans were assembled on the Rhine. Together with the unexpectedly hostile attitude of the South Germans, it was this promptness of the Northerners which disconcerted the French, and, contrary to their original plan, made them stand on the defensive.

All French officers detained as prisoners of war in Germany have been permitted to live in private lodgings, and put on civilians' clothes. To secure this privilege

they are only required to give their word of honour that they will not leave the places in which they have been quartered.

All professions are needed in the direful work of war. Numbers of railway officials have been sent to France to work the lines that have fallen into the possession of the invaders. A batch of chemists also has gone out, commissioned to perfect the work of destruction commenced by bullet and sword, and pour lime over the graves. The exhalations have become too strong for the living.

NAPOLEON AT WILHELMSHOHE.

Berlin, September 8, 1870.

On the 5th of September, at 9.50 P.M., a special train stopped at the small station of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel. It consisted of two carriages, and contained about a dozen passengers. After a few servants and inferior attendants had left the train, a short stout gentleman alighted. Slowly walking to an equipage that had been waiting for him, he seated himself in it with another gentleman, and drove off. He wore the red trousers of a French general, and a dark overcoat. His features were placid, and as with calm intelligent eye he gazed about him, you could easily see he was an observer, and a thinker to boot. His was one of those faces which, while indicating habits of reticence, are yet eloquent in the lines marking the inner workings of the mind. A second equipage followed, the train went on, and the closing scene in one of the most notable tragedies that has ever been played was at at end. Louis Napoleon, two days ago the Emperor of the French, and the commander of one of the most gallant

armies in the world, now by a double catastrophe reduced to the position of a prisoner of war and a private gentleman, had arrived at his place of confinement.

What reflections may have crowded upon the historical traveller as, driving through the magnificent wood, he approached the place appointed for his temporary abode! Was not this the identical palace in which his gay uncle Jerome had spent a few giddy years as Westphalian King? Was this not the very château in which the improvised Monarch had held his notorious revels, as long as his junior's star permitted him? And if one fine winter's day he had suddenly to pack up and vanish from view, never more to appear on the stage of history, in what position did his nephew find himself now? Was it not likewise in the unenviable capacity of ex-Sovereign that he arrived in this park, which the uncle had so precipitately quitted sixty-six years ago? Had he not also attempted to seize a portion of that German soil, the appropriation of which seems to be a main feature in the traditional policy of his house? And had he not been wrecked in a task which, in his peculiar position, he had found it equally difficult to avoid and to carry out?

But here is the palace. With drum and fife suddenly breaking the stillness of the night, a company of infantry present arms in honour of the new arrival. There is a warm glow inside the splendid hall. Generals and gentlemen of the royal household are standing ready to do the honours of the occasion. They bow low, and are the most obedient servants of his Majesty. They conduct his Majesty upstairs with the deference due to a Sovereign. They take the commands of his Majesty, and will be happy to execute them. Obsequious attendants are bustling about outside, and everything is in gala. Napoleon is received as a guest, not as a prisoner, by his generous host. The entire palace is placed at his disposal. A numerous suite of some forty persons, with a large retinue

of servants, have followed him, and will be likewise entertained by the King. He has brought eighty-five horses and a variety of carriages—greater, almost, than can be stored in the mews of the princely mansion. Royal *valets de chambre* and *chefs de cuisine* have been sent down from Berlin; and everything will be done to render his stay as pleasant as possible. The movements of the Emperor are apparently without restraint; and if he chose, he might drive about in the grounds, see company in the evening, and close the day with a visit to his Majesty's Opera at Cassel. Such is the aspect royal imprisonment assumes in the courtesy of the present age. Times have changed since Mary was locked up by Elizabeth, or, to quote a more analogous case, since the youthful King of France was captured by the German Emperor Charles V. on the battle-field of Pavia.

The considerate attention paid to Napoleon by special order of the King extends to the smallest particulars. All the way from the German frontier to Wilhelmshöhe the imperial train stopped at some distance from the stations, so as to avoid exposing the interesting traveller to the gaze of the curious. At Cologne, the day the Emperor passed through, the terminus happened to be full of German artisans expelled from Paris. There were many poor people among them who had greatly suffered from the severe measure adopted by the Imperial Government, and approved by its Republican successors. Loud was their joy on hearing of Napoleon's fate, and the retribution that had befallen his armies; and, had they been permitted to remain at the terminus, the deposed potentate on passing through might have been subjected to disagreeable observations. But care was taken to send them on before his arrival. The very choice of Wilhelmshöhe for his abode was owing to the King's wish to oblige his distinguished visitor. As, for reasons connected with his present situation and the

state of his health, he was reluctant to travel to the eastern provinces of the kingdom, the choice lay between Wilhelmshöhe and Stolzenfels, the only two royal palaces in Western Prussia sufficiently grand for his reception. But Stolzenfels, on its lofty crag on the Rhine, and with little even ground in its immediate neighbourhood, would have scarcely been so well suited for a reconvalescent as the more rural Wilhelmshöhe, with its beautiful gardens and parks stretching all the way down to the river. So Wilhelmshöhe was selected. It is very splendid, very healthy, and very private, the grounds adjoining the palace being inaccessible to the public since the arrival of the Emperor.

NAPOLEON'S FALL, AND ITS IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE ON THE ACTION OF GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND ITALY.

Berlin, September 11, 1870.

HAD not the Germans long ceased to expect better treatment at the hands of a French Republic than of a French Sovereign, M. Favre's circular on the war would of itself have been enough to disenchant them. From beginning to end it is here pronounced the work of a special pleader, not of a statesman. It is really a little too bad that M. Favre should saddle the Emperor Napoleon alone with the guilt of the war, when in another passage of the same document he admits the war to have been popular with his countrymen. It is equally extraordinary to find him stand up for the integrity of his country's soil, when for very many years past history has scarcely known a French politician who did not aspire to a slice of German territory. Such being the case, a good many German

papers decline to enter into a discussion of M. Favre's arguments. One paper which I have before me disposes of M. Favre's effusion by reminding its readers of M. de Tocqueville's celebrated *dictum*, that the French are full of genius, but devoid of common sense.

The semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* discusses M. Jules Favre's circular in an article, of which the following is an extract:

'The French Government carries the pretorian virtue too far, when, even for the sake of a peace that would put an end to a war of extirpation, it refuses to sacrifice fortresses that have not prevented Paris being exposed to a siege. Germany has seen M. Jules Favre unable to prevent war when the nation enthusiastically sanctioned it, and she will now probably require a lasting guarantee that her heroic victories have not been in vain. In conclusion, we must say we do not understand how right and justice can now be said to be on the side of France, when M. Jules Favre maintained the opposite a month ago. We trust Europe will possess sufficient influence to secure a lasting peace.'

Louis Napoleon, the protector of the Pope, having been defeated, Italy has not been slow to avail herself of this opportunity for promoting her interests. The Italian *ultimatum*, just rejected by the Pope, contained these terms:

'The Pope to retain the sovereignty over the Leonine portion of Rome, and the ecclesiastical institutions of all Rome. The income of the Pope, the Cardinals, and all the Papal officers and officials to continue uncurtailed. The Papal debt to be guaranteed. Envoys to the Pope and Cardinals to retain their present immunities, even if not residing in the Leonine city. All nations to be freely admitted to the Leonine city. The Catholic clergy in all Italy to be freed from Government supervision. The Italian military, municipal, and entail laws to be modified as regards Rome.'

There is little doubt that Rome will be shortly occupied by the troops of King Victor Emmanuel.

UNITY ACCORDED; MEDIATION REPUDIATED.

Berlin, September 16, 1870.

THE principal German Cabinets are making preparations for establishing a common Government and Parliament for all Germany. In reply to the addresses of their respective capitals petitioning for the immediate reunion of Northern and Southern Germany, the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg have expressed their hope that the two halves of Fatherland will be shortly connected by ties which, while they guarantee the safety of the whole, admit of a certain independence for its constituent parts. This is a valuable concession on the part of the Southern Sovereigns, who before the war would have thought it premature to place North and South under one Parliament. But, independently of the expressed wishes of nearly all educated men among their subjects, the fraternisation between their own troops and those of Prussia must have shown them that the day is drawing near when the destinies of Germany will be fulfilled. Among the most gratifying manifestations of this war is the heartfelt fellowship which the troops of the various States show towards one another. Who that, in former years, saw Prussian and Bavarian troops together in garrison could have failed to observe a certain want of harmony between them? In 1866 the Bavarians and Prussians fought perhaps the most bitterly of all those arrayed against one another. At present there are no dearer friends. Of all the various contingents, it is the Bavarians and Prussians who get on best together, and let no opportunity pass of showing their fraternal feelings.

THE PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT REPUDIATE MEDIATION.

THE Berlin official *Provincial Correspondence*, in an article upon the mission of M. Thiers, says:

'It may be altogether doubted whether the present Paris Government, which has hitherto derived its powers only from the democracy of the Paris streets, can be considered fitted or authorised to conduct negotiations in the name of France. Germany may view with calm confidence the impotent diplomatic negotiations of the temporary Republic, and may rest assured that, as the war has been localised, so also will the conclusion of peace—that is to say, that it will be arranged between ourselves and France alone.'

And *L'Indépendant Rémois*, a Rheims journal, contains the following *communiqué* from Count Bismarck:

'Rumours of negotiations and of speedy restoration of peace are current. These rumours are unfounded. The German Government has received no communication indicating that negotiations will be shortly opened; on the contrary, the Government which has constituted itself in Paris, and which lacks all those guarantees of durability that would be required for any other Government to enter into international relations with it, seems inclined to continue a fatal and henceforth unequal contest, rather than consider what may restore peace to France.'

After a confidential exchange of opinion between the principal German Governments, it seems probable that Alsace and Lorraine, if annexed, will be placed under the central Government of Germany, without being handed over to any one German Sovereign individually. A large police force has been sent to Alsace and German Lorraine, where a regular Government is now established. Herr von Kühlwetter, the German civil Governor of Alsace and the Department of the Moselle, has requested the Chamber of Commerce at Elberfeld to report upon the probable effect on German industry of the provinces administered by him entering into the Zollverein. In a proclamation to the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish clergy, Herr von Kühlwetter declares that all are to retain their

present rights and stipends. The Church will not be interfered with by the State, but ecclesiastics preaching, speaking, or acting against existing authorities will be punished by military law.

At Wilhelmshöhe a German apprentice was arrested with a pistol in his pocket. The supposition is, that he contemplated an attack on the Emperor Napoleon.

Preparations are making to send the overland mail by Brindisi, Tyrol, and Ostend, in case the French railway traffic is disturbed.

Count Itzenplitz and General Roon, Prussian Ministers of Commerce and War, have each lost a son in the field.

SECOND CIRCULAR OF M. JULES FAVRE.

On September 17th, M. Jules Favre issued a circular to explain the decree which hastens the elections to the Constituent Assembly, and the resolution to convoke that body as soon as possible. M. Jules Favre says:

'I will sum up our entire policy. In accepting the perilous task imposed upon us by the fall of the Imperial Government, we had but one idea—namely, to defend our territory, to save our honour, and to give back to the nation the power emanating from itself, and which it alone can properly exercise.

The first necessity is to face the enemy. We do not expect disinterestedness of Prussia. We make allowance for the feelings to which the greatness of her losses and the natural exaltation of victory have given rise in her. This explains the violence of the press, which we are far from confounding with the inspirations of statesmen. These latter will hesitate to continue an impious war, in which more than 200,000 men have already fallen. To force conditions upon France which she could not accept would only be to compel a continuance of the war.

It is objected, that the Government is without regular powers to represent the country. It is for this reason that we immediately summon a freely-elected Assembly. We do not attribute to ourselves any other privilege than that of offering up our soul and our blood for our country, and we abide by its sovereign judgment. It is therefore not our ephe-

meral authority, it is immortal France herself that confronts Prussia—France divested of the shroud of the Empire, free, generous, and ready to immolate herself for right and liberty, disavowing all political conquest and all violent propaganda, having no other ambition than to remain mistress of herself, to develop her moral and material forces, and to coöperate fraternally with her neighbours to promote civilisation.

It is this France which, restored to herself, demands the immediate cessation of the war, yet prefers its disasters a thousand times to dishonour. It is in vain that those who brought on this terrible catastrophe try to escape the crushing responsibility they have incurred by falsely alleging that they yielded to the wish of the country. This calumny may delude people abroad, but there is no one among us who does not refute it as a base falsehood.

The motto of the elections in 1869 was peace and liberty, and the Plebiscite itself adopted this as its programme. It is true that the majority of the Legislative body cheered the warlike declarations of the Duc de Gramont; but a few weeks previously it had also cheered the peaceful declarations of M. Ollivier. A majority got together by Cæsarism thought themselves obliged to follow the dictates of the "Personal Power;" but there is not a sincere person in Europe who could affirm that France was consulted, and of her own free will decided to make war against Prussia.

I do not draw the conclusion from this, that we are not responsible. We have been wrong, and are expiating the crime of having tolerated a Government which led us to ruin. We admit the obligation to repair, fairly and equitably, the evil done; but if the Power with which our former Government has so seriously compromised us seeks to take advantage of our misfortunes to destroy us, we shall oppose a desperate resistance. Henceforth it is the nation, properly represented in a freely-elected Assembly, that this Power wishes to destroy. Such being the case, each one will do his duty.

Fortune has been hard upon us, but she may be more propitious to-morrow, and our manliness will compel her favour. Europe begins to move; and sympathy for us is being reawakened. The sympathies of foreign Cabinets console us and honour us. Foreign Cabinets will be deeply impressed by the noble attitude of Paris amidst such terrible excitement. Serious, confident, ready for any sacrifice, the nation in arms descends into the arena without looking back, and having before it this one simple duty—the defence of home and independence.

I request you, Sir, to enlarge upon these facts to the representative of the Government to which you are accredited. He will see their importance, and will thus obtain an accurate idea of our disposition.'

PRUSSIA READY TO TREAT WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. A TOAST PROPOSED BY THE CZAR.

Berlin, September 19, 1870.

In still regarding Napoleon as Emperor, Prussia has no other object than to inform the various political parties and royal candidates in France that she will recognise that Government which accepts her terms of peace. The Republic ignoring her terms, Prussia, in return, ignores for the present the Republic. The absurd idea, that Prussia will only treat with the Regency, was never entertained here, and is expressly contradicted by the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, which declares that Prussia will put herself in communication with whatever French Government may accept her terms, and is sufficiently stable to insure a treaty of peace being conscientiously carried out. M. Favre's second circular, in which he admits France to have been in the wrong in going to war with Germany, has had the effect of procuring him an interview with Count Bismarck. The messages from the belligerents to one another, preparatory to the interview, were transmitted by the British Government. No basis for negotiation has been agreed upon.

The *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, referring in its bulletin to the assertions of some newspapers, that peace could only be concluded with Napoleon restored to the throne, says:

'We cannot believe that Prussia could entertain any such design, as it would be interfering with the domestic affairs of France. A peace concluded with a Government whose final fall would only be delayed a few days would not be a durable peace. The conclusion of a treaty of peace is only possible between the German Sovereigns and a Constituent Assembly after a preliminary treaty has been signed by the provisional Government, and an armistice established on the principle of the German troops remaining in the positions occupied by them.'

The Russian Czar, on receiving the news of the battle of Sedan at Moscow, on the 3d September, gave a dinner, when, having drunk to the health of his royal uncle of

Prussia, he broke the glass, according to German custom which prescribes that none shall drink again from a glass which has been used for a very solemn toast.

The Swedish Envoy here has announced that the anti-German articles in the *Stockholm Gazette* do not express the opinions of his Government, which is only responsible for the official portion of that paper. When the news of the capture of Sedan arrived at Stockholm, the King's theatres were ordered to be closed for that evening.

Prussia is preparing for all contingencies. All the Landwehr officers are asked whether they wish to enter the standing army. A hundred thousand furs have been ordered by the War Office. The staff for besieging Paris has been appointed.

The number of French prisoners in Germany is 140,000 privates, 62 generals, and 4,800 officers. Among them is Colonel Palikao, son of the late Minister, a prisoner at Wesel. French officers who are prisoners may live in one of twenty-one given cities—Breslau, Bonn, Wiesbaden, Dusseldorf, Deutz, &c.—according to choice.

Herren von Bennigsen and Lasker, the Liberal leaders in the Prussian Parliament, are at Munich, with a view to confer with the Ministers there on the expediency of Bavaria joining the North German Confederacy. The Prussian Minister Delbruck is expected at Munich from Rheims for the same purpose.

PETITION OF THE GERMAN REFUGEES.

Berlin, September 20, 1870.

GERMANS exiled from France and now in Berlin have resolved to present the following petition to his Majesty the King:

'Your most gracious and powerful Majesty,—Since the 15th July, the day on which France in her overweening pride declared war against Germany without any sufficient cause, the people as well as the Govern-

ment of that country have proved by a number of actions that they intend to carry on a war of extermination against the German element, in order to gain absolute power over the whole of Europe. That these efforts have been unsuccessful is owing, in the first place, to the wise policy of your Majesty, which succeeded in uniting in time all the Powers of Germany; secondly, to the genius of our generals, who have earned the admiration of their contemporaries and of posterity; and, thirdly, to the courage and bravery of our German armies, who quailed neither before the savage hordes of Africa, nor the new instruments of destruction inflicting death in a thousand forms. They have defeated an enemy who, alike oblivious of international law and human feeling, employed cunning and treachery, and yet did not gain a single victory. In the principal question at issue, right has triumphed; but in smaller matters justice has not yet overtaken the offender. We are referring to our own case. In the persons of many of its citizens Germany has been insulted and injured in the most glaring manner.

In the whole history of the world no example can be found of measures similar to those put in force by the French Government at the wish of the people, on the 27th of last August. The decree which compelled all Germans to leave the country within three days ruined many peaceable citizens, who had punctually fulfilled their duties to the State, and had been guilty of nothing that could justify such a measure. In the department of the Seine alone, 80,000 persons were obliged to leave their business, their property, many even their wives and children, and fly like criminals from a country to which they had for years devoted their energy, and the prosperity of which they had contributed to promote. Three days were granted to them. The same time intervenes between sentence of death and execution. What could be arranged in so short a period? Nothing. After obtaining a passport, there was just time enough left to gather together a few effects, and to hasten to the station. In places of business, workshops, and dwelling-houses, everything had to be left as it stood; they were locked and left to the care of Providence, and we fled the country in which Germans have been deprived of their rights, and left without protection to the rage of a fanatical people.

It will be impossible to determine how great have been the losses of the Germans expelled from all parts of France by this measure; but we may consider it certain that it is not much below a milliard. Is this sum to be entirely lost to the German nation? We, who address this petition to your Majesty in the name of our fellow-sufferers and as their representatives, are fully convinced that the men who now direct the policy of Germany will not permit this. In the confident hope that this our perfectly reasonable petition will be favourably heard and granted by your Majesty, we remain, in profound devotion,

THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE GERMANS EXPELLED FROM FRANCE.'

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE, AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

Berlin, September 21, 1870.

M. JULES FAVRE is to-day at Ferrières, the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, and Count Bismarck is discussing with him the propriety of convening the Representative Assembly, which is to declare whether France authorises her existing Government to treat for her, and recognises engagements undertaken by it.

The Russian garrisons in Poland and Volhynia are being reinforced. Seven divisions of infantry have been sent to the province of Kieff to line the Galician frontier. A military commission has been appointed at St. Petersburg to create a medical reserve force of 1000 surgeons.

To-day the Italian troops entered Rome, after a short resistance from the foreign soldiery, who desisted from firing by order of the Pope.

The *Official German Gazette* for Alsace, published at Hagenau, in its first number alludes to the recovery by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine. It says: 'These provinces, when re-annexed, will soon adopt German politics, being thoroughly German in language, manners, ideas, and even in their partiality for foreigners. They will be, moreover, only too happy to separate from socialistic France.'

The French squadron which has just evacuated the North Sea has had a lazy time of it. It consisted of eight cuirassed frigates, accompanied by a varying number of corvettes, which were never less than two nor more than five. With the exception of two ships which made every morning for the mouth of the Weser and Jade, this goodly array used to be stationed all day about seven miles south of Heligoland, where they could watch the Elbe, and at

the same time were near enough to support their western division in case of need. When twilight set in, the whole fleet united again, and having ranged in line of battle to avoid surprise in the night stood right out to sea. Dawn brought them back to their old anchorage, when the same manœuvres were again gone through. Every now and then the dull monotony of this life was interrupted by a German man-of-war coming out of the Jade to reconnoitre, and going back when chase was given.

Thus five weeks passed, during which all this powerful fleet effected was to capture four insignificant vessels in their attempt to run the blockade. Two of these were such rickety old tubs that the French did not think it worth their while to take them home when bidding farewell to the German shores. The motive which eventually prompted the raising the blockade seems to have been the fear that the French military ports might suffer a land attack, and fall into the hands of the Germans. It would have been too annoying had Cherbourg been conquered for want of defence, while the ships that might have saved it were lying idle in a distant sea. What an unexpected end this naval expedition has had! Sent out to infest the German shores, it has effected actually nothing, and is now ordered home to protect its own coasts against the German arms. Great praise has been bestowed by the German press upon Major Maxse, the British Governor of Heligoland, for observing the strictest neutrality towards the foreign visitors. Except selling him a few cabbages for his table, Heligoland has had absolutely no communication with the French Admiral.

Among the German towns which have lately had an ingredient of French soldiery added to their population is Breslau. The papers of this city relate that the inhabitants were not a little amused, when, upon arriving, the French officers had not the slightest idea in what part of the world they were. The very name of Breslau was

unknown to most of them. Even those who remembered having heard it mentioned, had no conception that it was a place with a quarter of a million of inhabitants, amply provided with theatres, cafés, and all the other institutions distinctive of the highest grade of civilisation. On learning that they were surrounded by all these luxuries, there was a perfect shout of relief.

All the officers among the prisoners live in furnished apartments at the expense of this Government, and receive a scanty pay. They may either live in one of the several fortresses, where their men have been sent, or in one of the twenty-one cities additionally placed at their disposal. Among these cities there are great and small, expensive and cheap, eastern and western, so as to suit every purse and taste. Berlin, however, is not on the list. It is to be hoped that the prisoners, being dispersed over the entire country, will acquaint themselves a little better with its social and political *status*, and also realise the fact that, however France may be blamed for her spasmodic politics, there is no wish to saddle the guilt on individual Frenchmen. Nothing, indeed, can exceed the kindness with which the involuntary visitors are treated by the public. No one remembers these are the men who fired upon their kith and kin. They are only pitied for their hapless fate, and accordingly comforted by ever so many cigars.

THE VICTORIA INSTITUTION.

Berlin, September 21, 1870.

To extend the bond of military brotherhood from the time of war to that of peace, the Crown Prince of Prussia proposes that a society should be established for the purpose of assisting invalided soldiers of all German States over and above the scanty pensions given them by the Government. To this end his Royal Highness addresses the following appeal to the German people:

'In consequence of the great victories of our army, the German people may hope for a glorious and durable peace. On the French battle-fields the nation has become proudly conscious of its unity and power. Consecrated by the blood of so many thousands of our warriors, this result of the war will, we trust, serve to bind us irrevocably together. But the enthusiastic uprising of the last few weeks was accompanied by deep sadness. Many of the youth of the nation, many of the leaders of the army, have purchased victory with their lives; and still greater is the number of those who, by wounds and excessive exertions, will be prevented from supporting themselves in the future. The widows and orphans of the dead, and the living victims of the war, have the first claim to our gratitude. Whoever has shared the enthusiasm of the contest, whoever hopes that this rising of our people will inaugurate a happy peace, and whoever humbly recognises the interference of the Almighty in our victory and the defeat of the enemy, ought to testify his sentiments by active sympathy with our fellow-citizens in arms and their families. The State alone, even if meting out assistance with comparative liberality, will be scarcely able to support the large number of invalids and the widowed and the orphaned. The State provides only the most indispensable assistance, and, being necessarily guided by general rules, cannot relieve every sufferer according to his special need. Voluntary aid will therefore be required to a large extent. The war having created a united German army, in which the sons of all German tribes vied with each other in displaying bravery, it is meet that we should make care for the sufferers a common German concern, to be equally attended to by North and South of the Fatherland.

Former experience has taught us that it does not suffice to collect charitable contributions. Equally important and much more laborious is the wise distribution of the funds, careful inquiry into individual necessities, and solicitude that the aid rendered should promote and not

diminish the capacity of earning a livelihood. It is therefore much to be desired that local and district societies be formed everywhere, which, cooperating with a central committee, shall collect subscriptions, find out sufferers, examine into their cases, and accord them the benefit of permanent help and advice. The Victoria Invalid Soldiers' Society of 1866 having already effectually worked for a similar end in the greater part of Germany, I charge the managing committee of this institution to undertake the organisation and direction of an invalid fund for all Germany, and to interest the public in the formation of fresh branch societies and the accumulation of funds. His Majesty the King, the Commander-in-chief of the German Army, has permitted me, as in 1864 and 1866, to establish a patriotic society for this purpose. This time I have had the happiness of commanding an army in which the Bavarian, the Würtemberger, and the Badener fought side by side with the Prussian; and I may therefore appeal to the benevolent instincts of all Germany. Let this work of love be performed conjointly by us all, and let it usher in many a beneficial enterprise to be carried out in days of peace.

FREDERICK WILLIAM, Crown Prince of Prussia.

Headquarters, Rheims, September 6, 1870.'

Like many other institutions at this memorable epoch, the Victoria Society, so long a local concern, is thus rendered serviceable to the wants of all Fatherland. The excellent results obtained in its more limited sphere, make it worthy of the honour conferred by the Crown Prince. In a short time it will spread its benign influence, so long felt in the North alone, throughout all Germany. The society—whose committee includes eminent men of all political parties, such as General von Peucker, President Friedberg, George von Bunsen, Professor Virchow, Judge Twesten, &c.—will have more than enough on their hands. Up to this date the number of the dead and wounded on the German side is estimated at rather more than 60,000. About 25,000 more are suffering from illnesses of various kinds. As to the third category of losses in the field, less than a thousand Germans have been taken prisoners in the entire campaign. Among the dead and wounded there are three times as many officers as there ought to be in proportion to the number of the men—a silent but indisputable testimony of their bravery.

As I am on the melancholy subject of dead and wounded, it may not be out of place to remark that, whereas the Prussian Government has already issued thirty-eight lists of casualties, France has not yet favoured her people with a single one. However large her losses may be, it seems cruel not to avow the fact, and inform families who is dead, who is wounded, and who is missing. The French prisoners in Germany are well aware of this omission on the part of their Government. The first thing they ask for on arriving is pen and ink, to write to their friends at home. For the illiterate crowd a good many letters have been written here by benevolent persons visiting them on purpose.

Manifold as are the tongues in which the news of the German victories is being circulated from one end of the world to the other, we were not prepared for receiving a letter from the battle-field of Sedan written in no less out of the way a language than ancient Sanscrit. To add to the marvel, this extraordinary epistle does not emanate from a Brahmin, who left the shores of holy Ganges on an exploring trip to contemplate the feuds of the heathen, but is actually the composition of a Prussian Hussar officer. The scholarly exploit of this Indo-German trooper is to a certain extent accounted for by the writer—or had I better say the rider?—pursuing in times of peace the more sedentary calling of a junior judge in the Berlin Court of Appeal. Like many Germans, he has a taste for philology, and even in the din of the camp cannot entirely divorce himself from the recollection of his studious moments. For curiosity sake I may be permitted to give you this unique epistle, with appended translation:

'*Sedan, September* 2, 1870.

'Hyo mahâyud abhavat. Catravah sarve nirjitâh, sarvâ teshâm senâ, mahârâjâ ca svayam, baddhâh. Tvashtâ no vajrâm svaryam tataksha; abanmâ'him svavîlau çiçriyânam (Rigveda i. 32).

Akam sukuçalo 'smi; yuddhe na mahad bhayam gato 'ham, yad etas-

min kshetre supârvate padâtaya eya yoddhum çaknuvanti, turanginas tu nâ 'rhanti. Mahatyâm sevâyâm bhavatah çishyah.'

Anglicè.—'Yesterday we had a grand battle. The enemy was completely routed, their entire army and the Mahârâjâ himself taken prisoners. Tvashtar (Hindoo Vulcan) forged for us the flaming thunderbolt; so that we defeated Ahi (Hindoo Python), who hid himself in his hole (Rigveda i. 32).

I am quite well, and was in no great danger in the battle. The country being hilly, it is the infantry rather than the cavalry who have had the most work.'

In printing this letter the Berlin papers cannot help observing, that an army in which lieutenants of light horse record current events in such erudite dialects is almost too precious to be used for the achievement of any victories, however brilliant. Of course this is not to be taken literally, as in past years none have more painfully realised the fact than the Germans, that science alone cannot satisfy the claims to liberty and independence of a manly and self-respecting race. Yet there is a grain of truth in the remark. If one of the reasons why the Prussians have conquered is their having a large number of highly cultivated men among their officers, as well as among their rank and file, the loss resulting to the country from the deaths decimating such an army is immeasurably greater than the injury inflicted upon France by a like number of casualties amid her less civilised hosts. It is partly from considerations such as these that the Germans are so exasperated at having had war wantonly forced on them. They are tempted to look upon the contest as an unequal one, when they have to pit so many highly-educated beings against the raw Zouave or ignorant ploughman of *la belle France.*

PRUSSIA ANNOUNCES HER RESOLVE TO ANNEX FRENCH TERRITORY, AND DISCOURAGES MEDIATION.

Berlin, September 24, 1870.

THE two following despatches have been issued in an identical form to the representatives of the North German Confederation at various Courts:

'*Rheims, September* 15, 1870.

'The erroneous opinions upon our relations to France, which reach us even from friendly quarters, have induced me to make the following statement with respect to the views held by his Majesty the King, in common with the allied German Governments.

We believed we could discern in the plebiscite, and the apparently satisfactory state of affairs in France which followed, a guarantee of peace and an expression of the pacific sentiments of the French people. Events have shown we were wrong, or at least that in France pacific sentiments may at a moment's notice be changed into fierce hostility. The majority of the representatives of the people—so great as to pass an almost unanimous vote—as well as the senate, and the journalistic organs of public opinion, have so emphatically demanded a war of conquest against us that the isolated friends of peace lost the courage to resist the popular current. The Emperor Napoleon was probably correct in assuring the King that the state of public opinion compelled him to make war.

In the face of these facts, we cannot seek our guarantees in the sentiments of the French. We cannot conceal from ourselves that, after and in consequence of this war, we must be prepared, not for a lasting peace, but for a renewed attack on the part of France at an early date, and this quite independent of the conditions we may impose. It is their own defeat and our victorious repulse of their iniquitous attack which the French will never forgive. If we were to retire from the country, without demanding any cession of territory, any contribution or any advantage whatsoever—if we were to be satisfied with the increased renown of our arms—the same hatred and the same longing to avenge their offended vanity and ambition would still rankle in the hearts of the French. Under any circumstances, they would yearn for the day on which to give vent to their animosity. It was not doubt as to the justice of our cause, or fear as to whether we were strong enough to engage in war, that in 1867 induced us to avoid the conflict then already imminent. If we eschewed war in those days, we were actuated by the dread of exciting revengeful

passions by victory, and thus bringing on an era of mutual enmity and repeated campaigns. We hoped, by cultivating peaceful relations with our neighbours to bring on an era of peace and prosperity for both of us. Having been forced against our will into a war, we must endeavour to obtain better securities against the next attack than we can find in the good feeling of the French towards us.

In 1815 the Holy Alliance and divers other arrangements were expressly set on foot to protect Europe from the passions of the French. These guarantees having in the course of time lost their efficacy, Germany, in defending herself against France, has had to rely exclusively on her own power and her own resources. The German nation must never again be required to make exertions like the present ones. We are obliged to demand material guarantees for the security of Germany from future attacks of France, and thus secure the peace of Europe, which has no interruption to fear from Germany. We have to demand these sureties, not from the temporary Government of France, but from the French nation, which has shown that it is ready to support any Government in a war against us, as wars waged by France against Germany for centuries clearly prove.

The demands which we shall raise on the conclusion of peace principally aim at rendering the next attack of France on the German frontier, and more particularly on the hitherto unprotected South German frontier more difficult. That frontier, the starting-point of so many French invasions, must be pushed farther back; and the French fortresses menacing our border must be secured and turned into defensive bulwarks.

You will please to express yourself in this sense.

VON BISMARCK.'

'*Meaux, September* 16, 1870.

'Your Excellency is acquainted with the document which M. Jules Favre* has addressed to the foreign representatives of France in the name of those now in power at Paris, who call themselves *Gouvernement de la Défense nationale.*

At the same time I have learned that M. Thiers has accepted a confidential mission to some foreign Courts, and I may take it for granted that he will make it his task, on the one hand, to awake a confidence in the pacific sentiments of the present Parisian Government, and on the other to request the neutral Governments to attempt intervention in favour of France, in order to deprive Germany of the fruits of her victory, and to prevent the conclusion of peace on a basis which should render the next attack of France on Germany more difficult.

We cannot believe in the serious intention of the present French

* See Appendix.

Government to make an end of the war, as long as they continue, both by word and deed, to excite the passions of the people, to increase the hatred and enmity engendered by the sufferings of the war, and to declare the only basis of peace Germany can accept as inadmissible for France. They thus render that peace impossible, for which they should prepare the people by using temperate language suited to the serious character of the situation. If they expect us to suppose that they honestly desire to negotiate with us, they must not themselves mar the prospects of an arrangement. The idea that we shall conclude an armistice without obtaining any guarantee as to the acceptance of our conditions of peace, can only be seriously entertained if we are supposed to be wanting in military and political judgment, or indifferent to the interests of Germany.

Besides, a great obstacle to the French being brought seriously to consider the necessity of coming to terms, is the hope, stimulated by those now in power, of a diplomatic or armed intervention of the neutral Powers in favour of France. When the French once come to the conviction that as they alone wantonly commenced the war, and as Germany fought it out alone, so will they have to treat with Germany, and with Germany only, they will be sure to abandon a useless resistance. It is an act of cruelty on the part of the neutral Powers towards the French nation, if they permit the Parisian Government to flatter the people with hopes of intervention which cannot be fulfilled, and can only serve to prolong the contest.

We are far from any wish to interfere in the domestic policy of France. What system of Government the French desire to adopt is a matter of indifference to us. The Government of the Emperor Napoleon is the only one we have hitherto formally recognised; but our conditions of peace, with whatever properly qualified Government we may have to treat, are quite independent of the question how and by whom the French nation is ruled. These conditions the nature of things and the law of self-defence compel us to exact from a powerful and restless neighbour. The unanimous voice of the German Governments and people demands that Germany be protected by better boundaries than hitherto against the threats and outrages she has had to suffer for centuries from all French Governments. As long as France remains in possession of Strasburg and Metz, her strategical position is stronger offensively than ours defensively, both as regards the whole of Southern Germany and the left bank of the Rhine in Northern Germany. Strasburg, in the possession of France, is an inviting gate open for the invasion of Southern Germany. In the possession of Germany, Strasburg and Metz assume a defensive aspect. In more than twenty wars with France we have never been the aggressors: we have nothing to demand from that country except our own security, which has been so often endangered. France, on the other hand, is sure to consider every peace now concluded merely in the light

of an armistice. To revenge her defeats she will again attack us as wantonly and iniquitously as the last time, as soon as, by her own strength or by the assistance of foreign allies, she feels competent to do so.

By thus laying difficulties in the way of the aggressions of France, from whose initiative so many disturbances of the peace have arisen, we are acting in the interest of all Europe. From Germany no disturbance of the peace of Europe need be feared. But now that a war, which we have carefully avoided for four years, notwithstanding our national susceptibilities were constantly provoked by France, has been forced upon us, we shall demand future security as the reward of the extraordinary exertions we have been obliged to make in self-defence. No one can accuse us of a want of moderation, if we insist on this just and fair demand.

I request your Excellency to make these ideas your own, and to bring them forward in the course of conversation.

VON BISMARCK.'

BISMARCK'S NOTES ON THE TERMS OF PEACE.

Berlin, September 25, 1870.

COUNT BISMARCK'S circular notes on the terms of peace have awakened a loud echo of applause in the press of this country. The praise bestowed upon their distinguished author is thoroughly genuine, the arguments preferred by him in diplomatic phraseology being substantially the same which, in a less polished style, have filled our papers for the last four weeks. What delights people most is Count Bismarck's endorsing the popular notion that, whatever conditions may be accorded her, France will remain hostile to a country guilty of defeating her. It seems strange that any one should be gratified at having his apprehensions confirmed. Yet it is so in this instance. I daresay you can imagine why. It is not the unpleasant anticipation of a future war, but a certain conclusion drawn from it that pleases people. If France is sure to attack Germany again as soon as she can, Germany has no interest in granting her lenient terms now, but, on

the contrary, must render herself as strong and her adversary as weak as circumstances permit. This is the view avowed by the leading politicians of the country. The whole press has followed in their wake. Professor von Sybel, the historiographer of the French Revolution, Heinrich von Treitschke, the best pen of the Liberal party, and others of the same rank and standing, have written categorically on this head, and so it is only natural that the million should join in chorus.

Considering that in a French war the life and property of almost every man in this country are imperilled, it is, after all, no wonder that people, in their wish to prevent a recurrence of the danger, should easily adopt an opinion which justifies their taking every precaution at the expense of a temporarily defeated but none the less formidable enemy. Count Bismarck's sanctioning their convictions by his personal assent, and embodying them in an official document, has therefore given no little satisfaction. However numerous indications may have been vouchsafed of late, that the King and the allied Governments looked upon the question of terms in the same way as the masses, the above circulars convey the first authentic information upon the subject. After this people think they have a right to expect that the bases for negotiations thus officially announced will not be abandoned. The only exception to this are the Republicans and Socialists. Rejecting annexation on principle, these are equally averse from the recovery of Alsace as they were from the acquisition of Hanover and Hesse. But their voice will have even less weight now than it had in 1866. Four years ago their censures were seconded by the Southern Republicans, aghast at the prospect of monarchical Prussia getting an addition of strength; in 1870 the Southern Republicans vote with the rest of their more immediate countrymen, who believe the Vosges will act as a natural rampart against France, and will afford them the protec-

tion which they, in their geographical situation, even more urgently require than the North.

M. Thiers is trying his hand in *la haute politique*. If my information is as correct as I have reason to believe, the great historian will endeavour to secure Russia's gratitude by offering her the plum she has so long coveted. In a word, if Russia will save France from the humiliation of a territorial loss, France is ready to make her certain concessions in the East. More than this, France in such a case will try to obtain the coöperation of Austria, who has so long resisted the growth of Russian influence on the Danube, but, it is hoped, will be induced to share and share alike, if the opportunity offers. As it is not very probable that these propositions will be listened to at St. Petersburg, it would be useless to discuss their bearing upon the future stages of the war. However favourable public opinion in Russia may be to France, the Russian Court is too cautious to enter into a compact of this magnitude with a Government so very unstable in itself, and likely to have equally shortlived successors. M. Thiers may promise a great deal in the name of M. Favre, and M. Favre may be honest in word and intent; but who guarantees the official existence of M. Favre a few months hence, or that those who may replace him will be of his way of thinking?

M. Thiers said at Vienna that the French Government thinks Prussia was not in earnest when demanding a cession of territory, and that she probably preferred the demand only to make its withdrawal a concession which might secure her a counter-concession. Nothing can be more erroneous.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE.

Berlin, September 27, 1870.

THE terms of truce proposed by this Government are, under the circumstances, mild. Of the three fortresses required, Toul fell immediately after being asked for; Strasburg is sure to be taken; and Verdun, though its possession would facilitate the provisioning of the army, is, now that the way by Toul is open, no longer so imperatively wanted. To offer these lenient conditions, Count Bismarck must have been firmly convinced that the representative Assembly, which was to have been convened during the armistice, would conclude peace, even though it might have to sign away a province or two. The French rulers having declined his proposition, his military colleague, Baron Moltke, has again taken the matter into his hands, and, as we are informed by a circular note of the Foreign Office, Paris must be henceforth regarded as a beleaguered city.

Why do the Germans reject the neutralisation of Alsace and Lorraine, when there are doubtless some advantages in this arrangement not to be secured by any other? So far as I can see, the reason is this: nobody here believes that France will respect a neutrality unguaranteed by the Powers. Supposing this difficulty were removed by the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Alsace and Lorraine as they have guaranteed that of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, France would certainly be cut off from Germany by an intermediate strip of inaccessible ground, and no more war would be possible between the two. Such an arrangement would be all that Germany could wish. It would give her absolute security on her western frontier, without burdening her with the laborious task of gaining

the goodwill of the two provinces, by the acquisition of which she means to compass the same end.

But I am afraid it devolves upon me to tell you that the value attached to a European guarantee in this country is no longer great enough to induce it to rely upon one in any question of vital importance. Not only is the condition of Europe so unsettled, and the future so very problematic, that some States may eventually not have the will, while others may lack the capacity, to carry out their present intentions; but all treaties become so rapidly obsolete in this fast-living age, or at least admit of opposite interpretations so soon after being concluded, that there is a general impression beginning to prevail that they are less binding than might be wished. As a case in point, I find the Luxemburg treaty adduced in the papers, which, as you may remember, the Germans complained was virtually exploded by the construction put upon it within a month of its being signed.

But would not the dismantling of the border fortresses of itself afford sufficient protection to Germany, even if the provinces in which they are situate were not neutralised, or at any rate not effectually neutralised?

In answering this question the Germans seem to doubt whether they can rely upon the French really dismantling the dreaded strongholds, unless coerced by all Europe. Independently of this, their Generals maintain that it is not so much the artificial strengthening bestowed on Alsace and Lorraine as the geographical situation of these provinces with regard to Germany, and the hilly nature of their soil, which in the hands of their present possessor render them dangerous to this country. Protruding into Southern Germany as they do, and bringing its capitals within a few miles of the French frontier, they are asserted to give France every facility for invasion, and render defence proportionately difficult for the devoted neighbour. Even supposing the attack to be beaten off,

and the Germans to follow the French into their own territory, the position of the retreating party is, under present circumstances, presumed to be infinitely more advantageous than that of the pursuer. Repulsed, the French would have to stand on the defensive, while the Germans would have to attack. But where could a more effective defence be organised than in the hills of Alsace and the broken ground of Eastern Lorraine? And where can invasion be more easily warded off than in the narrow passes of the Vosges? If, the argument goes on, these formidable positions have in the present campaign been rapidly taken by the Germans, the effort to take them was nevertheless very great. There is no guarantee that equal success will crown equal exertions on the next occasion of the kind. Besides, such an occasion must not be allowed ever to occur again. Germany can neither afford to be constantly arming, nor will she endure a state of things in which her sons are periodically obliged to sacrifice themselves to protect their fathers' property from the Zephyrs and their sisters' honour from the Turcos. This is a consistent train of reasoning, equally supported by diplomatic, military, and social grounds. Granting the individual facts alleged to be correct, one cannot but arrive at the same conclusion as the Germans—that there is nothing left but to seize Alsace and Lorraine bodily, and hold them as a material pledge for the good behaviour of their neighbour. But, whether correct or not, these facts are here believed to be absolute truth, and, while taken as such, will preclude any change in public opinion respecting the terms of peace.

The official *Provincial Correspondence* of this evening says:

'France can no longer hope to change defeat into victory. All continuance of the war is vain, and therefore the bloodshed is doubly wanton. Count Bismarck has announced our terms. Let France beware, lest finally the conditions of peace be more onerous. All Germany welcomes most heartily the town of Strasburg now won back to her.'

Baden, Würtemberg, and Southern Hesse have signified their intention to join the North German Confederacy and ratify its constitution with some slight modifications. The King of Bavaria still holds back.

The messenger who took Bourbaki to England was officially permitted to pass through the Prussian lines.

GERMAN CIRCULAR ON CERTAIN BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

'*Berlin, September* 27, 1870.

'In the sitting of the French Corps Législatif of September 1st, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Latour d'Auvergne, read two circulars in which the German troops were charged with sundry violations of the law of nations, as well as of treaty rights. German troops, the Prince stated, had attacked French ambulances, and more particularly taken prisoner the Baron de Bussière while employed in an ambulance organised by himself. They had, the Prince went on, fired explosive rifle bullets, compelled peasants from the environs of Strasburg to work in the trenches exposed to the fire of the fortress, and deceitfully marked provision, ammunition, and money wagons with the red cross of the Geneva Convention. Nay, one Prussian soldier had killed a French doctor while he was dressing his wounds.

However firmly convinced I was of the injustice of these accusations, yet, considering the name appearing under the notes in question, I would not confine myself to the mere assertion that such things were impossible, but have caused inquiries to be instituted whether anything had happened which by unreliable or malicious persons could be distorted into the alleged enormities. These inquiries were very difficult to carry on; the assertions of the French Minister, both with regard to detail and authentic testimony, being preferred in such vague terms as are rarely met with in official utterances of a serious nature. In no instance did he make a complete statement respecting names, time, and locality. In most cases the only proof alleged was the notoriety of the thing—or, in other words, the fact of its having been related in the French press—a press on whose veracity it would be useless to lose a word. Two of his charges, those referring to explosive bullets and the employment of peasants in the

trenches, are indeed supported, as he says, by the testimony of individual witnesses. Yet in neither case has he vouchsafed us the names of his witnesses, or the details of their evidence.

The inquiries I have caused to be set on foot have led to the discovery of one single circumstance, which, misstated and perverted, may have given rise to complaint. It is perfectly true that the Baron de Bussière was arrested, and that he had something to do with the tending of the wounded. The arrest, however, did not occur in the ambulance itself, and it was occasioned by the suspicion that he kept up intercourse with the garrison in Strasburg. Like his subsequent detention, the arrest was executed with the regard due to his position and his reputation as a man of honour. How long the measures taken against him were to last could be decided only by military authority. As to the other assertions of the two circulars, I am compelled to declare that they are mere inventions. It remains to be seen whether the French Government will recognise the duty devolving upon it of substantiating the accusations preferred, and whether it will do so in a manner which, after our ample experience respecting the trustworthiness of French official statements, may claim to be noticed. Out of deference to the other Powers which have signed the Geneva Convention and the St. Petersburg Declaration of November 29th (December 11th), 1868, I will give the positive assurance, that this Convention has been most carefully observed by the German troops, and that explosive rifle bullets, less than 400 grammes in weight, do not exist in the German army.

I cannot, however, but advert to the numerous and perfectly authenticated facts, of the most astonishing nature, proving beyond doubt that the French Government—which, as Prince Latour rightly observes, took such an earnest interest in the conclusion of the Geneva Convention—has not carried out this Convention. The German doctors who, after the battle of Weissenburg, in the lazarettes under the superintendence of the Physicians-General Wilms and Böger, treated French wounded, soon perceived that the latter were totally ignorant of the signification of the white band with the red cross. Head-surgeons of the French army, who subsequently came to these lazarettes to look after their countrymen, distinctly assured Prince Putbus, the delegate of the Johannites, that the French War Office had neither supplied their military surgeons with these bands nor directed them to put them on. The said head-surgeons had been obliged to improvise bands out of the first material at hand. Again, captive French officers have unanimously stated that the Geneva Convention, and the rules prescribed by it respecting the treatment of ambulances, physicians, and wounded, are entirely unknown to the French army; and yet the French Government were under a twofold obligation to acquaint their troops with these stipulations. If the humane sentiments which the circular of August 30th avers prompted their interest in the Geneva Convention permitted their marshalling against us

those Turco mercenaries, the refuse of the population of the North African towns, they ought to have taught them, at least, to spare doctors and wounded. I shall take another occasion to prove, by official evidence, the evil results of the negligence of the French Government on this head.

After all I have said, the two circulars of August 30th appear to have no other object than to meet our protest of August 26th, touching the flagrant violation of flags of truce, as well as the other protests which the French must have known might be justly brought against their conduct in the field. For this purpose a number of unproved accusations were raked together from unreliable newspapers.

I request your Excellency to deliver a copy or a translation of this circular to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For the Chancellor of the Confederacy,

THILE.'

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

THE following document has been forwarded from the office of *La Situation*, the French Imperialist journal recently established in London. It appears under the title, 'Les Idées de l'Empereur,' and is introduced by the statement that Count Bismarck, immediately after the failure of the negotiations which he had with M. Jules Favre, forwarded an exact report of what had passed to Wilhelmshöhe. The Emperor Napoleon thereupon retired to his cabinet, and the same evening dispatched M. de Castelnau to the Prussian headquarters with the following note, the whole of which was in the Emperor's own handwriting:

'The King of Prussia, in keeping me daily informed of the events which have been accomplished since the day when Providence compelled me to surrender my sword to him, seems to call his prisoner to witness the hardships which the Prussian armies are imposing on France, in the interest, as the King believes, of Germany.

The Count's communication confirms me in this opinion. But is the time really come for me to reply to this twofold attention by the expres-

sion of my own thoughts? Until the 4th of September the reserve which I have maintained since Sedan was founded upon a firm resolution to leave the Empress full and entire liberty to conform to the wishes of the country. Since the 4th of September, however, I have been unable to restrain myself from praying that France, even at the sacrifice of my dynasty, might succeed in driving back the invaders beyond her natural frontiers.

In the overture made to the Count, the result of which it was easy to foresee, the war has been deprived of its veritable character, an attempt being made to divest the popular movement, to which my Government felt it its duty to yield, of its responsible character. But this was to destroy the effect of the motives which we have for refusing to subscribe to the conditions offered: it was, above all, to paralyse the national defence at the moment when it was about to assume proportions worthy of France.

The Count appeared surprised that an armistice, necessary to the reconstruction of a regular Government, should have been refused; and he is astonished that none of the legally existing Powers should have offered an opinion upon what he regards as evidence of the King's moderation. But surely no one would reproach a Frenchman with having repaired an imprudent step by refusing propositions little in harmony with our glorious past.

A duel, like that which is taking place between France and Germany, can end only in the complete ruin of one of the adversaries, or in their loyal reconciliation. The Count should therefore, in the first place, ask himself whether Germany has a greater interest in the ruin or the friendship of France; and whether, if the former hypothesis be adopted, Germany does not feel that France may derive her safety from her despair, even though Europe consent to remain an indifferent spectator of an invasion that has no definite limits. My interview with the King authorises me to believe that he would prefer an alliance with France to her ruin. He is not without concern regarding the results of a struggle *à outrance*, and appreciates at their true value the rights which the complete recognition of the opinions manifested by the different nations of Europe during the war would give to the two peoples thus closely allied.

If such is the opinion of the King, nothing remains but to point out the means for making it effective; but does it really belong to the conquered to define the obligations of the conqueror, in order that his generosity may not seem less endurable than his demands? I can only remind the Count that an appeal to the heart of the French, supported by heroic action, is never made in vain; while at the same time nothing can certainly be obtained from them by an attempt to strike in their breasts the chords of self-interest or of fear, to which they will be strangers, whatever may be the reverses Providence imposes upon them.

Inclined by generous measures to a close and loyal alliance with Germany, France would be the first to admit that there is no necessity for a line of defence between the two empires, strengthened by fortresses.

As to the sacrifices France is expected to make, she would not hesitate to make them the moment she was able to perceive the immense advantage likely to accrue to both nations from a peace which would have their own free will as its sole arbiter. Upon this basis the Powers, which must maintain a complete reserve so long as France retains a hope of victory, would have cause for intervention.

The sincere and plain exposition of the truth has always established a sympathetic current between France and myself, which nothing could destroy. Were I to affirm that our honour has nothing to fear from a reconciliation based on the disarmament of fortresses become useless, and upon the principle of a war indemnity, to be determined by inventory, peace, I believe, would be possible. By these conditions France may be prevented from having recourse to those extreme measures which, by a whim of fate, might give the death-blow to the social order of Europe. With her eyes opened by experience to a just estimate of the divisions tearing her asunder, and freed from the scourge of war, France would not hesitate to acknowledge that—as she is compelled to attribute her misfortune to the want of political unity—she ought for the future to expect prosperity from the inviolability of her institutions.

These considerations are losing weight every day, especially if the King hesitates to well consider them before attacking Paris. The terrible rupture which Providence has permitted to take place between Germany and France may have given birth to a spark of which progress may make use for the moral and material well-being of Europe; but if there be an obstinate determination on either side to make it a trial of strength, the hidden passions of the human soul will be let loose in the encounter, and prove as disastrous to Germany as to France.

NAPOLEON.

Wilhelmshöhe, Sept. 26, 1870.'

CONTEMPLATED REVISION OF THE TREATY OF 1856.

Berlin, October 1, 1870.

IT is pretty generally assumed at St. Petersburg that Russia intends proposing shortly a revision of the Paris Treaty of 1856. The better to enable her to attain her object, diplomatic and military preparations are being made with all diligence. The Czar has conferred upon

Baron von Moltke the Order of St. George, the highest military decoration of Russia. The Russian War Office has been ordered to draw up new regulations intended to accelerate the embodiment of retired soldiers and those on unlimited leave. A strong Cossack corps has been sent from the Don to the western provinces. Active military preparations are being made in Trans-Caucasia. The Russian War Office has issued new regulations for the expeditious calling in of men on furlough. The Russian Hospital Board has drawn up new orders for the administration of the Military Sanitary Department in time of war. The Odessa commander-in-chief suggests that hospital tents should be adopted, as in the Prussian army. A legislative commission is engaged at St. Petersburg in revising rules for pensioning military surgeons and hospital attendants. The Russian Artillery Board has been ordered to revise the regulations for the drill and practice of their arm.

King Francis of Naples and Count Trani, not wishing to remain at Rome after its occupation by the Italians, will remove to Munich. They have bought the Château of Garathshausen, in Upper Bavaria.

STRASBURG RECOVERED.

Berlin, October 3, 1870.

THERE is a peculiar tone in the letters from Strasburg. An emotional tone I am almost tempted to call it. Captors and captured, when the hour of surrender struck, seem to have been pervaded by feelings more delicate and tender than are usually witnessed on such occasions. The Germans experienced a saddened triumph on entering a place which, generations ago one of their most notable cities,

has now had to be reconquered by fire and sword; the inhabitants, although too proud to give any demonstrative signs of conscious relationship, yet, as their bearing evinced, hardly knew whether to consider the new arrivals as conquerors or estranged, but still tolerably well-disposed co-nationalists. There was a certain shyness in the intercourse between the soldiers and townspeople, as though the two did not exactly know on what footing to meet. Eventually, on discovering a portion of the invaders to be their own immediate kith and kin, Suabians like themselves from Baden, the citizens began to thaw a little towards them, and might be heard conversing with the rank and file in their country dialect. But they kept, and still keep, a respectful distance from the Prussian regiments, who on their part are half-astonished and half-vexed at seeing the strange mixture of customs, languages, and monuments which have long been a characteristic of this border town.

To enable the Strasburgers to begin the world again, and also to show them that, if the Germans were by the exigencies of the war unfortunately obliged to treat the city harshly, they did so without any personal feeling against the inhabitants, subscriptions have been opened here for the indigent among them. The appeal to the public on their behalf is signed by the town-council of Berlin. As it well illustrates the sentiments of the Germans towards their estranged brethren of Alsace and Lorraine, I will subjoin it:

'Strasburg, that time-honoured city of the German Empire, once taken from us by the insolent rapacity of the French, has been gained back in a war undertaken by France with a view to fresh robberies. We lost it in 1681, because the old ties with which the Saxon and Stauffen Emperors had united the different tribes of our race had become so loose as virtually to leave every city and principality of our country isolated. We have reacquired it in 1870, because this last attack of our hereditary enemy found us reunited under the banner of the Hohenzollerns. Yes, we have reacquired it, but only by bloodshed and war. The crime of

those that took it from us, as well as the guilty omission of those who permitted the deed to be perpetrated when they ought to have prevented it,* has compelled us to resort to main force in repossessing ourselves of our own. The French, years ago, surprised Strasburg by a *coup de main* in time of peace, and without a drop of blood being shed. Alas that our warriors should have had to enter it through the breach made by their cannon-balls! Long in the enemy's hands, Strasburg has never ceased to be a German city. Nor have the German people ever forgotten the jewel once theirs, and now so again. Situated in a favoured locality of the blessed valley of the Rhine, Strasburg since a very early date has been one of the most renowned strongholds of the German burgher. A free and glorious commonwealth, the locality of Erwin von Steinbach's Minster and the scene of Goethe's youth, where he sang songs such as had never been heard since the times of the *minnesinger*—how could we ever have become oblivious of Strasburg?

Let us prove our sympathy with our Strasburg brethren at once. Let us not wait till they themselves delight in acknowledging that they are flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood. Let us forthwith build up as brethren what we have destroyed as enemies. We will bring prompt relief to those whose houses have been damaged, whose industry is at a standstill, or who may have emigrated to foreign soil to escape the dangers of the siege. We hope that all German cities, formerly proud of the example set them by Strasburg's power, freedom, and wonderfully successful results in every department of industry, science, and art, will unite with us in healing the wounds inflicted on the sister city, so that it may rise again, a tower of strength on the German frontier, a rampart of German liberty and independence alike. We hope that the town-councils of all German cities will actively coöperate in the work of assisting Strasburg, and open their treasuries, as yet scarcely touched by this serious war, and succour a place so fearfully tried by it.

THE BURGOMASTER AND TOWN-COUNCIL OF THE
ROYAL CAPITAL OF BERLIN.

Berlin, October 2.'

This appeal was no sooner published than the Queen, with a sympathetic letter, sent 1,000 thalers to the fund.

The official paper for Alsace, until lately published at Hagenau, and now removed to Strasburg, tells its readers, in so many words, that their incorporation with Germany has been resolved upon at the royal head-quarters. It hopes they will soon remember they are Germans in lan-

* A hit at the Hapsburg Emperors of the time.

guage, manners, and origin, and in the meantime prudently accept their situation, the result of the war. Old Germany, we are farther told, having been a divided country, permitted them to be dragged into captivity by her hereditary foe; new Germany, being united and strong, will make up for this neglect, and invites her children of Alsace and Lorraine to join hand and heart with the reformed body politic of the nation. Henceforth the Alsatians may be certain that all Germany will defend them against the French. Independently of the honour of Germany requiring this expiation of former shortcomings, the recovered provinces are indispensable for her own safety. Only a fool would believe in the French appreciating the generosity of the Germans, were they to restore Alsace and Lorraine to their unlawful possessors. The French are a vain and presumptuous people, and have for centuries thought it the most natural thing in the world that they should have a preponderance over their neighbours. If they went to war with Germany because Germany defeated the Austrians, how much more eager would they be to avenge the dozens of discomfitures they have themselves sustained in the present campaign? Were they let off without territorial loss, so far from recognising the German leniency, they would only boast that the Germans had not dared to touch the almighty nation of Gaul, and, instead of feeling grateful, be encouraged to undertake another war. If the French are at all capable of fair and equitable sentiments towards their neighbours, these will be engendered only by giving them tangible proof that they can be put down if needful, and held responsible for their crimes. This and the strategical importance of Alsace and Lorraine will never permit Germany to part again with her westernmost provinces.' Such is the gist of the official article. One must acknowledge, that if it does not spare the feelings of those addressed, it is remarkable for frankness and resolve.

Henceforth all petitions to the authorities of Alsace must be in German.

On October 3d, the Danish Parliament was opened by the King. His Majesty said it was difficult for mortal man to foresee the conclusion and consequences of the terrible war in France; but the King clings to the hope that the question pending between Denmark and Prussia may be settled in a way securing Denmark's future independence, and insuring good relations with its mighty Southern neighbours.

PRUSSIAN MEMORANDUM ON THE STATE OF PARIS.

Berlin, October 12, 1870.

THE following Memorial has been communicated to several Cabinets on the part of his Majesty's Government:

"The conditions of an armistice, proposed to M. Jules Favre, as a means of preparing a return to the normal state of things in France, have been rejected by him and his colleagues. The continuation of a struggle which, judging by the course it has hitherto taken, is a hopeless one for the French people, has been decreed. Since this decision has been pronounced, the chances of ultimate success for France have still farther diminished. Toul and Strasburg have fallen, Paris is closely invested, and the German troops scour the country as far as the Loire. The considerable forces hitherto occupied in besieging the two fortresses mentioned can now be employed elsewhere. France will have to suffer the consequences of the resolution taken by the Paris Government to wage a war *à outrance;* her unavailing sacrifices will be multiplied, and her social dissolution, already begun, will assume more alarming dimensions.

"However conscious that the policy of protracted resistance must be pernicious to the French, the Commander-in-chief of the German armies is powerless to protect them from the consequences of this resolve. One point merits particular consideration: it is the position in which Paris is placed. The engagements of the 19th and 30th of September, in which the *élite* of the forces assembled for the defence of Paris failed to push

back even the first line of the investing troops, furnish a convincing proof that the capital sooner or later must fall.

If the capitulation of Paris be deferred by the provisional Government of the National Defence till the pressing want of food has left no other choice but surrender, the consequences cannot fail to be frightful. The injudicious destruction by the French of the railways, bridges, and canals all around Paris has not impeded, in any appreciable degree, the advance of our troops; for the communications we wanted were reëstablished by us with ease and rapidity. But these communications are of a purely military character, and intended merely for military purposes; and the railroads and other ordinary means of intercourse between Paris and the provinces will not be available again for some time after the capitulation of the capital.

When the time for the latter event arrives, the German military authorities will find themselves totally unable to furnish a population of two millions of souls with the necessary food for even a single day. The neighbourhood of Paris, for many miles around, will have been stripped to supply the wants of our own troops, so that the famishing inhabitants will seek provisions in vain along the country roads. The unavoidable result will be, that hundreds of thousands will perish of hunger. The present rulers of France cannot but foresee these direful consequences of their policy as plainly as ourselves, who have at present no other alternative than to prosecute the conflict to the end. If the provisional Government are determined to push matters to this extremity, we lay the responsibility at their door.'

THIERS AND THE TREATY OF 1856. ASPECT OF THE WAR.

Berlin, October 15, 1870.

Upon M. Thiers suggesting a Congress at Petersburg, he was given to understand that Russia, to take part in it, must be able to count upon the revision of the Treaty of 1856. Meanwhile he was referred to the prudence of King William. At Vienna M. Thiers represented the European supremacy of Germany as the necessary consequence of French defeat. Since his departure the semi-official organs of the Vienna Cabinet advocate the most intimate alliance between Austria and Germany. The in-

spired circles at Berlin meet these overtures by allusions to Austria's hostile attitude and armaments at the beginning of the present campaign.

Three more Russian officers, Colonel Zetteler, Captain Doppelmeyer, and Prince Meschtcherski, have been sent to the Prussian head-quarters, where there is not one Austrian.

In an article of the official *Provincial Correspondenz* the Prussian Government inform their people of the general aspect of the war at the present moment:

'That section of the French Government which removed to Tours when Paris was invested is now about to migrate to Bordeaux or Toulouse. One hundred and fifty miles from Paris, then, and in the very heart of France, the French Government is no longer safe. To get out of the reach of our victorious armies, it must betake itself to the extreme south, to the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees and the Spanish frontier. So dire is the state of France!

A fortnight ago the French Government falsely attributed to Count Bismarck the saying that he would reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power. The statement, designedly invented to irritate the French against us, was of course a mere fiction; but what we never intended, the provisional Government is actually engaged in bringing about. If they continue carrying on the business of the State with the same criminal frivolity they have hitherto evinced, France will not only be lowered in her position, but experience a long and deep decline.

All revolutions involve the danger of injuring the moral and material resources of the State, while apparently they change only its Government; but rarely has a nation passed through the double ordeal of revolution and war at the same time—a revolution prolonged by the absence of energetic and sensible leaders, and a war which goes on because of the extreme confusion and disorganisation of the people which originally undertook it.

Wherever we turn our eyes in France, we see nothing but disorder and anarchy. The members of the Government have fallen out with each other respecting the most important questions of the day. While the Tours Government calls upon the nation to elect a representative Assembly, the Paris rulers disapprove the plan, annul the decree, and even depute one of themselves to step into a balloon and try to reach a part of France where he can assert their decision. Over and above these two central Governments, at loggerheads with each other, special Governments have been formed at Lyons, Marseilles, &c.; some of republican tendencies, others monarchical in their leanings. In every department—

nay in every large town—a set of local functionaries has gained the upper hand, and, according to its particular bias, directs the public affairs. As to the orders from Paris and Tours, they are respected only so far as it suits the views of the local demagogues.

The same confusion prevails in military matters. Apparently, indeed, all are agreed that the enemy must be driven out of the country *coûte qui coûte;* but there is such diversity of opinion as to the means to be adopted for this end, that no General can be found willing to bear the responsibility; and an old lawyer, M. Crémieux, has actually had to be intrusted with the conduct of the war. Acting with him, or under him, a council of war, consisting of seven members, has been recently instituted. At the same time, the individual departments are engaged in organising individual armies, each according to its own pattern, and there is no combined action between the regular and various irregular troops on the one hand, and the military leaders and revolutionary authorities on the other. As to discipline, it is sadly loosened even among the regulars. The irregulars, mostly young men recently called to arms, have never known what military order or obedience is. In the absence of a General fit to undertake the command of the armies in course of formation, great confidence is placed in the old leader of Italian Francs-tireurs, Giuseppe Garibaldi. It is still doubtful whether he will care to risk his reputation in the desperate task of confronting our armies with the motley bands at his disposal; but should he do so, would it not be indicative of France's unfortunate condition that she should be driven to look for rescue from an Italian *condottiere?*

Under these circumstances, we are at a loss to divine what the French Government expects of the immediate future. However many thousands it may call to arms, it cannot possibly indulge in the belief that the undrilled crowds which have been lately sent against us are an army, or can be formed into one with the means employed. The only result will be to devote thousands upon thousands to certain destruction.* What is to become of the country with this sanguinary game indefinitely prolonged?

Even now influential voices may be heard warning the Government against persevering in the path they have chosen; but the Government, domineered over by the extreme revolutionists of Paris, refuse to listen, and will not convene a representative Assembly, which would make the nation the arbiter of its own fate. Without taking the advice of the nation, it is bent upon pursuing the fatal and pernicious policy which has made of France what she now is.

The internal condition of France is important to us, in so far as it affects the question with whom we are to conclude peace when the military objects of the campaign have been secured. Still, our Government has announced its determination to abstain from exercising any influence

* This prophecy was but too literally fulfilled in the battles near Paris, on the Loire, and in the Vosges.

upon the domestic affairs of France, and even entered into transactions with the existing rulers which might have led to their securing for themselves a basis on which to establish new international relations. But by rejecting the moderate terms we proposed for an armistice, and adjourning the elections for a *Constituante*, the French Government have made bad worse, and augmented their internal difficulties, together with the impediments in the way of peace.

It remains to be seen whether the military operations against the capital, which have now become inevitable, will sufficiently impress the French to induce them to recognise a central Government, and so far acknowledge its authority as to enable us to treat with it. In the mean time, those members of the existing Republican Government, continuing a desperate war without plan or hope, must bear the responsibility of the unutterable woe which threatens to befall Paris and France.'

The German armies in France at present amount to about 600,000 men. Former losses have been made up from the dépôt battalions, and also by the Silesian reserve army, which has quite recently gone to the seat of war.

Of the Federal war loan of a hundred millions, eighty millions only will be issued. There is, however, a new loan to be voted by the Federal Parliament in a few weeks, the amount of which will no doubt exceed the sum saved out of the preceding operation.

WHY THE WAR IS INDEFINITELY PROLONGED.

Berlin, October 20, 1870.

In the form of an article of the *Provincial Correspondenz*, Government has issued another of those interesting manifestoes in which it has lately begun to inform the subject of the progress of the war:

'Speaking from a military point of view, we have arrived at the last stage of the present historical compaign. The siege of Paris is about to open. It is the decisive part of the war, and in all probability will be succeeded by no military operations of any importance.

After the defeat of the French army at Sedan, the German public expected a more speedy conclusion of the war, and would not believe in a serious and prolonged investment of Paris. France having lost all chance of making good her defence, and more especially of holding Paris, a task which could have been only executed with a large regular army, it was anticipated she would realise the uselessness of farther resistance, and soon restore peace to this part of the world.

We owe it to the self-delusions of the Republican Government, and the injurious influence their vagaries have on the state of public opinion in the country, that our armies are still battling on, and, after defeating Imperial France, must now repeat the same process in the case of Republican France. The French nation, being too proud to believe in the reality and serious character of its discomfiture in the first part of the campaign, eagerly listened to the soothing assurances of the Republican leaders, and willingly credited the absurd representations that their disasters were solely to be placed to the account of the Emperor, and after all were only of a temporary nature. On the proclamation of the Republic, there arose a pretty general impression in France that now the nation had been restored to itself it would forthwith take its defence into its own hands, and by a *levée en masse* create new invincible armies, making up in enthusiasm what they might lack in military skill, and sweeping the barbarous hordes of Germany from the sacred soil of *la patrie*.

It was the prevalence of this conceited notion of invincibility which prevented the conclusion of peace when all hope of victory had gone. It has forced us to continue the war, and palpably prove to the French that they have been beaten, and are actually and absolutely helpless. Natural as it is to wish for a prompt termination of the war, we are perhaps not wrong in seeing the finger of Providence in the retribution which the French are thus bringing in full measure upon themselves. It seems to be decreed that they are to empty the cup of bitterness to the dregs, and, by having their insolence thoroughly chastised, be weaned from their bellicose propensities, and converted into better neighbours for the future.

All of us would have been delighted had the last shot in this sanguinary contest been fired on the heights of Sedan. Yet there is no denying that, had peace been concluded then and there, the idea of holding universal supremacy, so firmly rooted in the French mind, would have regained irresistible ascendancy the moment we left the country. Even now the majority of the French deem themselves unconquerable, and indeed unconquered. They have heard of nothing but of victories, with perhaps a few insignificant reverses now and then. They have accustomed themselves to pooh-pooh the fancy that their armies have been subdued, and tell you, with the most implicit confidence, that if he liked Bazaine might easily get out of Metz and crush the forces besieging it. They smile at the thought of Paris ever falling into our hands when it is defended by hundreds of thousands of Mobiles, and attacked only by

German soldiers. Last, not least, they will swear that Europe will come to the rescue of their holy city, and save what they are pleased to call the "metropolis of the world." With these hallucinations the French are consoling themselves in the present disastrous period of their history. Were peace to be reëstablished before they have been cured of their self-sufficiency, they would doubtless flatter themselves that they have not been vanquished at all—that the war might have been continued, and that if it has not been, its premature conclusion is mainly owing to the pusillanimity and treachery of those in power. With these intoxicating illusions filling their brains, so arrogant a people as the French would not wait long before they attempted to win back what they had lost.

Only after the Parisians, and with them the entire population of France, have been humbled to the dust—only when the military strength of their country has been entirely broken, and the hope of creating fresh armies is everywhere annihilated — will they become conscious of the magnitude of their defeat, and perhaps perceive and remember that to invade a neighbour may be attended with unpleasant consequences to themselves.

In addition to the moral lessons the French are likely to derive from the war, the exhaustion which will ensue will, we may hope, guarantee the duration of peace. Every day that hostilities continue the French become so much poorer, so much more disorganised. The longer the war, the longer the time required to heal the wounds the French are now wantonly inflicting upon themselves. At present, ever new provinces are being occupied by our troops, and made to contribute to the cost incurred. The revolutionary mode of defence adopted makes the native troops even more injurious to the country than our own, and besides compels us to resort to stringent measures, chiefly borne by the productive classes of the people. Devastations such as those ordered by the Republican Government in a broad belt of country all round Paris, and necessarily attendant upon long occupation and continued fighting, cannot but exhaust the national resources for years to come.

The effect of this calamity will be heightened by the loosening of the ties which have so long kept the contending political and social elements of the country together. One really is at a loss to imagine what will be the form of Government next adopted by France. The difficulties likely to arise before this question can be settled are so many impediments in the way of reviving prosperity.

These considerations would certainly not induce our Government to prolong the war, were France inclined to sign a peace such as is imperatively required by the nature of the case and the nearest and dearest interests of Germany. Still, while the French will not let us have peace, it may be as well to reflect that protracted war also has its uses.

Our soldiers will bear the remaining hardships and dangers of the campaign in the full certainty that the more complete the discomfiture of

France, the more permanent the peace. Every week the war goes on may secure us an additional year of peace.'

This article is obviously written on the supposition that people are getting impatient of the delay that has supervened in the siege of Paris. However unjust towards the gallant men who have placed their guns before the capital with uncommon rapidity, there has no doubt been some impatience. It is a natural consequence of the military system of Prussia, which, while placing the whole strength and intelligence of the land at the disposal of the Government, requires that all that can be done shall be done expeditiously. But these popular longings for the work to go on will be satisfied in a day or two. I am told that the first allotment of batteries destined to begin the attack is ready. The heavy guns have arrived, the iron foundations on which they must be placed for fear of their sinking into the ground have been completed, and the solidity of the earthworks behind which they are concealed promises to outlast the siege. So the terrible business may begin.

The *Provincial Correspondenz* thus prepares us for the commencement of the attack:

'The reports of mediatory steps on behalf of peace, which are said to have been lately undertaken at the royal head-quarters by the representatives of neutral Powers, must be received with the greatest caution. All attempts to secure peace must in any case be first directed towards bringing the French people themselves to a clear knowledge of their own great need of peace, and to an acknowledgment of the indispensable and only bases on which it will be possible to conclude peace. Before Paris the comprehensive preparations of the German armies for the bombardment of the forts have been completed. The siege guns, despite all difficulties of transport, must all have arrived before Paris, and the coming week will scarcely pass without the German artillery having commenced their powerful work to its full extent.'

From my own knowledge, I may add that Prussia quite recently had occasion to declare her willingness to accord an armistice, provided France consented to a cession of territory on principle. Prussia again declined to

content herself with the dismantling of the Alsace and Lorraine fortresses under a European guarantee.

General Fleury, late French Ambassador to the Russian Court, has been to Wilhelmshöhe, and has returned again to St. Petersburg.

M. DE CHAUDORDY CRITICISED.

Berlin, October 22, 1870.

M. DE CHAUDORDY'S replies to the Bismarck circulars* have roused the anger of our press. One paper calls them insolent, another mendacious, a third pompous nonsense. No journal is more vehement in these denunciations than the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, which says that in representing the French as a pacific race the gentleman writing for M. Favre has impudently perverted the whole course of his people's history. We must, indeed, make some allowance for the excitement of the hour, when we find a Frenchman officially ignoring the fact of Germany having been very frequently invaded by France without any provocation, except that offered by her internal divisions. We must even assume our official Frenchman to have, in the passion of the moment, forgotten the events of the immediate past, when, in the face of Lord Lyons' statement that in the beginning of July the French Government were hardly strong enough to withstand the general cry for war, he now quietly asserts that his compatriots were against invading Germany. I must give a few extracts, were it only to show in what spirit the French utterances are met in Berlin. Here we have the concluding passages of the rejoinder in the *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*:

'It is true, there is some analogy between the Italian campaign of 1859 and the German war of 1866. On either occasion a nation strove to effect unity; but while Italy was obliged to call in the assistance of France, who

* Vide Appendix.

rendered it for a bakshish of two provinces, Germany was strong enough to attain her object through Prussia alone. As to M. de Chaudordy taking credit to himself for the pacific note the Emperor caused to be written after the battle of Sadowa by M. de Lavalette, all we can say is, that he, and those of his political friends repeating his arguments, are liars and hypocrites. Do these men really imagine we have forgotten how long and how vociferously they have clamoured for *revanche pour Sadowa?* Can it be true that they fancy we have overlooked the taunts and protests with which they, the Liberal opposition under the Imperial Government, represented Napoleon's reserved attitude in those days as a shame and dishonour to France? It is almost incredible, that the same men who but a short time ago attacked Lavalette's peaceable manifesto as one of the greatest humiliations their country has ever sustained, should now be referring us to this very manifesto in proof that the French people and Government had no better wish than to live in friendship and amity with Germany. In conclusion, we will just notice that M. de Chaudordy is menacing us with the revenge of France. His countrymen, he tells us, will avenge the injury we have committed in knocking them down when falling upon us with fire and sword. This threat will confirm us in our resolve to continue the war until we have secured for ourselves that position which we consider the most advantageous to occupy in anticipation of the next campaign. We shall be guided in this respect by our own opinion, not by anybody else's. We shall prepare for some future French Government requiring war against us, as did the Imperial Cabinet to keep itself in power at home. We shall make such arrangements as will enable us to defeat the French with a smaller loss in dead and wounded the next time they amuse themselves by coming down upon us. We shall take steps to penetrate to Paris a fourth time more easily than hitherto; and we shall repeat the operation until our neighbours have been forced to keep that peace which reason and common sense have preached to them in vain for centuries.'

The Berlin *National Zeitung*, the leading Liberal organ of the capital, adverting to M. de Chaudordy's assertion that conquest is unworthy of a civilised age, expresses itself as follows:

'M. de Chaudordy cautions us not to ruin ourselves morally by annexing a foreign province. We must say that up to very recently France was less solicitous of our welfare, wishing as she did to destroy us by the opposite process of appropriating some of our own territory. France has long claimed Rhineland,—a German country, and which has always been German,—as though it were inhabited by savages whose feelings a civilised race need not care to consult. It is to prevent a repetition of this monstrous iniquity that we in return claim two German provinces torn from our body politic through a previous robbery committed by France. As to M. de Chaudordy's

attempt to explain away the false version which M. Favre, to irritate his countrymen against us, published of his conversation with Count Bismarck, it only shows how very false that version was. It is, however, satisfactory to receive an implied admission on the part of the French Government that Count Bismarck never spoke of reducing France to a second-rate Power, though the French Government originally told their countrymen he had done so. What they ought to have communicated to their fellow citizens was not the conclusions, as M. de Chaudordy calls it, they derived from M. Favre's report concerning his interview with Count Bismarck, but the plain and uncooked report itself.'

The Breslau *Silesian Gazette*, a moderate Conservative paper, laments that M. Favre should have selected so incompetent an under-secretary as M. de Chaudordy:

'We are afraid that Paris must be taken before peace can be concluded. One need only read the circular note of the obscure gentleman suddenly appointed Under-Secretary of State in the Tours Government to convince oneself that the French are far from realising the position they are in. That unknown scribbler, the bold representative of a fantastical chief, has simply copied the threadbare arguments of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* to convince us that we are in the wrong. Can we be expected to refute these sophistical allegations over again? After all the trouble we have had to get as far as the line of the Moselle, is it not a little too absurd for him to tell us that it ought to make no difference to us where we begin the next war—on the Moselle or the Rhine? But we will not be so easily convinced that the possession of the Vosges and Metz is no advantage to us in case of another rupture.'

The *Cologne Gazette*, upon whose well-known position and influence I need not expatiate, declines to believe that generosity will be the best mode of conciliating France:

'It is very unfortunate that history should not bear out the supposition, that lenient treatment after defeat renders the French more pacific. They were very generously treated in 1815, when, notwithstanding two successive defeats, they were permitted to retain German soil. But the generosity we then displayed towards them had no power to modify their aggressive hankerings.'

The Stuttgart *Suabian Gazette*, a Liberal unity paper, likewise contends that it would be foolish to count upon French moderation and gratitude:

'We are told that France never wished the war, and that therefore we

ought not to be too severe upon her. But to this day their most eminent and unimpassioned periodicals declare that the battles they have lost only prove that France was right in attempting to break the power of Germany, and secure for herself a better frontier. These are the exact words of M. de Mazade in a recent article of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. Having to deal with such an inveterately iniquitous people, what remains for us but to make them feel our strength, and erect a strong barrier between them and ourselves?'

The Berlin *Volks Zeitung*, the most popular organ of advanced Liberalism in the eastern provinces, swells the chorus in the same key:

'M. Chauvin is as confident as ever. Notwithstanding all that has occurred, a M. de St. Ours, in presenting himself as candidate for the future *Constituante* in the department of Dordogne, coolly tells his electors that a little organisation will, after all, suffice not only to achieve a signal victory, but also to obtain the Rhine as a frontier from its source to its mouth. This simply means that Germany, Holland, and Switzerland are even now to be victimised by France. Very enterprising, though not very probable.'

Thus the papers of all hues and in all quarters sound the same note. With the exception of the Socialistic and Republican press, which, I believe, has not a dozen organs in all Germany, and out of Würtemberg exercises no appreciable influence on the course of events, the whole *posse* of German journalism may be said to be of one mind in regard to the terms to be exacted of France. If there is any dissension at all, it arises from some papers wishing to annex only what is German in language, and therefore opposing the idea of appropriating Metz and the narrow strip of French-speaking country south of it included in Count Bismarck's demand. By virtue of the ethnographical principle these papers advocate, they ask for Luxemburg, while renouncing Metz. But their number is very small.

The dispatch south of a portion of the besieging army, and the arrival of fresh troops before Paris, have somewhat modified the disposition of the German forces. At present the 5th Corps and the Landwehr of the Guard are

stationed near Versailles and opposite Mont Valérien; one half of the 11th Corps (the other half has gone south, together with the 1st Bavarian Corps) confronts Fort Issy; the 2d Bavarian Corps watches Forts Vanvres and Montrouge, and the 6th Corps Bicètre and Ivry. Crossing the Seine, we find one-half of the 13th Corps, and the Würtemberg division, under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, between the Marne and the Canal de l'Ourcq; north of the town, from east to west, are stationed the 4th Corps, the Guards, and the 12th (Saxon) Corps. Total, seven-and-a-half corps and some Garde-Landwehr regiments, or about 230,000 men. The garrison number at least 400,000, yet they are unable to break through the iron ring encompassing them.

As the disposition of the besieging army shows, there can be no attack intended from the east, and there is probably mischief brewing to the south-west. Of this respectable, but for the work in hand only just sufficient force, the outer line of sentinels has been pushed to within range of the enemy's posts. To prevent being made a target of, the sentinels are mostly obliged to lie down. At a short distance in their rear are stationed, in rifle-pits, the Feldwachten, or supports, numbering each between twenty and forty men. The retreat of these sentinels and Feldwachten, when attacked by superior numbers, has been more than once gazetted by the French as a brilliant victory over Moltke and Bismarck. If necessary, this retreat is continued till they fall back upon the vanguard—large masses of infantry and artillery, with a slight addition of cavalry. Like the two preceding chains of scouts, the vanguard must be ready to act at a moment's notice, and are not permitted to take off their clothes. They are mostly quartered in the deserted villages, which, by barricades, abattis, crenelated walls, pitfalls, &c., have been converted into so many miniature fortresses. These three successive arrays form the first

line of the besieging army. The *gros*, about two miles farther back, is the second line; the rest, still farther removed, being called the third line. The second line has more cavalry than the third, which, in turn, surpasses the second in artillery. As a rule, the second and third lines encamp in divisions. There are telegraph lines from the most distant sentinels to the Feldwachten, and, farther back, to the advanced guard, the *gros*, and the rear-guard. The moment the French make a sortie, the alarm is given by the sentinel to the Feldwacht, who, in case of necessity, send on the message to the rear. The telegraphic communication between the different portions of a division is supplemented by wires connecting the various divisions with each other.

ANOTHER ARMISTICE PROPOSAL.

Berlin, October 23, 1870.

EARL GRANVILLE has telegraphed to the English Ambassadors at Tours, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, with the object of inducing the belligerents to agree to an armistice which should allow of the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.* England has likewise expressed an ardent wish to be supported by Austria, Russia, and Italy. The Austro-Hungarian Government at once responded to this desire, and has in a friendly manner advocated an armistice both in Berlin and Tours. Russia is disposed to act in the same sense, but in an isolated manner. It is certain that these suggestions will come to nothing. Prussia demands that France should consent, on principle, to cession of territory. France declines to do so.

* Vide Appendix.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE.

Berlin, October 26, 1870.

THE semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* of to-day says:

'The various attempts to obtain peace through negotiations with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, which have been made by the Republicans, the Imperialists, and others, have always received as answer, that the first condition is the election of a representative Assembly of the French people, since from such a representative Assembly alone, and from a Government supported by it, can a safe and durable peace be hoped for. Count Bismarck has declared himself ready to take steps that every possible facility shall be granted for bringing about such an Assembly, and it appears to us immaterial what form of government the Assembly may approve or set up.'

The official *Provincial Correspondenz* of to-day says, in reference to the armistice, that no great hopes can be built upon it, since the men in power in France are far from having arrived at that point of view which they will have to take in all serious negotiations:

'After their hard-earned results, there is no reason why the Germans should withdraw any of the demands made in the national interest. The delay in the attack upon Paris solely arises from the inherent difficulties of the undertaking, and not from political considerations. Our military leaders have prepared everything to overcome even the last hostile bulwark.'

The same subject is thus dilated upon by the semi-official journals of St. Petersburg:

'When the neutral Powers, at the beginning of the war, mutually engaged not to relinquish the attitude they had assumed towards the belligerents without previous communication to each other, it was the unanimous opinion that a favourable opportunity for terminating the contest should be seized, but that such would only exist when mediation was requested by both sides. Upon the visit of M. Favre to the German head-quarters, the neutral Cabinets considered that the time for intercession had arrived, to facilitate which the Russian Government declared that the *de facto* Government in France is now the only possible one. The Prussian memorandum concerning the eventual starvation of Paris caused a new interchange of ideas. A wish was more than once expressed by several of the neutral

Powers to propose conditions which should be accepted by the belligerents. The Russian Cabinet does not believe in the efficacy of this scheme, because this kind of mediation would involve an attempt at arbitration which, without material support, must be unavailing. The belligerents alone must discuss the conditions of peace. At the same time the neutral Powers could advise the resumption of the interrupted negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice to allow time for the convocation of a National Assembly, which alone could decide on the continuance of war or on peace. These motives having prompted the English Cabinet to propose an armistice, its suggestion has met with the support of all the neutral Powers.'

THE TERMS OF PEACE.

Berlin, October 26, 1870.

LORD GRANVILLE'S suggestions respecting an armistice are not likely to lead to any very speedy results. Discreetly abstaining from definite proposals, he contented himself with directing the attention of the belligerents to the possible consequences of a bombardment, which perhaps might be avoided by the convention of a Constituent Assembly. As to the terms of the armistice, he left them for the belligerents themselves to settle. But here is the difficulty; and as Germany will not consent to a truce unless a cession of territory is conceded by France in principle, the negotiations came to a standstill before they had fairly begun. Unless telegraphic correspondence between the various Courts has succeeded in improving the aspect of things within the last twenty-four hours, we are, I am afraid, not much nearer an arrangement now than when M. Favre took leave of Count Bismarck three weeks ago.

In thus insisting upon their original terms, the Germans are actuated not so much by a wish to commence active operations against Paris, as by the apprehension that, if allowed a respite of several weeks to arm and drill, the Mobiles will give them a deal to do, should the armis-

tice expire without peace being declared. Paris, they hold, will be starved out before the end of the year, whether attacked or not, the armistice making little difference in this respect; but if the Mobiles and Francs-tireurs have time given them to organise fresh regiments and receive some military education, they may, with the facilities they possess for drawing arms from the greatest manufactories in the New and Old Worlds, possibly develop into a force sufficiently large and respectable to entail fresh fighting. To have to resume war in the midst of December, and sacrifice some more thousands of their gallant troops, is an unpleasing prospect to the German commanders, however little they may doubt the ultimate issue of the campaign. They therefore deem it imperative to guard as much as they can against the armistice bearing no fruit. For this reason they have pointed out to the King the necessity of having a surrender of territory consented to at once—a point which, unless granted without delay, is likely to meet with the utmost opposition in the Constituent Assembly, and perhaps may prevent it from effecting a settlement.

Unfortunately, this anxiety of the Germans to secure an ultimate result is likely to stand in the way of the very transactions from which that result is to spring. The present rulers of France are hardly in a position to make a promise so unpalatable to their countrymen. Mentally constituted as the French are, it is morally certain that, although the majority of the educated classes may wish to have done with the war, few of their number will come forward and second and protect the first to admit the expediency of yielding. If MM. Favre and Trochu were mobbed for recognising the uselessness of farther resistance, they might have the sympathy, but would scarcely have the support, of the thousands who are of the same mind with them. Only a representative Assembly, where individual responsibility is shifted on to the

whole body, can have the courage to look things in the face and recognise facts, however painful they may be. Such being the case, we are in the same vicious circle as before. While both parties wish for an armistice, the Republican Government dare not accord what the German commanders consider a *sine quâ non* of a suspension of hostilities.

It would be the more to be regretted were this obstacle to prove insuperable, as there are symptoms observable in the leading spheres of this Government which induce me to believe that, if the French were to give in before they are completely exhausted, they might perhaps succeed in securing an abatement of the terms this country originally meant to exact. Though I do not think that, as far as depends on the Germans, there is much likelihood of the French retaining Alsace and the German districts of Lorraine, the timely assumption of a conciliatory attitude might have some influence in keeping them Metz and the narrow strip of French-speaking country which, for the sake of a strong military frontier, German politicians at first were inclined to consider as a necessary appendix to the claimed provinces of their own tongue. It seems there are men in the Government ready to advocate some such arrangement, and purchase by the renunciation of Metz a speedy termination of the bloodshed that has already lasted but too long. The disinclination to have foreign subjects is at the bottom of the plan. But if the French continue speaking of *le sol sacré* and its perpetual inviolability, extending the euphonious term even to land they have taken by force, the present conciliatory disposition of their enemy may pass over, and they will probably fare the worse for it. For the time being the notion of a compromise exists, though faintly, at Berlin.

This idea, having been broached in influential quarters, has led the Luxemburgers to apprehend that they are

destined to serve as a scapegoat for Metz. I do not know whether any such intention has ever been authoritatively avowed. Were the Prussian Government so minded, they might not find it over difficult to secure the assent of the Sovereign and people of Luxemburg, as well as of the Powers which have guaranteed the independence of the Duchy. At present Luxemburg belongs to the Zollverein, but not to the Bund. She partakes of the economical advantages common to Germany, without the drawback of bearing her share in the political, financial, and military burdens of the nation. Were Germany to threaten her with exclusion from the Zollverein unless she joined the Bund, Luxemburg would, for financial reasons, be compelled to yield. To adopt the Belgian tariff would ruin her manufactures; to conclude a commercial treaty with France would not be permitted by victorious Germany, as it might lead to political absorption. It would be, moreover, impracticable when once Luxemburg is entirely surrounded by German territory. As to the permission to reënter the German Confederacy, which France forced her to leave three years ago, this would probably be accorded without much ado in the coming treaty of peace, when the guaranteeing Powers would not be likely to object to an adjustment which frees them from their pledge. *Il va sans dire* that, being indifferent patriots, the Luxemburgers would prefer selling their goods to Germany without having to contribute towards her military expenditure; but if the one were not to be had without the other, it may, as the world goes, be expected that they would not long waver in their decision.

In compliance with an invitation from the King of Prussia, the leading Ministers of the South German States have repaired to Versailles to concert the terms of their joining the North German Bund. I should not be astonished were the important transaction, which fulfils the dreams of so many preceding generations, to be completed

in a few days. Since the beginning of the war, the reunion of Northern and Southern Germany has been regarded as inevitable, even by those Southern Ministers who formerly opposed it most strenuously. The Southern armies, strongly in favour of joining Prussia since the great events of 1866, absolutely demand it since the victories conjointly achieved over France. Among the Southern populations, some time ago much divided on the question, the unity men have likewise obtained a decided majority amid the national enthusiasm of the war, and forced the Ultramontanes and Republicans to beat a retreat. Add to this, that the Southern Sovereigns cannot conceal from themselves the risk they would incur by running counter to the impulses of the most important portion of their subjects, and that they cannot wish to face the unsettled future of Europe in feeble isolation,—and there can be no doubt as to the course they have to adopt.

Baden, who had long wished to join, and been repeatedly refused admission, while there was the danger of such admission bringing on war with France, has been the first to come forward. Bavaria has likewise preferred a warm request to the same effect, but subsequently cooled down, and endeavoured to procure for herself a position which would have preserved her a greater share of independence than is supposed to be compatible with the effective direction of the nation's affairs by a central Government. Würtemberg, though not giving herself up as unconditionally as Baden, yet confines her reservations to points of detail which may be unhesitatingly conceded. As to the southern half of Hesse-Darmstadt, which also remains outside the Bund, it is only natural in the aspect things have assumed that it will follow the northern portion of the Grand Duchy, and likewise send its representatives to Berlin.

In all probability the main points are being settled at

this moment at Versailles. As Herr von Bennigsen and some other Liberal members of the Federal Parliament have been asked by Count Bismarck to repair to Versailles, and give him the benefit of their advice in the pending negotiations, it is hoped that the popular wishes will be attended to in the partial remodelling of the charter necessitated by the change. I ought not to omit mentioning, that the process by which this consummation of the German destinies accomplishes itself, supplies signal proof of the natural and necessary character of the reform. True to his avowed programme, Count Bismarck has not asked the Southern States to join. The Southern dynasties and Governments, though they will have to renounce some of their present prerogatives, have by the nature of things been themselves moved to apply for admission.

Yesterday General Moltke, the famous strategist, celebrated his 70th birthday.

THE PROPOSED ARMISTICE.

Berlin, October 27, 1870.

THE chances of the armistice are thus commented upon by the official *Provincial Correspondenz:*

'Rumours concerning attempts to bring about an armistice, rife for some time past, have assumed a more tangible shape in the last few days. England, we are told, has taken steps to induce the provisional Government of France to apply for an armistice with a view to the convention of a representative Assembly. The other Powers, having been invited by England to use their influence in the same direction, have, some of them, already responded to this request.

The English Government does not seem to have advanced any definite proposals or suggestions concerning the basis on which the armistice is to be concluded. It has limited its action to pressing France to ask for a truce, and, by convening a representative Assembly, to enter upon the only line of action which seems to promise the restoration of peace.

In taking this step the English Government is far from interfering in the contest between Germany and France. Its proceedings mainly spring from the conviction, shared by ourselves, that it would be useless to attempt to stop the progress of the war unless France has been previously brought to acknowledge that she is in need of peace. Were the English Government to exercise any very sensible influence upon France in this direction, its good offices would merit our highest praise.

At first sight one would imagine that the experience gathered by M. Thiers in his European tour, as well as the state of things in France, which on his return he found so much aggravated, ought to lend additional importance to the representations of the British Cabinet.

Yet it would be too venturesome to indulge in sanguine hopes as to the success of the experiment. Up to a few days ago the utterances of the temporary rulers of France were far from recognising the only points whence all endeavours in favour of peace, inclusive of negotiations for an armistice, will have to issue.

Count Bismarck has laid down these points in advance, and there is no reason to believe that, after several more weeks of war, and several more successes gained by our arms, he will find it admissible to abate anything from the demands put forward in the interest of our national safety.

On the contrary, the prolongation of the war forced upon us, and the approach we have made to the object for which we undertook the campaign, render it very difficult for us to accord a mere truce. An armistice, if at present granted, must either include a political guarantee of peace, or else a military guarantee that it will not diminish the chance we now have of obtaining a speedy success at Paris and Metz, as well as in the other parts of the country where fighting is going on. But it is hardly probable that the actual rulers of France should have so essentially modified their views in the last few days as to acknowledge the justice and necessity of the terms we are obliged to insist upon, if we wish to secure this double end.

We shall not therefore be easily induced to believe in a favourable result of the well-meaning step taken by England. Though the Tours Government has availed itself of this opportunity to open fresh negotiations, and though the choice of M. Thiers as their representative seems to indicate that they have perceived the impossibility of abiding by the resolves recently announced by M. Favre, yet we have little hope that the provisional rulers will be ready and willing to acknowledge the weight of accomplished facts, and accept such terms for an armistice as shall give us a pledge that the well-earned prize of our efforts will be delivered over on the conclusion of peace.'

The above is but too much in keeping with my previous intelligence. The sad conclusions to be derived from it are confirmed by an account of the state of mili-

tary affairs before Paris published in the same authentic organ:

'The delay which has occurred in the attack of Paris has given rise to many erroneous suppositions. The real cause is, that it has been impossible to complete the necessary military preparations in a shorter time. Our original calculations were grounded on the surmise, that a partial bombardment of Paris would be proceeded with directly the comparatively limited number of guns and projectiles required for this purpose had arrived. Excitable as the Parisians are, it was thought that to subject even a portion of the town to the fire of our artillery would suffice to bring on confusion and surrender; and when the fall of Toul admitted of a certain number of guns being rapidly sent up to head-quarters, the speedy commencement of the work was confidently expected. In a council of war held in his Majesty's presence it was, however, eventually decided to waive the proposed attempt to work upon the feelings of the metropolitan population. The vote passed on this occasion decided that the bombardment should be undertaken and carried through in accordance with those strict rules of the military art by adhering to which so many similar tasks have been successfully solved in the course of the war.

We have in consequence dispensed with a partial and, so to say, preliminary attack, which, had it failed of effect, would have done us more harm than good; and we have not hesitated to prolong a period of seeming inactivity in order to perfect our artilleristic preparations, and bring them to that state which will subsequently enable us to proceed with the more vigour and confidence.

It is true, it has taken us a longer time than originally anticipated to get ready. The difficulty of transporting guns and munition has proved greater than was foreseen. Even after the conquest of Toul, our railway extended only as far as Nanteuil, near Meaux, where a blown-up tunnel stops the way. Thence to Paris, a distance of about fifty miles, the transport has to be effected along the ordinary roads, which, considering the scarcity of wagons and horses and the impaired condition of the *chaussées*, cut up by the enemy, has been an immense effort. When we reckon that the munitions alone, independent of the guns, weigh 500,000 cwt., we believe we shall be justified in asserting that the time consumed in getting it to the front is rather under the mark than otherwise. To conquer Sebastopol took the allied English, Italians, and French a whole year. Is there any reason for impatience, then, if in the case of the giant fortress of Paris a few weeks more are needed for preliminaries than could be at first imagined?

We can give the positive assurance, that the postponement of the attack has been occasioned only by the technical difficulties incident to the task, not by any considerations of a political nature. There can be no political nor still less any sentimental considerations which could induce us to

forego the right and duty of carrying on to the complete overthrow of France a war which has been forced upon us against our will, and the continuance of which is rendered imperative by the conduct of the present Government as well as of the people of France. It is superfluous to repeat, that of all monarchs, King William would be the last to incur the responsibility of a needless continuation of hostilities, of farther bloodshed, and of the partial destruction of such a city as Paris, were it only possible to discover some other means of terminating the war and obtaining a guarantee of future peace. Owing, however, to the dominant position which Paris occupies in France, and the strength and influence of which has been but too fully proved of late, it is impossible adequately to finish the war without the reduction of the capital. If this requires a siege, with the dangers and horrors inseparable from it, this is not our fault, but the fault of those who have converted Paris into a fortress. And how enormous is the guilt of the present rulers of France, who, when all other military resistance has been put down, make the walls and works of Paris the mainstay of their defiant and haughty arrogance!

As for ourselves, the noble and costly blood of our sons and brothers, poured out like water in this fearful war, calls upon us not to permit ourselves to be turned back before reaching our goal. We will not be stopped in our career, but pursue it to the end. The end of a victorious war against France can be only Paris. Only at Paris can we find the definite acknowledgment of our victories and the guarantee of future peace. Our generals will soon be in a position to reduce the last bulwark of the enemy, and, the attack once entered upon, we may hope that their efforts will be crowned with corresponding results.'

Let us hope that the cogency of this reasoning will be admitted by patriotic Frenchmen while there is yet time. Strong as are the forts and ramparts of the besieged capital, they cannot withstand the effect which hunger and a bombardment of the town will have upon the population. As to their being relieved by the Mobiles and Francs-tireurs, that hope is infinitesimally small. Up to to-day the new levies of France have been defeated in every encounter with the German troops.

THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA APPOINTED FIELD-MARSHAL.

THE following is the text of the letter by which his Majesty conferred on the Crown Prince the title of Field-marshal-General:

'*Versailles, October* 28, 1870.

'The capitulation of the army of Marshal Bazaine and the fortress of Metz forms an important epoch in the war. Both armies arrayed in July against the united forces of Prussia and Germany, in this bloody conflict which we most assuredly did not provoke, have now fallen into our hands, and I am therefore impelled to mark the importance of the event by an act of special significance.

You have had a most important share in the execution of our task. You commenced the campaign by two victories which followed closely on each other. By your strategical advance you then covered the left flank of the chief army, so that it could securely advance to defeat the army of Bazaine; you next united your forces to those of the great army, to take part in the operations against Sedan, and assist in gaining our great success there; and you have now, after some fighting, completed the investment of Paris. All this shows you to be a great and successful general; you have merited the highest military rank, and I therefore nominate you Fieldmarshal-General. It is the first time that such a distinction has been conferred on a Prince of our House, and I have also granted it to Prince Frederick Charles. But the successes gained in this campaign are so great in themselves and so important in their consequences, as to justify me in departing from the usages of our House. What my paternal heart feels in being able, and indeed bound, to return my own thanks and those of the country in such a way, need not be expressed in words.

Your affectionate and grateful father,

WILLIAM.'

The Field-marshal's rank is a rare distinction in the Prussian army. Before the appointment of the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles, but one veteran, General Count Wrangel, enjoyed the honour of the title.

Prussia has announced her resolve to recognise the new King of Spain the moment he is duly elected by the Cortes. The announcement is contained in the following pointed telegram:

COUNT BISMARCK TO THE PRUSSIAN MINISTER, MADRID.

'*Versailles, October* 28, 1870.

'We have been the first to recognise in a speech from the throne the right of Spain to decide upon her own future. We will not to-day depart from this principle, nor imitate the example France gave before the war of trying to interfere with the internal affairs of Spain, by asking that the resolutions of an independent country should be subject to foreign consent. We shall await the resolutions Spain may adopt in her own affairs, and we will recognise the result, and offer the most earnest wishes for her felicity.'

The Czar of Russia has sanctioned the new regulations for accelerating the mobilisation of his army. They provide for the calling in of 427,297 men, 170,000 of whom come from Poland and the provinces of mixed nationality belonging to ancient Poland.

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL GARIBALDI TO THE ARMY OF THE VOSGES. APPEAL TO THE NATIONS.

'Militia of the Army of the Vosges,—The cosmopolitan nucleus that the French Republic is rallying in her midst, composed of men chosen from the *élite* of nations, represents humanitarian future; and upon the banner of this noble group you read the motto of a free people, which will soon be the watchword of the human family,—"All for one, one for all." Selfishness governs the world, and autocracy combats in the French Republic the germ of the rights of man, which it abhors. As the incarnation of evil, autocracy makes every effort for self-preservation.

And the people. Like ancient Carthage, modern Republics swim in gold and sybaritism, while despots shake hands amid the darkness they enjoy, and profit by the misfortune of a brother people. Helvetia, believing herself weak, holds down her head, and covers with the holy flag of William Tell her money-chests and her banks. Grant, who by a single sign of his finger could have dispatched the soldiers of Prim home to Madrid, permits an entire population belonging to the grand family of Washington to be massacred and to be destroyed, and barely allows the great Republic to utter a word of sympathy for the valiant sons of Lafayette. And thou, proud and classic ground, refuge of the exile, thou who hast first proclaimed the emancipation of races, and who to-day enjoyest the triumph of thy courageous initiative,—wilt thou abandon in its gigantic

struggle that sister nation which, like thee, marches, and will march, in the van of human progress?

France is sustaining a heroic struggle with the *débris* of an army of brave men, which the most stupid of tyrants conducted to defeat. But the nation is there. Risen like one man, she will cause the old autocrat soon to repent of his determination to continue the butchery.

What a noble mission, therefore, is ours! Sons of liberty, *élite* of all people. O, no! I would not change my title of Militiaman of the Republic for a crown. Being apostles of peace and of the fraternity of peoples, we are now compelled to fight; and we shall fight with the proud consciousness of men testifying to the truth of the dictum of the illustrious Chénier: "Republicans are men, and slaves are children." Your courage I do not doubt. All I ask of you is composure and discipline—indispensable in war.

G. GARIBALDI.'

PUBLIC OPINION IN GERMANY.

Berlin, October 31, 1870.

MUCH has been recently said upon the state of public opinion in Germany concerning the unexpected prolongation of the war. There is no doubt the Germans did expect the war would be over soon after Sedan. There is no doubt they *were* disappointed when they witnessed the determination of the French to continue the struggle, and go on hoping against hope. But from all I hear and see I am driven to the belief, that it would be erroneous to mistake this wish of a speedy cessation of hostilities for a disinclination to continue it, should continuation appear imperative. Notwithstanding that the military system of the country makes war very sensibly felt, yet such is the general confidence in the military and political leaders, that, as these hold the objects of the campaign are not yet attained, the people are willing to support them to the end. If the Generals had not declared the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine to be necessary for the protection of the German frontiers, the vast majority in this country

would be in favour of concluding peace at once, and on the terms proposed by M. Favre; but as the German Generals are, and indeed have been for the last hundred years, of the opposite opinion, the nation is determined to profit by the opportunity, and acquire the territory that is to enable them to ward off future invasions with a greater chance of success than hitherto.

Count Bismarck was but too accurate an interpreter of the thoughts of his countrymen when, a few weeks ago, he spoke of the probability of future collisions with France, and of the duty the Germans owed to themselves to prepare for coming attacks of the fiery Gaul. The French are now reaping the fruits of the treatment they have accorded this country for centuries both in word and deed. The Germans are but too keenly aware how frequently they have been invaded,* and with what intense hostility they have been spoken of by nearly every political celebrity in France up to the very outbreak of the war. It is the knowledge of the inveteracy of this feeling on the other side of the frontier, coupled with the observation that the French even now deem themselves invincible, which makes everybody here look forward to another war in the wake of the present one. Were the French to admit they are beaten and that they had better give up battling with Germany for the mere sake of prestige, they would perhaps not be suspected of a design to resume the fray as soon as they can after the conclusion of peace. But with M. Gambetta declaring the final victory of France a matter of course, and indispensable to civilisation to boot, the Germans ask,—

'What can we expect but to see them come down upon us whenever an opportunity offers? The contingency being so very probable a one, ought we not to guard against it by securing those military and territorial advantages commended by the Generals whose experience and judgment we have every reason to confide in? Is not every peace with the French merely an

* Forty-two times between 1660 and 1760; and about twenty times within the last hundred years.

armistice while they do not renounce their old ambition? And should we not be actually encouraging them to attack us again, were we to permit them to repeat the thing under the same favourable conditions as formerly?'

The better to illustrate these popular reasonings, I will, in conclusion, quote a sentiment the gist of which I have often encountered in conversation. The Bremen *Weser Zeitung* says:

'It is remarkable what an important influence a single trait in the national character of the French exercises upon the destinies of Europe. The constitutional vanity of the French, their inability to realise and recognise unpleasant facts, becomes as terrible a scourge to themselves as to the nations around them. Vanity has stirred them up to a frivolous war, vanity prevents the restoration of peace. Very characteristic in this respect is that passage in M. Jules Favre's last circular, in which he depicts the ravishing aspect France will wear when perishing amid the flaring halo of glory and renown. The consciousness of playing an imposing *rôle* before the world to a certain extent consoles him for the ruin of his country. But is ruin likely to follow the acceptance of the German terms? Will not the French remain a powerful, gallant, rich, and highly-gifted nation even after the forfeiture of their German provinces? And, instead of revelling in the prospect of fine tragical catastrophes, had they not better look realities in the face, consider the common-sense question how to get out of a bad job, and extricate themselves at as cheap a price as possible? All the states of Europe have had to do this occasionally, and history mentions even some French Ministers who capitulated when there was nothing left but to capitulate. But it is quite true, while other nations praise those of their statesmen who in the hour of defeat averted greater evils by timely concessions, the French have always called Talleyrand a traitor for procuring them the best terms possible after the discomfiture of 1815. Though Talleyrand saved all he could for them, the French, in their uncontrollable conceit, only look to what he was compelled to sign away, and therefore insist upon regarding him as a rascal. They have no Talleyrand now; no man sufficiently courageous to bend to the inevitable. Sheer compulsion alone can terminate the war. We know it, and are prepared for it.'

The *Kreuz Zeitung* declares that only those Francs-tireurs who wear no uniform and are not officered by gentlemen appointed by the Government will be treated as brigands. All others, including foreigners, are considered as soldiers, and allowed to benefit by the laws of civilised warfare.

KING WILLIAM'S SECOND PROCLAMATION TO THE GERMAN ARMIES.

Berlin, November 5, 1870.

His Majesty the King issued the following general order to the troops, on October 28th, from Versailles:

'Soldiers of the united German armies,—When, three months ago, we took the field against a foe who had challenged us to the combat, I expressed to you my confidence that God would defend our righteous cause. This confidence has been justified by events. Since the day of Weissenburg, when you first encountered the enemy, till this hour, in which I have received the announcement of the capitulation of Metz, the names of many combats and battles have been indelibly inscribed on the tablets of history. I will recall to you the days of Wörth and Saarbrücken, the bloody battles around Metz, the combats at Sedan, Beaumont, Strasburg, and Paris, each of which was for us a victory. We may look back on this period with pride, for never was there a more glorious war; and I rejoice to acknowledge that you are worthy of the reputation you have acquired. You have displayed all the qualities that adorn the soldier—brilliant courage in the fight, obedience, perseverance, and self-denial in sickness and privations. With the capitulation of Metz the last of the hostile armies you had to meet at the beginning of the campaign has ceased to exist. I embrace this opportunity to express to each one of you, from the General to the private soldier, my thanks and acknowledgments. In advancing my son, the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the Commander of the cavalry, Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, who have so often led you to victory, to the rank of Field-marshals, I desire to honour and distinguish you all. Whatever events the future may bring, I look forward to them with calmness. I know that with such troops victory can never fail us; and I am confident the termination of the war will be quite as glorious as its commencement.

WILLIAM.'

INTELLECTUAL HABITS OF GERMANY AND FRANCE.

Berlin, November 6, 1870.

SEMI-OFFICIAL correspondents from Versailles are amused at the incredulity the inhabitants of the French Potsdam at first professed at the news of the capture of Metz. It is only in keeping with previous experience. Since their entry into France the Prussians have not placarded a single victory without finding the obnoxious notification

within a few hours covered with incredulous comments in pencil, chalk, and other improvised writing materials. Mostly these remarks consisted in the two brief but expressive words '*Blague prussienne*,' but there were sometimes pleasant variations introduced, such as '*Mensonge allemand!*' '*C'est trop fort, Bismarck!*' and the like. Even when the victorious progress of the German armies proved the accuracy of the intelligence propagated by their commanders, the inhabitants of the discomfited country would not, as a rule, credit the reported successes. At any rate, they habitually doubted the latest announcements of the victors. In October they might indeed admit that there had been such a thing as Sedan, but they pooh-poohed Châteaudun, ridiculed Orleans, and roundly denied the various conflicts at the Oignon. Their belief always lagged behind the event, a fortnight being about the shortest period required to make them credit what the rest of the world had known, realised, and, in discussing the situation, taken into account just so much earlier. It is exactly the same with the French prisoners in Germany: they laugh in your face when you speak to them of the surrender of Metz, and the possibility of France being driven to accept a disadvantageous peace.

So deeply rooted is the assumption of invincibility in every individual of *la grande nation;* so firmly convinced are its proud and self-satisfied children, from the officer down to the recruit, that what has happened is an unlucky mischance, and very little likely to be repeated. The Germans, whose intellectual constitution is deeply impregnated with scepticism and the conviction of the mutability of all things, at first looked upon this French denial of facts as mere stolidity and conceit; but they have gradually learnt to acknowledge the feeling of self-respect, which, though over-strained and ofttimes perverted, yet forms a marked and estimable ingredient in it.

Once upon this topic, I may advert to the ludicrous

pertinacity with which the French ignore the circumstance of the minor States of Germany being arrayed against them, as well as Prussia. Having at the outset persuaded themselves that the minor States would be but too happy to side with them against the barbarians of Berlin, they cling to their illusions, notwithstanding the lesson given them by every battle-field of the war. If they cannot get rid bodily of the Bavarians, Würtembergers, &c., they are yet determined to omit them in their reports. Whatever is done by the enemy is done by the Prussians. Only the other day they were defeated at Talmey and Dijon by Badeners, but, as usual, credited the Prussians with the victory. The Germans are slow to compass the reason of this deliberate misnomer. Knowing the primary condition of success to be a correct appreciation of facts, they cannot very well understand how a people whom they have always believed to be preëminently *spirituel* should take such intense delight in abiding by a preconceived idea, though they must long have had the evidence of their senses to disabuse them of it. What is the use of reasoning with men, they will ask, who live in an imaginary world of their own? Or how can we ever hope to make them understand us when it takes them such a long time to grasp the obvious occurrences of this impressive period?

Count Moltke received many hearty wishes on the completion of his 70th year. The Prussian Cabinet sent him a joint congratulation, thanking him in simple and expressive words for what he had done for the country. Magdeburg requested his acceptance of the freedom of the city; while Nuremberg presented the renowned septuagenarian with a caligraphic work of art, consisting of a rich symbolic border, with words of homage and acknowledgment in the centre. At the bottom of the drawing, which in complicated flourishes is said to equal its mediæval prototypes, appears Moltke's coat of arms, with the proud family motto *Togâ saccoque illustris.* Whoever is

acquainted with the man, as unpretending as he is profound, cannot but be struck with the aptness of the device.

Dr. Russell's letters from the theatre of war continue to be printed *verbatim* by the German, Russian, Polish, Danish, and Swedish press.

The Russians announce the completion, in a few months, of the important railway between Poti and Kutais. When continued to Tiflis, it will, it is expected, attract the greater part of the Persian trade.

LETTER FROM THE QUEEN OF PRUSSIA.

'It is with sincere admiration that I have learnt on how large a scale the British nation has endeavoured to palliate the sufferings caused by the present war, and has participated in the care for the sick and wounded by giving pecuniary assistance to existing societies and hospitals, by fitting up ambulances, by establishing dépôts, and by distributing gifts. In my position of patroness of the German societies represented by the Central Committee at Berlin, I feel it to be a duty incumbent on me to tender my sincerest and most heartfelt thanks, both in my own name and in that of my countrymen at home and abroad who have been benefited by this aid, to the Committee of the British "National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded," through which this labour of love has been effected.

By these proofs of a true philanthropy the British nation honours itself, and once more vindicates its ancient claim to stand foremost in the ranks of those who labour for the interests of humanity.

Let Englishmen rest assured of the warmth of feeling with which we in Germany have appreciated their generous coöperation.

AUGUSTA, Queen of Prussia.

Homburg, 7th November 1870.

To the Committee of the British National Society
for Aid to the Sick and Wounded.'

A GERMAN PARLIAMENT AT VERSAILLES. THE ADDRESS OF THE HANOVER PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, November 7, 1870.

I DO not know whether the astounding news, that the German Federal Parliament is to be summoned to meet

at Versailles, is to hold good also in the event of an armistice being concluded. Probably no final resolution has been as yet come to on this head. What a spectacle it would be, to have two Constituent Assemblies side by side on the soil of France! A German Assembly giving the last touch to unity by receiving the Southern States into the Northern Confederacy, and a French Assembly, convened for the melancholy task of buying off the enemy, and devising a new form of government after so many previous abortive experiments; the one marking the ascendancy, the other acknowledging the humiliation of its race. Of the many surprising events of the war, this certainly would be one of the most extraordinary, and, I am afraid, most likely to wound the sensibilities of our proud and excitable neighbours. In explanation of the strange design, it is advanced in what must be taken for semi-official utterances, that the ratification by Parliament of the new Constitution of Germany brooks no delay, and that as King and Chancellor cannot come to Parliament, Parliament must go to King and Chancellor.

I will not discuss the question, whether it would be attended with injury to the public interest, were the Federal Parliament to postpone till after the war sanctioning the result of the momentous negotiations now carried on at Versailles between the Northern and Southern Courts. But, granting there is danger in delay, would it be quite impossible to convene the members in Berlin, and have their votes telegraphed to Versailles? Could not the representatives of the Government in the capital be provided with instructions by King and Chancellor sufficient to insure a successful termination of the debates? However great the loss to the Government of having to forego in this case the personal presence of Count Bismarck, ought they not to have regard to the impressions likely to be produced upon the French, on seeing German unity, the bugbear of their race for generations, actually established

within gunshot of their capital? There certainly would be the hand of Nemesis visible in such a consummation. German unity, originally shaken by the feuds consequent upon the rise of Protestantism, was completely subverted by the interference of the foreigner, and by no one more effectually than Louis XIV., the local deity of Versailles. But, however satisfactory the sight of retributive justice from a moral or a poetical point of view, it is not always advisable to push matters to extremes, and offend the feelings of a foe whose power one feels obliged to cripple.

As we have known all along, the Emperor counted upon Hanover and Hesse rebelling against Prussia the moment the first shot was fired. His diplomatists were so little conversant with the state of this country as to mistake the grumblings of the anti-unity men in the new provinces for love of the foreigner and a treacherous forgetfulness of the common German interests. You are aware how completely these anticipations were disappointed, and how the Emperor, when he proceeded to put the division he had so long and assiduously fostered to the proof, found he had but multiplied the forces of Fatherland. Were it necessary to adduce fresh proof of this, it would be supplied in an interesting document which has just reached us from the former capital of King George. As though intent upon giving the world ulterior evidence that German unity is at last more than a phrase and a wish, the Prussian Government convened the provincial Parliament of Hanover for the dispatch of local business in the very midst of the war. In all Germany, therefore, the Hanover Parliament has been the first Representative Assembly to pronounce upon the results of the campaign. What use it has made of this opportunity may be seen from the following address to the King:

'Most gracious King and Sovereign,—The Parliament of the province of Hanover has been called upon to resume its ordinary business at a time when a new historical epoch begins. Only a few months have elapsed since

an enemy, bent upon the ruin of our race, has, on the most futile pretexts, involved Germany in a severe and sanguinary struggle. Your Majesty engaged in this war for the independence of Fatherland, conscious of having omitted nothing compatible with your honour and the nation's that could avert the dire visitation. Your Majesty faithfully trusted that the Almighty would assist the just cause, and that the united action of the German people would guarantee a victorious issue of the contest. Your Majesty's expectations have been fully realised. Northern and Southern Germany have joined in companionship of arms, and through their union God has permitted us, under your Majesty's supreme command, to achieve victories such as were scarcely ever chronicled in the annals of any nation. While the enemy's power has been all but annihilated, our land has, by the gallantry of our armies, been spared the hardships of a devastating war.

But it is not only the rich meed of military renown we have earned which makes us look back with just pride upon the events of the immediate past. Our gratitude for the results obtained is enhanced by the near prospect of an honourable and durable peace, which shall restore to Fatherland what it has lost in less happy times. We are likewise buoyed up by the confidence that, while reëstablishing peace, your Majesty's wisdom will succeed in creating a common Constitution for all Germany, which, under your Majesty's leadership and protectorate, will promote the welfare of all States of the great Fatherland, and establish the power, the liberty, and the intellectual and material progress of the nation on a firm basis. We hope and trust that your Majesty is destined to secure these inestimable advantages for our people. If our earnest desires are fulfilled, the name of your Majesty will live in the grateful memory of this and all coming generations as the restorer of German unity. By this glorious achievement will our sorrow for the deep wounds inflicted by the war be softened, and our losses be made to appear as sacrifices for which we owe eternal gratitude to the more immediate sufferers, and which were indispensable for the good of Fatherland.

These sentiments, universal in all Germany, are also those of the province of Hanover, whose sons have had their glorious share in our national victories. Like all Germany, Hanover exults at the guarantees secured for the power and safety of the land; and we do not doubt that this feeling will contribute to cement our reunion with the monarchy ruled by your Majesty. Your Majesty will be graciously pleased to accept this expression of the feelings animating the loyal Estates of the province of Hanover at a moment when such extraordinary events have occurred, and others equally great are likely to ensue. May God's protection be farther graciously extended to your Majesty and the victorious German army! We remain, with feelings of the deepest respect, your Majesty's most loyal and obedient Parliament of the province of Hanover.'

The Parliament which passed this address being, like

most provincial assemblies of the kind, elected by class votes, it is interesting to notice how the representatives of the various sections of society behaved on the occasion in question. Nearly all the nobility members voted against the address—not, as they explained, because of its praising the victory over the foreigner, but on account of the passage relative to the reunion of Hanover with Prussia. The large majority of the representatives of the citizens and peasantry, on the other hand, would not hear of expunging the obnoxious clause, and carried the address against the noble dissentients. Correctly to appreciate the feelings of the Hanover knights, their nays must be placed side by side with the fact that hundreds of their sons and relatives are serving in the German army, and belong to the regiments who so valorously plucked the sanguinary laurels of Mars-la-Tour. Deeming themselves bound in honour to remain true to the principles they first vindicated upon entering political life, these noblemen will not ratify reunion with Prussia by an express vote; but if their Hanoverian propensities point in the direction of King George, they are too good Germans to think of acting upon them when such action can be undertaken only with foreign help, and to the prejudice and ruin of the nation at large. It is to be foreseen that their sons, having never voted for King George, will not be prevented by scruples of conscience from paying homage to King William. Even now, when the Hanover nobility are represented by a generation who because of auld lang syne believe themselves obliged to hold back, they are outvoted by the other more numerous and influential classes of society, whose politics are less based on sentiment than on the recognition of the facts and wants of the day.

Belfort, to which the systematic attack of the Germans has now proceeded, is a first-class fortress, equally important for situation and strength. Erected in the valley separating the Vosges from the Jura, it commands

the only high road from Southern Alsace to France. Were it to remain in the hands of the French, they might turn the Vosges at any moment, and render the possession of Alsace of comparatively little value to the Germans; whereas the Vosges and Belfort together give a safe frontier from Lorraine to the borders of Switzerland. The fortress of Belfort consists of a citadel on a rock 200 feet high, and four detached forts, defending an intrenched camp capable of containing 20,000 men. Next to Strasburg and Metz, it is the most formidable place among the whole array of fortresses on the eastern outskirts of France, and if defended by a sufficiently numerous and competent force, could hold out a very long time indeed. What the strength of its garrison is at present remains to be ascertained. Fifteen miles farther south, in a more narrow part of the valley, is the fortified castle of Montbéliard, the Mümpelgard so renowned in old German history.

More eloquently than any elaborate description does the catastrophe that has befallen France appear from the following table, showing the condition of her regular infantry before the war and now:

The French Infantry before the War consisted of		Taken prisoners up to Oct. 29.	Consequently remain to France.
A. Guards:			
Infantry Regiments	8	8	—
Rifle Battalion	1	1	—
B. Line:			
Infantry Regiments	100	94	6*
Zouave Regiments	3	3	—
Rifle Battalions	20	20	—
Light Infantry Battalions	3	—	3†
Foreign Legion	1	—	1†
Turco Regiments	3	3	—

In addition to the few regulars left, the dépôt troops,

* Not taken because four were in Algiers and two at Rome. Those from Algiers are now with the Loire army, the two others are at Paris.

† Escaped because at Algiers.

reinforced by numerous recruits and *anciens militaires*, now form the nucleus of the French forces.

SEMI-OFFICIAL UTTERANCES ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH M. THIERS.

Berlin, November 7, 1870.

SUBJOINED is a telegram from Versailles on the late negotiations for an armistice:

'*Royal Head-quarters, Versailles, November 7.*

'In the five days' negotiations with M. Thiers the offer of an armistice was repeatedly made to him on the basis of the maintenance of the military *status quo*, the armistice to last any time up to twenty-eight days, for the purpose of holding the elections; the same also to be held in the occupied parts of France. He was however, after frequent consultation with the Paris Government, not empowered to accept either one or the other; and he demanded before all the provisioning of Paris, without being able to offer any military equivalent. This demand being considered unacceptable by the Germans from a military point of view, M. Thiers yesterday received notice from Paris to break off the negotiations.'

The Berlin semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* says:

'The French Government, and that portion of the people who voluntarily or involuntarily allow themselves to be guided by them, having refused to listen to reason, the cannon will be resorted to for giving them a lesson. We have done all in our power to spare the unfortunate capital of France this last catastrophe. Those who, having usurped the government of France, lack the courage to recognise facts and accept the consequences of the situation will be responsible for the blood of the thousands who will suffer from the impending disasters.'

The Vienna *Correspondenz*, a semi-official organ of the Austrian Government, says:

'The fact of the King of Prussia offering peace before the gates of the hard-pressed French capital is a guarantee that there will be nothing in his terms incompatible with the honour of the French. Of course the French must comprehend that, being vanquished, they cannot expect an immunity which they would not have accorded as victors.'

M. Thiers has written to the Pope, informing him that

he has advocated his cause at all the Courts visited on his late diplomatic journey. All the Courts were ready to consider his case at the coming Congress, and would grant him a position worthy of the Vicegerent of Christ.

It is very unlikely that a guarantee of the neutral Powers will be accepted instead of Alsace and Lorraine. Prussia's relations to certain other Powers are not sufficiently intimate to render a guarantee acceptable.

The demands recently raised by Bavaria in the negotiations at Versailles, may result in her being left to choose between going in or remaining outside the Confederation. Bavaria insists upon participating in the direction of military and foreign affairs.

Liberal papers dissuade the Government from summoning the Federal Parliament to meet at Versailles, as the members would scarcely consent to go thither. The official *Provinzial Correspondenz* states that the North German Parliament will, in all probability, be opened about the 20th inst., to adopt resolutions for obtaining the farther means necessary to carry on the war, and of deliberating on the subject of the entry of the Southern States into the North German Confederation. The entry of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Würtemberg may be looked forward to with certainty, but farther negotiations will have to be held to settle the future relations with Bavaria.

In reference to the attack on Paris, the *Correspondenz* says that the order will certainly be issued at the moment which shall appear most opportune, after duly weighing all the circumstances, and especially the internal development of affairs in Paris.

In reply to a recent statement in a London journal, a semi-official *communiqué* denies that Count Bismarck sent a messenger to the Empress Eugenie on the 15th of September, and that he asked her for a cession of territory.

ARMISTICE REFUSED.

Berlin, November 8, 1870.

'*Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*' Though the negotiations for an armistice have been broken off, the very fact of their having been seriously entertained indicates a disposition to treat, which it may be hoped will revive before long with renewed vigour. If M. Thiers and the gentlemen in whose behalf he acted have so far modified their former intentions as to seek for a settlement which shall exempt their capital from destruction, we may expect that if once ruin is really at the door, they will not be too unyielding as to the conditions which are to secure their principal object. More than this, we may look forward to the same sensible conduct from the inhabitants of Paris itself. After the issue of the last *plébiscite*, when a vast majority of votes were virtually returned in favour of negotiations, we cannot but entertain the pleasing hope that a calm and more rational view of the case is beginning to prevail among *bourgeois* as well as *ouvriers*. Indeed, we shall not be far wrong in regarding the *plébiscite* as a proof that, notwithstanding that the papers and the decrees of some members of the Government still speak the language of an overstrained heroism, those who have no political position to make or to lose have quietly changed their minds, and are in favour of a practical and, under the circumstances, profitable compromise. Their opinions have not, it is true, been sobered to the extent of making them insist upon a settlement, or engage in overt action for that purpose; the fiction of invincibility is still sufficiently kept up to forbid an open and undisguised announcement of sounder politics; but the real sentiment of the people is already oozing out of the ballot-box and the folded papers concealing the momentous Yes or No.

Such being the case, our statesmen seem to be confident that no very prolonged attack will be required to make Paris recognise, as it is termed, existing realities, and bend to the inevitable. As to the present aspect of things, it was to be foreseen that the King of Prussia would not consent to feed Paris for a month, unless some military equivalent were forthcoming. He would have conceded victuals on the extradition of a fort or two; or he would, as he likewise proposed, have accorded an armistice pure and simple, renouncing his claim to a military advantage, and insisting on the French, in return, giving up the idea of having their stores refilled; but to supply them with bread and meat merely to secure the convention of a representative Assembly, which by this very replenishment of the Parisian larders would have been encouraged to reject the German terms of peace, was more than any of his military or political advisers could take upon themselves to recommend.

The next thing now to expect is a telegram announcing that active operations have commenced at last. I believe I am right in saying that the bombardment would have been proceeded with as far as ten or twelve days back, had not the King wished to exhaust all available means of a peaceable arrangement prior to resorting to the dread application of the 11-inch guns. But English mediation being proffered in the very nick of time, just as the preparations had advanced to a state where fire might have been opened, the King eagerly seized upon this new opportunity for compounding matters in an amicable way. The humane monarch had so often before expressed an aversion to the bombardment, that even while doubting the success of the negotiations, his advisers had to do all in their power to secure a settlement which might have enabled them to dispense with extreme measures. Now that everything has been tried, and tried in vain, the matter has once more been referred to the military. All

we have at the present juncture to hope is, that it will be taken out of their hands as speedily as possible.

Intelligence from inside of Paris certifies that provisions will be exhausted soon after the new year. Under these circumstances, the advantage to the Parisians of having their defence prolonged for a month by a fresh supply of comestibles would have been very great. And so would the disadvantage to the Germans have been. Assuming our advices to be correct, the late negotiations in reality turned on the question whether the siege was to terminate in the middle of January or in the middle of February; in other words, whether numbers of lives were to be sacrificed to the inclemency of the coming season, or to be preserved by a timely setting to work. Were it spring, and had we the summer before us, matters would be different; but on the 8th of November time is precious to those employed in the open, and delay the worst of enemies.

Au reste, the Paris papers still teem with announcements of fictitious victories. To believe them, the Germans are routed in every encounter by the Francs-tireurs, and have already lost so many men in dead, wounded, and prisoners, that the wonder is they have sufficient left to make good their stand in the country. As though military defeats were not enough, they are likewise visited by political disasters. A rebellion has broken out at Munich. Disconsolate wives of Landwehr men have stormed the Government offices at Berlin. The South German Ministers have been sent to Versailles—not, as is commonly assumed, to settle the terms of their admission to the Confederacy, but to remonstrate with the Prussians for giving the Southern troops all the toughest jobs in the war, and reserving to themselves those occasions where glory is to be reaped without danger. Even the communications from the Paris Government, although much soberer than those of the poetical Gambetta, are not yet entirely free

from casual flights of imagination, descriptive of dream-land rather than the France of 1870. However, this is comparatively of little consequence now. When conversing with each other, *le bon ton* of the besieged city may still require people to profess belief in the glowing reports of events which have never occurred; but, as we have seen, the cancer of scepticism has begun to gnaw at the foundations of their faith, and, if called upon to give a secret vote, they rationally and fortunately prefer a common-sense view of the *status quo.*

The construction of fresh batteries by the Germans has in the last fortnight been somewhat impeded by the number of projectiles thrown from the forts. Rarely as they damage the working parties, concealed in many ingenious ways, they yet compel caution and retard progress. The sums already spent by the French in keeping up this cannonade must be enormous. Each discharge from the big guns, such as abound in the forts, costs no less than 14*l.* As in the rough work of war the value of life may, perhaps, without impropriety be estimated by a pecuniary standard, one must say that the French hardly get their money's worth out of their cannonades. The last three days' bombardment of St. Cloud—which, ominously enough, rattled on during the negotiations for peace—yielded no more than one man killed and five wounded. The same minimum has been reaped by all their other efforts in the like direction. Things will change, of course, when the besieging batteries are unmasked, and the whereabouts of the gunners can be distinctly traced from the forts.

The Government papers make a jest of the bellicose decrees so prudently issued by Gambetta while Thiers was closeted with Bismarck at Versailles. The *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* begs to inquire whether each arrondissement, as it is obliged to supply a battery, will be also compelled to furnish a general fit to command it. Other

papers cannot refrain from pointing out that the present is the tenth law within ten weeks by which all capable of bearing arms have been commanded to join the ranks. It is quite clear that if none of the preceding decrees have been obeyed, the present is as unlikely to attract notice.

THE BOMBARDMENT POSTPONED.

Berlin, November 13, 1870.

THE fresh delay which has supervened in the commencement of the attack upon Paris betokens a plan. However much time may have been consumed originally in bringing up guns and grenades, it is certain that the artillery for an effective bombardment of the southern and south-western fronts was on the spot a fortnight ago, and only required to be placed in the batteries prepared beforehand. However painful a duty his Prussian Majesty may have felt it to be to give the dire word of command which is to hurl death and destruction upon the finest city in the universe, it would be entirely mistaking the character of the King to suppose him to have led his soldiers through a sea of blood to the appointed goal, and then from personal scruples have stayed their arm. Humane as he may be, a Prussian King, as Sovereign and Commander-in-chief traditionally standing in very near relation to every one of his subjects, is neither likely nor indeed in a position to prolong the hardships of his army in order to spare the enemy. We must therefore look for a military reason to explain the seeming inactivity of the besiegers. What can it be? The guns, as we have seen, being ready for the most important section of the attack, delay cannot be owing to the oft-alleged but at last suc-

cessfully overcome difficulty of material for cannonading. It must be and indeed is something else.

It appears, the lesson of Sebastopol has not been thrown away upon Paris, and General Trochu is an intelligent disciple of the renowned Todleben. The southern forts have been connected by a continuous line of earthworks, extending from Issy as far as the Seine, and affording shelter for a good many additional guns of a calibre which could not fail to make an impression on the German redoubts. To enhance the efficiency of these works, they are fronted by rifle-pits and trenches running in the direction of the besiegers, and approaching them within rather uncanny vicinity. These arrangements, most plentiful in the neighbourhood of Villejuif, where the heights of Clamart menacingly frown upon the besieged, are not wanting in any other part of the southern side, and have been imitated also in some places of the eastern and northern fronts. To conquer such works is an undertaking of unprecedented magnitude in the annals of the artilleristic science. Were it indispensable for the victorious termination of the campaign, it would nevertheless have been taken in hand the moment the preparations were complete; but as an easier method of attaining the object in view has been discovered by the Germans, it is probable they will stick to this, and possess themselves of Paris with less labour and bloodshed than would be entailed by the regular process.

Not very long ago the different opinions advocated in the council of war were superseded by the resolve to let hunger begin the work of reduction, and reserve the artillery for completing it. Only when the town has begun to feel the want of provisions will the German batteries be manned, and adding fiery persuasives to those supplied by personal needs, succeed, it is anticipated, in a comparatively short time to work a result. Surrender being expected from the impression to be pro-

duced on the inhabitants at large, the bombardment, when it does begin, is likely to include the town as well as the defences. With so excitable a population as Paris, premature bombardment might have engendered a troublesome heroism even in the face of the manifest impossibility of a successful resistance; when properly timed, it is expected to produce the opposite consequence. Naturally the hopes based upon this mode of procedure have been strengthened by the issue of the last metropolitan *plébiscite*, which so signally supported the Government when it was known to have entered upon negotiations for an armistice. That we shall not have to wait very long for the stern psychologists of the German camp to open operations, may be gathered from the Paris *Rappel*, in whose issue of the 5th inst. there occurs the following passage:

'To-day was a feast-day in the capital. The horse- and dogs'-meat, which is our usual fare, has for a day at least been superseded by more civilised viands. The calves of the Jardin d'Acclimatisation have been slaughtered and placed at the disposal of the butchers. The fish in the ponds of the Bois de Boulogne are also being caught, by order of the Government, and offered for sale in the Halles.'

That to defer the attack will not impair its energy, is proved by the order just sent to Königsberg to mobilise seven more companies of artillerymen, and dispatch them at once to Paris.

With these tactics adopted by the council of war, it is plain that the moment M. Thiers declared his demand of fresh provisions to be the *sine quâ non* of an armistice, the negotiations were virtually at an end. As to M. Favre's circular on the abortive transaction, it has elicited only contemptuous remarks in our press. The papers treat the pathetic appeal of the French Minister as the work of a special pleader, made up of perversion and overstrained eloquence.

'Vanity,' the journals say, 'coupled with the absence of all moral feel-

ing, made the French go to war with us; vanity prompts them to revel in their own misfortunes now that they have failed to revel in victory. But we shall smash the looking-glass in which they have admired themselves so long. We shall force them to look for worthier ideals than glory. As to their hypocritical protestations, they are perfectly indifferent to us. Nor do we envy those who pretend to be impressed by them when they proceed from men who have been among the worst instigators of the war. Even if we could assume that M. Favre had changed his morals, and from a would-be avenger of Sadowa had become a respectable man, who can trust a Frenchman making a promise on a political subject? These men have no political convictions, and all have advocated the day after what they condemned the day before. Their constant domestic quarrels, and the infamous *hauteur* with which they profess to look down upon neighbours, make them all but irresponsible. If they longed to avenge Austria by a murderous assault upon our homes, how much more will they yearn to avenge their present defeat! Let us meet them with the one firm resolve to disable them as much as we can from doing any more mischief.'

Such are the remarks elicited by the last diplomatic appeal of the Paris authorities. It is obvious M. Favre has to pay the penalty of the derelictions of many of his predecessors. Not to speak of more ancient grievances, the last four years of incessant intrigue against German unity, indulged in by the Emperor Napoleon and applauded by all French political parties alike, have in the eyes of the Germans deprived French promises of the value that might otherwise have attached to them. A French statesman and an inveterate enemy of Germany are supposed to be identical terms, and material guarantees are the cry of the day. Nor are the official papers inclined to take a more lenient view of the case than the independent press. The *Provincial Correspondence*, in an article upon the failure of the negotiations for an armistice, says:

'The prosecution of the war, regardless of consequences, is the only means of compelling France to a correct view of the position of affairs, and to a sense of her need for peace. Since the fall of Metz, everything has been done to bring that unfortunate country to an acknowledgment of the fact that its Government of National Defence is but a Government of national disorder, and that rehabilitation can only be brought about by a complete recognition of the absolute defeat it has suffered.'

The Russian suggestions relative to the revision of the Treaty of 1856 chiefly refer to the right of having men-of-war in the Black Sea. It is thought here that the matter will not give rise to any immediate complications.

A Prussian company having escorted some French prisoners to Munich, was entertained at the royal palace and by the municipality. At the municipal dinner Professor Sepp, formerly an Ultramontane, amid universal applause, proposed the toast, 'The Prussian Emperor of Germany.'

All the Liberal Bavarian papers demand that their Government should enter at once into the Northern Confederacy, and content itself with the position accepted by the other minor States.

The French Government has issued a Note thanking the Powers for their mediatory efforts, and declaring that to accept the Prussian proposals would have been to hand over France to the tender mercies of the enemy.

The French Government is treating the crews of captured German merchantmen as prisoners of war. Count Bismarck has demanded the extradition of the captains, forty in number. France refusing this demand, unless an equal number of French military officers was given up, Count Bismarck ordered forty French Notables to be arrested and sent to a German fortress.

The German Americans have contributed half a million of dollars for the sick and wounded of the old country.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Berlin, November 15, 1870.

RUSSIA'S desire for a revision of the Paris Treaty of 1856 has taken no one by surprise. Ever since the beginning of the war it was hinted at by her diplomatists, and

gradually her whispers became sufficiently audible to be reëchoed in my letters six weeks ago. It is not thought here that the matter will give rise to any immediate complication. What Russia is anxious to secure is not the repeal of the entire treaty, but only the cancelling of the clause which prevents her having more than six small men-of-war in the Euxine. This is a clause which it required the combined action of six Powers to force upon the Czar, and which it will be difficult to maintain when Europe is no longer agreed on the subject. At this moment Prussia and France, being otherwise engaged, are powerless to interfere in the East. Prussia, moreover, is indebted to Russia for keeping Austria in check at the beginning of the present campaign, when the latter was making ready for a possible descent upon the Silesian plains. It will be remembered that two Prussian *corps d'armée* were kept on the banks of the Oder till after the battle of Wörth: they only left for France when the Czar made up his mind to befriend this Government, and plainly cautioned the Vienna Cabinet against taking Prussia in the rear. With this obligation so recently conferred upon her, Prussia, even if she could, would not be likely to stay Russia's arm.

As regards Austria, it is obvious that by preparing to avenge her old susceptibilities upon Prussia four months ago she has not facilitated her task of vindicating her interests against Russia now. Had she not in July committed the indiscretion of giving Russia an opportunity of obliging Prussia, she might to-day be able to utilise the latter against the former. But there is the fact that the combined military and aristocratic parties at Vienna have armed for the impossible task of recovering their ancient position in Germany, and by this pursuit of a phantom paved the way for substantial changes in the East. It is quite true that Austria is strong enough of herself to intercede in behalf of Turkey. She has a numerous and

well-equipped army, a strong array of fortresses, and, in the event of a conflict on the Lower Danube, might perhaps not be wanting in funds; but as nearly every second man in her army is a Slavonian, there would, at the present height of the nationality movement, be no small courage needed for her to face the Russian hosts. It was probably owing to considerations like these that Count Beust, in 1867, of his own accord intimated to Russia a willingness to move for the revision of the treaty now under discussion, provided Russia would assist his then policy in Germany. If he acted thus when he thought he had France at his back, the world is perhaps not far wrong in looking forward to as conciliatory a conduct on his part at the present extraordinary juncture. For the time being, his journals have assumed a menacing attitude.

Of England, our politicians profess to believe that, her interest in the preservation of the Oriental *status quo* being much less pronounced than it was, she will not oppose a modification in the existing arrangements, provided it is properly solicited and requited by the Power benefited. The decision, then, mainly rests with Turkey. It took her nearly two years to put down the Cretans—will she court the creation of half-a-dozen Cretes nearer home? It is not likely. For these reasons both the political and commercial world of Germany are pretty well convinced that the untoward incident that has arisen will pass over without farther complicating Continental affairs. The German exchanges, disquieted for a day or two, have quickly recovered their balance, and already look upon the matter as a dark spot erased.

The demand of the Bavarian Government for a semi-independent position in the German Confederacy is nowhere opposed more vigorously than in the Bavarian press. While the Prussian papers refrain from exercising undue pressure upon a Court which, under any circumstances, will remain a trusty and valuable ally, the Ba-

varian journals are positively exasperated at the idea of their kingdom remaining outside the Confederacy when all the rest of Germany will be in it. Since Prussia has placed the alternative before their Government of either conforming to the indispensable demands of unity, or confining relations to the present military and tariff league, the language of all the Liberal organs of the Munich, Augsburg, and Nuremberg press has assumed a tone which will probably not be disregarded in the Government buildings on the Isar. The *Neuste Nachrichten*, for instance, by far the most popular organ of Munich, expresses itself as follows:

'We cannot bring ourselves to believe that a Bavarian Minister will have the audacity to undo with his pen what the sword of our brave soldiers has won—unity. We cannot suppose that any advisers of the Bavarian crown would have the unenviable boldness to cheat the Bavarian part of the German nation of the prize it has so richly deserved by pouring out its blood in this terrible war. Nor will we assume that any councillor of his Bavarian Majesty could be so silly as to insist upon a nominal independence, when in reality he would be only isolating this kingdom, and rendering it a fitting object to be portioned out among the belligerents in the next war. In a few days the modern Babylon will succumb to the German arms; Prussians and Bavarians will storm Paris shoulder to shoulder; they will dictate the terms of peace to our hereditary enemy, and return to Germany arm-in-arm. Is their friendship to be dissolved on reaching the German frontier? Are they again to become alienated, when there is no one in our midst, save the Ultramontanes, the slaves of fallen Rome, who would applaud their mutual estrangement? No, we have not shed our blood side by side with the Prussians to allow ourselves to be again separated from them and the rest of Germany.'

These feelings are shared by the bulk of the Munich population. Two days ago, when a Prussian company arrived with prisoners at Munich, they became the object of enthusiastic ovations. They were fêted, addressed at public banquets by leading politicians, and promised companionship in arms now and evermore. The Munich town-council has actually passed a resolution that they will grant no money to celebrate the entry of the Bavarian

troops on their return from France unless Bavaria has previously joined the North German Confederacy, and ceded to Prussia the direction of her military and foreign affairs.

PRUSSIA AND THE TREATY OF 1856.

Berlin, November 17, 1870.

Now that the exact wording of the Russian Note has been published, the vast majority of our papers agree in considering it an objectionable document. Not that they are astonished at Russia's moving for the repeal of a compact which the Powers have all along tacitly permitted her to ignore, and which some of them have actually offered to use their influence in formally abolishing. It is well known that, notwithstanding the distinct prohibition contained in the treaty of 1856, Russia has been suffered to build the fortress of Kertch on the Sea of Azoff, and make it a more formidable place than Sebastopol ever was. It is equally notorious that the vessels of the Black Sea Navigation Company have been so constructed as to admit of being converted into men-of-war at the shortest possible notice. Again, it cannot be denied that at one time Count Beust offered to purchase Russia's assistance against Germany by contributing to do away with the objectionable treaty and that he saw so little to conceal in this act that he caused his Notes on the subject, dated January 1, January 22, and February 3, 1867, to be publicly printed. Nor is it less certain that General Fleury, on behalf of the Emperor Napoleon, approached the Russian Court with the like overtures in 1869 and 1870, sufficient proof of which is to be found in the papers and political transactions of those days, as also in the correspondence recently discovered in the Tuileries, and published by the Republican Government. Yet although Russia may have

derived encouragement from this, it does not, in the opinion of our journals, entitle her to declare the whole treaty null and void. In the interest of peace the Powers may have chosen to wink at proceedings injustifiable in themselves; some Powers to gain Russia's assistance in other matters may have offered to interest themselves in the repeal of the treaty; but others have conscientiously abided by the much-discussed compact, and never intimated an intention to revise it. Russia, indeed, asserts that by allowing foreign men-of-war to pass through the Straits, and by permitting the reunion of the Danubian Principalities, all the Powers have offended against their express engagements, and been guilty of a breach of good faith, which frees her from performing her own obligations under the compact. This question is a delicate one, and can be decided only after a careful study of the transactions with which it is said to be at variance. What, however, is undoubtedly true is, that Russia would have only been paying the usual and necessary regard to the forms of diplomatic intercourse, had she first proved to the Powers why she thinks the treaty invalidated, and then receded from it, instead of reversing this order. That she should acknowledge this, is the least that can be demanded of her.

In the above I have given you the verdict of public opinion in Germany on the untoward event of the week. Little desirous as people are of breaking with Russia at a moment when they have their hands full in France, they are yet pretty unanimous in wishing the St. Petersburg Cabinet to make amends for its provoking conduct, and acknowledge that a contract can be cancelled only with the common consent of all parties. From declarations made here, it is hoped that Russia will herself perceive the expediency of obtaining the sanction of the Powers to her one-sided proceedings, and that if any propositions are made her with a view to this end, she will meet

them in a conciliatory spirit. That harsh measures will be resolved upon at Vienna or Constantinople our statesmen decline to believe. The Vienna telegrams certainly indicate a tendency to be up and doing, and to answer in the strain in which they have been addressed; but the interests at issue are so enormous, and the state of Austria's preparations is so very questionable, that it is confidently expected a compromise will ensue, and the matter be smoothed over by mutual concessions.

I proceed to quote some Russian and Austrian organs discussing the question of the day. The *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the mouthpiece of Prince Gortschakoff, says:

'Had it been possible for a Congress to assemble, the St. Petersburg Government would not have omitted to lay before it this question which is of such vital importance to Russia; but for Russia to wait until an agreement of the European Powers was obtainable, would have been tantamount to the perpetuation of an impossible state of things. The Russian Note does not imply the abrogation of the whole treaty. The dangers threatening Turkey are of an internal character. So long as the relations between the Porte and Russia do not rest upon a friendly footing, the perfect tranquillising of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey cannot be hoped for. Russia would value the loyal support of Austria in this vital question. Austria knows that her political difficulties commenced on the day when, by a perfidious Eastern policy, she lost the friendship of Russia. Both Empires would gain by a proper appreciation of their mutual interests.'

The St. Petersburg *Golos*, likewise a semi-official journal, denies that Russia promised Prussia to remain a neutral spectator of the French war, if Prussia connived at Russia's setting aside the Treaty of 1856.

'It might have been dangerous,' the *Golos* adds, 'to give such a promise to a neighbour whose power is growing so very fast. At any rate, it would have been paying a very high price for a small favour, considering that all Russia wishes to effect is the modification of a treaty, the general principles of which she still recognises.'

The Vienna *Correspondence Warren*, Count Beust's organ, says—

'That the declaration of Russia, by which on her own authority she revives certain important stipulations of the Treaty of 1856, is of a nature

which involves a principle of a most extraordinary character. The desire of the Russian Government that the articles relating to the Black Sea should be revised, would, if submitted to the negotiations of the other co-signatary Powers of the Treaty of Paris, have brought about a satisfactory result; but the course of Russia, in acting solely upon her own responsibility, is a violation of the rights stipulated in the Treaty, and fundamentally weakens the legal status of affairs upon which peace in the East is based. Prince Gortschakoff's Note has created a most threatening position, and it will induce all the signatary Powers of the Treaty of Paris to uphold with firmness and energy the public right thus menaced. The matter involves questions most important to our Empire. The signatories of the Treaty of 1856 have every reason to agree to a common course of action in order to resist the designs of Russia.'

A curious commentary on this announcement is contained by Herr Simonyi, the leader of the Left party in the Hungarian Diet, asking the representatives of the Government if they were acquainted with the statement of Lord Granville, that no Power was ready to support the intervention of England in the interests of peace.

The Vienna *Presse* states that the answer of Austria to the Note of Prince Gortschakoff will very soon be sent. The reply will be in perfect agreement with that sent by England, although not bearing an entirely identical character with the despatch of Earl Granville.

The apprehensions expressed in the address of the Luxemburg Government to the Prince Governor of the Grand Duchy originate in the endeavours of a neutral Power to make Germany accept Luxemburg instead of Metz.

Dr. Jacoby, of Königsberg, many years a member for Berlin in the Prussian Parliament, has not been reëlected this time, though the advanced Liberals ruled the metropolitan elections as formerly. They have abandoned him because he had expressed himself against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine.

RUSSIA, PRUSSIA, AND THE TREATY OF 1856.

Berlin, November 18, 1870.

RUSSIA does not object to attend a Conference for the revision of the Treaty of 1856. Prussia would probably consent to be represented at such a meeting, provided she could be brought to believe that topics connected with the war will be excluded from the debates, or, at any rate, touched upon in a way not prejudicial to her interests. In reply to the inquiries of Mr. Odo Russell, Prussia is expected to advocate an amicable arrangement of the Black Sea question. Official circles here continue to indulge the hope that the movement of Russia will entail no serious complication at the present moment.

Russia is endeavouring to prove to the great Powers that there is no foundation for the rumour that she has bought or intends to buy American men-of-war for a Black Sea squadron. Her language is very pacific, but her military preparations continue. The Czar has just resolved to reduce the time of active military service from ten to six years, and levy in future six instead of four recruits in every 1,000 souls.

While the greater part of the Russian papers have been cautioned by their Government against speaking out prematurely upon the cancelling of the Treaty of 1856, the semi-official *Golos* is permitted to address the nation and the world at large upon this delicate subject. After a jubilant flourish on the energy evinced by Count Gortschakoff in avenging the humiliation consequent upon the Crimean war, this paper continues as follows:

'While Russia strictly adhered to the duties imposed upon her in the Treaty of Paris, that treaty was constantly violated by the other Powers. Under various pretexts, foreign men-of-war were permitted to enter the Black Sea; and although the Oriental question had been seemingly buried for good, the Porte never published a decree to the prejudice of her Christian subjects without English and French ships appearing, often whole

squadrons at a time, in the Archipelago, whence they could have easily penetrated to the Black Sea. Again, this treaty was signally broken in regard to the Danubian Principalities, the garrisoning of the Servian fortresses, the free exercise of religion accorded to the rayah, and many other points which were either not observed, or only nominally so, and with a bad grace.

It must be also taken into consideration, that events which have occurred since the Crimean war have changed the import of the treaty, and made it more disadvantageous to us than was ever intended. Thus, for instance, the construction of iron-cased ships has greatly added to the dangers menacing our defenceless shores on the Black Sea. Italy, who has been always endeavouring to exercise naval influence in the Mediterranean, from a small and struggling State has become a respectable Power, and thereby sensibly modified international relations in that part of the world. Last, not least, the Suez Canal has wrought a revolution in the relative position of East and West, which could not have been foreseen some time ago. These and many other changes which have occurred in the last fifteen years have long rendered it obvious to the statesmen of all European countries that some new agreement must be arrived at respecting the affairs of the East. This conviction has been so general, that several Cabinets have actually proposed to Russia to revise the treaty in question, in return for counter services we were expected to render; but not wishing to fetter its action, our Cabinet prudently declined these overtures, and reserved to itself the possibility of taking the initiative at a more opportune moment. The time has at last arrived. Russia renounces a treaty violated by everybody else. But in taking this indispensable step, she restricts her action to the most moderate demands, and is therefore entitled to hope that, duly recognising the reasonableness of her conduct, the Powers will cease to ascribe to her warlike designs in the East.

It is to be foreseen that the enemies of Russia will denounce the circular Note of this Cabinet as the result of a secret understanding between St. Petersburg and Berlin. Russia, it will be asserted, having promised Prussia to remain neutral in continental affairs, has received a corresponding promise on the part of Prussia with regard to the East. But all these are idle words. The war which is now raging in the western part of Europe threatens to lead to so radical a change in the distribution of power, that only for a most substantial reward could we have promised our neighbour to abstain from interfering with him, whatever he might do. As, however, we did not want any such reward, there was no occasion to give the promise. It appears from the Note of our Chancellor that we continue to recognise the most important clauses of the Paris treaty. We only reject some clauses which, advantageous to no one, have yet offended the dignity and infringed upon the sovereign rights of this powerful Empire. All we require is, to regain the privilege of unrestricted action within our own frontiers. To regard this as equivalent to the recovery of our former posi-

tion in the Black Sea is to betray gross ignorance. If armies cannot be created in a moment, it requires a still longer time to construct a fleet. The catastrophe of Sebastopol destroyed our Black Sea squadron. Its magnificent vessels are at the bottom of the bay where they so long anchored. Its sturdy sailors have either fallen in the defence of their country, or lead an inactive life in the inland provinces, recalling the glories of the past. Its admirals are dead, and Sebastopol itself is only the grave of her former greatness. If we wish once more to have a fleet in those waters, we must begin from the beginning, and, in the present state of our finances, can progress but slowly. Even if we build the ships, whence are we to get an adequate number of sailors equal to those whose renown resounded throughout the world? Whence are we to get boatswains and artillerymen like those who silenced the Turkish guns at Sinope? They have all disappeared, and only in after-generations can we hope to see their like again.

At the present moment Russia is entirely incapacitated from resuming her former position in the Black Sea. In these days of cuirassed batteries and rams, a strong and numerous fleet is required to ward off hostile attacks. But such a fleet we are unable to have on our southern shores, though the clause prohibiting it is cancelled. For offensive purposes, then, we shall remain as weak as we were; and if we strengthen our defences, this, we trust, will not be regarded as a menace.

For these reasons, the announcement of the imperial will respecting the non-validity of some passages in the Paris treaty has been received with intense satisfaction by the Russians. We are not afraid that any complications will ensue. If we wish to erase the memory of the humiliation to which we have been subjected ever since 1856, this cannot awake serious apprehensions even in those Cabinets suspiciously watching our proceedings in the East. We repeat, moreover, that the moderation of our demands is the surest guarantee that, whatever advantages may arise to us from the modification of the Paris treaty, they have not been purchased by agreements impairing our freedom of action in other and more immediately urgent questions of international import.

It is just possible that the announcement of the imperial will is not sympathetically received by the other Cabinets. Yet no complication is likely to occur in the East. In reasserting her rights, Russia trespasses upon no one's interests. She has neither dictated nor violated those stipulations; she only refuses to recognise what others have set aside before her. The forbearance she displays gives her a right to count upon the indulgence of the European Cabinets. Should however, contrary to all expectations, an appeal to arms be made, the Russian people will maintain their old reputation for firmness and gallantry. In re-claiming our natural prerogative of doing what we please within our own frontiers, we have only performed a sacred duty towards ourselves. We can therefore look forward with confidence to all that the future may have in store for us.'

Most of the above is a paraphrase of the arguments preferred by Prince Gortschakoff. But there is one new topic touched upon, and that a most interesting one. Are the relations between Russia and Prussia really so distant as the semi-official writer wishes us to believe? Has the Russian Government, in rescinding an international engagement, really availed itself only of a favourable turn in Continental affairs, or does it act in concert with and on the basis of a distinct agreement with Prussia? Our politicians pretty much agree in believing the Russian Cabinet to stand alone. Let me give you briefly our impressions upon the matter.

The connection between Russia and Prussia has not been sufficiently intimate the last few years to render an alliance probable. Russia looked on the sudden aggrandisement of her neighbour with very mixed feelings indeed. Such were her misgivings, that, up to the catastrophe of Sedan, she continued to listen to the representations of General Fleury, the confidant of Napoleon III., who had been expressly sent to St. Petersburg to advocate a Russo-French understanding at the expense of Germany. It is true, as the *Golos* hints, Russia never approved these propositions, steadily as they have been urged upon her the last two years; but she was far from declining them abruptly, or regarding the whole train of thought so often explained by the Napoleonic Ambassador as a design upon the safety of a sure and permanent ally. The fact is, there are two currents distinctly noticeable at the Russian Court. Many of the leading statesmen are inclined to reëcho the voice of public opinion in the Empire, of late years very unfavourable to Germany; while others of equal influence deem it venturesome to break with a strong and reliable neighbour for the sake of securing support in quarters equally powerful perhaps, but less constant in their politics, and less certain of the means at their disposal. Numerically small as the latter class of

Russian politicians may be, it gains considerable strength from the known disposition of the Czar. His Russian Majesty is bound to his royal uncle of Prussia by ties of sincere affection, and though his political interests undoubtedly prevent his coöperating in the aggrandisement of this monarchy, is yet very unlikely ever to resort to extreme measures to prevent it. Such being the balance of power at the Russian Court, the consequence was, that, while neither party succeeded in getting entirely its own way, each remained sufficiently strong to influence to some extent the conduct of affairs. Thanks to the anti-Germans, General Fleury remained one of the most honoured members of the *corps diplomatique* up to the very moment of his departure; thanks to their opponents, the hope of effecting an agreement in the future was the only harvest the French diplomatist reaped from his assiduous labours. Thus, when Napoleon, tired of waiting for Russia's approval, and confident of defeating Germany single-handed, suddenly made up his mind and went to war with this kingdom, Prussia was assured that Russia would not improve the occasion against her, but had no right to count upon much more. Those Russian diplomatists who look with jealousy upon the rapid growth of their western neighbour would have probably prevented the conclusion of a positive alliance, had Prussia asked for one. That no regular arrangements were entered into is proved by an incident that occurred during the war itself. When sending her hosts to the Rhine, Prussia at first left two *corps d'armée* on the Oder to watch Austria. Only after the battle of Wörth were these withdrawn and sent after their brethren westward. They were no longer wanted in the eastern provinces. The Czar had expressed himself in such quieting terms as to the possibility of Prussia's being attacked in the rear, that there was no other protection needed. Now, had a treaty subsisted between Russia and Prussia, the

Czar ought to have spoken at an earlier date, when his declaration would have been much more valuable, as it would have enabled Prussia to open the campaign with 80,000 additional troops. To this proof that Russia and Prussia are acting each on their own responsibility may be added another dating only a few days back. Were the two bound by an alliance, Prussia must have stipulated for Russia postponing her present proceedings until France was entirely subdued and the war over. Russia coming forward thus early may bring other Powers into play and create a completely new situation, in which Prussia is no longer left alone with the enemy she might have otherwise hoped to finish in a short time. But what damages Prussia in this instance benefits Russia. In not tarrying till the end of the war, Russia evidently wished to create a *fait accompli* while two Powers were engaged, and the others might be supposed to dislike the idea of unsheathing the sword and producing a general *mêlée*. It is obvious Russia trusted less to the inclination of Prussia to come to her aid after the conclusion of the French campaign, than to the aversion of the Powers to create a general conflagration, and perhaps to the allies which the emergencies of a universal hubbub might give her.

But if Prussia is not bound to support Russia, it is, on the other hand, very improbable that she will like to go against her. William is as true a friend to Alexander as Alexander is to William; and there is the broad fact that Russia did free Prussia from any apprehensions she might have entertained as to the possibility of having to fight in two directions at once. Nor ought one other point to be left unconsidered. It is only a fortnight since Austria promised her protection to Bavaria, if the latter refrained from entering the German Confederacy. Bavaria turned restive after this, and, if her own people had not coerced her Government, might have caused the completion of unity to be deferred indefinitely. If she is

now on the eve of giving in, this is not Austria's merit. But Austria would be Russia's enemy in a war about the East; and were Prussia to oppose Russia, she would have to befriend the very Austria who has just played her such a trick. However, people here remain as sceptical as ever concerning fresh entanglements. It is known that Russia would willingly go to a Congress, if a Congress could be convened and effectually carried through to-day; this being unlikely, the thing will probably have to stand over till after the war.

RUSSIAN FACTS.

Berlin, November 22, 1870.

A CONGRATULATORY address has been presented to the Emperor of Russia by the Lithuanian regiment of the Guards on the occasion of the celebration of its anniversary. His Majesty replied: 'I hope there will not be war. Should, however, Providence will it, I am confident that the Lithuanian regiment will give fresh proofs of its devotion.'

General Timascheff, the Russian Minister of the Interior, has cautioned the St. Petersburg press against supporting France and attacking Germany, it being against the interest of Russia to irritate the latter country at the present juncture.

The Russian Post Office has quadrupled the postage for Russian journals sent to Turkey and Greece. These journals having for years kept up an anti-Turkish agitation among the Slavonian subjects of the Sultan, the Post Office action is regarded as indicating an intention to prevent an outbreak at this critical moment. The Russians seem to be convinced, that after this measure there can

be no doubt as to the pacific intentions of their Government.

The Vienna Government papers continuing to inveigh against Russia, the *Pragüe Czechian Politik*, the leading organ of the Slavonian movement in Austria, says that if Austria goes to war with Russia, the Turkish question will be converted into an Austrian question, as all Austrian Slavonians, with the sole exception of the Poles, look upon such a war as contrary to their interests.

It may not be superfluous to take note of the continued industry of the French press in representing the events of the war the reverse of what they are. The game which the Ollivier and Palikao Governments began is being zealously kept up by the rulers and papers of the day. Scarcely twenty-four hours elapse but the Tours authorities publish and cause to be telegraphed to the four corners of the world a victory which either has not been gained at all, or which in comparison to the announcement displays as wide a discrepancy as there is between a lion and a mouse. As regards the papers, I need only mention that a few days ago the *Constitutionnel* printed the news that the French fleet had bombarded Hamburg, and after performing this little preliminary feat had forced the Jade and bundled off the whole Prussian navy. Considering these are the only sources whence the French people derive their knowledge of passing events, we cannot wonder at the sanguine view they have long taken of their prospects. But if the French liked to learn the truth, even though wounding their self-love, would they not have papers to open their eyes? As yet only those parts of the country which suffer most from the war have produced journals that admit facts and call a spade a spade.

Among the extraordinary phenomena of the time there is an Arabic address from Algiers to King William. It entreats the 'Father of Glory' to take pity upon his dis-

tant children and free them from the yoke of the impious, and restore them to the empire they formerly belonged to. After this loving allusion to Turkey, the address, curiously enough, proceeds to complain that the Turcos were placed in the van of the French army in the present war, when there has always been peace and amity between Fatherland and the Moslems. So this stratagem, which was intended to terrify, but only served to infuriate, the Germans, has had the additional disadvantage of irritating the Arabs themselves.

DOES RUSSIA MEAN WAR?

Berlin, November 24, 1870.

LORD GRANVILLE'S reply to Prince Gortschakoff is made the subject of the following comments in the St. Petersburg semi-official *Golos:*

'The warlike excitement kindled in the English and Austrian press by the circular note of our Foreign Minister is another proof that Europe cannot rid herself of the suspicion with which she has so long looked on our intentions with regard to Turkey. No step can we take in the affairs of the East without former jealousies being roused against us in all their ancient vigour and bitterness. Even the categorical declaration of Prince Gortschakoff, that his Imperial Majesty the Czar has no wish to revive the Eastern question, but in this, as in every other instance, is desirous to promote and consolidate peace, has been impotent to convince public opinion in Western Europe. Now, as ever, people ascribe to us the fantastic intention of conquering Constantinople, subjecting the Mediterranean to our rule, and dictating laws to the civilised lands of the West. The Cabinets of Vienna and St. James see the circular of Prince Gortschakoff in a most uncharitable light. However temperate and reserved his language, Lord Granville expresses himself with sufficient energy against our setting aside a treaty without obtaining the consent of the Powers who have signed it, or are directly or indirectly interested in it. The British Ministry, and with it, we must admit, nearly the whole of the European press, look upon the step taken by our Cabinet from the abstract standpoint of international law,

and therefore energetically protest against the method we have adopted for modifying one of its clauses. Exclusively emphasising the question of international law, and sacrificing, it would seem, the treaty itself, Lord Granville informs us that he would not perhaps have objected to remodel the agreement in question, had we only taken the trouble to address the signatary Powers on the expediency of a change.

However dark the clouds gathering on the political horizon, it does not follow that a thunderstorm need burst forth. It is, after all, quite natural that England and Austria, our rivals in the East, should have been irritated by our circular, the more so as they had no inkling of it. But we confidently trust they will soon look more calmly upon the matter, and perceive that to make it a *casus belli* would be very disadvantageous to themselves. Not to speak of other drawbacks, it is certain that by declaring war against Russia they would tie their hands at a time when they might wish to interfere with the struggle between Germany and France, in which they are so materially interested. For England and Austria to open hostilities against us, would be to benefit Prussia; a result which they will be hardly anxious to promote, having latterly become more and more hostile to that Power.

What, however, ought principally to make Austria and England wish for an amicable settlement is the fact that, even after recovering her right to protect her shores by a fleet, Russia cannot exercise the same ascendancy in the East as formerly. Having long vigilantly observed the progress of events in Turkey, those two Powers must be aware that, even could we succeed in abrogating the whole treaty instead of a single clause of it, it would take us generations to regain the influence we possessed before the Crimean war. They cannot but know that our Government not only adhered to the treaty stipulations of 1856 as conscientiously as possible, but of their own accord, and over and above what was imposed upon them, did away with our naval establishments in the Black Sea, which had cost us immense sums, and required some twenty years to render them what they were before. Only four years have elapsed since we broke up our ship-yards at Nicholaieff, so long the admiration of our sailors; and can we think of having a navy without a ship-yard and docks? Is there any one who after this can seriously entertain the thought that, having honourably acquitted themselves of their obligations for a period of fifteen years, our Government should be suddenly seized with ambitious designs, and be intent upon re-acquiring their former ascendancy in the Orient? If we had really such an object in view, should we not have taken the precaution of obtaining ships for the protection of our southern coasts, if not against the Western fleets, at least against Turkey, before resuscitating the old quarrel about the East? It would have been very easy to procure a sufficient squadron for this purpose. But we have refrained from doing anything of the kind. England and Austria ought to take into consideration that we have no such fleet in the Black Sea, and that at present it is physically impossible for us, without Turkish consent, to get one through the Dardanelles and the

Bosphorus, whose batteries would reduce to fragments the strongest vessels in the world. In the present state of our naval defences on the Black Sea, the Turkish fleet alone would suffice to inflict the greatest injury on our shores and commerce, without our being able to make reprisals.

Under these circumstances, neither Austria nor Great Britain has reason to look upon Prince Gortschakoff's circular as announcing a turn of affairs dangerous to their interests. Upon consideration, they will doubtless admit that what Russia has in view is to be permitted to defend her shores, but not to indulge impossible dreams respecting an attack upon Turkey. Why the present moment has been selected for the declaration of our Cabinet, and why a declaration so offensive to the Western Cabinets should have been chosen as the most appropriate mode of procedure, we know not. A near future will probably explain this satisfactorily. Meanwhile we may hope that mature reflection will place the matter in a different light from what it seemed at first, and that the excitement which otherwise would inevitably be aroused in the East will be allayed in good time. Repeatedly since the sanguinary rupture of 1853 has the Eastern question threatened to disturb the world's quiet; but on each occasion the combined endeavours of the European Powers, aided by the frank coöperation of Russia, have proved adequate to postpone the severing of the Gordian knot. Let us hope that in the present instance also the Powers will use their best efforts to avoid bloodshed. Russia, they may be assured, will meet them half-way, if they approach her with this intent. We are gratified to remark that even now the fact does not altogether escape foreign journalists, that Russia is not looking out for material advantages, but only wishes to alter those stipulations in the treaty which have offended her dignity as a great national commonwealth. The more thoroughly Europe acquaints herself with the real meaning of the Russian note, the more rapidly will the warlike tone of the English and Austrian press be changed for a cooler and more dispassionate one.'

To test the truth of the above reasoning we must look to the facts upon which it is grounded. If it be true that the Russians have omitted the precaution of conveying men-of-war into their waters, or assembling a large army in their Western provinces, prior to denouncing the objectionable treaty, it follows that, whatever their ulterior intentions, they do not now wish to bring on war by a breach of compact. In other words, the inference in such a case would be, that they have not committed an act likely to give them an opening for attacking Turkey, but only avenged in their own particular way the humili-

ation which was their lot at the end of an unfortunate war.

Now I think I am speaking within bounds when I say that all the Powers are at this moment convinced that there are no extra ships concealed in some hidden bay of the Euxine, and that the troops stationed in the south-western provinces of the realm, although sufficient to ward off surprise, and perhaps exercise a pressure, are yet not enough to undertake a decisive campaign. The very circumstance of these troops having been collected and disposed along the frontier, seems to indicate a pacific rather than a warlike bent. There is no doubt that for the last eight weeks Russia has been preparing for military contingencies, and that a good many measures have been taken calculated to enhance the efficiency and secure a ready concentration of her troops. But these orders were given almost publicly, and without any underhand work. Step by step they became known, if not to the Russian public at large, at any rate to official and more initiated circles; step by step they were reported in my letters. Had Russia intended to take Turkey by surprise, the greatest secrecy would have been used: as it was, the comparative publicity allowed necessarily leads us to conclude that Russia wished us to know she was making ready for all eventualities, and thus remove the danger of being herself attacked upon the perpetration of her diplomatic *coup d'état.*

Apart from this, Russia has the last few days given unmistakable signs of her anxiety to smooth over matters rather than aggravate them. She has proved to the Powers that she has not bought any ships in America to be formed into a Black Sea squadron; she has raised the newspaper postage to Turkey and Greece fourfold—a measure which can be only intended to diminish political excitement among the Slavonians thereabouts; and she has, from the moment of delivering her Note, instead of

assuming a haughty attitude, as she would have done were she intent upon a rupture, uniformly expressed herself with remarkable meekness, and avoided any unguarded utterance which might add fuel to the flames. Such being the case, we may also attach some importance to the collateral proof of pacific intentions contained in the above semi-official article. Obviously it was written with a view to pour oil upon the troubled waves. The writer does not take upon himself to deny that Russia was wrong in the way she chose to rid herself of an unpalatable obligation; but with characteristic *naïveté*, only wonders that 'the way' should have given so much offence, when the object she has in view is such a very innocent one. Again, the writer invites Austria and England to pounce upon Germany if they are eager for war, rather than upon Russia, who wishes to be at peace with them. One may have two opinions upon the interest England and Austria have to forcibly prevent Germany from reaping the fruit of her victory over France; but certain it is, if Russia meant war against Turkey, she must look out for allies, and with Austria and England necessarily opposed to her, could not afford to incense this Government and people by kindly pointing them out as a fit target for somebody else's shot. All which helps to confirm our former conclusions.

November 25.

The St. Petersburg semi-official *Golos*, in reply to an article in the *Times* charging Russia with an intended breach of the Treaty of Paris, says that Russia scorned to modify that compact by forced interpretations, as has been so often done by her adversaries, but openly denounced an agreement which had been violated by everybody else. Russia, moreover, would have had no objection to lay her grievances before a conference, could she have hoped for redress.

OPENING OF THE NORTH GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, November 26, 1870.

On Thursday last the North German Reichstag was opened, after the usual divine service, by the President of the Chancelry, State-Minister Delbrück, in the absence of his Majesty, with the following speech:

'Honoured Gentlemen of the North German Reichstag,—His Majesty the King of Prussia has deigned to commission me to open the North German Reichstag, in the name of the allied Governments.

It would have given his Majesty sincere satisfaction to be present with you to-day, to thank God in this place for the victories accorded to the German arms, and to express to you how much the attitude of the nation, and the unanimity of the Reichstag in supplying the means of carrying on the war, have contributed to its success. The attack made on Germany by France last July has been repelled in a series of victories unprecedented in the history of war, and achieved, under God's blessing, by the heroism of the German troops and the intelligence of their commanders. The French people must now be convinced that the forces which remain at their disposal are altogether inadequate, after the annihilation of their regular armies, to continue a struggle against the united strength of Germany. We might therefore confidently reckon on an immediate peace, if our unfortunate neighbours possessed a Government whose members regarded their own future as inseparably bound up with that of the country. Such a Government would have embraced the first opportunity of enabling the nation, at the head of which it had arbitrarily placed itself, to proceed to the election of representatives, legally authorised to deliberate on the present condition and future prospects of the country. But, gentlemen, the documents about to be submitted to you by the Presidency of the Confederation will abundantly prove that the existing Government of France has chosen to squander the resources of a noble nation in a prolonged and hopeless struggle.

The exhaustion and ruin, without a chance of commensurate advantages, which a continuation of hostilities must under present circumstances entail on France, cannot fail to weaken that country to a much greater degree, and for a much longer period, than if the war had followed a more regular course. The allied Governments regret but cannot suppress their conviction, that even in the future peace will be endangered by the impression left of the present war—and this as soon as France, having either recovered her lost

strength, or succeeded in forming an alliance with other Powers, shall feel herself formidable enough to renew the combat.

The conditions on which the allied Governments are willing to make peace have been publicly discussed. The stringency of these terms must bear a due relation to the extent of the sacrifices which a war totally unprovoked on our part, but undertaken with the consent of the entire French nation, has imposed on our country. Above all, Germany must be left in possession of an easily defensible frontier, as a security against a revival of that policy of conquest which has distinguished the rulers of France for centuries. The consequences of those deplorable wars in which Germany, rent asunder by internal discord, had to yield to the will of France, must be at least partially removed, and our South German brothers must be secured against the menace which France, intrenched in the territory previously taken from Germany, constantly held suspended over their heads. The allied Governments have no doubt that the North German Reichstag will cheerfully vote the means which are indispensable for accomplishing this purpose. They are sure of finding in you to-day, when we are called on to secure the military successes we have gained, the same patriotic devotedness that placed the means of obtaining them in our hands. At the same time, they earnestly hope and desire that they may not be obliged to expend those resources to their full amount.

In order to give you a complete view of the political situation, communications will be laid before you which have been lately received by the Foreign Office on the subject of the Treaty of Paris of 30th March 1856. In doing so, the allied Governments give expression to a hope that the blessings of peace may be preserved to those nations by which they have been hitherto enjoyed.

The prosecution of the war has not been able to hinder the work of peace. The feeling of solidarity awakened by common danger and common victories; the consciousness of the position which Germany, for the first time since centuries, has won by unity; the conviction that only by the creation of permanent institutions can the legacy of these days of deeds and sacrifices be secured for Germany's future welfare, have led the German people and sovereigns, more rapidly and generally than a short time ago seemed possible, to recognise the truth, that a closer bond was required to connect North and South than mere international treaties. This conviction, shared by all the allied Governments, has led to negotiations, the first-fruits of which will be submitted to you for approval, in the form of a Constitution for a new German Confederation, as agreed on between North Germany, Baden, and Hesse, and unanimously approved by the Federal Council. The understanding arrived at with Bavaria, on the same basis, will also furnish a subject for your deliberations; and the identity of aim and purpose which exists between us and Würtemberg leads us to hope that an arrangement as to the means of reaching our common goal will soon be attained.

With this work, gentlemen, you will worthily terminate an activity such as few other legislative bodies can boast of. In little more than three years you have, by enacting a series of important laws affecting the life of the people in all its varied aspects, lent your coöperation to our efforts to realise the federal Constitution: by the measure now submitted to you, just before the expiration of the term for which you were elected, this constitution, and the laws founded on it, are extended beyond the limits that have till now separated us from our South German brothers. The great national idea, which has guided you in all your deliberations, is destined, if God so wills it, to make a decided step towards its complete fulfilment in this, the last of your sessions.

By command of his Prussian Majesty, President of the Confederation, I declare, in the name of the allied Governments, that the North German Reichstag is opened.'

EASTERN APPREHENSIONS ALLAYED.

Berlin, November 26, 1870.

THE quieting declarations of Russia, successively recorded in my letters, have allayed the apprehensions at first entertained as to the consequences of her provoking demeanour. At present official and mercantile circles are convinced that, whatever fruit Russia may eventually reap from the seed she has sown, she will not now be obliged to make any more positive retractation than is involved in her revising the Turkish Treaty in common with the other Powers. Of the latter, two at least have already signified an intention to consider her claims. Both England and Prussia are willing to examine the grievances of their imperious neighbour; and as Austria and France have intimated a similar disposition on sundry previous occasions, it is not too sanguine to expect that an attempt will be made to arrange the matter for the present, and defer a final settlement to a more convenient season. That Russia has no wish to aggravate affairs by carrying

out her threats I have been able to prove in preceding communications. In any case, negotiations will have to be entered into, if the wording and spirit of existing treaties are to be regarded. On these necessary preliminaries an interesting letter, said to emanate from a British statesman, has been published and given prominence to by the semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*. The contents commanding general interest now, and being likely to do so for some time to come, I subjoin a translation:

'In reply to your note of the 17th, I hasten to tell you that war between England and Russia is not to be thought of while the latter confines herself to declarations, and does not proceed to acts involving a positive infraction of our treaty. At any rate, I am certain that the present English Cabinet will not take upon itself to make war while the *status quo* remains what it is. You ought not to overlook that, in accordance with clause 8 of March 30, 1856, neither England nor Turkey is in a position at once to have recourse to the *ultima ratio gentium*. Here is the article:

"S'il survenait entre la Sublime Porte et l'une ou plusieurs des autres Puissances signataires un dissentiment qui ménaçat le maintien de leurs rélations, la Sublime Porte et chacune de ces Puissances, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, mettront les autres parties contractantes en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par leur action médiatrice."

There is also clause 23 of the Protocol of the Paris Conferences of the 12th of April 1856, which prohibits premature hostilities:

"Les Plénipotentiaires n'hésitent pas à exprimer au nom de leurs Gouvernements le vœu que les Etats entre lesquels s'éleverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours autant que les circonstances admettraient aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie."

Accordingly, a friendly or neutral Power—Prussia, for instance, or the United States—might tender their good offices with a view to postpone or entirely remove the danger of hostilities. The main point, under any circumstances, will be, that until Russia has actually committed a breach of treaty, a *casus belli* does not exist. For the present we have only to deal with the threat that such infraction will be committed.'

The events of the last few days prove these arguments to have weight with the Powers. Negotiations have been opened, and but for the continuance of war in another quarter, would probably by this time have led to a result. As it is, things cannot be expected to move rapidly. Whether the question be settled simultaneously with the

restoration of peace between Germany and France, or whether a special Conference be called to meet in London, the final solution is likely to be deferred till after the war.

The Prussian Government have referred the matter to the Federal Council. The document containing the important communication begins by laying down the principle, that political steps which may endanger the peaceful relations of Germany with its neighbours can only be justified so far as treaty obligations render them an international duty, or require them as affecting the interest of the German nation. It proceeds to show that treaty obligations do not in this case rest on Prussia and its legal successor, the Confederation, inasmuch as such obligations have only been undertaken on behalf of the integrity of Turkey, which is not now in question. On the other hand, the right of demanding the fulfilment of duties undertaken in a treaty by others exists; but whether that right should be exercised depends solely on the interests of the nation. Those interests could not be deemed affected by any formal violation on the part of Russia, unless it were evident that the position of Germany was thereby endangered. Prussia desires to ascertain the opinion of the Confederates on the question, how far the interests of Germany are affected by these matters, in order to come to an understanding as to the handling of the question, and to submit the case to the Reichstag. It is stated, in conclusion, that Prussia has proposed to the signataries of the Paris Treaty of Peace the following proposition, which has been favourably received in London, St. Petersburg, and Florence: 'That they should authorise their representatives in London to attend a Conference for the purpose of considering the question raised by the declarations made by the Russian Cabinet in its circular of the 19th October.' It is added, that the Russian note has not been answered by Prussia, which desired in so weighty a matter first to learn the

sentiments of its Confederates and the nation; that the North German Ambassadors have consequently been directed simply to do their utmost for the preservation of peace among the Powers concerned; and that Count Bismarck has expressed himself in the same sense to Mr. Odo Russell, whom Lord. Granville has dispatched to Versailles.

While uniformly manifesting the most conciliatory sentiments, Russia omits no precaution, but energetically prepares for the worst. Great activity prevails in the military department; the people have been permitted to indulge in loyal demonstrations; and the Church is—naturally enough in a theocratic State—likewise engaged in aiding the policy of the Cabinet. Addresses thanking the Czar for his policy in respect of the East have been voted at St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Poltava, and Ekaterinoslav. To cite one of these congratulatory epistles, the following is the address of the St. Petersburg town-council:

'Your Majesty, in your incessant solicitude for the welfare of the nation providentially intrusted to you, has intimated an intention to improve the defenceless condition of our southern shores. We, the citizens of St. Petersburg, while fully sensible of the blessings of peace, are convinced that its consolidation cannot be effected on a more durable basis than your imperial will has announced in the firm, candid, and equitable despatch of your Chancellor of State, dated October 31st. We recognise the beneficial result of the announcement made in your Majesty's name to the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and, prostrating ourselves at your Majesty's feet, venture to express our respectful gratitude for the measures which your wisdom, Sire, has adopted for the protection, the safety, and dignity of Russia.—We are,' &c.

In reply to this address, the Emperor ordered a dignitary of his Court to convey his thanks to the town-council. A similar address to Prince Gortschakoff from the University of Kieff elicited the following reply:

'I am deeply sensible of the honour conferred upon me by your congratulations. By zealously and accurately carrying out the commands of

the Emperor, we shall always effectually promote the true interests of our beloved country.

GORTSCHAKOFF.'

Some time ago the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople proposed to convene an Œcumenical Council of the various Greek Catholic Churches, to pronounce on the claim of the Bulgarians to form a national church of their own. The Russian Government objecting to all ecclesiastical debates, the Russian Church declared against the plan. The Patriarch has just renewed his proposal at St. Petersburg, informing the Russian Church that all the other Greek Catholic Churches have already signified their assent. In the event of Eastern commotion, Russia is likely to approve the project and attend the Council, which would be, in fact, a parliament of the Oriental Christians.

Up to a fortnight ago the total of the North German and Baden losses was as follows: (1) Officers—dead, 802; wounded, 2,426; missing, 24: total, 3,252. (2) Soldiers—dead, 10,499; wounded, 50,249; missing (which category includes the dead not found), 7,872: total, 68,620. Grand total of all losses, 71,872. To this figure must be added the Bavarian losses, officially reported up to the battle of Orleans, with 901 dead, and 4,614 wounded. The Würtemberg losses remain to be accounted for, as also those of the whole army by sickness. We know, though, so much, that the present war has been no exception to the old rule of disease being a more deadly enemy than powder and shot. When will it be over?

While the thoughts of men are exclusively engrossed by military events, the Federal Parliament meets with the greatest indifference from the public. People know beforehand what it has to do and what it will do, and are therefore not over anxious to learn the particulars of the debates. In the first place, a loan of 100,000,000 of thalers has been asked, in addition to the 120,000,000 voted at the beginning of the war. After this the new

Federal Constitution, slightly remodelled so as to make the Southern States fit in comfortably, will have to be sanctioned. The draught has been already submitted; but as it provides only for the admission of Baden and Southern Hesse, Würtemberg and Bavaria not having signed their treaties of adhesion at the time it was completed, it will have to be modified again, and need not therefore be dwelt upon now. The speech from the throne, I may add, is justly praised as proclaiming with modest dignity the victorious results of the war, as well as the ultimate realisation of the long-desired unity.

In their anxiety to reprove those who have taken the liberty of defeating them, the French papers have long revelled in the grossest misstatements respecting the treatment of the prisoners in Germany. To contradict these accusations, the Conseil d'Honneur of the French officers prisoners at Erfurt publish a letter to the editor of the *Erfurter Zeitung* expressive of their gratitude for the generous and considerate sympathy shown them by General von Michaelis, the commandant of the place. All they have to complain of, they say, is the smallness of the pay officially accorded them. This, as it amounts to only twelve thalers per month, is certainly insufficient, and involves a severe drain upon their private resources. If I am not mistaken, the officers are, however, also in the receipt of a *solde de captivité* paid them by their own Government through the English Embassy here. As regards the religious condition of the prisoners, the complaint of Bishop Mermillod, of Geneva, that they are tempted by extra rations to embrace Lutheranism, is publicly denounced by Father Namszanowski, the Catholic Bishop of the Prussian Army, as an 'infamous lie.' 'The mendacious effrontery of this statement,' the Father adds, 'is the blacker because it requites the benevolence of the Prussian Government and people with ingratitude, and under the mask of religion endeavours to disseminate hatred where there ought to be only

ready and sincere acknowledgment of favours received.' I am afraid the contradiction will not reach all the good curés that have been horrified by the charge.

A GERMAN CONFEDERATION RE-ESTABLISHED.

Berlin, November 28, 1870.

BAVARIA and Würtemberg having in the eleventh hour given in their adhesion to the North German Confederacy, the latter is converted into a Pan-Germanic Confederation, and the old style and title of Deutscher Bund revived. It would be carrying owls to Athens to dwell upon the importance of the event, and to point out that it marks a period in the history of the nation, and indeed of the Continent at large. For the first time since the Reformation, when religious dissension fomented political discord, the 40,000,000 of Germany are a united people, joined together for the needs of foreign and all the more essential purposes of domestic policy; for the first time in history they are one without a foreign admixture, having set themselves free from that Austria which, even in the most prosperous days of the old Empire, clogged and perverted the action of the race it claimed to rule over, without belonging to it. The dream of centuries is fulfilled at last, and what has so long been a number of divided and jealous States becomes the commonwealth of one of the most numerous, most valorous, and most highly-civilised nations of the earth.

At the same time, the gathering of the German forces under one common Government is marked by a certain regard for the independence of the individual States. Though no longer such a one as to thwart unity, the position allotted to each State is yet sufficiently strong to

spare the feelings of the various dynasties, and leave a pretty wide margin for future progress, should it appear desirable, in the direction of centralised institutions. The moderation of Prussia and the proud traditions of the other States have equally contributed to bring about this result. A few words on the Constitution of the Confederacy will prove this. My remarks are based upon the bill laid before Parliament providing for the admission of Baden and Southern Hesse, as well as upon what has officially transpired concerning the treaties with Bavaria and Würtemberg, concluded after the introduction of the bill, and necessitating its modification in the course of the debates.

You are aware that the Constitution of the North German Confederacy claims military and naval affairs, as well as criminal and commercial law, tariff, excise, and some minor subjects, as the domain of the central Government and Parliament. To these the remodelled Constitution adds legislation on the right of forming private societies and on the liberty of the press. The Government of the Confederacy is carried on by a federal Council, formed by the representatives of the various Sovereigns. In voting upon the measures proposed by any of them, each representative is accorded a number of votes, supposed to be proportionate to the size and importance of the State he sits for. While Hamburg, for instance, has one vote, Brunswick has two, Saxony four, and Prussia seventeen. In the federal Council, as it existed up to the present war, there were forty-three votes altogether, of which Prussia herself possessing nearly half, could always count upon so many more as made her practically paramount in the Assembly. In the new Council, as it will be after the entry of the Southern States, though the sum total of the votes is increased by fifteen, Prussia retains only her former number, and accordingly has her influence proportionately weakened. Bavaria possessing six

votes, Würtemberg four, Saxony four, and Hesse three, will together have as many votes as the presiding power of the Confederacy, and by a coalition be always able to neutralise their principal colleague. If this arrangement seems to bear an ominous resemblance to the old Bund, in which the various German States so effectually neutralised each other, it ought to be remembered that Prussia at present is the only great power in the Confederacy. Formerly there were two — Prussia and Austria — each equally strong and equally likely to draw a number of minor States after it. At present, without an hereditary rival to combat her every action, it is thought that Prussia's ascendancy will be sufficiently great for all practical purposes, even though the influence constitutionally assigned her may be comparatively small. Such a result is the more likely as the minor States, having once recognised Prussia's leadership, and had their existence guaranteed by her, have no object in opposing her for the sake of self-preservation, but may be expected to use their votes according to the merits of the case, and not as petty spite dictates. To secure, however, the main points of unity against even the possibility of a change in the wrong direction, Prussia retains the right she already possesses of vetoing any modification of the military and naval arrangements, and, which is a remarkable progress, acquires the same right with regard to the tariff and excise. This renders her mistress of the federal finances, and, together with her command over the army, is sure to weld the various States together into a solid whole. By way of counter concession to the Southern States, she has voluntarily divested herself of her present privilege of declaring war in the name of the Confederacy without the sanction of the federal Council. Except in case of attack by a foreign foe, when she may act without consulting her allies, declarations of war in future will proceed, not from Prussia, but from the Council that represents the

Deutscher Bund. It is to be hoped that this enactment will allay the apprehensions concerning Prussian aggressiveness entertained, or at any rate professed, by some of the weaker neighbours of this country.

Two more important concessions have to be recorded. Three-fourths of the votes of the Federal Council, instead of two-thirds, as hitherto, will be required for any alteration in the Constitution — a proviso which, as every coming change is sure to strengthen unity at the expense of local government, is clearly in favour of the minor dynasties. Again, in each of the special committees of the Federal Council, which have to prepare the laws and superintend the different branches of the administration, four minor States, instead of two, as formerly, will be represented, in addition to Prussia. Other points are of minor importance. Baden, Bavaria, and most probably also Würtemberg retain the legislation on the beer and spirit excise—a matter of the greatest moment to the Southern exchequers, which rely principally upon the creature wants of the subject—and will not vote on these points in the federal Council and Parliament. A privileged position has been accorded to Bavaria in military matters, which leaves her the exclusive organisation and direction of her army in time of peace; Würtemberg, it seems, secures the exception made in favour of Saxony some time ago, and, while conforming to the federal laws in all that concerns organisation, retains the direction of her troops in time of peace; but the opposite policy is followed by Baden, who, not satisfied with the diminution of her sovereignty decreed by the federal charter, has concluded a special treaty in which she renounces even the financial portion of her military business, as well as the right to appoint officers, and some other points of secondary importance constitutionally left to the local governments. The Baden army simply becomes embodied with the Prussian, as have so many of the other federal States.

The gradations in the mode in which they give up their armies to be commanded and employed by Prussia accurately reflect the degree of importance belonging to each minor Sovereign. Proud Bavaria only consents to keep a certain number of troops and place them at Prussia's disposal in war. Saxony and Würtemberg go a step farther, and, while promising succour in war, accept the Prussian organisation in time of peace. Hesse, Brunswick, and a few other States, adhering to the letter of the federal law, claim the privilege of appointing the greater part of their officers, and of provisioning, clothing, equipping, and paying their forces, who in every other respect are Prussians. The other minor States have not thought it worth their while to preserve these scanty rights constitutionally left them, but, ceding to Prussia a proportionate amount out of their share in the Zollverein revenue, have entirely handed over their couple of regiments to the Berlin Government.

To conclude, Southern Hesse will send six, Baden fourteen members to the federal Parliament, whose total is thus swelled to 317. The exact number of the Würtemberg and Bavarian deputies is still unknown.

The first few sittings of the federal Parliament have been devoted to the bill demanding another war-loan of 100,000,000 thalers. As was to be expected, the members availed themselves of this opportunity to express an opinion on the conduct and the prospects of the war. With the exception of the four Socialists in the House, who openly sympathise with the French Republic rather than the German constitutional monarchy, all parties alike approved the Government programme as repeatedly announced by Count Bismarck, and again sanctioned in the speech from the throne. The language used with regard to the conduct of the French Government and educated classes, which give tone to the society of our neighbouring country, was as strong as ever. They

were denounced for having made war to gratify their vanity, and for continuing it because they could not bring themselves to believe that their wicked pride was to be chastened this time. All the members were in favour of the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine; some because it is ancient German soil, others because it strengthens the military position of this country against future attack.

A BLACK SEA CONFERENCE.

Berlin, November 29, 1870.

THE Eastern Conference, which I was in a position to announce a fortnight ago, has now been formally proposed by this Government. If accepted by *all* the Powers, it is sure to lead to an amicable solution of the pending difference. Russia, by the very fact of attending the Conference, would virtually retract her arbitrary proceedings, and consent to refer the matter to the decision of her equals; while the latter, if so much is conceded, are likely to examine into the alleged grievances of their imperious colleague, and accord redress, should it appear just. But though, once assembled, the Conference presents such a fair chance of effecting a compromise, it is not certain that it will meet. The preliminary negotiations will require delicate handling to lead to a favourable issue. On the one hand, the Powers cannot possibly come together merely to register a fiat pronounced by one of their number; on the other, the country the action of which necessitates discussion is not likely to eat her own words, and make any more formal recantation than would be implied in her agreeing to arrange in common with others what she at first intended

to decide according to her own will and pleasure. Always full of conscious dignity in her diplomatic dealings, Russia is sure to be doubly so in a case where her action originates in the personal initiative of the Emperor. If therefore it is to be accepted by all, the invitation to the Conference will have to be framed in such a way as to vindicate the view taken by the Western Powers without actually summoning and arraigning Russia.

It is probable that Prussia, from whom the idea of the Conference emanates, and who is much interested in preventing a second complication arising before her first and special quarrel is fairly concluded, will have the art and the tact requisite under the peculiar circumstances of the case. But will all the other Powers follow her example? Will all be equally content to exact a merely diplomatic satisfaction? Will all be able to keep their temper after the extraordinary missive addressed them? We learn officially from Vienna that, before going to the Conference, Austria wishes to have a number of preliminary questions answered. It is much to be feared these are the very questions Russia objects to answer beforehand, however willing she might be to have them discussed in solemn conclave with her equals. If the other Powers manage to keep negotiations in smooth waters, this difficulty will be overcome. In the other event, the matter will have to be postponed for a longer time, as Austria is not in a position to follow up words by deeds unless seconded by France. But France will take some time to recover before she can think of engaging in another conflict. Her rulers *pro tem.* have certainly right joyfully hailed the chance of an Eastern conflict, which they hope is to convert the present localised war into a general European conflagration, in which they might have allies: but they will be defeated long before anything serious can occur in the East; and it is doubtful whether their successors, if peace is once restored, will consider it to their interest

to take the same view of the question as MM. Favre and Gambetta.

Speaking of diplomatic negotiations, a passage in M. Favre's last Circular, dated November 21, has attracted attention here. M. Favre asserts that the Powers, especially Great Britain, in suggesting the expediency of an armistice, approved the re-victualling of Paris, and that even Prussia at one time tacitly admitted the idea. No proof, however, is brought forward in support of this statement, which, were it correct, would shed fresh light on the events of the last few weeks.

Yesterday afternoon the war-loan of 100,000,000 thalers was voted all but unanimously by the federal Parliament. The vote implying the approval of the well-known Bismarck programme, in accordance with which the war is to be carried on until the French consent to surrender their German provinces, is as important from a political as from a financial point of view. The sole dissentients were, firstly, five Socialists, who, expecting the rise of Communism to succeed the establishment of a Republic in France, are loath to injure the State which is to realise their *beau idéal;* secondly, the notorious Professor Ewald of Göttingen, an adherent of King George of Hanover, and consequently an enemy of unity and all that is connected with it; and thirdly, M. Schraps, a Saxon lawyer, the only member sharing M. Ewald's sentiments on contemporary politics. Yesterday's debate moved in the ordinary grooves. From the stanchest Conservatives to the most advanced Liberals, the members of all parties insisted that a territorial barrier must be created against the haughty, frivolous, and wicked French nation. The military being unanimous in regarding Alsace and Lorraine as such a barrier, these provinces must be annexed, whether they like it or not. It would be ridiculous to trust to the pacific assurances of the Republic, when they proceeded from men who, at one time or other, had been

as maliciously eager for war as the Emperor Napoleon himself, and when all previous Republics of the French had been as bad neighbours of Germany as their Kings and Emperors.' The only members taking exception to these opinions were the Communists, who behaved so uproariously that they had to be silenced by the Speaker of the House. One of them, evincing the strongest predilection for the French, tempted a noble member into remarking that if he (the Communist) were a Frenchman, and outraged a French Assembly by the like perorations with regard to Germany, he would not be permitted to leave the room with a whole bone in his skin. The party thus complimented gave as good as he received. Altogether it was a disgraceful scene, painfully differing from the rigid propriety which ordinarily distinguishes parliamentary debates in this country. For the presence of the Socialists in the House the nation are indebted to the adoption of universal suffrage for the federal Parliament, and the consequent ascendancy of the extreme party in the few manufacturing districts where their existence is at all apparent.

STARVING PARIS INTO SUBMISSION.

Berlin, November 30, 1870.

As the surrender of Paris has been officially stated to be drawing near, the eyes of all Germany may be said at this moment to be riveted on the besieged city. There are few houses in which the question as to how many weeks will elapse before the white flag is unfurled is not daily debated. The sanguine are convinced that the first few days of December will witness the fall of the obstinate place. Discreet people, taking a cautious view of men and things, believe they are justified in fixing upon the 15th as the last possible date of the long-desired event.

Even pessimists, who love to dwell upon the French taste for heroism, and know all about the concealed flocks and herds of the catacombs, express a hope that the year will not expire without the great metropolis changing hands. One need not belong to either of these contending schools of prophets to read the symptoms of the day, and conclude that the decisive hour cannot be very distant. To predict the exact moment is to pretend to draw the sum-total of a hundred fortuitous circumstances, and calculate the impression they will make upon an excitable race with feelings constantly ebbing and flowing between the sublime and some other sensations of the human soul.

More interesting than these venturesome adumbrations of the shadowy future is the question, what conditions will be accorded Paris, should Paris once sue for conditions. In Prussia there are many people and papers advising the Government to accept the surrender of the hostile capital only if it consents to deliver up not herself alone, but all France at the same time. In other words, Paris is not to be rescued from the pangs of hunger unless its Government and people ratify the German terms of peace in advance, and more particularly approve the cession of the two coveted provinces. The severity of this proposal will give you an idea of the tone of the public mind in this country. Arguing on the conviction that, as the French began the war for vanity's sake, so are they continuing it because too conceited to give in, although they know they have no chance of success, the Germans have been latterly denouncing the conduct of their neighbours in terms of increasing hatred and contempt. No matter how great the glory achieved by their troops, each successive battle adds to the irritation against those who have forced the citizen warriors of this country to leave their homes, suspend their industry, and take to the heroic. The Germans are certainly determined to go on beating the French as long as they will not concede them

the terms considered to contain the only guarantee that peace will not be broken the day after its conclusion; but, at the same time, they are sick of the war, and more and more incensed at the bloodshed wantonly inflicted upon themselves as well as upon the discomfited enemy. It is this resolve to have their own way, together with the unspeakable weariness occasioned by ever fresh telegrams with lists of killed and wounded, that begins to make people comparatively indifferent to the sufferings of their adversaries, and displays itself in the idea of starving Paris into obedience. I believe the French had better realise the fact, that the enemy they have to deal with is not likely to be beaten in a game of endurance, and being more systematic and cool-headed than themselves, may turn his firmness to the utmost account.

However, all this is in a sense premature, as Paris is still holding out, and as it is too early to judge of the impression made upon the city by the four fresh defeats sustained during the last three days. Pending the final catastrophe on the Seine, there is much to interest us in an official report, dated Versailles, November 24, which gives us an inkling of what is going on at this moment in Paris:

'Paris journals up to November 22, received at head-quarters, leave no doubt that a pacific disposition is at last being strongly manifested by the inhabitants. The French Government, it is true, as yet declines to recognise the demands of public opinion, and, we are sorry to say, continues to deal in falsehood and deception. Thus, for instance, the *Journal Officiel* of November 22 dares to assert that forts Issy and Bicêtre have succeeded in entirely demolishing the Prussian intrenchments opposite them, when absolutely nothing at all has occurred. The audacity of this statement is the greater, as for several preceding days not a single shot had been fired by the forts mentioned. It would be indeed incredible that a responsible Government should venture to propagate such monstrous inventions, were it not they regarded it as the only way of keeping up the sinking courage of the poor deluded masses. Of all changes wrought in Paris since the beginning of the war, not the least curious is the altered language of the *Figaro*, the organ, it is well known, of the *bourgeoisie*. At first most eager for war, and revelling in the grossest insults against Germany and Prussia, even

after the battle of Sedan, this journal now takes the lead among that portion of the press which blames the Government for the continuance of the defence. The statement in one of our previous reports, that the mobilisation of the National Guard has caused much dissatisfaction, is confirmed in the articles of this journal. The Government, we are told, wishing to dispense with a formal order, at first asked for volunteers to come forward from the Nationals; but as only a few responded to the call, a decree had to be issued which made an obligatory duty of what the armed citizens were loath to do of their own accord. The measure was very badly received. "Before its publication," the *Figaro* relates, "every one boasted of his indomitable courage. In the hour of danger he would be assuredly there and march against the foe. But now that they were taken at their word, the most bellicose suddenly revealed themselves as so many devoted paterfamilias, indifferent to their country, but filled with the utmost solicitude for the welfare of their offspring." The article arrives at the conclusion, that the Government will be obliged to rescind the decree sooner or later. In another place the paper discusses the conditions of peace, and looks upon the neutralisation of Alsace and Lorraine as acceptable terms.

These opinions are reëchoed in many of the private letters seized by us. To give one example in place of many, the following is an extract from a letter indited by a person belonging to the highest classes: "Some people hope for a resumption of diplomatic negotiations; but is it possible that anything good could ever come from this Government of lawyers? Do they not repudiate the very idea of concession, as though we had been victorious in every encounter? (*Comme si l'on était partout vainqueur.*) There is so much inaptitude (*ineptie*) and petty obstinacy (*entêtement*) in our rulers, that they are determined to risk all rather than abandon their high-sounding phrases. To make their conduct even more reprehensible, they have been at their wits'-end ever since the loss of Metz. Surrounded by difficulties, and absolutely unable to cope with them, they will not let us have the armistice which alone could save us. It is high time we should be allowed a Chamber and a regularly constituted Government. It may just be possible to hold out till next month (December), but then provisions will fail, and nobody knows what will happen. In the mean time, they are trying hard to make us believe they are doing something. Whole armies are being organised on paper. But all is a farce. They are simply wasting the time which might be better employed in an armistice, even though Paris were not re-victualled. To me France appears so demoralised by Republican ideas, which, after all, are only ochlocratic ideas, that an army has become impossible. I should congratulate myself upon being let off with the neutralisation of Alsace and Lorraine. (*Et j'accepterai avec bonheur pour nous la neutralisation en projet pour l'Alsace et la Lorraine.*)"'

Prussian judges are being sent to Alsace and Lorraine to fill up vacancies occasioned by the emigration of their

French predecessors. In accordance with the announcement of the Prussian Finance Minister, a portion of the new federal loan will probably be allotted to English bankers.

BAVARIA'S POSITION IN THE CONFEDERACY.

Berlin, December 1, 1870.

ALTHOUGH it is three days since the treaty containing the adhesion of Bavaria to the Confederacy has been made public, the papers are slow to pronounce an opinion upon it. The fact is, many cannot help feeling disappointed at the exceptional position accorded Bavaria in the German commonwealth. The concessions made are even more important than had been permitted to transpire. It is not so much that they begrudge the Munich Government the right to organise and command their troops in time of peace without interference on the part of Prussia; or that they object to Bavaria being granted a disproportionate influence in the federal Council, having been allotted six votes when Prussia, with nearly five times as many inhabitants, has only seventeen; but it has caused considerable regret that the federal laws, abolishing former restrictions on trade, marriage, &c., are not at once introduced in the principal and most old-fashioned of the Southern States. This not only violates the principle of uniform legislation for all parts of Germany, but maintains diversity in a department directly affecting the interests of the individual, and therefore particularly calculated to give the nation a sense of unity or the reverse, according as identical laws prevail in all the States or not. Concessions of the same kind have, it is true, been made also to Baden and Hesse, but they are nothing in comparison to what has been allowed their immediate neighbour.

I should not wonder were an attempt made in the federal Parliament to amend the treaty, and render Bavaria amenable to the conditions imposed in the interests of unity upon all our States. Whether, should the Bavarian Government remain firm, a majority will be found to make its *ad*mission conditional on its *sub*mission, is a question which it would be premature to answer. In my opinion the ratification of the treaty as it stands, or with a few immaterial alterations in favour of centralised institutions, is the most probable solution of this new difficulty. So much is gained by all Germany being joined together in the bonds of a tolerably practical constitution, that the generation blessed with this invaluable boon can afford to overlook minor deficiencies. Once welded together, it is certain that the country will daily become more closely united. The ties of brotherhood, the necessity of making a common stand against unfriendly neighbours, and the tendency of the age to legislate in accordance with scientific principles, alike applicable in every province of a civilised country, all will serve to strengthen the central Government, and gradually do away with the legislative differences still permitted to exist. That such is the opinion of the most ardent advocates of unity in Bavaria herself, is proved by the arrival in Berlin of three members of the Munich Fortschritt's Partei, who have come to persuade our Parliament to pass the treaty as it stands, and trust to the future for amendment.

My former remarks on the contents of the Würtemberg Treaty require a supplement. Würtemberg retains not only the direction of her army in time of peace, but also the administration of her post and telegraph departments, and the right to appropriate the profits. You are aware that both these privileges have been likewise conceded to Bavaria, the former even to the extent of rendering it optional whether she will fully introduce the Prussian military organisation or not.

A PRUSSO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

Berlin, December 1, 1870.

WHILE some people persist in charging Prussia with entering into a secret agreement with her eastern neighbour on the subject of Oriental affairs, the news that reaches us from St. Petersburg is in ludicrous contrast with these hasty accusations. We hear that the Russian papers do not at all reflect public opinion as it is expressed in the talk of the great towns on the Neva and Moskva. Gratified as the Russians are by their sovereign boldly wiping out the memory of the Crimean war, they are not at all elated at the idea of taking so decided a step against instead of in concert with France. For years past popular politics in Russia have been based upon the axiom, that all advantages in the East must be gained through France, who in return was to have free leave to put down Germany. By adopting this strategy, it was proposed to kill two birds with one stone. The old dream of Russian ascendancy in and near the Black Sea was to be promoted with the assistance of an ally regarded as so powerful that his merely joining them seemed tantamount to success; Germany, on the other hand, was to have her wings clipped before she became dangerous. The latter process would have had the contingent advantage of leaving Russia's German subjects at the mercy of the Muscovites, long enraged at their Teuton compatriots presuming to preserve their own language and religion as a badge of superior culture in the icy north.

And now the whole plan has been knocked on the head by that *maladroit* Gortschakoff. What a pity! what a thousand pities! Is he not aware of the feelings of his countrymen, or has he no respect for them? Ought he

not to have waited for France to recover, rather than avail himself of her temporary misfortune? Ought he not to have succoured her in her present dire need, and thus paved the way for the long-coveted coöperation in Europe, Asia, and where not? Does he not indirectly strengthen Germany by making an enemy of France? and will he not of a surety be left in the lurch by Bismarck, long-headed and cunning, as is the whole of that odious German race? Such are the questions indignantly put at this moment at Moscow and St. Petersburg. Such would be the sentiments manifested in the press, had not the editors, by the Minister of the Interior in person, been threatened with the Emperor's wrath, were they to continue their favourite invectives against the hated Nemetz. Whatever suspicions, then, may be entertained of Prussia's conduct elsewhere, they are not shared by public opinion in the country immediately concerned. In Russia, people, with the experience of the last few days to go by, are convinced that Gortschakoff has only seized an opportunity which to him appeared favourable, and which most probably will ultimately turn out to be quite the contrary. Of course, there is no denying that, though they may be correct enough in their appreciation of the present, their inferences as to the future may prove erroneous. While Austria and France remain as hostile to Prussia as up to yesterday they have shown themselves, there are no compacts required to make Prussia treat Russia with cautious consideration. The Czar knew this when he declined the constantly-reiterated offer of Napoleon III. to assist in carrying out the Russian popular programme.*

Another curious illustration of the secret treaty charge

* As we learn from the Blue-book on the war and other sources, the Czar repeatedly wrote to King William to request that the French territory be left intact. This is another proof of his having reserved to himself full freedom of action. And so evidently has King William, as he declined the request. The mutual support, then, they may be rendering each other appears the result of circumstances, not of alliance.

brought against this Government is afforded by the fact that Russia has prohibited subscriptions in favour of the German sick and wounded soldiers. Soon after the list was opened by the Germans at Riga and Petersburg, the police put a stop to the thing, which even during the short time it was tolerated the papers were forbidden to speak of.

Russian policy is more successful in Turkistan than in the Kirghis steppes forming the entrance to it. On the high road between Orsk and Kasalinsk, along which all troops must pass, the post convoys, as well as other caravans, are so regularly set upon by the rebels, that fresh military measures have been taken by the Orenburg Government. On the other hand, it is reported with much satisfaction, that the Khan of Khokand has given up to Russia the fugitive chiefs of Shakhrizabsk, who had fled to him for safety, after their unlucky attempt to free themselves from the sway of Bokhara and her Russian patrons.

The Grand Duke Cesarevitch has published an appeal to all those possessing special knowledge upon the siege of Sebastopol. They are requested to communicate to him their records, to be used in the compilation of a great national work upon the subject. A Russian paper, relating the fact, says that one of the gratifying results of the Crimean campaign was the speech Mr. Ralston, of the British Museum, delivered in fluent Russ at the last anniversary of the Sebastopol festival. The gracious acknowledgment he made to the bravery of the then adversaries of England left a deep impression upon the Russians.

The junction line between the Azoff and the Rostoff-Voronesh railway has just been opened. It establishes a direct connection between south-eastern Russia and the Crimea.

PRUSSIAN NOTE ON THE LUXEMBURG TREATY.

'*Versailles, December* 3, 1870.

'The undersigned Chancellor of the North German Confederation has the honour of making the following communication to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg:

At the commencement of the war, the Government of his Majesty the King declared that they would respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in case the French pursued a similar policy, and of course supposing that the Grand Duchy would faithfully maintain her neutral position.

His Majesty's Government have fulfilled their promise. They carried their respect for the Grand Duchy so far as to abandon the plan of conveying wounded German soldiers through Luxemburg, suggested by humane considerations, as the French Government protested against it. They regret to find that neither France nor Luxemburg has pursued a similar policy. We may leave unnoticed a number of cases in which the hostile feelings of part of the inhabitants have been displayed in the ill-treatment of German officials resident there, in order that the Grand Ducal Government may not be made responsible for the actions of individuals, although these merited a more severe repression than they found.

A more striking violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg occurred in the provisioning of Thionville, as long as it remained in the hands of the French, by means of night-trains. The Grand Ducal Government have expressed their regret at this occurrence, but they could not deny the fact; and it is established beyond all doubt that the trains could not have been despatched to Thionville without at least the passive assent of the Grand Ducal railway and police officers. His Majesty's Government at the time complained to the Grand Ducal Government, and called their attention to the consequences which must ensue from such a policy. This warning was unfortunately disregarded. Indeed, the violations of the neutrality of Luxemburg have of late become so flagrant, that his Majesty's Government find it impossible to ignore them any longer.

After the surrender of Metz, very large bodies of French soldiers and officers passed through the Grand Duchy for the purpose of avoiding the German positions and reëntering France. In the city of Luxemburg itself, the resident French Vice-Consul actually established an office, in which the refugees were furnished with money and papers to enable them to continue their march to France for the purpose of entering the army of the North. According to present accounts, the number of soldiers who have by this means been added to the French forces amounts to 2000 men.

On the part of the Grand Ducal Government, no measures have been adopted to prevent this. The French soldiers have not been interned. They

have not been prevented from returning to France, with the obvious intention of taking part in the war against Germany. Nor have any difficulties been laid in the way of the French Vice-Consul in pursuance of the course he has publicly adopted, in open contempt of the neutrality of Luxemburg. No doubts can be entertained that the transit of soldiers through the Grand Duchy for the purpose of entering the active army of France, the official assistance afforded to the same by the employés of the French Government, and the toleration of such a course of action on the part of the Grand Ducal Government, constitute a flagrant breach of neutrality.

The conditions on which his Majesty's Government were obliged to make their observance of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy dependent no longer exist. The undersigned, by the command of his Majesty the King, has the honour of informing the Grand Ducal Government that his Majesty's Government no longer consider themselves bound by any consideration for the neutrality of Luxemburg, as far as the operations of the German armies are concerned, and that they reserve to themselves the right of prosecuting their claims against the Government of the Grand Duchy, for the injury suffered by the non-observance of neutrality on the part of Luxemburg, and of adopting the measures necessary to secure themselves against similar occurrences in future.

The undersigned has the honour of adding, that the Governments that signed the treaty of the 11th May 1867 have been informed of this step; and takes this opportunity of renewing the assurance of his most distinguished consideration.

Von Bismarck.'

THE IMPERIAL CROWN OF GERMANY OFFERED TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, December 4, 1870.

The following letter has been addressed by the King of Bavaria to the King of Prussia:

'After the adhesion of Southern Germany to the German Constitutional Alliance, the presidential rights vested in your Majesty will extend over all German States. In consenting to those rights being vested in a single hand, I have been influenced by the conviction that the interests of the whole German Fatherland and its allied Sovereigns will be effectually promoted by this arrangement. I trust that the rights constitutionally possessed by the President of the Confederacy will, by the restoration of the German Empire and the German imperial dignity, be recognised as rights exercised by your Majesty in the name of the entire Fatherland, and by

virtue of the agreement effected between its princes. I have therefore proposed to the German Sovereigns, conjointly with myself, to suggest to your Majesty that the possession of the presidential rights of the Confederacy be coupled with the imperial title. As soon as I have been informed of the resolutions of your Majesty and the allied Princes, I shall direct my Government to take steps to effect a formal agreement on the subject.

LUDWIG.'

Simultaneously with the above the King of Bavaria has addressed to the King of Saxony, and all other German Sovereigns and free towns, the following letter in reference to the Imperial Crown of Germany:

'Most serene and powerful Prince, dear Friend, Brother, and Cousin,—Victoriously led by Prussia's heroic King, the German tribes, who for centuries have been united in language, manners, science, and art, now celebrate a brotherhood of arms which gives a glorious proof of the importance of the power of a united Germany. Animated with a desire to coöperate with them in their endeavours to effect this unity of Germany, I have not delayed entering into negotiations calculated to bring about this result with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation at Versailles.

I now address myself to the German Sovereigns, and especially to your Majesty, to propose that you should, together with me, urge upon his Majesty the King of Prussia, that the exercise of the presidential rights be united with the title of Emperor. It is to me a sublime thought that I can feel myself called upon, both by my position in Germany and by the history of my country, to take the first step towards crowning the work of German unity; and I entertain the joyful hope that your Royal Majesty will accord to me your friendly assent.

While I thus have the pleasure of asking your Royal Majesty, as well as the other confederate Princes and free towns for their opinion, I am, with the assurance of my highest consideration and friendship, your Royal Majesty's friendly brother and cousin,

LUDWIG.'

The North German federal Council ratified the Bavarian Treaty of adhesion by a majority of only two-thirds, many of the minor Governments objecting to the exceptional privileges accorded to Bavaria. The Bavarian Liberal press inveigh against its Government for demanding these privileges. Amendments to the treaty will be proposed in the federal Parliament. Count Bismarck having determined to treat the acceptance or rejection of

the constitutional treaties with the South German States as a Cabinet question, it is certain that they will be passed.

The official *Provinzial Correspondenz* says, in reference to the proposed amendments, that people will soon see that these amendments are equivalent to a rejection of the treaties, and that such a determination would not only materially endanger German affairs, but also the conclusion of peace. The one object to be secured now was that unity which would permit Germany to confront the world as a compact whole, and exact her own conditions of peace.

The semi-official *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* flatly contradicts the rumour that Count Bismarck intends to conclude peace with Napoleon.

M. Lefaivre, French Consul at Vienna, publicly thanks the four Communists in the German federal Parliament for defending the cause of the French Republic against an assembly intoxicated with the lust of conquest. Lefaivre says he has been accredited to German democracy.

The *National Zeitung* relates that a few days ago the French officers detained in Belgium were invited to assemble at M. Tachard's, the French Envoy at Brussels, where they met M. Richard, the French Army Inspector, who in the name of his Government asked them to break their parole, fly to France, and reënter the army. Officers were wanted, and they would be immediately promoted. Many French officers have fled during the last few days from Germany.*

Bishop Mermillod, of Geneva, retracts the accusation published in his name by a French priest, that allurements to heresy are held out to French prisoners in Germany.

To partially cover the damage occasioned by the expulsion of the Germans from France, and by the capture of German merchantmen, a contribution of 750,000 francs is exacted from the arrondissements of Nancy, Toul, and Luneville.

* Several hundred officers broke their parole while residing in Germany.

FRANCE AND THE BLACK SEA CONFERENCE.

Berlin, December 5, 1870.

FRANCE assents to a Black Sea Conference to be held in London, in the hope of finding an opportunity of submitting her own case to the consideration of the Powers. Before participating in the Conference, she, however, wishes the Powers to procure her an armistice, during which to convene a constituent Assembly and institute a recognised Government. This proposal is countenanced neither in London nor in St. Petersburg nor in Vienna, as the Conference itself would thereby be endangered. Count Beust's reply was, that participation of the Envoy of the provisional Government in the Conference would be an indirect recognition of the *status quo*. Prussia, who will accord no armistice except on her own terms, does not object to attend the Conference, even if France absents herself. The Porte agreed to the proposal presented by the Prussian Minister, on the condition that the only questions to be discussed shall be those raised by the Note of Prince Gortschakoff. Official invitations are about to be dispatched. It is confidently hoped that France will waive her scruples and attend, as in consequence of the pacific disposition of Turkey the matter might otherwise be settled without her.

The Petersburg semi-official *Golos* says, that in denouncing certain clauses of the Treaty of 1856, Russia had no wish to announce the immediate construction of a fleet, but, on the contrary, counted upon her declaration being legalised by the Powers. In point of fact, her declaration was only a short-cut to a Conference. The same paper says that the proposed Conference being likely to consider the substance rather than the form of the Russian demands, a pacific solution may be regarded as certain.

After the publication of the Note of Prince Gortschakoff, private subscriptions were opened at St. Petersburg for building a fleet in the Black Sea. The official St. Petersburg *Gazette*, referring to this subject, says there is no occasion for any extraordinary shipbuilding, the defence of the coasts of the Black Sea being secure in time of peace through the ordinary means furnished by the budget. The subscriptions have been prohibited.

The Moscow papers inveigh against the German press for censuring the denunciation of the Treaty of 1856. The sale of the German *Petersburger Zeitung* has been subjected to special restrictions because it supports Germany against France.

All the American Envoys in Europe have been instructed to refrain from participation in any collective step of the Powers in the Eastern or Franco-German questions.

THE DEBATE ON THE NEW GERMAN TREATIES.

Berlin, December 6, 1870.

In yesterday's sitting of the federal Parliament the debate on the treaties which are to join the Southern States to the Northern Confederacy and create a united Fatherland was opened by Secretary of State, Delbrück, who gave a short account of the origin and contents of those important compacts. The House and galleries were crowded, when, with his usual businesslike demeanour, he rose and said:

'When in the spring of 1867 the Constitution of the North German Confederacy was settled by this assembly, the members were all but unanimous in holding that the new federal alliance would not be for ever restricted to the Northern section of the country. Accordingly, a clause

providing for the adhesion of the Southern States was expressly inserted into the Charter. Earlier than we expected have our hopes been fulfilled. An historical event of uncommon magnitude has convinced the people of Germany, that the time has arrived when their reunion must be effected, and, the like conviction pervading the various Governments, we have to-day the gratification of submitting to Parliament the treaties of adhesion concluded with the Southern States.

You are aware that, on the Southern States signifying their intention of joining the Northern alliance, I was instructed to open negotiations with them. Bavaria had taken the initiative, and to Munich I went. In acquitting myself of this task, I was directed to avoid all that could be interpreted as implying a wish to exercise any the slightest pressure upon the Southern States. Our discussions at Munich were greatly promoted by the presence of a Plenipotentiary representing the kingdom of Würtemberg. On the negotiations being subsequently continued at Versailles, the Baden and Hesse Governments addressed corresponding overtures to his Majesty's Government; with this difference, however, that whereas Bavaria and Würtemberg asked for some modifications of the federal Charter, which should regulate their position in the new commonwealth, the two other Cabinets simply moved for admission to the Confederacy as it stood. The negotiations with Bavaria, not leading to a speedy conclusion, were suspended for some time, but eventually resulted in the treaties now submitted to your sanction. In the treaties with Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse some clauses have been inserted at the instance of Bavaria, which, had they not been insisted upon by the Munich Government, would probably not have been demanded by the States immediately concerned. These clauses refer to the relations between the Southern States and the central Government, giving them a position privileged, it is true, but not at variance with the essential requirements of unity.

Some of you may be of opinion that the unity thus attained is not sufficiently close; but in consenting to it we were convinced that we were securing that which was indispensable, and might confidently leave future developments to the federal Council and Parliament. You will moreover admit that the larger the States entering into the Confederacy, the more natural was it for us to leave them in the enjoyment of a certain amount of independence. After all, the primary requisite of unity, which is the creation of a united German army, has been secured. Even the King of Bavaria, who has an exceptional position granted him, has engaged to organise his army upon the federal pattern, and in time of war to place it unconditionally at the disposal of the federal Commander-in-chief. If Prussia has renounced the right to declare war, and allowed this supreme privilege to be vested in the federal Council, we were prompted to make this concession by the consideration that the Confederacy will be an alliance chiefly for defensive purposes. At the same time, we do not think that this concession, or even that other one by which a standing committee on foreign

affairs is established in the federal Council, will have power materially to alter the existing state of things.

The wishes of the Southern Governments have been likewise acceded to in some smaller matters. The federal beer and spirit excise has not been extended to the South. This is of no great moment, as it will perhaps be shortly modified in the North. We have left to the Southern States also the direction of their posts and telegraphs in time of peace, and do not object to Bavaria retaining the supervision of her railways. As the Southern States did not wish to part with a prerogative so long exercised by them, and moreover engaged to conform to our rules in the administration of these departments, we should not, in our opinion, have been justified in wounding their feelings by a peremptory demand. It is a more important exception accorded to Bavaria that the federal law on the right of residence will not extend to her. You are aware that, until a very short time ago, the right of taking up one's residence wherever one chose was subject to sundry limitations not easily overcome in the largest of the Southern States. Two years ago this law was superseded by a more liberal one, which has worked well, and which the Bavarian Government does not wish to change so soon after its enactment for the unrestricted liberty accorded under the federal statute.

In conclusion, I have to remark that most of the federal laws passed since the establishment of the Confederacy will, under the new treaties, be introduced into the South either at once or shortly. In forming an opinion on these treaties, you will, I have no doubt, remember that, though the federal ties may not be so tightly drawn as some have expected, they are sufficiently close for the reunion which the nation is engaged in gradually achieving. We had to accommodate ourselves to existing realities, and put up with what was good when perfection could not be attained. The having acted differently on previous occasions did not certainly turn out to the advantage of Germany. Let us be discreet this time.'

The next speaker, Herr Schultze-Delitzsch, the famous originator of the Savings-bank and Trade Association movement, found it difficult to make himself heard. Victorious intelligence having just arrived from Orleans, the members were hardly in a mood to interrupt their speculations on the prospects of the war to listen to Opposition arguments, which they had determined beforehand not to accept. Herr Schultze defended an amendment introduced by the advanced Liberals, that the treaties, as they established a new federal Constitution, should be laid before a Constituent Parliament specially elected, and including Depu-

ties from the Southern States. This, he urged, was a more dignified course than to have them ratified by the federal Parliament and the four Southern Parliaments. The new Constitution would be a very bad one, granting, as it did, Bavaria an exceptional position. It required more exact scrutiny than could be given it now. The Sovereigns had taken time to secure their interests; so must the people.

Other speakers then rose to attack or vindicate the new treaties, as the case might be. The Conservatives, upon the whole, were in favour of accepting them; the moderate Liberals, represented by Herr Lascar, regretted the spirit of unnecessary jealousy possessing the Bavarian Government, yet hoped that an agreement would be effected there and then; while the advanced Liberals, by referring the matter to a new Parliament, wished to put off a settlement, and, if Bavaria remains obstinate, would not object to leaving her out altogether. In their opinion this procedure was the more advisable, as the Liberal party in Bavaria were in favour of complete unity, and would certainly coöperate with the federal Parliament in bringing their Government to reason. It is, however, certain that their advice will not be followed, and that the new treaties, with some amendments perhaps, agreeable to the popular politics, will be ratified by the House before many days are over.

In the course of the debate, Herr Delbrück communicated to the House the letter of the King of Bavaria to the King of Prussia, the text of which I have already sent to you. The proposal that the King of Prussia shall assume for himself and heirs the Imperial title of Germany will, as you were informed a month ago, be accepted by all parties. Already have the Sovereigns assembled at Versailles given their consent, and the others are sure to follow suit. As regards the people, the inhabitants of the old provinces of Prussia are not particularly gratified by a change of title, transforming the time-

honoured character of Der König von Preussen into the less familiar and less tangible one of Der Kaiser von Deutschland. However, as the rest of the Germans, the minor Sovereigns inclusive, are in favour of the metamorphosis, and find it more natural to be presided over by the Emperor of Germany than by the King of Prussia, public opinion in this country will not actively oppose an innovation which, after all, is likely to cement unity.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

Berlin, December 10, 1870.

THOUGH the second reading of the South German treaties did not pass without some amendments being voted by the House, the third reading witnessed the restoration and ratification by an overwhelming majority of the original text. A telegram from Count Bismarck, that he would resign rather than submit to any alteration in the new compacts, sufficed to make honourable members reconsider their votes, and bow to one who is supposed to know best. Some, who would not have been swayed with equal facility by personal influences, were induced to give in by the consideration, that even imperfect unity is too valuable a gift to be rashly rejected. Does not unity, according to the hopeful anticipation of the Liberals, involve the promise of everything else? Is not a united Parliament supposed to be a Liberal one, strong enough to bear down any reactionary propensities of the Government, or rather the Governments, at no very distant date? Why, therefore, not allow Bavaria to retain a more independent position than the other States? Why not spare the sensibilities of her dynasty when her

local Parliament will itself soon compel the withdrawal of claims beneficial to no one, and maintained by her royal House only because it would be too painful to part with all one's prerogatives at once? Why not sanction a federal Charter marked by the absence of official responsibility, and containing no increase of constitutional rights, if it is morally certain that, with the nation fully awake to the requirements of a safe and respectable existence, all deficiencies will have to be made up before many years are over? Has not the most satisfactory progress towards liberty been made by the various State Parliaments in the last twenty years? And will not the little that remains to be achieved be obtained with comparative ease, now that the principal points have been secured, and the rest of the combat is to be carried on, not by thirty separate assemblies, twenty-five of which were of diminutive proportions, but by one grand dignified body, the representative of the entire nation, and the exponent of its united will?

Such were the reflections which did away with the scruples of the Liberal party, and produced a majority for an arrangement which public opinion otherwise would have denounced as of rather a questionable nature. If any particularly recalcitrant member held back notwithstanding, he was got over by the friends of the Government urging the necessity of presenting a united front to the world at a time when peace, even if restored, would be of but doubtful duration. And so the decisive votes were passed. The Baden, Hesse, and Würtemberg treaties were sanctioned all but unanimously; while the Bavarian Convention, the most objectionable of all, was negatived by no more than some thirty votes out of 225. The opposition mainly proceeded from the unity party demanding still more centralised institutions. A good many members absented themselves because they would not say 'Nay,' and could not bring themselves to say 'Ay.'

As the result of this important change, all Germany henceforth forms a united commonwealth, with an hereditary Emperor, a central Parliament, and a common capital. The jurisdiction of the Empire, subject to the exceptions in favour of Bavaria and Würtemberg noted below, extends to the following points:

'1. The privilege of residing, exercising political rights, carrying on trade, and possessing real property in every part of Germany; as also all that relates to passports and the supervision of travellers, with the whole legislation on trade, commerce, emigration, colonisation, inclusive of the provisions affecting insurance companies.

2. The tariff and the federal excise and taxes.

3. Coinage, weights and measures, together with the fundamental provisions for the issue of paper money.

4. Banking.

5. Patents of invention.

6. The protection of books and all kinds of intellectual productions from spurious imitations.

7. The protection of German navigation, and the appointment of federal Consuls.

8. Railways and other means of communication.

9. Inland navigation and water tolls.

10. Post and telegraph.

11. The carrying out of judicial decisions and requisitions in every State alike.

12. The legalisation of public documents.

13. The legislation on criminal law, commercial law, as likewise the law on bills of exchange and obligations, and common rules of judicial procedure in matters civil and criminal.

14. Army and navy.

15. The action of the sanitary and veterinary police departments.

16. The press laws, and the right of forming associations.'

In future, legislation on the above topics will be the joint work of all the States. There are, though, some notable exceptions. The federal law on the right of residence will not extend to Bavaria, which retains the unenviable privilege of preventing her own subjects from easily changing their residence, and of excluding other Germans from carrying on trade in Bavaria. Neither do the railways, posts, and telegraphs of Bavaria come under the

federal jurisdiction, except so far as regards military purposes; nor will the insurance companies laws of the Confederacy be valid in that State, unless with the special assent of its Government. Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria will be exempt from the federal excise on beer and spirits, and consequently do not participate in the distribution of the sums flowing into the federal exchequer from this source; and Würtemberg, like Bavaria, preserves the supervision of her posts and telegraphs, though in a much more restricted way.

Other exceptions relate to military matters. The northern States, and Baden and Hesse, have either handed over their armies entirely to Prussia, or conform in everything to the federal military organisation, and are placed under federal command in time of peace as of war. Würtemberg consents to accept the federal organisation and military laws, as also a federal Commander-in-chief, yet practically retains the command of her troops in time of peace. Bavaria only introduces the federal organisation, but retains her own military laws, and moreover enjoys the special distinction that the King of Bavaria remains commander of his army during the continuance of peace. The troops of all the States swear fidelity to their own Sovereign as well as to the Emperor, the Bavarian oath confining, however, fidelity to the latter only to time of war. In the North, as well as in Baden and Hesse, the commanders of the troops of every State, as also the commanders of all fortresses, are constitutionally appointed by the Emperor; all other officers to be appointed by the local Sovereigns, and generals, and officers acting as generals, to be confirmed by the Emperor. In the case of nearly all the Northern States and of Baden, this constitutional provision has, however, been superseded by special treaties, handing over the minor State armies entirely to the Emperor, and making them part and parcel of the Prussian force. Würtemberg appoints

all her officers, but, as I have said, accepts a federal commander even in peace, a concession which Bavaria makes only in time of war.

The legislation of the Empire is carried on by a federal Council (Bundesrath) and a federal Parliament (Reichstag). The federal Council is formed of the representatives of the Emperor and the twenty-four other Sovereigns of Germany. To give each Sovereign an influence proportioned to his territory a curious arithmetical arrangement has been devised. Prussia's vote in the federal Council is put down at seventeen, Bavaria at six, Saxony's and Würtemberg's each at four, Baden and Hesse each at three, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick each at two, the rest having one each. The distribution of these votes being copied from the old German Bund is an arbitrary one, and does not at all represent the relative importance of the various States. Prussia, for instance, with 24,000,000 inhabitants, has only seventeen votes, while the rest of Germany, which taken together has no more than 15,000,000 inhabitants, has forty-one. It was chiefly this arrangement which the Liberal party objected to, and which but for the assurance of the Government that they had every reason to confide in the discretion of their allies would have been scarcely sanctioned by Parliament.

How it will work remains to be seen. Bills to be valid require the consent of the federal Council and federal Parliament, which latter consists of 382 members, elected by universal suffrage and ballot votes. In addition to its legislative functions, the federal Council represents also a sort of supreme administrative and consultative board. It prepares bills, and issues such supplementary provisions as may be required to insure the enforcement of the federal laws. The better to superintend the business of the Empire, the Council divides itself into eight standing committees, respectively for army matters; naval matters; tariff, excise, and taxes; trade and commerce; railways,

posts, and telegraphs; civil and criminal law; accounts and foreign affairs. Each committee consists of representatives of four States and the Emperor; but the foreign affairs committee includes only the representatives of the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg. These committees prepare the business for the *plenum* of the federal Council, and are of course assisted by officials and clerks forming the staff of the Imperial service. As yet the number of these officials is inconsiderable, as they serve only to assist the federal Council and to convey its behests to the State boards, suffered to continue as formerly. The more unity is strengthened, the more will the State boards be superseded by Imperial boards.

The Emperor is to represent the nation, conclude treaties, and accredit as well as receive envoys. He also declares war in the name of the Empire; but unless the national territory is attacked, he requires the consent of the federal Council for the exercise of this latter right. The necessity of such consent, which did not appear in the Charter of 1866, and was inserted in the new Charter only at the instance of Bavaria, was one of the great stumbling-blocks of the Liberal party. On closer inspection the passage does not, however, seem to deserve the attention it has attracted, seeing that the wording of it permits the King of Prussia to declare war, even though in his capacity as Emperor he may not be permitted to do so by the federal Council. After the events of the last few years, it is very unlikely that any German Sovereign will venture to stand aloof when Prussia goes to war, no matter whether she draws the sword in her Prussian or in her German capacity. Bavaria, as indeed every individual State, retains the right to keep up diplomatic relations; a privilege conceded them merely as a matter of courtesy, as, after the loss of their former independence, they can have no regular diplomatic business to transact. If an Imperial and a Bavarian envoy be accredited at a foreign

Court, the latter will be entitled temporarily to replace the former, if absent or otherwise prevented from officiating.

The mention of a few more arrangements will complete this general outline of the remodelled Charter. No changes can be effected in the Constitution if they are opposed by fourteen votes in the federal Council — another of those enactments which the Liberals, for whom the present Constitution is not half centralised enough, would not have passed, were they not convinced of the growing influence of the people on the local Governments. A display of this confidence was all the more necessary, as the exceptional privileges accorded to the Southern States have been declared *jura singulorum—i. e.* cannot be abolished without the special consent of the privileged parties. For the present, the only counter-concession of the Southern States is, that their representatives in the federal Council and Parliament have no right of vote on matters wherein they have placed themselves outside the federal law. Finally, the greater part of the federal laws issued during the last four years is introduced into the Southern States either at once or at different dates near at hand.

As appears from the above, the reunion of the German States, accomplished under this Charter, leaves a wide margin for future improvement. It makes no fresh concessions to constitutionalism. It does not satisfy the popular longings for a state of things in which towns and villages will administer their local business independent of Government interference. It does not make the administrative authorities liable to obey the decisions of the courts of justice; nor does it allow the public sufficient influence over school and church to adapt them to what they regard as the requirements of an enlightened age. All these principal *desiderata* remain to be secured now as before. Again, as regards the relations of the individual States to the central Government, only the most indis-

pensable framework of unity has been created. The whole domain of civil law, school law, and church law—vast everywhere, and vaster in Germany than it ought to be, owing to the meddling propensities of the State—is exempt from federal jurisdiction. Even in those departments legislated for by the federal corporate bodies, the Emperor has no regular administrative machinery to enforce the statutes enacted by himself and the central Parliament, but depends for their execution upon the State authorities. He certainly, with the consent of the federal Council, can put in an execution against refractory States; but this is an extreme proceeding, and not likely to be resorted to except in extreme cases. Only in matters military is his power supreme and its exercise secured, Bavaria's doings in time of peace alone excepted.

I believe I am not uttering a paradox when I say that some, though certainly not all, of its deficiencies adapt the new Constitution all the better to the generation it is intended for. While fully affording the principal requisite of protection from foreign enemies, it leaves many other demands of the time to be worked out gradually. If the federal Parliament becomes what it ought, it will, like its predecessor during the last four years, succeed in securing many valuable liberties by convincing the Governments that there is no danger in the concession, though there might be some and ever-increasing inconvenience in the refusal. In such a case even the *jura singulorum* and the large majority required in the federal Council for modifications of the Constitution will offer no insurmountable obstacle. On the other hand, if Parliament falls short of what is expected of it, another time of probation will be useful, if not necessary. But there are few in this country who think it will come to this. In consequence of the immense achievements of the army and bureaucracy at a time of danger, the Liberal party have been certainly disappointed in their tactics of offering the crown

of Germany in exchange for the full and immediate satisfaction of all Liberal desires. But the Crown, not to dispense with popular assistance, has already given in on many essential points, and having had occasion to test afresh the loyal and conservative tendencies of the people, will be more and more disposed to recognise the moderation of its claims.

The following is the text of the address which is to be presented by a deputation of the North German Parliament to King William at Versailles. It was adopted by 191 Ayes against 6 Noes (Social Democrats):

'Most illustrious and most mighty King, most gracious King and Lord,—At the call of your Majesty the people have rallied around their leader, and heroically defend on foreign soil the Fatherland, which had been wantonly challenged. The war demands immeasurable sacrifices; but the deep grief at the loss of her brave sons does not shake the determined resolution of the nation, who will not lay aside her arms till peace is assured by secure and better-protected frontiers against the ever-recurring attacks of her jealous neighbour. Thanks to the victories to which your Majesty has led the armies of Germany in faithful companionship of arms, the nation looks forward to an enduring unity.

The North German Parliament, in unison with the Princes of Germany, approaches your Majesty with the prayer that your Majesty will deign to consecrate the work of unification by accepting the Imperial Crown of Germany. The Teutonic Crown on the head of your Majesty will inaugurate, for the reëstablished empire of the German nation, an era of power, of peace, of well-being, and of liberty, secured under the protection of the laws.

The Fatherland thanks its leader and the glorious army which your Majesty has led to many a victorious battle-field. The devotion and the deeds of its sons will be remembered for ever. May it soon be vouchsafed to us that the Emperor, crowned with glory, restore peace to the nation! United Germany has proved victorious in war, under the leadership of its supreme commander; the United German Empire will be mighty and peace-loving under its Emperor.

Your Royal Majesty's most humble and most faithfully obedient,

THE REICHSTAG OF THE NORTH GERMAN BUND.'

PRUSSIAN OPINION ON THE WAR.

Berlin, December 12, 1870.

One hundred and eighty thousand freshly embodied Reserve are at this moment on their way to the seat of war. The King is determined to follow up his victories, and make a clean sweep of it in the shortest possible time. The new troops will be employed in filling up gaps, in reinforcing General Werder at Dijon, and in occupying the extensive lines of communication opened by the steady advance of the regulars into the heart of France. Coming after so many preceding ones, this new levy strikes home, and is grievously felt by many families who never dreamt of seeing their bread-winners—men between thirty-five and forty—enter the ranks again. Still, there is no grumbling. There is the same stern determination to settle the French once for all; the same ardent desire to render the promenade *à Berlin* a thing henceforth to be much more maturely considered than hitherto. The frivolity with which the French planned the invasion for so many years, and the recklessness with which they entered upon it at what appeared to them a favourable moment, has created a sustained indignation in the intended victims which nothing hitherto has been able to allay.

It cannot be too often repeated, that people in this country are much more enraged at the losses they endure than elated at the triumphs they achieve. This feeling, paramount in the towns and centres of culture, has penetrated to the remotest villages, and will supply the King with willing reserves quite as long as the natural grief and disappointment of the French are likely to fill the ranks of M. Gambetta. Independently, moreover, of the politics of the day, it has always been a recognised principle in this monarchy, that the State in time of war should have unconditional command over the resources of the

population, their lives not excepted. In a land which, owing to its unfortunate geographical situation, has had so very often to fight for bare existence, this conviction is the natural result of a toilsome past, and in fact the only reliable shield against so many unfriendly neighbours. Heavily, therefore, as the burden and misery of the war have fallen upon the people, and doubly as it afflicts them in an industrial and prosperous age, there is no murmuring, no opposition on the part of the civilian warriors and the millions of others involved in this great national sacrifice.

If there is any dissatisfaction here at the conduct of the war, it relates to the bombardment, or rather the non-bombardment, of Paris. Somehow or other, the rumour has got afloat, that the long delay which has supervened in this the crowning action of the war is not so much the result of military considerations as the consequence of royal and imperial influences brought to bear upon the leading personages in the camp. By the repeated announcements of the cannonade, people were naturally led to conclude that the thing was quite practicable; now that it is not executed after all, they fancy they can discern sentimental reasons which, while sparing Paris, sacrifice the life-blood of Germany's own warriors. "The longer the time consumed in waiting for the surrender, the more unavailing become the assurances of inspired papers, that all that is done or left undone is in harmony with the plan of the campaign, and solely referable to tactical grounds. Yet the public are mistaken in their dismal conclusions. It is certain that, whatever extraneous influences may have been at work, the decision arrived at was taken in the regular course of military business.

On what I have reason to believe good authority, I am informed that the royal head-quarters is not agreed on the subject. General Count Moltke, as well as General von Blumenthal, the chief of the Crown Prince's Staff, and Colonel Rieff, the commander of the siege artillery, from

the very first looked with diffidence upon the arduous undertaking of reducing such a fortress by powder and shot. They certainly thought the thing practicable, but long and difficult, and knowing Paris to be but scantily provided, preferred the safer and less sanguinary method of starving it out. Their arguments were opposed by Count Bismarck and General von Roon, the Minister of War, urging the expediency of an attack, were it only to hasten the effect of hunger, produce a strong impression upon the inhabitants, and dispel the dreams of inviolability fostered by the tirades of a Victor Hugo and his friends. According as the one or the other opinion prevailed, the language of official organs varied, until ultimately it ceased altogether. The last decision was a sort of compromise between the two opposing opinions; but it is, of course, more than any one can tell whether events have not caused it to be again superseded.

Among the many noble acts of charity which the misery of the war has called forth stands out the gift of Dr. Strousberg, the great railway contractor, who a few days ago provided winter fuel for the wives of Berlin Landwehr men at an expense of some 15,000*l.*

While the King is still in the camp, a younger sister of his has departed this life. Princess Frederick of the Netherlands was born on February 1, 1808, married May 21, 1825, and has spent the long years since that event in Holland, visiting Berlin very rarely since the death of her parents. Her husband is the uncle of his Dutch Majesty; and of her two daughters one is Queen of Sweden, while the other is as yet unmarried. This bereavement leaves the Grand Duchess Dowager of Mecklenburg-Schwerin the only living sister of King William. A third sister, the widow of the Emperor Nicholas, died some years ago. Of his Majesty's brothers, King Frederick William IV. died in 1861; Carl and Albrecht are still alive, and actively engaged in the war—the one at head-quarters at Versailles,

the other holding the command of a cavalry division in the army on the Loire.

THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG IMPAIRED.

Berlin, December 13, 1870.

In a circular note, dated the 3d of December, Prussia denounces the Luxemburg neutrality Treaty of 1867, on the ground that the Luxemburg authorities connived at the provisioning Thionville, and suffered many French fugitives and escaped prisoners to return to France. The French Consul at Luxemburg kept an open office for the reënlistment of his fugitive countrymen. Count Bismarck's note declares to the Powers concerned, and to the Grand Ducal Government of Luxemburg, that in the face of these violations of neutrality, the Federal Government must reserve for itself full freedom of future resolve.

It is denied in Prussian official circles that there is any analogy between the denunciation of the Black Sea and the Luxemburg Treaties. Russia, at the time the alleged infractions of the Black Sea Treaty were committed, never favoured us with her opinion that the treaty had been invalidated, but, waiting her opportunity, denounced it when the Powers were otherwise engaged; but Prussia receded from the Luxemburg compact the moment it was violated, in order to inform the Luxemburg Government they had forfeited the neutral position accorded them, and would be henceforth regarded as responsible agents.

The Luxemburg affair will lead to no complications. Though Luxemburg, in consequence of the Prussian declaration, ceases to be a State neutralised by the common consent of all Europe, it is nevertheless acknowledged as an independent State. Only in the event of Luxemburg

openly supporting France and injuring Germany would the latter be provoked to reprisals. But it is very improbable things will come to that. The Grand Duke of Luxemburg is evidently not disquieted by the Prussian note. The statement of the Brussels, Luxemburg, and Vienna press, that the Grand Duke would not object to cede the Duchy to Germany, is thus far not contradicted at Amsterdam. All the Vienna journals speak most emphatically against the proceedings of Prussia in regard to Luxemburg.

The unity party have achieved a brilliant victory in the elections for the Würtemberg State Parliament. The Ultramontane and Republican parties, which are anti-Prussian, and were formerly paramount in the Würtemberg Parliament, have succumbed.

PRUSSIAN NOTE ON THE DESERTION OF FRENCH PRISONERS.

COUNT BISMARCK has addressed the following circular to the North German Ambassadors at foreign Courts:

'*Versailles, December* 14, 1870.

'The frequent desertions of French officers, involving a violation of their word of honour, and the declarations which several of them included in the capitulation of Sedan have published with reference to their secret departure, show that the ideas of honour, current among some of the French officers, are not those which on the German side were hitherto regarded as a sufficient guarantee for the observance of *parole*. We had it in our power on the 2d of September to annihilate the army shut up in Sedan, by arms or by famine, and thereby to render it harmless. Confiding in their good faith, we acceded to the well-known capitulation. In signing the instrument of capitulation, the Generalissimo of the invested troops, General Wimpffen, guaranteed its fulfilment by the officers under him; the latter, according to the usual notions of military honour, and according to the general law of treaties, were bound to respect it. What the individual officers thought of the capitulation, we neither knew nor required to

know; otherwise an army or a garrison could never capitulate without the assent of every individual in it. As a matter of fact, all the officers of MacMahon's army who were in Sedan availed themselves of the concessions made in the capitulation, in order to retain their lives and property. Some of them have abused the trust which the German Commander-in-Chief placed in them personally, with regard to the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by them. Among these were Generals Ducrot, Barral, and Cambriels.

Your Excellency will have observed in the newspapers the statement of General Ducrot, in which he relates how he escaped from the railway station at Pont-à-Mousson; and, by a casuistry which I will not discuss, explains how he deceived the confidence reposed in him and abused the privileges afforded him. Nevertheless, he did not, as he chooses to regard it, break the word of honour personally given by him after the conclusion of the capitulation. At any rate he evaded it. General Cambriels, in a letter published in the *Siècle* of the 15th of November, in which he defends himself against certain reproaches cast on him by the French, mentions incidentally, and as a matter of course, that he profited by the capitulation in which he was included, and by our considerate treatment of the wounded, to escape from Sedan. General Barral, so far as I know, has made no attempt to justify or gloss over his having treacherously entered the French army, when he had given his word of honour not to take up arms against Germany in the present war and to repair to the place of residence assigned to him.

After this, it is less surprising, though not the less remarkable, in an army jealous of its honour, if many officers of lower rank, some of whom are indicated in the appended list, have, by a breach of their parole, escaped from the places in Germany wherein free and uncontrolled movement had been allowed them, in return for the pledge given that they would not depart. Considerable as the number of these faithless officers is, it constitutes but a small fraction of the whole number. Up to the present time we have accordingly refrained from holding the French officers responsible as a body for the dishonourable conduct of some of their comrades, and have not subjected them to stricter supervision. The matter, however, assumes another aspect when the offence committed by the fugitive officers is officially approved by the Government of the National Defence placing them in the army fighting against us; and when no refusal to receive these faithless officers in their ranks has been known to proceed from the French army. It is evident the Paris Government, and all the officers serving under it, thereby accept a share in the responsibility of those individuals, who, in defiance of all the usages of war, have broken their engagements.

Under these circumstances, the allied German Governments are bound to consider whether it is consistent with their military interests to grant in future the usual privileges to captured French officers; and they will have to consider the still more serious question, what confidence they can place in

the fulfilment by French Generals or by the French Government of any convention which may yet be concluded without material guarantees. Reserving to the German Governments the right to take the measures they may judge necessary, I think it right to direct the attention of the Government to which your Excellency is accredited to the experience which we have had, and to the influence it must exercise upon international relations with France as at present constituted. After this any complaints lodged by the French rulers against such measures of precaution as we may be obliged to take will, I am sure, meet with proper appreciation.

I beg your Excellency to read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to hand him a copy of it.

VON BISMARCK.'

THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION.

Berlin, December 16, 1870.

To form a correct estimate of the Luxemburg question, it is necessary to take certain extraneous circumstances into account. The King of Holland, who is likewise Grand Duke of the little principality, seems to be as willing as ever to part with his sovereign rights for a consideration. His Dutch advisers do not object to his giving up a territory which, not being subject to their control, and having a delicate position between two antagonistic empires, is likely to prove an embarrassment at some future day. In denouncing the Treaty of 1867, then, Count Bismarck had good reason to hope that he was not committing an act which would occasion any very considerable disquietude at the Hague. On the contrary, it is thought that a disposition has been evinced at the latter city to come to an arrangement which, while not entirely annihilating the independence of the Duchy, divests its present Sovereign of a dignity which he has learned to regard as a burden. These conditions would be fulfilled by the transfer of the Duchy to one of those minor Princes of Germany at present not possessing a sovereign title of his own. If, for

instance, the ex-Duke of Nassau or his son, who are nearly related to the King of Holland, and indeed form the senior branch of his house, were to ascend the Luxemburg throne, and join the empire, to which Luxemburg has belonged for a thousand years, the Luxemburgers would remain Luxemburgers, keep their local Government, and yet return to that relation to Germany in which they stood till within the last four years. As it was only a threat of war on the part of Napoleon III. which induced Germany to part with Luxemburg soon after 1866, the idea of recovering the lost territory has probably never been entirely abandoned at Berlin; and the Hague not being averse from the plan, it now seems that some such project is in the wind. Besides the Nassau royalties, I hear the young Prince of Wied, who is the brother-in-law of the Prince of Roumania, and engaged to a Dutch princess, spoken of as a possible candidate. His Serene Highness has just gone from the camp of Versailles, where military duties had called him, to the Hague to convey to his Dutch Majesty the condolence of King William on the demise of Princess Frederick of the Netherlands. Prince Henry of the Netherlands, the brother of King William III., and Governor-General of the Duchy, is also mentioned as a candidate.

As regards the important question, what the Luxemburgers themselves would say to such a change, it cannot be legally effected without the consent of their local Parliament. Should it be asked, that consent will not be very willingly given. Yet it will be given. On the one hand, the Luxemburgers have always belonged to the Zollverein, and would be subjected to serious pecuniary loss, were they to suffer exclusion from the tariff league of Germany, in consequence of a refusal to rejoin its political commonwealth. On the other hand, if on reëmbodiment with the empire they were permitted to remain a separate principality, the priests, who have always fomented opposition

to Germany because afraid of annexation to Protestant Prussia, would have no very urgent cause to represent to the villagers, that by voting for the Bund they were endangering their souls. It is quite true that the Luxemburgers would not be much gratified at the prospect of personal military service, and the necessary increase of taxes consequent upon it; but circumstanced as they are, even this would be less unpalatable than the ruin of their industry.

From the Powers no particular resistance would be probably offered to the innovation. As you may remember, Lord Derby, then Lord Stanley, a few days after the conclusion of the Treaty for the neutralisation of Luxemburg, observed in Parliament that, directly that treaty was no longer recognised by one of the signatary Powers, the others would be likewise at liberty to regard it as null and void. We are perhaps not far out in supposing this particular declaration to have had some influence in prompting Count Bismarck to take the step announced in his circular note. If he wished to pave the way for a change in the international position of the Duchy, it was natural for a man with his long memory to call to mind the words dropped by an English Secretary of State, and avail himself of the advantage they seemed to offer. At any rate, it is not to be defined what other practical motive he can have had in receding from the treaty in question.

Though his circular deprives Luxemburg of its privileged existence as a State neutralised by the common consent of Europe, it remains nevertheless a State neutral in the present war, and as such legally free to sell arms and provisions to either belligerent. It may have forfeited neutralisation, which involves a guarantee from others, by serving as an *entrepot* for French escaped prisoners on their way home; but it none the less retains neutrality, which means no more than impartiality towards either party, and, in consequence, may suffer French fugitives to tra-

verse its soil, and have commercial dealings with both French and Germans. Apart therefore from the one act of running a provision train into Thionville while besieged by the Germans, which was a breach not only of neutralisation, but also of neutrality, the Luxemburgers will be at liberty, even after the circular of the German Chancellor, to continue nearly the same course as before. But it is not very probable that so eminently practical a man as Count Bismarck should have taken so marked a step as the denunciation of a treaty merely to express dissatisfaction, without any tangible advantage to be secured by it. Much less would he have done so at a time when he has so much else on his hands, and if there had been any danger of conjuring up a European question by Holland appealing to the Powers. As much has been written on the 'Luxemburg language,' it may be necessary to observe that it is mainly the same dialect as that spoken by the country people in the adjoining districts of the Rhine province.

KING WILLIAM'S THIRD PROCLAMATION TO THE GERMAN ARMIES.

Berlin, December 17, 1870.

His Majesty the King has issued the following order to the army:

'Soldiers of the allied German Armies,—We have again arrived at an epoch in the war. When I last addressed you, the last of the French armies opposed to us at the commencement of the campaign had been destroyed by the capitulation of Metz. Since then, the enemy, by making extraordinary exertions, has opposed to us new bodies of troops, and a great part of the inhabitants of France have abandoned their peaceful avocations, which we did not disturb, to take up arms. The enemy often outnumbered us, yet you have again defeated him; for bravery, discipline, and a just cause are of more value than superiority of numbers. All the endeavours of the enemy to break through the investing lines of Paris have been decisively

repulsed; sometimes, as at Champigny and Le Bourget, with severe sacrifices, yet with the heroism you always display. The hostile armies which approached on every side to raise the siege of Paris have all been beaten. Our troops, part of which only a few weeks ago lay before Metz and Strasburg, have now advanced beyond Rouen, Orleans, and Dijon; and besides many small but victorious engagements, two great victories—Amiens, and the battle before Orleans, which lasted several days — are added to our former achievements. Several fortresses, and a great deal of war material, have been taken. I have therefore occasion for the greatest satisfaction, which I feel a pleasure in expressing to you. I thank you all, from the general to the common soldier. Should the enemy insist on continuing the war, I know you will continue to exert all your powers in the same manner, which has led to the great successes we have gained, until we succeed in concluding an honourable peace, worthy of the sacrifices of blood and life we have made.

WILLIAM.

Head-quarters, Versailles, December 6, 1870.'

LUXEMBURG CORRESPONDENCE.

Berlin, December 13, 1870.

THE Prussian circular on the Luxemburg affair reserves to this Government the right of exacting an indemnity for injury suffered. It is probable that negotiations will be opened with a view to define and vindicate this claim. Possibly it will be referred to arbitration. The assurance given by the semi-official *North German Gazette*, that Prussia has no wish to deprive Luxemburg of her position as an independent State, does not necessarily clash with the report that it is intended to induce Luxemburg to rejoin the federal empire of Germany.

The Berlin ministerial *New Prussian* (*Cross*) *Gazette* says, that as the Luxemburg Government must have foreseen the consequences of its ignoring the duties of neutrality, it cannot be surprised if action is at once taken without reference to diplomatic negotiations, for which there is no time in the midst of a war. The interests of

the German armies would be gravely compromised, if flagrant breaches of neutrality were allowed merely to lead to a protracted exchange of notes, whereas an immediate secession from the treaties secures safety in every respect.

The Brussels papers publish a despatch from Arlon which states that the King of Holland has sent the following tardy telegram to the Government of Luxemburg: 'I will defend the Treaty of 1867 and the honour and independence of the Grand Duchy. I approve all the acts of the Grand Ducal Government.' In Luxemburg an address is being prepared, beseeching the King of Holland to preserve the present privileged position of the Duchy. In signing it, Monsignor Adames, Bishop of Luxemburg, added the words: 'I beg to tender my respectful homage and profound gratitude to his Majesty the King for the noble words with which he has reassured the inhabitants of Luxemburg.'

It is stated that Russia, in her reply to the Prussian communication in reference to Luxemburg, declares that there is no occasion for her to investigate the facts relative to the violation of neutrality advanced by Prussia, and that it must be left to the Luxemburg Government either to invalidate them or to offer some satisfactory proposal for the prevention of their recurrence. Should the facts alleged be proved, Prussia would be justified in regarding them as a violation of the treaty, and in no longer considering herself bound by the said treaty, as the neutrality of Luxemburg must be advantageous to both neighbouring States.

THE BAVARIAN CHAMBER AND THE NEW FEDERAL TREATIES.

Berlin, December 17, 1870.

WHILE many German patriots hardly know whether more to rejoice at unity having been obtained, or to grieve at the degree of independence still left to the minor States, they have to witness the spectacle of the Bavarian Chamber finding fault with the great reform of the day, on the ground that it too sensibly impairs its cherished sovereign rights. We need not look very far to explain this strange contrast. The Bavarian Chamber was elected at a time when the Bavarian Government, having no wish to enter the Northern Confederacy, encouraged the priesthood to agitate for Ultramontane candidates. Their exertions were but too successful. The majority of those elected turned out to be men regarding Bavaria as the last stronghold of Catholicism in Germany, and objecting to her absorption by the Confederacy, not only on political, but on religious and fanatical grounds. The Bavarians themselves were anything but agreeably surprised at this issue of their elections. The masses had allowed themselves to be led astray by Church and Government combined. Not then having any very urgent desire to extend their connection with the North beyond the military alliance which gave them ease and safety, they had been controlled without difficulty. As to the educated classes, these as a rule wished for political reunion with the North, but had had their votes swamped by the million, and were all the more afflicted by the defeat sustained in so many wards.

Since this occurred, public opinion in the largest of the Southern kingdoms has undergone a remarkable change. By the French attack, all classes of society alike have been persuaded of the necessity of an immediate and intimate

alliance with the North; and by the German victories this conviction has been heightened into perfect enthusiasm, causing the duty and glory of forming a great national commonwealth to be generally acknowledged. The upper strata of society enjoy the satisfaction of seeing their policy borne out by events, and are firmer than ever; even artisans and country people have been imbued with the spirit of the times, and in matters of national import adopt an attitude which renders it somewhat venturesome for the extreme section of the clergy to resume their whispers against the Lutherans of Berlin. Such being the case, there is no doubt that, were a new Chamber elected at this moment, passion and principle would unite to secure a very different result from the former.

But the Bavarian Government have not thought it politic to resort to the simple expedient of a dissolution. They prefer submitting the new treaties to a Chamber ruled by the anti-unity party, rather than run the risk of having a new assembly elected, in which the opposite principles might prevail. The fact is, they foresee that in the present aspect of things even an anti-unity Chamber will be forced to approve unity treaties, however objectionable they may think them; while were a new assembly chosen, it would probably be so liberal as to censure the new compacts for leaving the individual States too many privileges, and impairing the central authorities in favour of the local Governments. Of the two evils, of having to defend the Versailles agreements against the Ultramontanes, who think them too favourable to the central power, or against the Liberals, who deem them too little so, they decidedly prefer the former. The adherents of Rome will, it may be hoped, complain, but ratify; but the patriots, though they neither would reject what has been already sanctioned by the allied Princes, as well as the North German Parliament, yet might render themselves seriously unpleasant by avowing indiffer-

ence to the exceptional position accorded to their State in the Empire, and by denouncing it as useful to the Munich bureaucracy rather than the Bavarian people. To avoid this latter criticism on their proceedings it is that the Bavarian Cabinet are now vindicating their handiwork before a Chamber which expresses neither the sentiments of the State it represents nor possesses any power to stay the rushing tide of the nation's life. One cannot witness without a smile the bitterness with which the attack is made, and the earnestness with which it is repelled, in the legislative halls of Munich. It is rather a good joke to see the Cabinet conjure honourable members to pass a treaty which they are utterly impotent to foil; it is more than amusing to hear them apologise for acceding to unity when they have done all in their power to thwart it, and when their people in reality blame them, not for having bowed to a central Government, but for having too much restricted its functions.*

Of the other Southern Governments, that of Würtemberg has avoided the false position of the Bavarian by dissolving its Chambers and securing a unity majority in the new assembly. Strong as the Republicans and Ultramontanes were in the old House, they have not been able to hold their own in the new elections. In Baden, where Government and Chamber have been always in favour of joining Prussia, no dissolution was required to secure the passing of the treaties *nem. dis.* All the Southern Chambers will probably have to vote loans, as the extraordinary supplies granted at the beginning of the war must have been before this exhausted.

Apropos of war-loans, the methodical way of carrying on financial affairs in Prussia was strikingly illustrated in yesterday's sitting of our Parliament. In the speech introducing the budget, Herr Camphausen, the Finance Minis-

* Notwithstanding the exertions of the priesthood, the majority secured by the Ultramontanes and Secessionists is only six.

ter, incidentally observed that the money advanced by the Reserve Fund Administration at the beginning of the campaign had, of course, been refunded out of the war-loan subsequently raised. The reserve fund, I ought to explain, under the laws of this country, consists of 30,000,000 silver thalers, kept in readiness for emergencies. In the present instance it had been handed over to the War Office on armaments being ordered. As we now learn, it was returned a month later, out of the loan raised for the covering of current expenses. Whatever happens in Prussia, to replenish the reserve fund is the first care of the Government. As a matter of course, one is almost tempted to say the year closes without a deficit, notwithstanding all that has come and gone in the last six months. So do the estimates for 1871 likewise. The reason is, that, while the military expenditure is covered by loans, the diminution in the yield of the taxes consequent upon the war is made up by nearly 10,000,000 thalers of surplus accruing from other sources. The Government railways and mines, far from suffering by the war, show a somewhat higher return than anticipated; while savings and other small sums set apart for the reserve fund, in case the latter should fall short of its regular amount, have produced an extra of 3,000,000 thalers this year, and are expected to produce as much in 1871. 3,600,000 thalers more will be available next year from the consolidation of the public debt enacted a short time ago. The total of the Prussian expenses at present amounts to 173,000,000 thalers, in which sum the military and naval expenditure, as it comes under the federal budget, is not included.

It has been noted, that in the detailed account of the French expedition to the North Sea and the Baltic, officially published by our neighbours, the failure of the operations is partly attributed to the neutrality of Denmark. The report candidly admits that the coöperation of the Copenhagen Government had been counted upon.

Farther statements, it is true, show that neither would Danish assistance have been of much avail. In most places, we are told, the water on the German shores is too shallow for frigates to approach them near enough to manage an effective bombardment; and where there is a sufficient depth, it had been studded with torpedoes and blocked up with sunken vessels, so as to render attack out of the question. The only two exceptions mentioned are Colberg and Dantzig; but even these are so favourably situate, that Admiral Bouet thought he had better not fire at all than produce an impression disproportionate to the magnitude of his ships. The conclusion at which the Admiral arrived, after a several weeks' cruise, was, that nothing could be done without flat-bottomed gunboats and a strong marine force to effect a landing and occupy the bombarded localities. Had he been able to land, he would have attacked Kiel, Eckernförde, Dantzig, and other places. This is exactly what was anticipated. Had he landed, he would have encountered troops on the beach.

With its many other advantages, the chassepot combines that of dealing with its victims more leniently than other weapons. Of the men wounded in the first few months of the campaign, no less than sixty per cent have entirely recovered, and have returned to their regiments, or, at any rate, joined the dépôt battalions.

KING WILLIAM'S REPLY TO THE ADDRESS OF THE NORTH GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, December 20, 1870.

THE following is the reply of his Majesty the King to the address of the Reichstag, which was presented to him at Versailles by a deputation of that body:

'In receiving you here on foreign soil, far from the frontiers of Germany, my first impulse is to express my gratitude to Divine Providence, whose wonderful dispensation has brought us together here, in this ancient royal city of France. God has granted us victory in a measure which I scarcely ventured to hope or pray for, when, last summer, I claimed your assistance in this arduous war. Your support was given to the fullest extent, and for this I thank you, in my own name, in the name of the army, and in the name of our country. The German armies, in the midst of which you have come to seek me, were encouraged in their severe struggles and deprivations by the self-sacrifice of the country, the genuine sympathy and care of the people at home, and the perfect unanimity existing between the nation and the army. The grant of supplies, for carrying on the war, has given me a new proof that the nation is resolved to exert her whole strength, in order that the great and painful sacrifices, which deeply move my heart and yours, may not have been made in vain, and that she will not lay down her arms till the frontier of Germany is secured against future attacks.

The North German Reichstag, whose salutations you bring me, was called upon to take a decisive part in the unification of Germany. I am grateful for the readiness with which it almost unanimously assented to the treaties that will give an organic form to the unity of the nation. The Reichstag and the federal Governments have approved these treaties in the conviction that the new constitution of Germany is likely to promote the welfare of the country, having been freely chosen and offered to us by our South German allies, in unison with what they feel the nation requires. I hope that the representative assemblies of the States, to which the treaties have still to be submitted, will follow their Governments in the path they have adopted.

The letter of his Majesty the King of Bavaria requesting me to re-establish the Imperial dignity of the old German Empire has filled me with deep emotion. You, gentlemen, in the name of the North German Reichstag, request me to listen to the call addressed to me. I willingly accept this expression of the confidence and the wishes of the North German Reichstag. But you know that in a question like this—intimately connected as it is with interests so high and memories so glorious—I cannot be swayed solely by my own feelings or judgment. It is only in the unanimous vote of the Princes and free cities of Germany, united to the wishes of the German nation and its representatives, that I should recognise the voice of Providence, confident that God will grant us His blessing. It will afford you satisfaction to learn that I have been informed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria, that the assent of all the Princes and free cities of Germany has been obtained, and that this will shortly be officially announced.'

This reply to the deputation presenting the Imperial Crown of Germany prudently makes acceptance depend

upon the consent of all German Sovereigns *and* Parliaments. The only two votes which still remain to be given are those of the representative assemblies of Bavaria and Würtemberg. What they will be, it is not difficult to divine. Even though the Bavarian Ultramontanes are seemingly intent upon showing fight, they will be powerless to influence the ultimate result. On their way to Versailles the North German deputation stopped at Strasburg, where they were entertained by the Governor, and at a festal banquet exchanged congratulatory toasts with the leading officials. The astounding idea of the German Imperial dignity being about to be revived in a military camp in sight of the hostile capital received due prominence in their speeches. Germany, at last overcoming her domestic divisions of which no Power more eagerly profited than France, recovers unity and strength in the very heart of the country that has so long striven to prevent it. There is a dramatic sequence in the event which the Strasburg orators knew well how to turn to account.

The Royal Irish Academy, and Trinity College, Dublin, have asked Göttingen University to join them in advocating the exemption of Paris, one of the principal centres of culture, from bombardment. Göttingen replies that Paris, far from being exclusively devoted to culture, has wantonly undertaken many barbarous wars. Dublin University, instead of palliating the fearful vices of the French, would have done better to protest against the last of their murderous raids. In the interest of culture, the frivolous ferocity of France must be restrained by Germany, the more highly civilised country of the two. To this answer are appended reflections on English neutrality, the siege of Delhi, and the alleged impropriety of Dublin University soliciting Germany's assistance for an agitation in behalf of her worst enemies.

The St. Petersburg correspondent who sent to the *Independance Belge* a summary of President Grant's letter

to the Czar, concerning a possible coöperation of Prussia and America; has been banished to Olonetz. The letter being private, its publication is regarded as constituting an offence against the person of the Emperor.

The Russian conscription is not at the rate of six in every 1,000 souls, as originally announced, but eight in Poland, six and a half in the Western provinces of mixed nationality, and six in Russia proper. Galician papers state that, according to the version of the decree published in some Polish districts, ten recruits will be levied there in every 1,000 souls.

The continued delay in the convention of the Black Sea Conference is occasioned by France wishing to lay her own case before the meeting; a design objected to by Prussia, and not actively favoured by any of the other Powers.

The Russian military agent Prince Wittgenstein, and some other diplomatists, have been at last permitted to leave Paris. They say the city has bread, salt meat, and wine for another two months.

LUXEMBURG. A NEW FACT IN WARFARE.

Berlin, December 19, 1870.

THE Luxemburg question is made the subject of the following official *communiqué* in the *Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung:*

'By the treaty of the 11th of May 1867 permanent neutrality was guaranteed to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by Prussia, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and France. The concession of this privilege was coupled with the condition laid down in the same treaty, that the like neutrality should be observed by Luxemburg towards all other States. Upon the outbreak of the present war, Prussia, at the request of the Luxemburg

Government, on the 17th of July expressly declared that she would respect the neutrality of Luxemburg as long as it was respected by France and maintained by Luxemburg itself. This promise has been faithfully kept by his Majesty's Government. Though it would have alleviated the sufferings of many of our wounded to be sent home through the Luxemburg territory, we have foregone this advantage, as France objected to it. Nor was his Majesty's Government led to change its neutral attitude by the hostile acts and insults which German officials and travellers had to put up with from a portion of the Luxemburg population.

His Majesty's Government preserved the same considerate policy when railway trains were sent from Luxemburg at night to provision the fortress of Thionville while occupied by French troops and invested by a German corps; an act which rendered the infraction of the neutrality of Luxemburg manifest to all. These provision-trains were being secretly got ready at Luxemburg for whole days, and sent right through the investing force, the Commander of Thionville being previously informed of their coming, and taking measures to facilitate their entry into the place. The preparations made in Luxemburg for the lading and dispatch of these trains could not have been effected without the connivance, not to say the direct coöperation, of the Government railway and police officials. But, notwithstanding this gross infraction of the neutrality of Luxemburg, his Majesty's Government refrained from retaliation. His Majesty's Government contented itself with complaining to the Government of the Grand Duchy, and pointing out the consequences which must ensue. The excuse brought forward, that the Eastern railway, along which the provision-trains ran, has for several years been worked by a French company, and that the Grand Ducal Government cannot therefore be held responsible for the doings on that railway, is no excuse at all. On the contrary, the fact of a French company working a Luxemburg railway ought, under the circumstances, to have prompted the Luxemburg Government to subject railway connection with France to the strictest supervision. Unless we had counted upon their recognising this duty, we should have destroyed the railway between Luxemburg and Thionville.

Though expressing regret at what had happened, the Grand Ducal Government took no effectual steps to prevent future infractions of neutrality, which became more frequent and glaring than ever. After the capitulation of Metz, large numbers of fugitive French soldiers and officers entered the territory of the Grand Duchy, to return to France along a road where they knew they would not fall in with our troops. In the town of Luxemburg there is an office at the railway station, under the auspices of the French Vice-consul, in which thousands of French fugitive soldiers have been provided with money and passports to enable them to return to France and enter the Army of the North. The Grand Ducal Government has not interfered with this violation of neutrality to our prejudice. The French fugitive soldiers were neither detained nor otherwise prevented from

returning to France, nor has the French Vice-consul at Luxemburg been disturbed in an activity at variance with the law of nations and the neutrality of the Grand Duchy.

These facts involving a flagrant infraction of the neutrality to observe which the Grand Ducal Government solemnly engaged in the treaty of May 11, 1867, his Majesty's Government could not but judge that the conditions on which they had declared their willingness to acknowledge that neutrality had ceased to exist. His Majesty's Government, by order of his Majesty the King, has therefore directed its representatives at the signatary Courts of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, to declare, that in its military operations, as well as in the measures required to protect the German troops against injuries inflicted by Luxemburg, it does not any longer consider itself obliged to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy. His Majesty's Government has added, that it reserves to itself the right to ask for an indemnity which shall compensate it for the injuries received by the non-observance of the neutrality of Luxemburg. This has been done in an explicit communication, dated the 3d of December.'

This latter demand will probably become the starting point for ulterior negotiations. If it can be proved that the siege of Thionville was prolonged in consequence of the re-victualling of the place, Count Bismarck is likely to ask for a heavy indemnity. The question then will be, where the little duchy is to get the money from. Matters having reached this stage, it is probable that a compromise will be proposed which shall free the duchy from the claim, and perhaps give its Sovereign something into the bargain for the goodwill.

The engagements of the last fortnight show what a formidable weapon the chassepot is even in the hands of raw recruits. Though a large portion of the Loire army have scarcely undergone any drill, and certainly betray no taste for a military career, the losses of the Germans were still very severe. The fact is, the chassepot has so wide a range, that there is always time for a considerable number of discharges before there can be any occasion for retreat for troops ensconced in woods or villages, as the French nearly always are. Armed with old-fashioned guns, these new levies, who never stand a close attack,

would be harmless; with breech-loaders they are enabled to fight at a distance, and to kill a good many of the enemy before they themselves can be dislodged. When the retreat does take place, it certainly is apt to degenerate into flight. Pending this, however, the power exercised and the comparative impunity enjoyed serve to inspire a certain degree of confidence. The consequence is, that though the new levies cannot achieve a victory, they are quite competent to inflict damage. They are as different as possible from the levies of the first Republic, whose enthusiasm achieved victory; all they can do being to give trouble by numbers and a superior arm. The Germans have realised this new fact in warfare in the latter part of the campaign. It gives a sustained strength to the defence which formerly used to be possessed only by victorious attack; it somewhat modifies the relation between a regular army and a mere militia, giving the latter a chance where formerly there was none, and allowing them to hold the field, provided they are content to sacrifice themselves with no higher object than that of annoying the enemy. These remarkable facts having been ascertained at last, it will require the adoption of stringent measures on the part of the Germans to prevent the opportunity for victory being indefinitely prolonged.

The Bavarians, who are fierce passionate soldiers, and apt to expose themselves, seem to have lost about one-fifth of their men in the twelve days' fighting against three times their number on the Loire.

CONGRATULATORY ADDRESS TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, December 22, 1870.

NEXT to the Saxe-Altenburg Parliament, the Prussian House of Lords has been the first of the State Legislatures of Germany to congratulate King William upon his successes and imminent assumption of the Imperial title. To communicate one of these addresses will be the more indispensable as it is likely to be succeeded by twenty more from the other State Parliaments, and therefore may be regarded as a specimen of a grand national demonstration. Subjoined is the text of the address proceeding from the Prussian House of Lords:

'To approach your Royal Majesty at this serious time is the first duty of the Prussian House of Lords on re-assembling. With deep and faithful sympathy we see our royal master, surrounded by the Princes of Germany, accomplish the renovation of our Fatherland in the camp before the gates of Paris. In a victorious career of unprecedented continuity, our army, the flower of the nation, in close alliance with its brethren in arms, has annihilated the most formidable armies of the enemy. A powerful and insolent foe, who for centuries has been endeavouring to divide, humiliate, and rob Germany, and has wantonly provoked the present war, has been crushed by our unaided strength.

Germany is more closely united than it has been for centuries, and under your Majesty's guidance recovers her ancient power and rank. Noble provinces, torn from our body politic at a time of domestic strife, are about to be restored to Fatherland, to share its national life, and afford us greater security against a repetition of these unjustifiable attacks.

Your Royal Majesty having been chosen Emperor by the Sovereigns and free towns of Germany, will in this capacity protect the rights of the German Empire, and, true to the device on your shield (*Suum cuique*, the Hohenzollern motto), at the same time allow the various German States to retain and develop their own national and characteristic peculiarities. While crowned with the German Imperial title, we cherish the hope that Prussia will not forfeit the royal dignity endeared to us by a glorious history and a succession of great Sovereigns.

As is your Royal Majesty, so are we moved to thank God for his gracious guidance. We pay homage to your Majesty in hereditary loyalty, and lay at your feet the thanks the country owes to our heroic army, who, under your command, and at the sacrifice of so many precious lives, has attained such great results.

The Prussian House of Lords has faithfully aided and supported your Majesty at all times. Intimately connected with the history of the land, it knows no other aim than to promote the welfare of your Royal Majesty, and, what is the same, the welfare of the country.

The jurisdiction of the federal Parliament having been extended by the recent treaties necessarily restricts the influence of the State Parliaments. The Prussian House of Lords willingly parts with a portion of its prerogative, if its sole aim can be more fully secured by the establishment of a German Empire.

A just and truly national war has matured German unity in the midst of a fearful struggle. Like Prussia, the new German Empire is based upon the manful defence of our rights by our Sovereigns. The truly German and monarchical spirit which has contributed to create it will sustain it. United with the German Sovereigns and free towns, your Royal Majesty's wisdom will know how to establish institutions securing for the new Empire a genuine German, Prussian, and monarchical development.

We are, &c.'

This address is interesting in two respects. It speaks of the French in exactly the same uncompromising language as that used at the beginning of the war; and it urges the necessity of carrying on the Imperial Government on the Conservative principles which the House of Lords has always endeavoured to infuse into the Prussian administration. I suppose the task will prove more difficult in a united Germany than it did in a separate Prussia. The federal Parliament knows no House of Lords, is sure to have a Liberal majority, if not at once, at least shortly, and will pursue its aims with the weight belonging to the representatives of the entire nation. Even while restricted to Northern Germany, the federal Parliament has exercised a greater influence than the Prussian, and has obliged the Government to consent to many valuable reforms, which the Prussian representatives alone had been impotent to effect.

French officers living in Germany on parole have recently begun to run away so frequently, that stringent measures have been adopted. Henceforth ten officers will be sent to a casemate for every one breaking his solemn engagement and attempting to escape. Nor is this the

only unpleasantness that has arisen. At Coblentz, Königsberg, and other places, French officers have come into disagreeable contact with the public in consequence of using offensive language in beerhouses and cafés. At the first-mentioned place their conduct has been so provoking as to cause General Wedel, the Commandant, to issue an order of the day, announcing that all soldiers have been enjoined to arrest French officers using 'insolent and scandalous language' in their hearing. The 350,000 privates, too, begin to give trouble. They were pacific enough until proclamations bearing the signature of the French Government found their way to the fortresses in which they are detained. Since then some have tried to escape, and many others evinced a mutinous disposition, necessitating the proclamation of martial law to keep them within bounds.

To enable the soldiers in the field to celebrate Christmas in the hearty German fashion, subscriptions were opened a fortnight ago which are said to have yielded a substantial result. Up to December the pecuniary donations for the wounded and the families of soldiers in the field had reached the sum of almost 5,000,000 thalers (750,000*l.*). This is far more than private charity has ever subscribed for a public object in this country; yet it is wholly insufficient to satisfy the wants of the thousands of sufferers. Probably a State grant will have to be made for the victims after the restoration of peace.

A MOSCOW ADDRESS TO THE CZAR.

Berlin, December 26, 1870.

The address in which the Moscow town-council congratulated the Czar on the denunciation of the Black Sea Treaty has met with little favour at St. Petersburg. Notwithstanding the abundant protestations of loyalty it con-

tains, it was returned to the body from which it proceeded, and has actually led to the imprisonment of a number of persons supposed to be implicated in its dispatch. The cause of the Imperial displeasure is the occurrence in it of sundry passages touching upon the delicate ground of domestic affairs. Permission having been given only to send up addresses on the foreign action of the Government, this trespassing upon a prohibited subject would in itself constitute an offence, and be incompatible with the autocratic system of government. The impropriety of the address was, however, considerably aggravated by allusions to ecclesiastical affairs, which, from the lofty and unapproachable position of the Russian Church, are about the last a lay subject is allowed to discuss. The address, which is thus invested with the double interest of a loyal demonstration and a politico-ecclesiastical offence, runs as follows:

'Your Majesty,—Fifteen long years Russia has patiently endured unprecedented humiliation, hoping all the time the day would dawn when, having gained strength under your Majesty's wise auspices, she would be able to come forward and recover the respect due to her from the foreigner. Impelled by conscientious considerations, your Majesty has judged that the time has arrived to break the fetters unlawfully imposed upon us by our enemies. Not secretly or ambiguously, but openly and publicly, your Majesty has denounced certain articles of the Paris Treaty; a compact long since torn to pieces and trodden under foot by the very parties who enacted it to our damage.

The announcement made by your Majesty in the name of the Russian country and people will not remain a mere announcement, but be shortly converted into an impregnable fact. Whatever trials may be in store for us, they will find us prepared to rally round your Majesty's throne. If we were loyal and patriotic in former days, we are doubly so now, when your Majesty's clemency and sagacious reforms have infused fresh vigour into the national life.

The great reforms which you have carried out, or are engaged in promoting, have become a new source of strength to your Majesty and Russia. No one ever had such a claim upon the gratitude of the Russian people, no one ever earned our thanks so abundantly, as your Majesty. You have conferred upon us very many valuable gifts, and are the guardian of our

newly acquired liberties, which have already become as indispensable to us as our daily bread.

To your Majesty alone we look for the completion of your blessed reforms. May it please your Majesty to present us with liberty of speech and liberty of the press, without which the life of the spirit is deadened, and there is no room for sincerity and truth in the relations between the governing and the governed! May your Majesty condescend to proclaim liberty of religion, the most precious treasure of mankind, and which alone renders preaching effective!

O Lord and Ruler, foreign and domestic affairs are connected by indissoluble ties, and success abroad is alone guaranteed by a nation's proud consciousness of belonging to a noble and well-ordered State. Only by carrying aloft the standard of nationality can a political organism attain and preserve vitality, can it acquire the solid and concentrated force which has been the historical inheritance of your and our ancestors since the first days of Muscovy. Under this glorious banner, all classes of the people will rally round your Majesty at the first summons, and fight for your sacred throne, as one army of brothers, without distinction of rank or origin, buoyed up with hope of the grace of God and the justice of our cause. Our Sovereign's loving confidence in the people, common views and aspirations uniting us and our ruler with inseparable and truly national ties, and moderation in the liberty we enjoy—these constitute our strength, and will enable us to fulfil our great historical destiny.

We conclude by repeating the vow with which our fathers greeted the first of your crowned ancestors in 1642: "Thee we will serve with our blood and treasure." For this is our purpose and intent.

We are, &c.'

The draft of the address is said to have been composed by M. Aksakoff, a well-known Slavophil of ardent and inflammable temper. The moment of assuring the Emperor of his devotion in the matter of foreign influence and aggrandisement he probably thought an excellent one for soliciting a reward in the domain of internal politics. But he was mistaken. The Church adopts the motto of *noli me tangere;* and as regards the liberty of the press, the experience the Emperor had of it in the first few years of his reign will hardly induce him to try the experiment again. Russia is in a peculiar position as regards the liberty of the press. In the western countries of Europe, professional writers and politicians are under the control

of the educated classes, and, if indulging in erroneous or extravagant notions, find themselves speedily contradicted and discarded by more legitimate exponents of public opinion; in Russia the lettered portion of society is so small, and so divided into adherents of autocracy and advocates of very comprehensive reforms, that it can exercise but little real influence upon its literature. It either opposes reform on principle, when it is indifferent to journalism and its allotted task; or, if admitting the expediency of reform, is apt to conceive enthusiastic notions respecting its necessary limits and possible results. Broadly speaking, the first class are men of rank and position, and the second youths and thinkers. Want of responsibility, hot opposition to an absolute Government, and the tendency of the Slavonic character to go all lengths, alike contribute to make the latter category too sanguine as to what can and ought to be done. Under these circumstances, and until the solid nucleus of an enlightened middle class has been created, the Government cannot help exercising a stricter supervision than would be legitimate or useful in any other European country.

The Petersburg semi-official *Golos* contains a discursive leader, endeavouring to prove, in reply to the *Times*, that in denouncing the Black Sea Treaty the Russian Government obeyed the irresistible demand of the nation, and only gave the finishing stroke to a compact already regarded as obsolete by all parties concerned.

The *Moscow Gazette* frankly says, that as both England and Russia are content to let Germany become a most formidable Power, one of them must be mistaken in reckoning upon her support. The article in the *Moscow Gazette* is written upon the supposition of continued antagonism between England and Russia in the East.

The Russian military budget for 1871 has a field-hospital expenditure double that of 1870.

The rumoured appointment of Prince Tcherkassky

to the post of Russian Minister of the Interior is improbable during the continuance of peace in Eastern Europe, the Prince holding advanced opinions concerning the assertion of Slavonic nationality in and out of Russia.

In reply to the Bishop of Posen, who recently visited Versailles, King William said he would do what he could for the Pope. No definite promise was, however, given by the King.

Mr. Odo Russell has officially congratulated the King of Prussia on the impending assumption of the German Imperial title.

Herr von Maltzan, the famous Oriental traveller, writes from Djedda, the harbour of Mecca, that the Arabs are well informed of what is going on in Europe, and delighted to see the French beaten. Partly from opposition to the conquerors of Algeria, partly because they have been frequently exposed to the haughty demeanour of the French Consuls, they derive intense satisfaction from French defeats, and have constituted themselves allies and well-wishers of the Germans. The pilgrims congregating at Mecca are all imbued with the same sentiment, which is likewise shared by the Turkish governors, and has more than once been manifested against French residents. The news of the capture of Metz was received enthusiastically, and taunts and witticisms at the expense of the defeated country are the order of the day. If the feeling is really so universal, the 'Gums' newly levied in Algeria, whose killing capacities are so coarsely extolled in the French press, are probably Kabyles, not Arabs.

Germany is arming energetically. In the Northern Confederacy a portion of the Ersatz Reserve, or Supplementary Reserve, has been called out. This category includes those healthy and able-bodied men up to forty years of age who from some slight ailment, real or supposed, have been exempt from military service in time of peace. Their exact number is unknown, but must be very

large. Government never having had the money to drill the whole youth of the nation, very many thousands were allotted to the Ersatz Reserve, who otherwise would have had to occupy a place in the ranks. Called out in the present emergency, they will, after a month's drill or so, be sent to the front, and, shoulder to shoulder with the veteran soldiers, are expected to be more than a match for the new levies of M. Gambetta. Government are evidently intent not only upon beating the French, but upon convincing them in the shortest possible time of the hopelessness of all farther resistance.

THE GERMAN AND THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRES

Berlin, December 28, 1870.

When, after the Seven Days' campaign, Austria was expelled from Germany, she stipulated for the country to be divided into two Confederacies, a northern and a southern. Or rather, being too weak to make conditions, she appealed to France, whose aid enabled her to insert this unpalatable proviso into the instrument of peace. Prussia, not wishing to provoke France by a refusal, and run the risk of a second war while the first was not yet at an end, accepted the terms forced upon her. Thus the bisection, instead of the unity, of Germany was the result of 1866, notwithstanding the brilliant victories achieved by this Government. After the restoration of peace, the Northern Confederacy was forthwith organised under Prussian auspices, and speedily gained the strength and solidity which have been so strikingly manifested in the present campaign. It was different on the other side of the Main. Being too much alike in power and size, none of the Southern States were prepared to invest one of their number with the superior dignity and influence of carrying on their common affairs. As

Count Bismarck had moreover taken care to conclude offensive and defensive alliances with each individually, they enjoyed the protection of the Northern Confederacy as well as of each other under any circumstances, and had nothing to gain by the additional formation of a Southern Bund.

The evils of bisection were partly remedied by the attraction naturally exercised upon each other by the severed limbs of the nation. They were farther counteracted by a clause in the Prague Treaty itself. Though North and South were to be at liberty each to form a separate union, they were at the same time allowed the benefit of 'national ties' binding the two halves together. What these 'national ties' were to be, the treaty did not deign to express. The clause referring to the subject was one of those indefinite passages such as are sometimes inserted in diplomatic documents when room has to be left for opposite contingencies. The fact is, Prussia, having been unable to prevent France from ordering Germany to be cut in twain, had yet been strong enough to secure the insertion of a clause which meant very little while peace continued, but might mean everything that was desirable in case of a victorious war. The latter eventuality has now arrived. It has been brought on by France herself. Not content with what she effected in 1866, and tormented by envy at the steady growth of German power and patriotism, France fell upon Germany in the midst of peace, on a pretext too frivolous to be named. Like the other opponent of German unity, Austria, she succumbed in a marvellously short time. Under these circumstances, Germany is in a position to undo that part of the work of 1866 which was the inspiration of the foreigner and prejudicial to herself. Bisection may be replaced by unity. The 'national ties' declared admissible in the Treaty of Prague may be regarded as implying the fusion of the two halves of the country.

One Emperor, one Parliament, one Army, may be instituted where her adversary meant to create two. Steps to attain this end having been already taken by the Sovereigns and most of the Parliaments of Germany, we are on the eve of the nation's realising its long-cherished hopes. Count Bismarck has selected this moment to advise Austria of what has been going on, and in what it is likely to result. If not by a sense of duty, he is actuated by courtesy in this announcement. The Prague Treaty, though it does not compel Germany to retain an organisation advantageous only to her adversaries, yet seems to oblige this Government to inform the other contracting party why the institutions created after its enactment have been replaced by more natural arrangements. This delicate task Count Bismarck has acquitted himself of in the following note, just addressed to Herr von Schweinitz, the Prussian Ambassador at Vienna:

'*Versailles, December* 14.

'The treaties between the North German Confederacy and the South German States, concluded at Versailles with Bavaria and Hesse, and at Berlin with Würtemberg, have been so far matured by recent transactions at Berlin as to admit of their being laid before the South German Parliaments. Not only a regard for the Prague Treaty of Peace, in which Prussia and Austro-Hungary embodied their notions respecting the then anticipated development of German affairs, but also the wish to cultivate such relations with a friendly and powerful neighbour as shall be in harmony with our common past as well as with the sentiments and necessities of both peoples, causes me to acquaint the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government with the point of view from which the Government of his Majesty the King looks upon the reorganisation of Germany.

In the Prague Treaty of August 23, 1866, the supposition is expressed, that the German Governments south of the Main will form a Confederacy which, independent in itself, would be connected by close national ties with the Confederacy of the North German States. None of the contracting parties being by this treaty entitled or obliged to prescribe to the sovereign States of Southern Germany how to order their mutual relations, it rested exclusively with these States to fulfil the above supposition. The South German States have omitted realising the ideas underlying the Prague Treaty of Peace. They have confined themselves to forming national relations with Northern Germany, and as a first introductory step renewed the

Zollverein, and the treaties providing for a mutual territorial guarantee. It was beyond human power to foresee that, under the mighty impetus given to German patriotism by an unexpected attack of the French, these arrangements would be completed by the constitutional treaties recently concluded, and by the establishment of a new German Confederacy. Northern Germany had no call to hinder or foil a consummation which it had not indeed brought about, but which had its origin in the history and spirit of the nation. Nor does the Austro-Hungarian Government, according to your reports, expect or demand that the stipulations of the Prague Treaty of Peace shall throw difficulties in the way of the prosperous development of the German States. The Austro-Hungarian Government regards the pending reorganisation of German affairs with the confident hope that all members of the new Confederacy, and especially the King, our most gracious master, are animated by the desire to preserve and promote these friendly relations with the neighbouring empire of Austro-Hungary, which are equally recommended to both by their common interests and an active literary and commercial intercourse. The allied Governments, on their part, confidently hope that their wishes in this respect are shared by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

The imminent fulfilment of the German national aspirations and requirements will impart a steadiness and safety to the future development of Germany which all Europe, and more particularly our immediate neighbours, will, I trust, see not only without apprehension, but also with satisfaction. The unfettered growth of material interests, which bind countries and nations together with so many ties, cannot fail to react beneficially upon our political relations. Germany and Austro-Hungary will, we are convinced, look upon each other with feelings of mutual goodwill, and unite for the friendly promotion of each other's welfare and prosperity.

As soon as the fundamental treaties of the new Confederacy have been ratified by all parties, I shall enable you to communicate them officially to the Chancellor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. I request you to read this communication to the Chancellor, and to leave a copy of it with him.

I am, &c.

BISMARCK.'

As the reader may have noticed, no allusion is made in the above to the reëstablishment of the Germanic Empire. Speaking of the impending innovations, Count Bismarck contents himself with calling the new Commonwealth a Confederacy, but cautiously abstains from using another name, which reminiscences of the past might render less agreeable to the Hapsburg ear. There is no doubt that the moment Austria renounces all idea of regaining

that influence over Germany which she exercised for centuries, Prussia will be happy to entertain the best relations with her. Up to a few months ago this was impossible, owing to Austria betraying a morbid intention to coöperate with France against Germany. Perhaps things will change now that France has been defeated, and seems not likely to recover the fascinating charm she formerly possessed.

It is stated that the Bavarian Cabinet has expressed to the Prussian Cabinet its satisfaction at the above declaration communicated to the Court of Vienna respecting the Treaty of Prague. Although obliged to assist in the reunion of Germany, the Bavarian Cabinet are traditionally disposed to look upon Austria as an ally. A common religion, a common South German dialect, and the reminiscences of a common policy in the past, constitute so many ties between the two Governments.

The Russian Government has given orders to construct a number of railway carriages with movable axles. These carriages will have the advantage of fitting the broad gauge of their own rails as well as the narrow one adopted in the rest of Europe. In other words, while foreign troops cannot be sent to Russia in foreign railway conveyances, the Russians will be able to enter foreign territory in their own.

The troops in the south-western provinces of Russia are being continually reinforced.

The Prussians have seized six English vessels at Du Clair, on the Seine, and have scuttled and sunk them in order to impede the navigation.

Prince Henry of the Netherlands, the Governor-General of Luxemburg, has addressed an autograph letter to the Luxemburg Patriotic Committee, in which he says:

'I have much pleasure in informing you that the King has received the address of the inhabitants of Luxemburg, and that his Majesty has instructed me to acquaint you, as well as the signataries of the address,

how deeply touched and grateful he is at this proof of the confidence which his faithful subjects place in him under the present grave circumstances. I feel happy thus to have been the interpreter of the sentiments of his Majesty towards the Duchy.'

Austria, at the Black Sea Conference, will ask for fresh measures to insure the safety of the navigation of the Lower Danube.

A conspiracy has been discovered among the French prisoners at Cologne, Coblentz, and Mayence, 50,000 strong. It is declared that they intended to mutiny on Christmas-eve, disarm the guards, and fight their way back to France. The troops, being kept in readiness, prevented the outbreak. Many French officers have been removed from the Rhine to the fortresses on the Russian frontier.

M. GAMBETTA AT BORDEAUX.

On January 1, 1871, M. Gambetta delivered a speech from the balcony of the Prefecture at Bordeaux, in the course of which he said:

'In the face of this magnificent spectacle, in face of all the citizens assembled here to welcome the dawn of our success, which is due to the perseverance and tenacity of our efforts, I say that our success is well merited for two reasons: first, because France has had faith in herself; secondly, because, alone in the universe, France to-day represents justice and right. (*Prolonged applause.*) Yes; let it be for ever closed, if possible; let it be for ever effaced from our memory, this horrible year of 1870, which, while it has witnessed the fall of the most deceitful and most corrupt of Governments, has also handed us over to the insolence of the foreigner.

We must not forget, citizens, that the evil fortune against which we are battling to-day is the result of Bonapartist intrigues abroad. Let each one bear his share of responsibility. It was in this very town that the man of December, the man of Sedan, the man who tried to poison France, uttered the memorable imposture—"The Empire is Peace." His reign, we must confess, had to be endured for the expiation

of our own sins; for we are to blame for having so long submitted to it. Nothing just or unjust happens in history but what bears its fruits. It is because we have submitted to this reign of twenty years that we must submit to-day to foreign invasion up to the walls of our glorious capital. And it is because all the sources of power and of grandeur were systematically drained in this country; it is because we had lost that retrieving power without which nothing can endure or triumph in this world—namely, the love of duty and virtue—that it was thought for a moment France was about to disappear. (*Continued applause.*)

It was at this moment that the Republic, springing into life for the third time in our history, assumed the duty, the honour, and the peril of saving France. (*Enthusiastic cries of "Long live the Republic!"*) It was on the 4th of September; the enemy was advancing by forced marches on Paris; our arsenals were empty, half our army captured, our resources scattered and frittered away on all sides; a double Government—one captive, the other flying; a Chamber whose past servility made it incapable of seizing the helm. O, on that day no one gainsaid the legitimacy of the Republic. It was later on, when the Republic had been brought to a state of sacred inviolability (*bravo!*); when it became patent that the Republic had redeemed its promise of the 4th of September to save the honour of the country, to organise the defence, to maintain order; when it was proved that, thanks to the Republic, France would not perish, that she must triumph; that, through her, right would overcome brute force—it was then that the adversaries of the Republic, to whom it now insures quietude and security, began to contest its legitimacy and question its origin. (*Continued cries of "Long live the Republic!"*) The Republic, devoted and linked to the defence and the welfare of the country, is irrevocably established. It is immortal.

Do not, however, confound the Republic with the members of its government, who, by the force of events, have been temporarily lifted into power. When they shall have fulfilled their task, which is to expel the foreigner, they will relinquish their power and submit themselves to the judgment of their fellow citizens. This task—this mission—which has to be wrought out to the end, must be accomplished at any price, to the entire exclusion of self-interest. What we must attain is, safety and respect for the liberty of all—yes, respect for perfect liberty, not excluding the liberty to disparage, to calumniate, to abuse; secondly, respect for right and the authority of Government. Speech must be as free as thought, and respected in all its excrescences up to that fatal point where it becomes resolve and leads to unlawful acts. If this boundary be overstepped—and I here give expression to the opinion of all the members of the Government—you may rely on energetic repression. (*Continued cheering.*)

I will not close without telling you that the Government expresses, serves, and only intends to serve, public opinion, in contradistinction to those despotic Governments which have preceded us, and have only been

guided by their dynastic lust of power. I thank the patriotic population of Bordeaux, as well as the inhabitants of the neighbouring towns and country gathered here to-day, for the striking support which they afford to the Republican Government by this imposing manifestation on the first day of 1871. I thank them especially in the name of our dear besieged brethren, in the name of our heroic Paris, whose example sustains us, and guides and incites us to emulation. Ah! would they could be witnesses, those dear besieged ones, of all the sympathy and self-devotion roused within us by their valour. Their faith in success would be strengthened, if indeed it can be strengthened. We will transmit your good wishes, citizens. Perhaps soon, cutting our way through the enemy's lines, we shall personally convey to the Parisians your good wishes together with the expression of the world's admiration and of the profound and imperishable gratitude of France. Long live France! Long live the Republic!'

At the close of M. Gambetta's address indescribable emotion was manifested by the immense crowd that had assembled, and prolonged shouts were heard of '*Vive la France!*' '*Vive Paris!*' '*Vive Gambetta!*' '*Vive la République!*'

ULTRAMONTANISM AND THE WAR.

Berlin, January 3, 1871.

It is probably not too early to allude to certain impressions prevailing among the more liberal portion of the Catholics in Germany with regard to the war and the events immediately preceding it. During the debates of the Œcumenical Council, the Jesuit journal at Rome used to smile at the cautions uttered by discreet well-wishers. When told that they had better not offend the persuasions of a civilised age, the Jesuit journal would mysteriously hint, there was nothing to fear A grand catastrophe was drawing near on the wings of the wind. It was approaching rapidly, and its effect would be terrible. It would change the political aspect as well as the moral

condition of the universe, and, like a hailstorm of celestial fire, purify the hearts and reëstablish the Church on its adamantine base. The friends of the Church, therefore, need not be afraid of the effect the Council would have on the welfare of the Holy See. There was better in store than they imagined.

To these half-uttered suggestions, the Pope himself, in his conversations with friends and adversaries, would append a significant commentary. While the Council sat, as indeed during the two previous years, the Pope never made a secret of his conviction that a great international conflict would be shortly kindled in central Europe. It would be a formidable ordeal, entailing intense suffering, but chastening the nations and restoring the moral balance of the world. It would do away with the religious and political abominations of the present period, and result in a Romanist revival of incomparable splendour and saving sanctity. It would be a thunderstorm gathered by the Almighty, and poured out upon the evil and the good to purify the atmosphere and dispel the poisonous vapours of rebellion and heresy. As often as in the course of the last few years peace seemed menaced, the Pope would refer to these prophecies and speak of the coming crisis as imminent; while when the clouds broke and a moment's sunshine was accorded to the anxious multitude, he would shake his head, and sadly observe that there were breakers ahead, and that they could not hope to steer clear of them.

Comparing the hints of the Papal organ with the opinions so often enunciated by the leading member of the Church, liberal Catholics have arrived at the conclusion, that the Œcumenical Council has been convened not without an eye to the political events of the day. Indispensable as it might appear on theological grounds to declare the Pope infallible and raise him to the sphere of superhuman intelligence, it peeped out that the date

for this deification had been chosen with a shrewd appreciation of the doings of this terrestrial race. If the Pope believed war to be inevitable, and if his papers looked forward to it as a guarantee for the triumph of the ecclesiastical cause, that war, it was obvious, must be waged by Catholics against Protestants, and lead to the defeat of the latter. In other words, France, who was then earnestly endeavouring to gain Austria's support against Prussia, was, in the Pope's opinion, sure to take up arms as soon as possible, and might, with equal certainty, be expected to be the victor. Heretic Germany crushed, and absolutism consolidated at Paris by military success, the day would have arrived for the head of an irresponsible Church to proceed from theory to action, and recover the ancient ascendancy of his predecessors in office. The Catholic Governments would then be stronger than ever, both at home and abroad. They would be as able to crush domestic opposition as they had proved to overcome foreign resistance. At this fortunate juncture they might be expected to use their power in extending the influence of the Church, and inculcate unconditional obedience to an institution which in turn would declare subjection to them a religious duty. To be ready for this grand opportunity the Council was convened in the nick of time, and invested its originator with every authority calculated to strengthen his position and assist his claim to universal supremacy.

These opinions are very general among that portion of the German Catholics who at first opposed the Council, and are now waiting for an occasion which shall permit them to discard it. They seem to be borne out by the fact, that those persons at the French Court on terms of intimacy with Rome have notoriously belonged to the ardent promoters of the war; that the French clergy are even now engaged in fanning resistance on religious grounds; and that the Ultramontane party in Germany

at the beginning of the struggle made every effort to cause Prussia to be left in the lurch by the Southern States, even though France were to be victorious, and the German nation to be crippled for an indefinite time. However, things have fallen out differently, and instead of the Franco-Slavonic era of mixed secular and religious despotism shadowed forth in the above, we have anarchy in France, confusion in Austria, and a steady determination to assert itself and its liberal principles in the race between the two which was to have been their victim.

SOME RESULTS OF THE WAR.

Berlin, January 4, 1871.

SOME statistical results of the German victories are thus recorded in the *Staats Anzeiger:*

'Up to the end of November, the number of unwounded prisoners in our towns and fortresses amounted to 10,067 officers, and 303,842 non-commissioned officers and privates. In addition to these, we have on our hands those taken in December and January,* and a very large number of wounded. We have also seized 4,200 guns, 170 mitrailleuses, and 112 eagles. The day after the capitulation of Sedan the total of the French prisoners was 104,750, with 3,289 officers. To these were added, by the capture of Laon, Toul, and Strasburg, 18,950 men and 288 officers; 150,000 men and 6,000 officers by the capture of Metz; 2,400 by the fall of Schelestadt; 5,000 by the fall of Neu Breisach; 4,000 by the conquest of Soissons; and as many more by the surrender of Verdun. 3,500 were taken in the different engagements near Paris, 1,500 by General von Werder near Dijon, and more than that in the north. 7,700 men and 500 officers were, in the course of October and November, sent to Germany from hospitals under our care.† Of these prisoners, 61,260 men and 2,700 officers have been sent to the Rhine province, 47,150 and 1,800 officers to Saxony, 29,500 and 740 officers to Westphalia, 24,400 and 590 officers to Posen, 21,100 and 170 officers to Pomerania, 20,500 and 610 officers to Silesia,

* According to a rough computation of the translator, about 20,000.

† To give an idea of the number of the French wounded left to be taken care of by the Germans, it will suffice to say that in Metz alone there were 23,000; at Sedan there were 14,000.

16,360 and 200 officers to East Prussia, 7,200 and 250 officers to Brandenburg, and 4,000 with 1,450 officers to the new provinces of Prussia which have no fortresses. The rest of the prisoners are quartered in the other German States. 334 officers and 40,886 men are in Southern Germany, one-half in Bavaria, and the remaining half in Würtemberg, Baden, and Southern Hesse. The Northern States have each received an allotment corresponding to their size. The Hanse Towns being very populous, but having a small territory, have had chiefly officers assigned to them.

By the beginning of October the captured artillery consisted of 96 mitrailleuses, and 2,120 other guns of every possible calibre. At Orleans we took three more guns; at Soissons 128; at Paris two; at Schelestadt 108; at Fort Mortier five; at Neu Breisach 100; at Metz 1,498, and 72 mitrailleuses. Of those found at Metz, 622 were rifled field-artillery, 384 rifled fortress artillery, 492 smooth-bores, howitzers, and mortars, and 72 mitrailleuses. Those taken at Thionville, Phalsbourg, Montmédy, Mézières, and Orleans are not included in this list, which was closed on November 28, that is, before the renewal of the fighting on the Loire.

Equally great is the amount of every variety of *matériel* captured by our troops. At Sedan alone we took 815 ammunition wagons, 160 gun-carriages, 355 baggage and commissariat wagons, 61 field smithies, 57,000 rifles, 2,800 cavalry sabres, 900,000 infantry cartridges, 60,000 cannon balls, 50,000 grenades, &c. In Metz, 2,400 gun-carriages, 2,000 wagons, 100,000 rifles, 280,000 kilogrammes of powder, &c. fell into our hands. Schelestadt gave us 122 gun-carriages, 6,000 rifles, and 660 tons of powder. Similarly ample stores were appropriated in most of the minor places. It ought, however, to be observed, that the gain to us from these spoils is considerably less than the loss to the French. A large quantity, for instance, of the artillery *matériel* we shall not be able to make any use of. It belongs to a different sort of equipment, and therefore is of no more worth to us than so much old wood and iron.'

These enormous figures, being the largest ever witnessed, produce peculiar results, not always of the most satisfactory kind. The prisoners suffer from their numbers being so very great. To be guarded, they must be kept together in camps or forts. But the season is inclement, and the available localities do not always admit of being properly heated. Iron stoves or other similar makeshifts, had recourse to in so unusually severe a winter, would be scarcely sufficient for Germans, and are certainly inadequate for the sons of sunny France. Nor is it easy for the military authorities to provide warm clothing for

330,000 prisoners at a time when every woollen stocking, every piece of flannel they can lay their hands on, has to be sent to the army to enable it to endure the hardships of this terrible campaign. Much, however, is being done, and considering the trials the prisoners underwent previous to their dispatch here, their state of health may be pronounced uncommonly good. The very fact that no epidemic has broken out among them, crowded together as they necessarily are, is good evidence of the humane treatment they receive. The smallpox and typhus which they brought with them have been successfully combated by the German surgeons. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the poor fellows will, as long as they live, with a shiver recall to mind the winter they passed in a German casemate or wooden hut. Their clothing, being mostly in a dilapidated state on arrival, is not improved since, and is altogether unsuited to the rigours of the climate. Here and there stockings have had to be distributed. Woollen plaids and other coverings have also been liberally allowed them. But so far as I have been able to ascertain, no underclothing has been given out, and the want of it is doubtless being severely felt. Next to a present of 330,000 pairs of drawers and woollen jackets, the best thing that could happen to the prisoners would be a sudden thaw. There is, however, not much prospect of it. In Germany the frost, when intense at this time of the year, seldom breaks before the second week in February.

Yesterday four German bankers were tried at Berlin on a charge of high treason. The crime alleged against them was, that, being German subjects, they subscribed for a French loan while their country was at war with France. The gentlemen thus accused were Herren Georg Güterbock of Berlin, M. Kulp and M. St. Goar of Frankfort-on-the-Main, and G. H. Levita of Antwerp. From the evidence it appeared the prisoners had telegraphed to London for scrip, thereby supplying irrefragable proof

of their offence, and at the same time clearly showing they had not reflected on the culpable nature of the act. Instead, however, of basing their defence upon this latter circumstance, counsel preferred bringing forward excuses which, while they did not remove the guilt, were calculated to veil the fact that it had been incurred by mere inadvertency. Herr Güterbock stated he had subscribed not for himself, but for M. Soria, a banker at Florence, who then happened to be at Berlin; Herr Levita subscribed for the banker Habicht of New York, then sojourning at Frankfort; Herr Kulp did not subscribe at all, but merely meant to purchase scrip subscribed by others, which clearly does not implicate him under the law; while Herr St. Goar insists that he only inquired about the scrip, but neither subscribed for nor purchased any. The Court, regarding these excuses as disproved by the wording of their telegrams, found the prisoners guilty. Herr Güterbock, who had ordered the largest sum, 17,000*l.*, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in a fortress. Kulp, who had telegraphed for 4,000*l.*, was let off with nine months, probably because he stated that he was a naturalised French subject. Herren St. Goar and Levita, who had asked respectively for 10,000*l.* and 5,000*l.*, got six months and three months, as, their order not having been carried out, the crime was not completed. After the trial, all the prisoners were set at liberty on bail, and, it is expected, will receive a full pardon.

The Prussian Government has taken a resolution of great importance. In reply to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Breslau, asking for the dismissal of those teachers in public schools who have declared against Infallibility, the Minister of Education has uttered a decisive 'No.' It follows from this that the Fallibilists are considered by the Government equally good Catholics as the Infallibilists.

In a new note to Count Bernstorff, Count Bismarck declares, that if Luxemburg behaves as badly during the

siege of Longwy as it did during the siege of Thionville, a portion of the Grand Duchy will be occupied by German troops.

Loyal addresses on the Black Sea question continue to flow in at St. Petersburg. As a specimen how the country people look upon international matters, I subjoin the following, signed by the villagers of the district of Pskoff:

'Your Imperial Majesty, Father Liberator, — News has reached us that thou, idolised Czar, in thy unceasing solicitude for the good of our country, hast announced to Europe that thou wilt reclaim thy rights to the Black Sea. In reply, certain States have threatened thee. To see thee threatened is unbearable to us. Command, O Czar, and all of us, young and old, will hasten to punish the audacious ones that dare to dispute the rights acquired by our ancestors at the cost of their sacred blood. This is our humble wish, which we venture to submit to thy approval.'

There is a delightful frankness in the above, which caused the Emperor to command that his royal thanks be conveyed to the senders. Most of the rural addresses are conceived in a like spirit.

Fresh measures are being daily taken with a view to increase the efficiency of the Russian forces. The Council of State is discussing the increase of officers' salaries and pensions. Non-commissioned officers have been permitted to ride in carriages and to visit the theatres.

A Roumanian memorandum to the Powers complains that a strictly constitutional form of government should have been forced upon the country by the Paris Conference of 1856 at a period when the social and intellectual condition of the inhabitants renders it impossible to maintain order and quiet simultaneously with the existence of democratic institutions. The Porte protests against the Roumanian Government appealing to the Powers instead of to the Sultan.

Count Beust, in his reply dated the 26th ult. to Count Bismarck's note of the 14th of the same month, acknowledges the ready recognition and friendly spirit with which Count Bismarck has alluded to the Treaty of Prague.

Count Beust, however, deems it advisable not to enter into farther particulars regarding the treaty, and considers that it is in the interest of both parties to avoid discussion in this direction. The Austrian Chancellor is of opinion, that it is not desirable at the present moment to make too literal an interpretation of the treaty the subject of discussion. The views of Count Beust, on the contrary, incline towards regarding the union of Germany under the leadership of Prussia as an act of historical significance and as a fact of paramount importance. He holds that the future mutual relations of Austria and Germany should shape themselves accordingly. Taking this stand-point, Count Beust is able to declare, in expectation of the farther communications notified by the Prussian Government, that among all the influential classes of Austria and Hungary a most sincere wish prevails to cultivate friendly relations with the new German Confederation. Count Beust continues thus:

'At this moment especially, it is not without justifiable confidence that we look forward to the realisation of these promising prospects, and hope that identity in action and interest connecting the two States will become a pledge of enduring harmony between them, and a guarantee of lasting peace to Europe. Similar sentiments animate the Emperor, by whom the history of a glorious past which has connected his dynasty during centuries with the German people will be always remembered with the warmest sympathies for that people's farther development, and with an earnest hope that in its new constitution it may find guarantees for a happy future—a future advantageous not only to itself, but also to the Empire bound to it by so many ties.'

MILITARY DETAILS.

Berlin, January 5, 1871.

The conquest of Mézières is an important military event. It gives the Germans a new line of railway from

Metz to Paris, and renders them comparatively independent of the southern or Nancy line, so long burdened with the immense transport required to provision and sustain in fighting trim about a million of men. The new line has the additional advantage of being less exposed to attack than the old one, which, skirting the central provinces, could not always be protected from the inroads of Francs-tireurs. Some day, when the history of the war is written, the world will be astonished to see how many thousands had to be detailed for the laborious, inglorious, and yet indispensable task of protecting the lines of rail along which the German communications ran.

'The Prussian War Office have adopted a new mode of rewarding military merit. Instead of showering orders and clasps upon the troops as hitherto, gallant deeds will be henceforth noted in the *Gazette*, every man who has distinguished himself being accorded a short paragraph commemorative of his conduct. The large number of such notices already published forms a valuable contribution to the history of the war. It not only proves the personal prowess of the men, but, detailing the circumstances under which it was exhibited, preserves many a minute feature of the several engagements which might otherwise be lost to the historian. I will give an example or two:

'Fifth Corps d'Armée, 20th Brigade of Infantry, Westphalian Fusilier Regiment; No. 37, Fusilier Edward Ermrick. On the 6th of August, at 6 A.M., Sergeant Schmidt with ten men went patrolling in the direction of the enemy. Having passed through Wörth, he lay down with his men in the ditch along the high road, on the outskirts of a wood opposite the vineyards occupied by the enemy. At the end of three-quarters of an hour, about 900 paces in front, several guns were noticed. Being unable to distinguish whether they were French or Prussian, the sergeant asked which of his men would go and ascertain what they really were. Ermrick at once volunteered, and having advanced 400 paces, found himself stopped by three Turcos suddenly springing out of a ditch. He killed one, wounded another, and kept the third at bay. Then, calling out that he had fallen in with the French, he forced his adversary to retreat, and continued firing upon the French artillery till recalled by the sergeant.

Fusilier Carl Tomkewicz, while storming the heights of Wörth, received a ball in the little finger of his right hand. He asked one of his comrades to wrench off the finger, which was hanging by the skin and impeded his loading. As his comrade would not do it, he continued to fire in spite of the mutilated finger, and, notwithstanding the increasing pain, left the field only when exhausted by loss of blood.

Fusilier Friedrich Zimmer, having helped to push back the enemy into Fröschweiler, and taken part in the street fighting, saw several gun-barrels pointed from a cellar. Resolutely entering the house, and descending to the kitchen, he found seven Turcos, and captured them all by his determination and address.

Silesian Jäger Battalion, No. 5. Jäger Ernst Hase, in the battle of Sedan, getting ahead of his comrades, crept into the copse east of Floing, whence he noticed a hostile battery. Opening fire against it, he actively contributed to force the battery to retreat. One gun, which had lost most of its horses and men, being left behind, Hase approached stealthily, and suddenly running forward, captured it.'

For several thousand more of these incidents I may refer the reader to the *Staats Anzeiger*.

When the Prussian troops left Berlin in July the military police were provided with small dialogue books in German and French. The troops themselves got none, the duration and extent of the war not then being anticipated. This deficiency has been made up by large quantities of a similar publication found in France and prepared for the use of the French, who, never getting to Germany, never wanted them. The contents of this guide to military conversation curiously illustrate the realities of the war. Just glance over the following polite intimations:

'*When in quarters*:—Leave the room. Go along. Take away all the furniture. None of you dare enter this room. Bring instantly bread, butter, cheese, and eggs. Bring poached eggs, with bacon and ham. We will kill your chickens, pigeons, and ducks. Roast them. Be quick. I am thirsty. Bring me a bottle of beer, rum, spirits. Boil coffee, chocolate, tea, &c.'

The little work containing these useful sentences has served a double purpose. It has enabled many a German soldier to converse with his host, and at the same time re-

conciled the latter to exactions which, as proved by the book, his countrymen had themselves contemplated against others. Another product of French ingenuity likewise bought up by the German soldiers whenever they can get a copy, is Doré's cartoon representing the French crossing the Rhine. It was intended to commemorate last year's invasion, and is conceived with the usual talent and fantastic imagination of its designer. In serried ranks and fine military array the Napoleonic legions are descending upon German soil, where the soldiers of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. rise from their graves to welcome the fresh arrivals. In the background the German cities are open to the advance of the victorious hosts. They were not quite so defenceless as M. Doré—himself a man of Alsatian blood—imagined.

The Germans in the Namaqua country, the most northerly district of Cape Colony, have sent a congratulatory address to King William. There is hardly a place in the world inhabited by German settlers whence such an address has not issued.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF PARIS. COMPENSATION ACCORDED FOR THE ENGLISH VESSELS.

Berlin, January 9, 1871.

THERE is little doubt that, after the reduction of forts Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge, the Prussian batteries will be advanced nearer to the ramparts, and bombard the city itself. If necessary, the same plan is likely to be adopted on the eastern side of the capital after the reduction of the forts Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent. From the neighbourhood of Issy and Vanvres all the *quartiers* on the left bank of the Seine could be brought under the shell-fire of the 24-pounders; the eastern batteries, when

sufficiently near, will throw their missiles into Belleville, and the other faubourgs inhabited by the working population. Even before this extreme measure grenades will be, and indeed are at this moment being, hurled into the southern suburbs by some monster guns, with a range that admits of reaching the city from their present remote position. There are also fresh batteries in course of construction on Mount Avron, which will be able to do as much against Belleville before Noisy is silenced. It is hoped that the city will surrender before the great mass of the German artillery is employed against it. If it holds out, it may be doomed to suffer the fate of Strasburg.

Public opinion in Germany is intensely gratified by what is supposed to be the beginning of the end. Though the French are no longer blamed for continuing the war, as they were after Sedan, the determination to put them down is as unshaken as ever. If they *will* fight, or are terrorising each other into fighting *à outrance*, Germany accepts the challenge. But the more prolonged their resistance, the greater appears the necessity of convincing them of their defeat, and disabling them from recommencing hostilities soon after the conclusion of peace. If, it is said here, this people, actuated by pride and a sense of national honour, thus obstinately continue a war which they themselves admit was frivolously begun by a Sovereign whom they profess to detest, it is all the more probable they will want their revenge as soon as they can. To reduce them to a position which will render it difficult to execute such a design is therefore the unanimous demand of the press and public. Much as Paris is pitied, this feeling of commiseration does not prevent the German armies or people from insisting upon the most rigorous proceedings being taken against it. It is thought to be a case of self-defence, which justifies going all lengths. Had any fresh motives been needed to strengthen this

resolve, it would have been supplied by the terrible losses sustained north and south of Paris in the course of the last six weeks.

The German Government will allow adequate compensation for the English vessels sunk in the Seine. They were seized because it was apprehended they would be used by the French for the purpose of landing troops. The incident is made the subject of the following semi-official communication in the *Cologne Gazette:*

'The sinking of some British vessels in the Seine, near Duclair, the harbour of Rouen, has been eagerly discussed in the English press. While it is undeniable that the ships were the property of neutrals, it is equally certain that they were seized in waters subject to the legitimate authority of a belligerent engaged in active operations of war. According to the law of nations, men-of-war, if belonging to a neutral Power, are inviolable, even in waters where war is going on; but merchantmen do not partake of the same privilege, and must be content to come under the law of the locality in which they may happen to find themselves. In the present instance we have to deal, not with a political, but with a purely military measure. It is a fact that French men-of-war have repeatedly steamed up the river, and, by landing troops and firing at our posts, inflicted damage upon us. Such being the case, it was probable that the English ships would be impressed by the French commanders, and used for similar operations, the more so as they might be expected to take advantage of a neutral flag for their own purposes. The Germans clearly owed it to themselves to forestall such a contingency, and by sinking the ships close the mouth of the river. The embargo laid upon the ships, therefore, was a perfectly justifiable measure.

The right of embargo in such a dilemma legally belongs to every State, and has been frequently exercised by all in turn. At the same time, this right involves the duty of allowing ample compensation; as the right has been taken advantage of, so will the duty be fulfilled by our Government. To quote a few examples from the past: the Spaniards in 1718 and 1732 embargoed and paid for many foreign ships. Louis XIV., on the other hand, when he appropriated foreign ships to facilitate the transport of troops for the Knight of St. George, refused to allow compensation, on the ground that a Sovereign held unlimited sway in the ports of his dominions. At any rate, he declined to pay for losses incurred during the time the embargoed vessels, if not seized, would have been obliged to remain in his ports. Many States have sought by special treaties to protect their subjects against this embargo, or secure for them indemnity. These treaties are quoted in Nau's *Völkerrecht* (Law of Nations), chap. 260, and

more explicitly in Pöhl's *Seerecht* (Maritime Law), p. 1169. In a treaty concluded between France and the Republic of San Salvador on May 2, 1858, an embargo was expressly declared admissible, provided full compensation were granted. The embargo therefore is no confiscation; and very different from the measure which England and France, in November 1832, adopted against Dutch commerce, with a view to compelling a solution of the Belgo-Dutch difficulty. A learned Dutchman, M. Karseboors, has written an interesting essay on the embargo, entitled *De Navium Detentione quæ vulgo dicitur Embargo*, Amstelodami, 1840. By the testimony of all these writers, as well as the existing international usages, we are borne out in saying that our military, being compelled by the necessities of warfare, had a right to turn neutral property to account.'

At the beginning of the war Prussia inquired whether she might count on a favourable neutrality on the part of Russia. The answer was in the affirmative, but accompanied by the expression of a hope that Prussia would find it possible to come to some arrangement with Denmark in regard to Northern Schleswig. In reply, Prussia said she should be happy to compromise the matter at an early opportunity. There the affair rested until the repudiation of the Black Sea Treaty by Prince Gortschakoff. Prussia being disagreeably surprised by this fresh complication and the possibility of a new conflict before she had done with the one in hand, Prince Gortschakoff thought it necessary to make amends by obliging her in another quarter. He accordingly dropped a hint that the Schleswig difficulty need not perhaps be settled in a hurry; at least not if Denmark persisted in her former demand, which included not only Northern, but a portion, and that a valuable one, of Central Schleswig also. There is no doubt this suggestion was favourably received at Versailles.

The German Empire has been inaugurating its establishment with a courteous note to the Austrian sister State, to which the latter has replied in the like strain. Both Governments assure each other that common interests and common traditions bind their countries together, and will cement the ties of a lasting friendship

between them. To speak plainly in a matter of such vital importance, there are not as yet very many in this capital who believe that these mutual good wishes will be fulfilled. I will try and condense current opinions in a few lines.

By the very nature of their position, Governments are obliged to let bygones be bygones, and turn over a new leaf when it would be no good to go on in the old grooves. But in the present instance the question appears to be, whether Austria will be really compelled to adopt a new policy, or whether the aspect of Europe after the restoration of peace will enable her to cherish the hope of recovering lost ground, notwithstanding all the victories achieved by her successful neighbour. On the popular supposition that France will pant for revenge the moment she is released from the German grip, it is evident that there will be some temptation for Austria to resume her former politics, and shape her course, if not in the hope, at least in the expectation of another trial of strength between Paris and Berlin. Russian complications, too, may have the same effect upon her resolves; nor are the host of our minor neighbours, all unfriendly to the new commonwealth, likely to persuade her that she alone has no other policy left than to support it. Jammed in between so many powerful and antagonistic States, as the Germans are, would it be unnatural for Austria to think, that they are not safe from attack even after the reunion of their national resources? The question for Austria therefore remains, now as before, whether she best serves her interests by declaring for or against her rising neighbour. After the experience of Sedan and Metz, she will certainly have a strong incentive to ally herself to Berlin; yet so many chances of farther conflicts remain, and the ultimate issue can be so little foreseen, that, after all, it will be a mere matter of policy with whom she casts in her lot. The progress of events, together with the judg-

ment and the passions of the leading personages, will determine what the relations between Austria and Germany really are to be.

NOTE OF COUNT BISMARCK ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Berlin, January 15, 1871.

THE following is the full text of a despatch addressed by Count Bismarck to the North German representatives abroad, in refutation of the charges brought by M. de Chaudordy against the German mode of carrying on the war:

'*Versailles, January* 9.

'Your Excellency will probably have noticed in the papers a document signed by Count Chaudordy, teeming with accusations against the German commanders and troops, and which is said to have been transmitted to the neutral Powers in the name of the Government of the National Defence.

I do not know, and am inclined to doubt, whether this has been really done, as the document is evidently intended for the French public and for the requirements of that section of the foreign press inimical to us. It is difficult to believe that Count Chaudordy and the persons who instructed him should have supposed any Government so ignorant as to treat them to this communication. In other countries, the condition of foreign nations is habitually made the object of study and observation. The world knows the systems of education prevailing in Germany and France. The world knows the uniform liability to military service with us, and the conscription and purchase of *remplaçants* in France. The world knows the elements composing the German armies, now arrayed against *remplaçants*, Turcos, and convict battalions. It remembers the history of former wars, and recollects but too well how French troops conduct themselves in an enemy's country. Representatives of the European and American press, whom we have readily admitted among us, acknowledge that the German soldier knows how to combine valour with humanity. They have repeatedly had occasion to see how reluctantly rigorous measures are carried out, when our commanders find themselves under the necessity of adopting them for the protection of the troops from the unlawful practices of the French.

The grossest distortion of the truth will not conceal the fact that the

French have imparted a cruel character to this war. Soon after the beginning of the war we learnt that the French troops wilfully ignore the common law of nations, as well as the special conventions in which France has participated. The bearers of our flags of truce were almost invariably fired upon, and unwarrantable and brutal acts committed against our surgeons and ambulances. I therefore requested your Excellency, some months ago, to lodge a protest with the Government to which you are accredited. During the time which has since elapsed, we have been able to collect documentary proofs and to make out a long list of fresh cases. On twenty-one different occasions, which preclude the supposition of accident or mistake on the part of the French troops, flags of truce, accompanied by a trumpeter sounding his bugle, were fired upon. They were fired upon from rifles and cannon, by single marksmen and in volleys. Several trumpeters were killed, and the bearers of the flags of truce wounded, on these occasions. The judicial affidavits proving these cases are lying before me, and will be printed. After the battle of Weissenburg we found, as your Excellency will recollect from my despatch dated the 27th of September, that not only the wounded prisoners, but even French military surgeons of superior rank, knew nothing of the Geneva Convention; and that several of the latter, having received the necessary information from our delegates, themselves manufactured a makeshift brassard, which could only be recognised with difficulty. We cannot wonder at this, after reading in official despatches dated July and August of last year, and published by the present authorities in Paris, how imperfectly prepared France has been for this long-intended and wantonly-provoked war. The French have at last made themselves so well acquainted with the Geneva Convention, that they know how to derive the greatest advantage from it; but there has been no commensurate improvement in their own conduct with respect to the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the treaty.

While we are upholding even the less practicable stipulations of the Convention, causing us great inconvenience and detriment; while more than a hundred French military men are moving about here at head-quarters with the greatest freedom as surgeons and attendants; while French delegates have been allowed access to the prison dépôts in Germany, although it might have been foreseen that this intercourse would give rise to treacherous designs—the French, on their part, have, up to the present time, continued their attacks on dressing-stations and ambulances, have persevered in ill-treating and robbing surgeons, delegates, hospital servants and attendants, and have even murdered wounded men. When surgeons have fallen into the hands of the enemy, they have frequently been ill-treated and imprisoned, or robbed of their property, and taken by the most circuitous roads to the Swiss or Italian frontiers. As it has not been possible, on account of the frequent removal of the troops from place to place, to take judicial cognisance of all cases which have become known,

the examples quoted in the enclosure of this despatch may for the present be sufficient. I can, however, not refrain from quoting the evidence of the Swiss surgeon, Dr. Burkhard, dated Pinseaux, December 18, 1870:

"The Geneva Convention has in many instances been infringed during the fighting in the forests of Orleans. On the 30th of November I saw a French military surgeon, of whom not only the French prisoners asserted, but who himself openly acknowledged, that he had killed many Prussian prisoners with his revolver. Numerous wounded men relate that the Francs-tireurs, when retreating, pulled Geneva brassards out of their pockets."

In the face of such glaring violation of the Geneva Convention, the German Governments will have to consider how far they will in future be bound by it in their relations to France.

Besides the violation of Conventions, international law, and the usages of warfare, alluded to in my despatch of the 27th of September last year, offences of a different nature have occurred. At the battle of Wörth it was remarked that bullets, on striking the ground, exploded with a loud detonation and scattered the earth. Immediately after this had been remarked, Colonel von Beckedorff was dangerously wounded by an explosive bullet; a similar projectile struck Lieutenant von Œrtzen, of the 2d Prussian Uhlan regiment, on the 20th of December in an engagement near Tours. Among the ammunition captured in Strasburg, explosive projectiles for the so-called *fusil-à-tabatière* were found: the investigation of this matter is not concluded. I purpose to bring this violation of the St. Petersburg Convention specially to the notice of its co-signataries. It ought to be mentioned that a French commander accuses the Baden troops, who are no more in possession of explosive bullets than the remainder of the German armies, of having made use of explosive projectiles contrary to the stipulations of the Convention, and that he has officially threatened the population of Baden on that account with the fate of the Palatinate: "*Même les femmes.*"

Closely connected with this mode of warfare is the fact, that a cartridge has been found in the pockets of French prisoners, the ball of which is divided into sixteen edged segments, loosely joined again. A specimen of this sort of projectile, which is tantamount to chopped lead, has been sent to the Foreign Office at Berlin, and will there be submitted to the representatives of the foreign Powers.

At sea the French have likewise scouted international law. The French man-of-war Desaix destroyed by fire and scuttled on the high seas three German merchantmen which she had captured, the Ludwig, the Vorwarts, and the Charlotte, instead of taking them to a French port and having them condemned by a prize court. The German men-of-war will consequently be ordered to make reprisals.

It cannot be a matter of surprise, that authorities who have so little respect for laws and conventions are equally unscrupulous in casting aside

modern usages, and reviving the manners and customs of a former and less civilised age. Nor that they should sanction actions which at all times, and by all peoples who had any honour, were deemed disgraceful.

The humanity with which the French prisoners, wounded and sick, are treated, has been attested by the neutrals attending on the sick and wounded, who have publicly and spontaneously given evidence on the subject, with their signatures appended.

The German prisoners in France, although not a tenth part of the French prisoners in Germany, have in many instances been treated with inhuman severity and neglect. A convoy of about 300 Bavarian sick "captured" in the hospitals of Orleans, and mostly suffering from typhus, dysentery, or wounds, were penned up in the gangways and cells of the prison at Pau. For a bed they had a bundle of straw, and for six days only bread and water were given them, until English and German ladies took pity on them, assisted them with their own means, and induced the reluctant authorities to take some care of them. In other places, especially with the army of General Faidherbe, the prisoners were kept in lofts without fire, without blankets, without warm or sufficient food, in a cold of sixteen degrees; while in Germany all buildings intended for the reception of prisoners of war were provided with stoves at the commencement of winter.

The crews of German merchantmen are not only kept as prisoners of war, but were at first treated as criminals, chained together two and two, and transported from one place to another, their food being insufficient in quantity and inferior in quality. A civilian who had been unjustly imprisoned, and complained about some money that had been sent to him being withheld, was officially informed by letter that prisoners were not entitled to consideration. Prisoners who are conducted through towns in the provinces are even now not protected against ill-treatment by the population. It is to be presumed that no case has occurred in Germany where the inhabitants have violated, even by an expression that would give pain, the respect vouchsafed by civilised men to misfortune.

Notwithstanding the barbarities committed by Turcos, not one of them has been insulted or ill-treated in Germany. The uncivilised Turcos and Arabs are less accountable for the cruelties, mutilations, and bestialities perpetrated by them on the persons of our wounded than is the European Government which, with the full knowledge of their habits, brings these African hordes to a European theatre of war. The *Journal des Débats* retains sufficient sense of humanity and shame to give expression to its indignation that Turcos should with their thumbs gouge the eyes of their prisoners from their sockets. But the *Indépendance Algerienne*, and several other French papers, thus address the newly-formed African soldiers, the Gums, when recommending to them an invasion of Germany: "We know you. We prize your courage. We know that you are energetic, impetuous, and enterprising. Go and cut off heads—the more, the higher you will rise in our esteem. Away with the invader! Away with feelings of

humanity! The Gums will reap honours, when we give them the parole, Death, Pillage, Arson!"

The Turcos are accountable for the dead and wounded, who were found decapitated, or without noses and ears, in the village of Coulours near Villeneuve-le-Roi, and at Anscan near Troyes. Perhaps it is due to the long connection with Algiers and the progeny of the Barbaresques that French authorities allow and even order their fellow-citizens to commit acts, which set aside all military usages of Christian nations and all sense of honour. While the soldier of other European nations makes it a point of honour to be easily known for what he is, an enemy, the Prefect of the department Côte d'Or, Luce Villiard, dispatches a circular to the sub-prefects and mayors on the 21st of November, in which assassination by persons in plain clothes is recommended and praised as heroism. He says: "The country does not demand of you that you should assemble in arms and openly oppose the enemy; it expects from you that three or four resolute men should every morning sally forth from their communes, and assemble at a well-chosen spot from which they can fire on the Prussians without danger. Above all things, they must fire on the horsemen of the enemy, and deliver over the horses to the head-quarters of the arrondissement. I shall award them a premium, and publish their heroic deeds in all departmental journals, as well as in the *Journal Officiel*."

An infraction of the rules, not only of military honour but of common probity, is shown in the conduct of the present rulers with respect to the breach of parole committed by French officers and commented upon in my despatch of the 14th of December. As I then observed, it is comparatively indifferent how a small number of French officers behaves, even though they may be breaking their word of honour. But it is a grave matter, if their Government practically sanctions this breach of parole by admitting the delinquent into the army, and enticing him to do wrong by the promise of rewards. During the last few days we have obtained proof that the French Minister of War sanctions this faithlessness, encourages it, and promises to reward it by payment in cash. A decree of the Minister of War, dated the 13th of November, which has fallen into the hands of our troops, says that, "*désirant encourager les officiers à s'échapper des mains de l'ennemi*," the Minister promises to each individual escaped from Germany, besides the previously promised compensation for losses, a sum of 750f. A Government which calculated upon remaining at the head of the nation would scout the adoption of such measures in the interest of the country. But the dictatorship which has assumed power in France by a *coup de main*, and which is neither acknowledged by the European Powers nor by the French people, only considers the future of the country in the light of its own interests and passions. The rulers in Paris and Bordeaux suppress the utterance of the public desire for an expression of the popular will, as well as every other free utterance of opinion by word or letter. By an arbitrary reign of terror impossible in any other

European country, they extort from the people the means of carrying on the conflict, because they foresee that when it ceases so will their usurpation.

To prolong its existence, such a Government requires to incite passions and embitter feelings. They hope to attain their object by adopting a mode of warfare opposed to the civilised ideas of the age. Only by the non-observance of European customs in colonial warfare could a considerable portion of the French army, irrespective of its African element, have been habituated to these practices; otherwise the military traditions of France would have rebelled against such conduct. Were it the intention of the French rulers to facilitate the restoration of peace, they would afford the French people the possibility of hearing the truth, and of expressing its opinions by the infallible method of a free press; and they would hasten to share with representatives of the nation the responsibility at present resting upon them alone. Instead of this, we see that the press in France is a monopoly of a despotic Government, and only used to misrepresent events, falsify the state of affairs, and make political capital out of those popular prejudices which public education in France has systematically fostered among Frenchmen respecting their superiority and their claims to dominate over other countries.

The Government of the National Defence rouses the passions of the people without making any effort to restrain them within the bounds of civilisation and international law. It does not wish for peace: by its entire language and attitude it deprives itself of the power to make peace acceptable to the masses whom it has stirred up so long. It has unchained passions which it knows not how to dominate or to keep within the limits of international law and European military usage.

If, in view of this state of things, we are forced to exercise the rights of war with a severity which we regret, and which appertains neither to the German national character nor to our traditions, as is proved by the wars of 1864 and 1866, the responsibility falls upon those who, without call or justification, have forced upon the French the continuance of the Napoleonic war against Germany, and cast aside the traditions of European warfare.

I respectfully request your Excellency to hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of this despatch and its appendices.

VON BISMARCK.'

AUSTRIA AND THE BLACK SEA CONFERENCE. FRENCH PRISONERS.

Berlin, January 10, 1871.

THE following has been semi-officially published at Vienna:

'In order to render the assembly of the London Conference possible, it was intentionally avoided to discuss the question, how far the most important provisions of a solemn treaty can be legitimately set aside by one of the parties concerned. The Conference will emphatically have to uphold the validity of the rights conveyed by treaties, and to insist upon the principle, that the stipulations of a treaty can only be modified by consent of all parties. Should, after this indispensable declaration, an amendment of the Treaty of 1856 be proposed which would increase the rights of a single Power, and thereby lessen the security and guarantees given to other Powers, it becomes an essential point for consideration, what compensation should be made to these Powers in order to reimburse them for the damage sustained. It is to be hoped that any changes in the Treaty of Paris may be brought about without limiting them to concessions made to a single party.'

This means, Austria intends asking for concessions in respect to the navigation of the Lower Danube, &c. The more manifest this intention, the less is it in Prussia's interest to accelerate the meeting. Prussia eschews a new complication before she has done with France.

Nor is Austria's action in another quarter calculated to accelerate the setting to work of the Conference. Austria is taking preparatory steps with a view to mediation between Germany and France on the occasion of the Conference. As yet no propositions have been submitted by her to the belligerents; but the ministerial *Cross Gazette* remarks, that as neutrals cannot but know that Germany will on no account deviate from her conditions of peace, their object can only be to influence the French Government, in order to induce it to cede territories which formerly belonged to Germany. The *Cross Gazette* therefore con-

siders the statements made by several journals on the subject of mediation premature.

Complaints have been recently heard of French prisoners being sent to Germany in open trucks. The proceeding would be no doubt unpardonable, were there a possibility of avoiding it. But the military authorities plead not guilty, and the explanation they give seems plausible. Thousands of prisoners are being daily taken. What is to be done with them? Are the Germans to set apart large detachments to guard them until the most desirable means of transport can be provided? Are they to weaken their effective strength, and render pursuit less telling, in order that the prisoners may be spared exposure on their journey east? Humane as this would be towards the French, it would be scarcely just towards themselves. It would facilitate the escape of the retreating host. It would enable thousands to get off who, unless captured to-day, are sure to defy the Germans to-morrow, and send some more hundreds prematurely to the other world. In a word, it would prolong the campaign, and, while lightening the rigours of war to the enemy, proportionately aggravate matters to the Germans. The one dreadful alternative thus being, which of the two parties is to suffer, the German generals think themselves justified in first caring for their own men, and then attending to the health or welfare of their adversaries. This does not, however, exclude better conveyances being employed whenever they are at hand. We have seen many a French prisoner arrive at Berlin in a first-class compartment; we have seen others crowded into vans, closed indeed, but cold and draughty; and now that the horrors of war begin to thicken, and the struggle is taxing all available resources to the utmost, it has come to open trucks. Let us hope that the need of railway carriages, very great for the last two months, will soon be less sensibly felt, and that the late arrivals at Cassel will be the last condemned to suffer from this cause.

In the mean time it must not be imagined that the Germans are exempt from their share in the general calamity. Of the large reinforcements recently dispatched westward, not a few have had to put up with railway accommodation hardly superior to that enjoyed by the involuntary travellers in the opposite direction. Again, while these transports were going on, the post-office refused to send parcels to the seat of war, thereby depriving both officers and soldiers of the indispensable additions to their wardrobe and their mess which they have been in the habit of receiving from their friends at home. Only a few days ago this suspension of traffic was removed in the case of the officers, being still, however, enforced against privates. For the last fortnight a pair of fur boots has been standing in melancholy attitude opposite my writing-table, daily hoping to be sent off to Versailles, and daily disappointed in this fond expectation.

Count Bismarck has conveyed to Professor Dove of Göttingen the thanks of the King of Prussia for his reply to Dublin University.

In order promptly to make up for the want of officers, the Russian War Office has determined to appoint civilians to the commissariat and other supplementary branches of the service.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COUNT BISMARCK AND THE CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE AT PARIS.

'*Paris, January* 13, 1871.

'Your Excellency,—For several days large numbers of shells from the localities occupied by the besieging troops have penetrated as far as the interior of Paris. Women, children, and sick people have been struck, and among the victims are many persons subjects of neutral States. The life

and property of persons of all nationalities are thus in constant danger. These incidents have occurred without the undersigned, most of whom are at present in Paris with the sole mission of protecting the lives and interests of their fellow-subjects, having by previous notification been placed in a position to warn their fellow-subjects of the dangers with which they are threatened. Many reasons, and more especially the difficulty opposed by the besiegers to their departure, have prevented the undersigned protecting them against these dangers. In consequence of such serious events, the members of the diplomatic body now in Paris, who in the absence of their respective Embassies and Legations have been joined by the undersigned members of the Consular body, sensible of their responsibility to their Governments and fellow-subjects, have deemed it necessary to concert upon a common conduct. They have unanimously determined to request that, in conformity with the principles and recognised usages of international law, measures should be taken to insure the safety of the lives and property of their fellow-subjects. In confidently expressing the hope that your Excellency will be good enough to intercede with the military authorities in the above sense, the undersigned, &c.

Dr. KERN, Minister of the Swiss Confederation.
Baron ALDELSVAERD, Minister of Sweden and Norway.
Count MOLTKE-HVITFELD, Minister of Denmark.
Baron BEYENS, Minister of Belgium.
Baron DE ZUYLEN DE NYEVELT, the Netherlands.
Mr. WASHBURNE, United States.
Viscount DE BALLAVIAN Y ROXAS, Bolivia.
Duke D'ACQUAVIVA, Chargé d'Affaires of Monaco.
Mr. H. L. RATTON, Chargé d'Affaires of Brazil.
JULES THIRION HUSNI EFFENDI, Military Attaché of Turkey.
M. DE AROSEMENA, Chargé d'Affaires of Honduras.
M. C. BONIFAT, Chargé d'Affaires of Peru.
Baron G. DE ROTHSCHILD, Consul-General for Austria and Hungary.
Baron TH. DE VALKERSALEM, Consul-General for Russia.
Señor JOSE CALVOY-FERNEL, Consul for Spain.
Signor SERUTI, Consul-General for Italy.
Senhor DE VIEIRA, Consul-General for Portugal.
M. G. DE VUTOS, Vice-Consul for Greece.

To Dr. Kern.

'*Versailles, January* 17, 1871.

'I have had the honour to receive the memorial of the 13th inst., signed by you, the American Ambassador, and several other diplomatists

formerly accredited in Paris, in which reference being made to international law, I am requested to induce the military authorities to take measures for allowing the countrymen of those who have signed the document to convey themselves and their property into a place of security during the siege of Paris.

I regret I cannot admit that the demand which the parties who signed the document have done me the honour to address to me has any foundation in international law. The unusual measures, unparalleled in modern history, of turning the capital of a great country into a fortress, and converting its environs, with three million inhabitants, into an intrenched camp, has certainly led to very unusual and lamentable results; for these results those persons are responsible who have converted this capital and its environs into a fortress and a battle-field. But in every fortress inconvenience must be borne by those who voluntarily take up their residence in it, and remain in it during war. Paris is the most important fortress in the country, and France has collected her principal armies within it. They attack the German armies by sorties and artillery fire from their strong position in the midst of the population of Paris. In the face of these facts, it cannot be expected of the German commanders that they should give up the attack on the fortress of Paris, or conduct it in a manner irreconcilable with the object of every siege.

Whatever could be done to protect the unarmed neutral part of the Paris population from the dangers and inconvenience of the siege has been done by the Germans. A circular of Herr von Thile, Secretary of State, of the 26th September, informed the Ministers accredited in Berlin, and my note of the 10th October informed the Papal Nuncio and the other members of the diplomatic corps in Paris, that from that time the inhabitants of Paris would be exposed to the perils of a siege. A second circular of the 4th of October called attention to the consequences which would result to the population, if resistance were carried to extremities; and on the 29th of the same month I communicated the substance of this circular to the Minister of the United States in Paris, with a request that he would bring it to the knowledge of the other members of the diplomatic corps. There has been no lack, therefore, of previous warning, or of exhortation to the neutrals to leave the besieged city. The giving of such warnings, and the permission to leave the city, have been dictated by feelings of humanity and of consideration for the subjects of neutral and friendly States, but were not compelled by any principle of international law; and still less do law or custom establish the duty of giving previous notice to the besieged of the military operations which may be undertaken. As I had the honour of stating in my letter of the 26th of last September to M. Favre, that continued resistance would lead to a bombardment of the city, such an event was what every one must have been prepared for. Although Vattel had no such example before him as a fortified city with such great armies and munitions of war as Paris, he says: "Détruire une ville pas les bombes et

les boulets rouges est une extrémité laquelle on ne se forte pas sans de grandes raisons; mais elle est autorisée, cependant, par les lois de la guerre, lorsque on n'est pas en état réduire autrement une place importante, de laquelle peut dépendre le succès de la guerre, ou qui sert a nous porter des coups dangereux." There is all the less legal objection to be raised against the bombardment of Paris, inasmuch as it is not our intention to destroy the city, which Vattel considers allowable, but only to render untenable the strong central position in which the French armies prepare their attacks on the German troops, and under cover of which they carry them into execution.

In conclusion, I take the liberty of reminding your Excellency and the other gentlemen who signed the memorial on the 13th inst. that, after the above-mentioned notices and warnings for months past, all the neutrals who wished it, without any other condition than that of establishing their identity and nationality, have been allowed to pass our lines, and that up to the present day passes for our outposts have been placed at the disposal, not only of members of the diplomatic corps, but also of other neutrals when demanded by the Ministers of their respective Governments. Many of those who have signed the memorial of the 13th have been informed for months past that they could pass our lines, and have long had the permission of their Governments to leave Paris. Hundreds of citizens of neutral States, for whom permission to leave was requested by their Ministers, find themselves in an analogous position. I have no official information why they have made no use of this permission; but I conclude, from trustworthy private sources, that for a long time past the French authorities have not permitted the citizens of neutral States, not even diplomatists, to leave Paris.

Such being the case, it would seem advisable that those compelled to remain in Paris should address their protests to the rulers of that city. At all events, after what I have stated above, I am justified in denying, on the part of the German commanders, the assertion made in the memorial of the 13th, that the neutrals "ont été empêchés de se soustraire au danger par les difficultés opposées à leur départ par les belligérants." We shall continue to grant permissions to members of the diplomatic corps as a matter of international courtesy, however difficult and inconvenient it may be during the present stage of the siege. As to withdrawing their numerous countrymen from the dangers inseparable from the siege of a fortress I regret not to see any other way than the surrender of Paris. We find ourselves under the melancholy necessity of not being able to make our military action subordinate to our sympathy for the sufferings of the civilian population of Paris. Our method of proceeding is strictly prescribed by the imperious necessities of war, and the duty of protecting the German armies against the attacks of the French armies.

That the German artillery does not fire intentionally on buildings intended for the residence of women, children, and sick persons hardly requires

any assurance on my part, considering the strictness with which the Geneva Convention has been observed by us, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty. From the nature of the fortress, and the distance at which the batteries are firing, accidental injury to such buildings can hardly be prevented; nor is it possible to avoid the killing and wounding of civilians, however deplorable it may be. That these painful incidents, which we regret, should be more numerous in a city like Paris than in other fortresses, ought to have prevented the fortification and defence of the place; but no nation can be permitted to wage war with its neighbours, and to protect its principal fortress by pleading that the enemy ought to respect the unarmed and neutral inhabitants of a place in which the troops seek protection after every attack, and prepare for fresh encounters.

I request your Excellency, &c.

BISMARCK.

RAILWAY TRAFFIC TO AND FROM FRANCE.

Berlin, January 15, 1871.

OF the more than 20,000 fresh prisoners taken in the last fortnight, very many, we hear, are insufficiently clad, and are consequently suffering grievously from the weather. Will not M. Gambetta understand at last, that to achieve victory more is needed than to assemble a large number of men and arm them with a deadly weapon? Insufficiently clad, ill-officered, and untaught, his men are merely being led to the shambles, and very naturally take their revenge by surrendering wholesale. After what I have repeatedly said on the subject, it is almost superfluous to remark, that the sensations awakened in this country by this unparalleled run of success are of a very mixed nature. While people are proud of the valour and endurance displayed by their sons and brothers in the field, they are at the same time aggrieved at what they think the dire necessity of obtaining so many triumphs. There is no rejoicing in the country at the news of a fresh success, no exultation in the press at the arrival of some more victorious telegrams. Independently of the sadness occasioned by so

many deaths in their own ranks, the Germans, in their present state of civilisation, cannot help regarding war as something horrible, and, in fact, look upon it quite as much as a melancholy ordeal as the French themselves. Were it not for the steady resolution to do the thing thoroughly, now that it is once begun, and to obviate another campaign against the same enemy, as much as it can be obviated by securing material guarantees, the cry for peace would be general here. As it is, the earlier the French realise the fact, that some of the most prominent features of the German national character would have to be changed before M. Favre's terms will be accepted, the better for both combatants.

As the French continue to complain of the mode of transport accorded to their prisoners, I will just give you an idea of the number of carriages regularly required for some branches of the service. As you may be aware, the 'requisitioning' has never been of much use. Only upon the first occupation of a district does it supply any considerable amount of food. If the troops remain for any length of time, the provisions of the inhabitants are either exhausted or else concealed, and in most cases cannot be had for love or money. Thus, for instance, during the whole siege of Metz the troops engaged in this arduous undertaking had to be fed by Germany. When marching from Metz to the south they were, indeed, maintained by the larger places they passed through, but had to fall back upon their own resources in the smaller towns and villages. Even at Orleans they found very little for the men, and scarcely anything for the horses. These remarks hold good for the other armies likewise, not excluding that now in front of Paris. And now try and count up the wants of a single corps d'armée. In the space of 24 hours each corps d'armée consumes 18,000 loaves weighing 3lb. each, 120 cwt. of rice or pearl barley, 70 oxen or 120 cwt. of bacon, 18 cwt. of salt, 30 cwt. of coffee, 12 cwt. of oats,

3 cwt. of hay, 3,500 quarts of spirits, and 3,500 ounces of orange essence, or some other bitter tincture taken with the spirits. To this gigantic repast add 60 cwt. of tobacco, 1,100,000 ordinary cigars, and 50,000 officers' cigars, for each ten days. If you multiply these figures by 25, you have the sum-total of the consumption of a single day, or as regards tobacco of ten days, of the troops in the field. The difficulties of bringing up these enormous quantities were aggravated by the usual disasters incidental to warfare. At Metz a large proportion of the cattle received had to be destroyed, being infected with the cattle-plague. Again, the orange essence and other bitters given to the men to prevent diarrhœa would sometimes arrive in a condition compelling their being thrown away and replaced by fresh cargoes; or the bread would turn sour, or get mouldy; and more to the same tune. The wear and tear of the war in a rainy autumn and an unusually cold winter, moreover, required an incalculably large stock of every article of clothing to be sent out continuously. It is not many weeks since that each corps had again distributed among them 34,000 woollen shirts, 25,000 pairs of woollen stockings, 25,000 flannel bandages, 25,000 woollen comforters, 25,000 woollen plaids, &c. The Field-post too, in an army where everybody can read and write, regularly takes up no inconsiderable amount of rolling stock. From the 16th of July to the 31st of December no fewer than 67,600,000 letters and 1,536,000 newspapers—in other words, about 400,000 letters and 9,090 papers per day—have been dispatched from and to the army. In the same period 41,000,000 thalers and 58,000 parcels of all sizes and weights were sent by the War Office to the German military authorities in France. The soldiers received from or sent to their friends and relatives at home 13,000,000 thalers and 1,219,533 parcels, making 22,173 parcels per day. In addition to these trifles, 180,000 fresh troops have travelled

to France within the last eight weeks, while the transport of guns, shell, and every variety of ammunition has not ceased to this day.

Taking all this into account, the wonder seems to be, not that some of the prisoners, and of the German soldiers too, were obliged to put up with very uncomfortable accommodation on the road, but that the traffic has been so regular and uninterrupted as it has. By the way, the above account proves that some 50,000,000 thalers, which is rather more than 200,000,000 francs, have been expended by the army in France—a sum which, though it does not cover the losses of the French, will yet serve to lighten their pressure. Other large sums were sent to the front by private messengers.

The Baron Berlichingen, who fell the other day before Paris, was by no means the last descendant of the immortal Götz with the Iron Hand. He was the last but one of the Catholic branch of his family, which will die out with his brother, who is a monk. The Protestant line is still a tree with many branches.

Of the nine professors of the Roman Catholic theological faculty at Munich, six have declared for Infallibility, and three against it. In the majority there are two whose consent has been given conditionally.

M. Gambetta having ordered the immediate enlistment of the recruits due in October next, this is regarded as a proof that the available supply of men of riper years is exhausted. The regulation number of the fresh recruits is 143,000. Deducting sickly persons and those to be provided by the provinces under German control, there remain no more than 80,000, who, under M. Gambetta's system, will be ready to take the field in a month. A large number of conscripts, levied in the last month, are believed to be drilling in the south.

Austria at the Black Sea Conference intends to move for permission to widen the channel of the Danube at the

Iron Gate on the Austro-Roumanian frontier at the common expense of the Powers. A perfect agreement has been effected between the Powers concerning the principal points to be settled at the Conference.*

NAVAL WARFARE.

Berlin, January 16, 1871.

A SEMI-OFFICIAL article on the exploits of the French navy has appeared in the German press:

'The peculiar game which is being played by the French squadrons in our waters is but too much in keeping with the unworthy practices resorted to by the French army ever since the bombardment of the open town of Saarbrück. Repeatedly the French men-of-war have left our shores for a few days, to come back the moment our merchantmen ventured out. Repeatedly have we re-kindled our beacons and replaced our buoys, only to be compelled to return to the war armament of torpedoes the day after. Owing to this alternate appearance and disappearance of the French, and the consequent want of beacons at a time when navigation was practically encouraged to recommence by their absence, shipwrecks have been occasioned, and a state of blockade created which could not otherwise have been enforced. However, as the law of nations still admits of these manœuvres, all we can do is to make them pay for it on the conclusion of peace. It is different with the acts of piracy committed by French captains while cruising. On several occasions they have plundered their prizes on the high sea, and, after robbing them of all that could be taken, scuttled or burnt them there and then. This being at variance with existing laws and usages, which require condemnation from a Naval Court, is piracy,† and ought to be avenged by sending the captains in question to the gallows. It would be exceedingly desirable that on the conclusion of peace the extradition of these official pirates should be insisted upon by our Government.'

On the ground of these alleged violations of inter-

* The Conference was opened on January 15, but adjourned after the dispatch of some preliminary business. There was no French representative present.

† The French deny this, on the authority of some professors of international law.

national law on the part of the French cruisers, the Prussian Government has now ordered its own men-of-war to make reprisals. Henceforth French merchantmen will not indeed be captured,—a right Prussia expressly renounced at the beginning of the war,—but destroyed wherever it is possible. The crews will be treated as prisoners of war, as the crews of the German merchantmen are by the French. To allow time for neutrals to withdraw their cargoes from French ships, the order will not be enforced till February. It is expected that by that time a sufficient number of fast-sailing corvettes will be in the Atlantic to give effect to the threat. During a blockade of four months, extending along a coast of 700 miles, the total of the German merchantmen captured has been about twenty, being nearly all of them small craft.

The semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* reviews Count Beust's despatch of the 2d inst. relative to the Black Sea question. Alluding to Count Beust's argument, that Russia owes a debt of gratitude to Austria for her non-participation in the Crimean war, the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* remarks that this view possesses the merit of novelty; but, in the opinion of Russia and Europe, the policy of Austria was as detrimental to Russia as it could possibly be, short of direct participation in the war. The pretended goodwill of Austria was more damaging than her openly joining in hostilities could have been, because the theatre of war was confined to Russia's own soil. Moreover, Austria was the cause of the conditions of peace being drawn up less favourably for Russia than might have been the case. This line of policy was neither calculated to insure the friendship of Russia nor of the Western Powers. It is a matter of regret that the Austrian statesmen have not profited by the lesson. The *Journal* protests against the assertion, that the fact of the Russian Black Sea circular being forwarded to Belgrade and Bucharest was calculated to cause agitation in the East, and

to call forth illusions as to the abrogation of the treaty. The circular dispatched in October last expressly guarded against stirring up the Eastern question, as well as against the challenging of the principles which secure the position of Turkey in Europe.

THE TEN SIEGES OF PARIS.

Berlin, January 17, 1871.

THOUGH the French have made Paris the largest and strongest fortress in the world, they profess to regard the idea of its being besieged as simply barbarous; yet there is no capital which has so often provoked and undergone attack. The first mention of Paris in history records an investment. Fifty years before Christ it was the stronghold of the Gauls. Labienus, the most able of Cæsar's Generals, in that year marched an army against the rebellious place, and, crossing the Seine, forced the insurgents to evacuate it. Before retreating, Vercingetorix, the chief of the Gauls, burned what there was of a city. But the site was too eligible not to invite the building of a new town. Like Berlin, Paris originally was confined to an island formed by a river and surrounded by inaccessible swamps. No sooner had the Germans conquered France than Chlodwig, the leader of the invading tribe, reconstructed ancient Lutetia, and made it the centre of the new empire. During the time his descendants held sway in France it remained their principal fortress. When their authority began to decline, the defence of Paris against a foreign enemy gave such prestige to a leading General of the day as to enable him to usurp the throne of the decaying dynasty. Nearly 900 years after Christ, Charles le Gros, a degenerate scion of Charlemagne, found himself attacked at Paris by the Normans. A helpless imbecile, he had no choice but to make his peace with the predatory

bands, no matter at what cost. On the occasion of a second raid, however, Paris gallantly held out for a whole year, under the command of Count Otto, one of the King's nobles. So great was the renown Otto acquired by this feat of arms, that on Charles's death, in 888, the Frankish nobility elected him their King. A nephew of this Otto was Hugh Capet, the ancestor of the Bourbons.

In the mean time the German conquerors of France, comparatively few in number, had become absorbed by the subject nationality, and every now and then had a brush with the old country whence they had proceeded. In 978, when the German Emperor Otto II. was celebrating the festival of St. John at Aix-la-Chapelle, he was surprised by King Lothaire of France at the head of an army of 30,000 men. The German Emperor returned the compliment, and, crossing the frontier on the 1st of October, marched straight upon Paris, overcoming all resistance in his way. Before winter set in he stood at the foot of Montmartre, and invested the city. Very much like the Moltke of our day, he had to detail a portion of his army to ward off the hosts attempting the rescue of the beleaguered place; but, unlike what seems to be reserved for Paris in the present instance, he was obliged to withdraw without effecting his object. Winter and disease decimating his troops, he eventually returned the way by which he came. There is an old story that, before leaving, the Germans assembled on Montmartre and sung a *Te Deum* with so vast an energy of lungs that all Paris reëchoed the sound. Why they should have offered up their thanks in this boisterous manner when foiled in their efforts is a riddle unsolved to this day.

The strength of the place having thus been proved by experience, King Philip Augustus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, extended its fortifications, adding several hundred towers to the walls. King Charles V., in the latter part of the fourteenth century, surrounded the

new suburbs with a fresh *enceinte*, built a citadel called the Bastille, and constructed a fort on the isle of St. Louis. Notwithstanding these new defences, the English took Paris after the battle of Agincourt, 1420. The Maid of Orleans, attempting to recapture Paris, 1429, was repulsed by the English, who, however, seven years later were obliged to march out, owing to the gallantry of Dunois, le Bâtard Royal.

King Henry IV. was the next to assail the devoted capital. As he was a Protestant, it would not recognise his authority. Having defeated the Catholic League at Ivry, March 17, 1590, he approached Paris in forced marches, and occupying Corbeil, Lagny, and Creil, cut off provisions, then chiefly received by the river. He next planted his guns on Montmartre, and from this dominant position left the Parisians—his naughty children, as he jokingly called them—to choose between bread and bombs. Not less obstinate then than they are now, 15,000 of the inhabitants died of hunger before the town opened negotiations with the King. Just in the nick of time, however, the Spaniards, who assisted the Catholic League, sent General Farnese with a large army from Belgium to the rescue. Henry was compelled to raise the siege, and only entered Paris four years later, when he had embraced Catholicism, and then he was welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm.

France now rapidly increasing in power, Paris remained more than 200 years unvisited by an invading army. In the reign of Louis XIV., the mere idea of the foreigner venturing into the heart of France had come to appear so preposterous as to lead to the razing of the old fortifications. Louis XV. in 1726 again encircled the city with a wall, which, however, was not intended to serve a military purpose. As an open town, Paris underwent the storms of the Revolution. When, in 1814, the allied armies arrived in front of it to avenge the deeds of Napoleon I., a

few redoubts, hastily thrown up, were all the impediments in their way. 25,000 regulars under Marmont and Mortier, and 15,000 National Guards, with 150 guns, held the place for a day against 40,000 Prussians and Russians. When Montmartre had been taken by storm, and the Cossacks and Uhlans were swarming in La Chapelle and La Villette, the proud metropolis surrendered. On March 31, Frederick William III. of Prussia, the father of William I. of the present day, and Alexander I. of Russia made their entry into the city.

The following year witnessed the repetition of the feat. On the 2d of July 1815, the Prussians, under Blücher, took Montrouge and Issy by storm, while Wellington forced his way into the northern and eastern suburbs. On the 7th of July the English and Prussian Guards once more trod the Boulevards. The united Germans are soon likely to imitate their example.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMPERIAL DIGNITY BY THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, January 18, 1871.

A PROCLAMATION of the King of Prussia to the German people has been forwarded through Count Itzenplitz to the Upper and Lower Houses of the Prussian Diet. It runs as follows:

'We, William, by God's grace King of Prussia, hereby announce, that the German Princes and free towns having addressed to us a unanimous request to revive the German imperial dignity, which has now been sixty years in abeyance, and the requisite provisions having been inserted in the Constitution of the German Confederation, we regard it as a duty we owe to the Fatherland to comply with this invitation, and to accept the dignity of Emperor.

Accordingly, we and our successors to the crown of Prussia henceforth shall use the imperial title in all the relations and affairs of the German

Empire, and we hope that it may be vouchsafed to the German nation to enjoy a blessed future, under the symbols of its ancient greatness. We assume the imperial dignity conscious of the duty we have to protect with German loyalty the rights of the Empire and its members, to preserve peace, to maintain the independence of Germany, and to strengthen the power of the people. We accept it in the hope that it will be granted to the German people to enjoy in lasting peace the reward of its arduous and heroic struggles within boundaries which will give to the Fatherland that security against renewed French attacks which it has lacked for centuries.

May God grant to us and our successors to the imperial crown that we may be the defenders of the German Empire at all times, not in martial conquests, but in works of peace, in the sphere of national prosperity, freedom, and civilisation!'

After Count Itzenplitz had read the proclamation of the King relative to the imperial dignity in both Houses of the Prussian Diet, the Presidents made speeches referring to the high significance of this document, and calling for cheers for Germany's Emperor, King William. The members cheered unanimously. The Lower House determined to reply to the proclamation by an address.

On the same day, King William of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of Germany at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, in the palace of the French Kings, and in the presence of all the German Princes who are under the standards of the army before Paris, and surrounded by the representatives of the different regiments.

A letter from the King of Prussia to Prince Henry of the Netherlands, Governor-General of Luxemburg, expresses the hope that the questions pending between Luxemburg and Germany will be amicably settled. The letter also assures the Prince that Germany has no intention to imperil the existence of Luxemburg as a separate State.

Lord Granville, in a communication to Count Bismarck, accepts the proposal of the German Chancellor to pay for the British vessels sunk at Duclair.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR TO THE SOVEREIGNS OF GERMANY.

Berlin, January 23, 1871.

THE German Emperor has addressed letters, with nearly the same contents, to all the Sovereigns and Republics of Germany, announcing his assumption of the imperial dignity. His letter to the Bremen Senate is as follows:

'The Senate of the free town of Bremen having, conjointly with all the German Sovereigns and free towns, asked me, through the King of Bavaria, to reëstablish the German imperial dignity, I hereby thank the Senate for this proof of their confidence, and deem it a duty I owe to our country to answer the call that has been addressed to me to assume the German imperial dignity, not with a view to the realisation of those claims to extraneous power, in enforcing which our domestic affairs were but too much neglected in some glorious epochs of our history; but with the firm purpose, under God's blessing and as a truly German Sovereign, to protect the right and wield the sword of Germany for the furtherance of justice. Strong by the reunion of her Sovereigns and States, Germany has recovered her position in the council of nations; she neither needs nor wishes to aspire to anything beyond her frontier except the cultivation of friendly intercourse based upon mutual respect, and having for its object the promotion of the welfare of nations. Securely relying upon and content with its own strength, the German Empire will, I trust, after the victorious termination of the present war, in which we have been involved by an unjustifiable attack, and when once we have obtained such a frontier as will protect us from France, become a realm of peace and happiness in which the nation will possess and enjoy what it has striven after for centuries. I avail myself of this occasion to assure the free town of Bremen of the continuance of the sentiments which I have long entertained for it.

WILLIAM.

Versailles, January 17.'

The Emperor has issued the following order of the day, addressed to the army, in reference to his acceptance of the imperial dignity:

'On this day, ever memorable to me and my House, I take, with the consent of the German Princes, and the adhesion of all the German people, in addition to my rank as King of Prussia, that of German Emperor. Your bravery and endurance, which I again recognise to the fullest extent, have

hastened the work of the unification of Germany—a result which you have achieved at the sacrifice of so much blood.

Let it always be remembered that brotherly feeling, bravery, and obedience have rendered the army great and victorious. Maintain this feeling; then will the Fatherland always regard you with pride as to-day, and you will always remain its strong arm.

WILLIAM.

Versailles, January 18.'

THE GOAL OF THE UNITY MOVEMENT.

Berlin, January 21, 1871.

EVER since the German unity movement arose out of the wars against Napoleon I. the reëstablishment of the imperial dignity has been a dream dear to the nation's heart. It meant the reinstatement of the country in its ancient rank among the monarchies and republics of the Continent. It implied the revival of pristine splendour obscured by so many petty Courts, imperious towards the subject and timid in their relations to foreign Powers. Last, not least, it seemed to promise the resuscitation of old liberties, once so amply possessed by the people, but dead and buried since the terrific catastrophe of the Thirty Years' War. With the mellow hue of the past enhancing the worth of what once had been, and the mysterious haze of an indefinite future raising exaggerated hopes as to what would be, the restoration of the imperial throne was a prospect replete with promises of political and social happiness. The struggles of the last twenty years have indeed somewhat sobered these poetic anticipations, and brought home to every reflecting mind the truth that progress would neither be so easily accomplished, nor attended with such perfect results, as the German *gemüth* had flattered itself. The refusal of the imperial crown, too, by King Frederick William IV. could not but enlighten people as to the many foreign and domestic difficulties in the way, and warn them that victory would be hardly as complete

as in the confiding innocence of their hearts they had fancied. Enough, however, of the ancient ideas remained to make them look forward to the consummation of the popular programme as a glorious and inspiriting object, worthy of being striven for with all their might and main.

You know the events of the last few months. You are aware how fully the nation has asserted its independence, how steadily it has borne the trials incidental to the task, and how brilliant is the reward earned. Can there be anything more perfect than the unbroken series of victories since the storming of Spicheren hill? Or would it be possible for the boldest imagination to picture a more thorough revenge over the traditional enemies of German unity than the proclamation of the German Empire in the Salle des Glaces at Versailles? Is not all we have lately witnessed more like a tale from the *Arabian Nights' Entertainment* than the living reality of an age in which cause and effect have been reduced to a continuous chain of closely connected, and, as is supposed, well understood circumstances?

But, notwithstanding the completeness of the triumph attained, the important act which was to confirm and symbolise the recovery of national greatness has not produced the enthusiasm which would have been natural considering all which has gone before. Neither the length of time the nation has had to wait for the establishment of the Empire, nor the incredibly short period in which it accomplished its purpose the moment it set seriously to work, has been able to call forth the rejoicing one might have expected on the occasion of so great and solemn an event. Excepting an address passed by the Chamber amid the deepest silence, and a leader in a paper here and there, nothing has marked the reinstitution of the title, once the grandest in Christendom, and the prerogatives of which were so long and so powerfully asserted by the Henries, the Ottos, and the Fredericks of old. Why is this? Is it

apathy or disappointment? Is it indifference to names and titles, or discontent at accompanying circumstances? Is it want of patriotism, or a feeling that some cherished aspirations are still unfulfilled?

Many things have combined to cause this strange unconcern. In the first place, determined as the nation undoubtedly is to continue the war to the bitter end, it laments the necessity of prolonging a sanguinary strife, and has no thoughts to bestow on anything else while it lasts. With hundreds daily wounded and killed, the nation finds it hard to rejoice. Those foreign critics who thought that the Landwehr system would not work because it produced too many widows undervalued the sternness and patriotism of the German; but they were certainly right in foreseeing the losses it would involve. Though a married man, the German is sure to fight as bravely as his bachelor comrade, if his heart is in his work; but, being a civilian, he cannot help feeling the terrible nature of the ordeal, and looking upon it as so gloomy as to be hardly redeemed by victory itself. Had the Empire been proclaimed upon the conclusion of peace, it would have been hailed as the termination of the war and the beginning of a less sanguinary epoch; to announce it now is to draw a bill upon the nation which it is not yet in a position to pay.

Independently of this, the Liberals, who have so long been at the head of the unity movement, are not satisfied with the large privileges accorded to the minor Sovereigns under the new Charter. The influence conceded to the minor Courts upon the conduct of public affairs appears too great to the popular party to allow of the central Government exercising the degree of authority which, in the interest of the nation, it ought to possess. Hence they look upon the new arrangement only as provisional; as a step in the right direction, it is true, but as nothing very satisfactory in itself. Their judgment approves the Char-

ter, but their feelings do not; they will assist the Government in carrying it through, but they will not exult at what they regard as a makeshift, entailing much irksome work to bring it to perfection.

Another chilling element is, that the internal administration of the various States—the department in which reform is most required—is exempt from federal jurisdiction, and remains the same after as before the institution of the Empire. Now, as formerly, the administrative authorities exercise a greater power than public opinion regards as compatible with the self-respect of a cultivated and well-to-do race. Now, as ever, church and school are under the absolute control of Government. To-day, as fifty years ago, a policeman is responsible only if his superior officer thinks fit to make him so, and every individual teacher is compelled to teach what and how the Government prescribes. For various reasons it is certain that the necessary changes in all these respects will be effected very shortly, and that the Government meanwhile will avail themselves of their discretionary power with the moderation and intelligence that have so long distinguished the Prussian bureaucracy. Still, though they may have little cause to complain of what is actually done, the people grumble at the antiquated machinery used for the dispatch of public business. In ordinary times they might have put up with the system, and tolerated its theoretical defects in consideration of its practical advantages; but in the Empire, the new German Empire, the promised land of liberty and independence, they are nettled at finding their old grievances perpetuated, not because of the grievances themselves, but because of the slur cast on their beloved, and at last compassed, ideal. They certainly appreciate, and cordially sympathise with, the elevation of the Hohenzollern dynasty to the central throne of the land; they regard it as a great national boon, and an earnest of continued progress and might; but they have their

eyes opened to the fact, that the realisation of all their wishes cannot be attained at once, and that another period of political labour will have to be gone through before they can hope for the fruition of the remaining half.

To spare the feelings of the minor Sovereigns, the new title is not 'Emperor of Germany' (as it is given in the English press), but 'German Emperor.' 'Emperor of Germany' would imply that the territories of the other Sovereigns are situate in a land belonging to the owner of the title; 'German Emperor' simply means the head of the German nationality. In this country, punctiliousness in such matters is traditional. When the Electors of Brandenburg first assumed the royal title they were not in a position to couple it with the name of their oldest province because this belonged to the Empire, in which there could exist but one king, viz. the 'King of the Germans and Holy Roman Emperor.' Hence they had to take the title from the province of Prussia, a colony, but not an integral portion, of the German Empire in those days. Even this distinction was not exact enough. To leave no doubt as to the fact of their not being kings within the limits of the Empire, they were obliged to call themselves 'Kings *in* Prussia,' not *of* Prussia. Only after the victories of Frederick the Great the significant *of* was substituted for the guarded *in*. The Austrian Emperor of Germany by that time had become too much of a cipher to be able to assert his ancient supremacy.

COUNT BISMARCK DETAINING M. FAVRE AT PARIS. CAPITULATION.

Berlin, January 23, 1871.

COUNT BISMARCK has no desire to allow M. Jules Favre to leave Paris now that the moment for settling with Germany is drawing near. As M. Jules Favre has so materi-

ally contributed to create the present position of affairs, Count Bismarck wishes to keep him at his post to the end, so that there may be somebody with whom to conclude peace when the moment arrives. He has therefore refused to permit him to cross the German lines, on the ground that in his final acceptance of the invitation to the Conference he declared that his presence at the meeting would imply the recognition of the provisional Government by all the Powers assembled. There is no doubt that no impediments would be thrown in the way of any other French statesman not a member of the provisional Government.

The following correspondence has passed on this subject between M. Favre and Count Bismarck:

M. Favre to Count Bismarck.

'*Paris, January* 13.

'Lord Granville has informed me, in his despatch of the 29th of December 1870, which I received on the evening of the 10th of January, that your Excellency, at the request of the English Cabinet, has placed at my disposal the safe-conduct, necessary for the Plenipotentiary of France at the London Conference, to pass the Prussian lines. As I have been appointed to that office, I have the honour to request you to forward the safe-conduct in my name as soon as possible.

Accept, &c. Jules Favre.'

Count Bismarck to M. Jules Favre.

'*Versailles, January* 20.

'I beg your Excellency, in reply to your two letters of the 13th inst., to allow me to clear up a misunderstanding. Your Excellency assumes that on the proposal of the Government of Great Britain a safe-conduct is ready for you in order that you should take part in the London Conference. This assumption is not correct.

I could not enter upon an official negotiation the basis of which is the supposition that the Government of the National Defence is internationally in the position to be able to negotiate in the name of the French people; for me to enter upon such a negotiation, the Government must have been recognised by the French nation itself. I imagine that the commanders of our advanced posts would have granted your Excellency permission to pass through the German lines, had your Excellency requested such permission from the commander of the besieging army. It would not have been within

the province of the latter to take into consideration the political situation or the object of your journey, and the authorisation to pass our lines granted by the military leaders, would have left the Ambassador of his Majesty the King in London free to assume the proper attitude in reference to the question whether, according to international law, the declarations of your Excellency are to be regarded as the declarations of France; and his Majesty's Ambassador would have known how to hold intercourse without prejudging the preliminary question at issue. This plan your Excellency has, by officially requesting a safe-conduct, and officially declaring that the object of your journey was to represent France at the Conference, rendered impossible. The above political considerations, in support of which I refer to the declaration which your Excellency on the 12th inst. officially published, prevent my complying with your wish that such a document should be forwarded.

In communicating this to you, I can only leave to you and your Government to consider whether any other way can be discovered in which the above-mentioned scruples can be allayed, and any unwarrantable assumption that might be based upon your presence in London be avoided. But even if such a plan can be discovered, allow me to ask if it be advisable that your Excellency should leave Paris, and your post as a member of the Government, in order personally to take part in a Conference about the Black Sea, at a moment when interests are at stake in Paris so much more important to France and Germany than Article 11 of the Treaty of 1856. Your Excellency would also leave behind in Paris the diplomatic agents and the subjects of neutral States, who have remained, or rather have been detained, there long after they had received permission to pass through the German lines, and who are therefore so much the more under the protection and care of your Excellency and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government *de facto*. I can therefore scarcely suppose that your Excellency, in the critical position of affairs, which you have so materially helped to bring on, will deprive yourself of the possibility of coöperating to effect a solution of the responsibility which rests upon you.

Receive, &c. V. BISMARCK.'

Postscript. Three days after the receipt of this letter, M. Favre was obliged to repair to the German camp to open negotiations for capitulation and surrender.

THE CROWN OF GERMANY.

Berlin, January 24, 1871.

SUBJOINED is the official report of the proclamation of the German Empire in the Salle des Glaces at Versailles,

a ceremony which will be long remembered in the annals of Germany and of France:

'In the palace of Louis XIV., in that ancient centre of a hostile Power which for centuries has striven to divide and humiliate Germany, the solemn proclamation of the German Empire was made January 18th, exactly 170 years after the assumption of the royal dignity by the Prussian Sovereigns at Königsberg. Though the German people, owing to the necessities of the times, were represented at the ceremony only by the German army, the eyes of the entire nation were gratefully turned to the place where—surrounded by sovereigns, generals, and soldiers—King William announced to the world the assumption by himself and heirs of a title, for the re-establishment of which we have been yearning the sixty long years that it has been in abeyance. As yet, the infatuation of the enemy does not permit us to throw aside the weapons we have taken up in self-defence; and as our unity arose out of the first part of the campaign, so will our Empire be strengthened by the remaining feats of arms. By the self-sacrificing devotion of all classes of society, the nation has proved that it still possesses the warlike prowess which distinguished our ancestors. It has recovered its ancient position in Europe; and, neither fearing an adversary nor envying any neighbour, discreet and temperate in its acts and aims, it accepts the destination prescribed to it in the proclamation of its new Emperor. This destination is to add to its power,* not by conquest, but by promoting culture, liberty, and civilisation. As far as the German people are concerned, there will be no more wars in Europe after the termination of the present campaign.

The exigencies of the military service prevented all parts of the German army in front of Paris being represented equally at the solemnity. From the troops quartered at a distance, as well as by the army operating on the Meuse, only small deputations could be spared. But the Generals in command and officers' deputations were sent by all the various sections of the forces. The Third Army, by order of his Royal Highness the Crown Prince, deputed four representatives from each regiment with the colours, as also all the Staff officers whose presence with the troops was not indispensably necessary. In the case of the two Bavarian corps, it was made optional whether they would take part in the celebration. (They could not be ordered to do so, because the treaties providing for the adhesion of Bavaria to the Empire were not sanctioned by the Bavarian Parliament till four days after the solemnity.) They sent nearly all their colours, and numerous deputations of officers and soldiers, headed by all the Bavarian Princes in the field.

* The words used in the proclamation contain the ancient phrase '*Mehrer des Reiches*,' a translation of the old Latin title '*Auctor Imperii*.' The King promises to aim at deserving this title, not by annexation of foreign lands, as the old Emperors understood it, but by promoting peace and culture.

Owing to the unfavourable weather, the festive procession which was to conduct his Majesty from the prefecture to the palace did not take place. The Crown Prince with Lieutenant-General Blumenthal, his chief of the Staff, and an escort of Prussians, Würtembergers, Badeners, and Bavarians, drove to the palace to receive his royal father at the eastern portal, in front of L'Escalier des Princes. In the courtyard of the palace a company of the King's Own was drawn up as a guard of honour. The first thing the King did upon his arrival, a few minutes after twelve o'clock, was to inspect the troops.

While the King was conversing with the sovereigns, princes, generals, and ministers assembled in the Chambres de la Reine, the company in the Galerie des Glaces had ranged themselves in the following order: at the central pillar of the southern front, right and left of the altar which bore the symbol of the Iron Cross, were stationed the troops. The colours, with the standard-bearers, were on an *estrade* on the narrow eastern front of the hall. There were there five colours of the Guards, eighteen colours of the 5th Corps, ten colours of the 6th Corps, five colours of the 11th Corps, ten colours of the 1st Bavarian Corps, and eight colours of the 2d Bavarian Corps. The Würtembergers, who now belong to the Army of the Meuse, had not sent any colours, but a large number of officers. The officers present—about 600—occupied the northern front. Before the altar stood six clergymen—the Revs. Rogge, Abel, Richter, Rettig, Lehman, and Hoseman.

At a quarter-past twelve his Majesty entered the hall, when a choir, consisting of men of the 7th, 47th, and 58th Regiments, intoned the chorale, "*Jauchzet dem Herrn alle Welt*" ("Let all the world rejoice in the Lord"). The King placed himself opposite the altar. In a semicircle around him stood the Crown Prince of Prussia, Prince Carl of Prussia, Prince Adalbert of Prussia, the Crown Prince of Saxony, Prince George of Saxony; the Grand Dukes of Baden, Saxony, and Oldenburg; the Dukes of Coburg, Meiningen, and Altenburg; Princes Otto, Luitpold, and Leopold of Bavaria; Princes Wilhelm and August of Würtemberg; Dukes Engen and Engen the younger of Würtemberg; the Crown Princes of Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Meiningen, and Anhalt; the Princes of Schaumburg-Lippe and Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt; the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg, the Princes of Wied, Putbus, Lynar, Pless, Reuss, Croy, and Biron of Courland. Close to them were the generals and ministers, among them the English Military Agent, General Walker; the English Political Agent, Mr. Odo Russell; and the Russian Military Plenipotentiary, General von Guern.

When the choir ceased, the congregation sang one verse of the chorale "*Sei Lob und Ehr*" ("Praise and honour unto the Lord"). The ordinary military liturgy was then read by the clergymen, and a sermon preached by the Rev. A. Rogge. Alluding to the well-known inscription on the ceiling of the hall, "*Le Roi gouverne par lui-même*," the preacher observed

that the Kings of Prussia had risen to greatness by adopting a different and more religious motto, "The kings of the earth reign under me, saith the Lord." The *Te Deum laudamus* closed the service. The King then walked up to where the colours were displayed, and, standing before them, read the document proclaiming the reëstablishment of the German Empire. Count Bismarck having read the King's proclamation to the German nation, the Grand Duke of Baden stepped forth and exclaimed, "Long live his Majesty the Emperor!" The cheers of the assembly were taken up by the bands playing the national anthem. His Majesty embraced the Crown Prince, Prince Carl, and his other relatives among the assembled Sovereigns and Princes.

After this the officers defiled past the Emperor, who most graciously returned their salutes. Upon his Majesty leaving the hall, the bands struck up the "Hohenfriedberg March"—the victorious march of Frederick the Great. A little later his Majesty gave a banquet to the officers in the Hôtel de France, the men receiving a present of money. On the same day his Majesty the Emperor ordered numerous promotions in the higher ranks of the army, and distributed sixteen Iron Crosses of the second class among the Bavarian regiment of infantry of which he is the chief.'

Such, in genuine Prussian curtness, is the official report of an event destined to open a new era in the political existence of Germany. It is followed by a copy of the sermon preached on the occasion.

In the capitals of Germany the proclamation of the Empire has in the last few days been the occasion of official displays and festivities.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

THE National Assembly met at Bordeaux, Feb. 28th, at 4.30 P.M. In the midst of the most profound silence, M. Thiers rose and spoke as follows:

'We have accepted a painful mission, and after having used all possible endeavours, we come with regret to submit for your approval a Bill for which we ask urgency. "Art. 1. The National Assembly, forced by necessity, is not responsible, and adopts the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on the 26th of February."'

At this point M. Thiers was overpowered by his feelings, and obliged to descend from the tribune and leave the room. M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire continued to read the Preliminaries:

'1. France renounces in favour of the German Empire the following rights: the fifth part of Lorraine, including Metz and Thionville, and Alsace less Belfort.

2. France will pay the sum of five milliards of francs, of which one milliard is to be paid in 1871, and the remaining four milliards by instalments extending over three years.

3. The German troops will begin to evacuate the French territory as soon as the treaty is ratified. They will then evacuate the interior of Paris and some departments lying in the western region. The evacuation of the other departments will take place gradually after payment of the first milliard, and proportionately to the payment of the other four milliards.

Interest at the rate of five per cent per annum will be paid on the amount remaining due from the date of the ratification of the treaty.

4. The German troops will not levy any requisitions in the departments occupied by them, but will be maintained at the cost of France.

5. A delay will be granted to the inhabitants of the territories annexed to choose between the two nationalities.

6. Prisoners of war will be immediately set at liberty.

7. Negotiations for a definitive Treaty of Peace will be opened at Brussels after the ratification of the treaty.

8. The administration of the departments occupied by the German troops will be intrusted to French officials, but under the control of the chiefs of the German Corps of Occupation.

9. The present treaty confers upon the Germans no rights whatever in the portion of territories not occupied.

10. The treaty will have to be ratified by the National Assembly of France.'

APPENDIX.

I.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO M. JULES FAVRE'S FIRST INTERVIEW WITH COUNT BISMARCK.

M. JULES FAVRE'S REPORT ON THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE following is the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Government of National Defence, describing his interview with Count Bismarck:

'Mes chers collègues,—L'union étroite de tous les citoyens, et particulièrement celle des membres du Gouvernement, est plus que jamais une nécessité de salut public. Chacun de nos actes doit la cimenter. Celui que je viens d'accomplir de mon chef, m'était inspiré par ce sentiment; il aura ce résultat. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous l'expliquer en détail. Cela ne suffit point. Nous sommes un Gouvernement de publicité. Si, à l'heure de l'exécution, le secret est indispensable, le fait, une fois consommé, doit être entouré de la plus grande lumière. Nous ne sommes quelque chose que par l'opinion de nos concitoyens, il faut qu'elle nous juge à chaque heure, et pour nous juger elle a le droit de tout connaître.

J'ai cru qu'il était de mon devoir d'aller au Quartier-Général des armées ennemies; j'y suis allé. Je vous ai rendu compte de la mission que je m'étais imposée à moi-même; je viens dire à mon pays les raisons qui m'ont déterminé, le but que je me proposais, celui que je crois avoir atteint.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler la politique inaugurée par nous, et que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères était plus particulièrement chargé de formuler. Nous sommes avant tout des hommes de paix et de liberté. Jusqu'au dernier moment nous nous sommes opposés à la guerre que le Gouvernement Impérial entreprenait dans un intérêt exclusivement dynastique; et quand ce Gouvernement est tombé, nous avons déclaré persévérer plus énergiquement que jamais dans la politique de la paix.

Cette Déclaration, nous la faisions, quand, par la criminelle folie d'un homme et de ses conseillers, nos armées étaient détruites; notre glorieux Bazaine et ses vaillants soldats bloqués devant Metz; Strasbourg, Toul, Phalsbourg écrasés par les bombes; l'ennemi victorieux en marche sur notre capitale. Jamais situation ne fut plus cruelle; elle inspira cependant, au pays, aucune pensée de défaillance, et nous crûmes être son interprète fidèle en posant nettement cette condition; pas un pouce de notre territoire, pas une pierre de nos forteresses.

Si donc à ce moment, où venait de s'accomplir un fait aussi considérable

que celui du renversement du promoteur de la guerre, la Prusse avait voulu traiter sur les bases d'une indemnité à déterminer, la paix était faite ; elle eût été accueillie comme un immense bienfait ; elle fût devenu un gage certain de réconciliation entre deux nations qu'une politique odieuse seule a fatalement divisées.

Nous espérons que l'humanité et l'intérêt bien entendus remporteraient cette victoire, belle entre toutes, car elle aurait ouvert une ère nouvelle, et les hommes d'état qui y auraient attaché leur nom auraient eu comme guides la philosophie, la raison, la justice ; comme récompense, les bénédictions et la prospérité des peuples.

C'est avec ces idées que j'ai entrepris la tâche périlleuse que vous m'avez confiée. Je devais tout d'abord me rendre compte des dispositions des Cabinets Européens et chercher à me concilier leur appui. Le Gouvernement Impérial l'avait complètement négligé, ou y avait échoué. Il s'est engagé dans la guerre sans une alliance, sans une négociation sérieuse ; tout, autour de lui, était hostilité ou indifférence ; il recueillait ainsi le fruit amer d'une politique blessante pour chaque état voisin, par ces menaces ou ses prétentions.

A peine étions-nous à l'hôtel de ville qu'un diplomate, dont il n'est point encore opportun de révéler le nom, nous demandait à entrer en relation avec nous. Dès le lendemain, votre ministre recevait les représentants de toutes les Puissances. La République des Etats-Unis, la République Helvétique, l'Italie, l'Espagne, le Portugal reconnaissaient officiellement la République Française. Les autres Gouvernements autorisaient leurs agents à entretenir avec nous des rapports officieux qui nous permettaient d'entrer de suite en pourparlers utiles.

Je donnerais à cet exposé, déjà trop étendu, un développement qu'il ne comporte pas, si je racontais avec détail la courte mais instructive histoire des négociations qui ont suivi. Je crois pouvoir affirmir qu'elle ne sera pas tout à fait sans valeur pour notre crédit moral.

Je me borne à dire que nous avons trouvé partout d'honorables sympathies. Mon but était de les grouper, et de déterminer les Puissances signataires de la ligue des neutres à intervenir directement près de la Prusse en prenant pour base les conditions que j'avais posées. Quatre de ces Puissances me l'ont offert ; je leur en ai, au nom de mon pays, témoigné ma gratitude, mais je voulais le concours des deux autres. L'une m'a promis une action individuelle dont elle s'est réservé la liberté, l'autre m'a proposé d'être mon intermédiaire vis-à-vis de la Prusse. Elle a même fait un pas de plus : sur les instances de l'envoyé extraordinaire de la France, elle a bien voulu recommander directement mes démarches. J'ai demandé beaucoup plus, mais je n'ai refusé aucun concours, estimant que l'intérêt qu'on nous monstrait était une force à ne pas négliger.

Cependant, le temps marchant, chaque heure rapprochait l'ennemi. En proie à de poignantes émotions, je m'étais promis à moi-même de ne pas laisser commencer le siége de Paris sans essayer une démarche suprême, fussé-je seul à la faire. L'intérêt n'a pas besoin d'en être démontré. La Prusse gardait le silence et nul ne consentait à l'interroger. Cette situation était intenable ; elle permettait à notre ennemi de faire peser sur nous la responsabilité de la continuation de la lutte ; elle nous condamnait à nous faire sur ses intentions. Il fallait en sortir. Malgré ma répugnance, je me, déterminai à user des bons offices qui m'étaient offerts, et, le 10 Septembre,

un télégramme parvenait à M. de Bismarck, lui demandant s'il voulait entrer en conversation sur des conditions de transaction.

Une première réponse était une fin de non-recevoir tirée de l'irrégularité de notre Gouvernement. Toutefois le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord n'insista pas, et me fit demander quelles garanties nous présentions pour l'exécution d'un traité. Cette seconde difficulté levée par moi, il fallait aller plus loin. On me proposa d'envoyer un courrier, ce que j'acceptai. En même temps on télégraphiait directement á M. de Bismarck, et le premier ministre de la Puissance qui nous servait d'intermédiaire disait à notre envoyé extraordinaire que la France seule pouvait agir ; il ajoutait qu'il serait à désirer que je ne reculasse pas devant une démarche au quartier-général. Notre envoyé, qui connaissait le fond de mon cœur, répondit que j'étais prêt à tous les sacrifices pour faire mon devoir, qu'il y en avait peu d'aussi pénibles que d'aller au travers des lignes ennemies chercher notre vainqueur, mais qu'il supposait que je m'y résignerais. Deux jours après, le courrier revenait. Après mille obstacles, il avait vu le Chancelier, qui lui avait dit être disposé volontiers à causer avec moi.

J'aurais voulu une réponse directe au télégramme de notre intermédiaire, elle se faisait attendre. L'investissement de Paris s'achevait. Il n'y avait plus à hésiter, je me résolus à partir.

Seulement il m'importait que pendant qu'elle s'accomplissait, cette démarche fût ignorée ; je recommandai le secret et j'ai été douloureusement surpris en rentrant hier soir d'apprendre qu'il n'a pas été gardé. Une indiscrétion coupable a été commise. Un journal, *L'Electeur Libre*, déjà désavoué par le Gouvernement en a profité ; une enquête est ouverte, et j'espère pouvoir réprimer ce double abus.

J'avais poussé si loin le scrupule de la discrétion que je l'ai observée même vis-à-vis de vous, mes chers collègues. Je ne m'y suis pas résolu sans un vif déplaisir. Mais je connaissais votre patriotisme et votre affection ; j'étais sûr d'être absous. Je croyais obéir à une nécessité impérieuse. Une première fois je vous avais entretenus des agitations de ma conscience, et je vous avais dit qu'elle ne serait en repos que lorsque j'aurais fait tout ce qui était humainement possible pour arrêter honorablement cette abominable guerre. Me rappelant la conversation provoquée par cette ouverture, je redoutais des objections, et j'étais décidé ; d'ailleurs, je voulais en abordant M. de Bismarck, être libre de tout engagement, afin d'avoir le droit de n'en prendre aucun. Je vous fais ces aveux sincères, je les fais au pays pour écarter de vous une responsabilité que j'assume seul. Si ma démarche est une faute, seul j'en dois porter la peine.

J'avais cependant avertir M. le Ministre de la Guerre, qui avait bien voulu me donner un officier pour me conduire aux avant-postes. Nous ignorions la situation de quartier-général. On le supposait à Grosbois. Nous nous acheminâmes vers l'ennemi par la porte de Charenton.

Je supprime tous les détails de ce douloureux voyage, pleins d'intérêts cependant, mais qui ne seraient point ici à leur place. Conduit à Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, où se trouvait le général-en-chef commandant le 6me corps, j'appris assez tard dans l'après-midi, que le quartier-général était à Meaux. Le général, des procédés duquel je n'ai qu'à me louer, me proposa d'envoyer un officier porteur de la lettre suivante, que j'avais préparée pour M. de Bismarck :

"M. le Comte,—J'ai toujours cru qu'avant d'engager sérieusement les hostilités sous les murs de Paris, il était impossible qu'une transaction honorable ne fût essayée. La personne qui a eu l'honneur de voir votre Excellence, il y a deux jours, m'a dit avoir recueilli de sa bouche l'expression d'un désir analogue. Je suis venu aux avant-postes me mettre à la disposition de votre Excellence. J'attends qu'elle veuille bien me faire savoir comment et où je pourrai avoir l'honneur de conférer quelques instants avec elle.—J'ai, &c. JULES FAVRE."

Nous étions séparés par une distance de quarante-huit kilomètres. Le lendemain matin, à 6 heures, je recevais la réponse que je transcris :

"Je viens de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a eu l'obligeance de m'écrire, et ce me sera extrêmement agréable, si vous voulez bien me faire l'honneur de venir me voir demain, ici à Meaux.

Le porteur de la présente, le Prince Biron, veillera à ce que votre Excellence soit guidée à travers nos lignes.—J'ai, &c. DE BISMARCK."

A 9 heures l'escorte était prête, et je partais avec elle. Arrivé près de Meaux vers 3 heures de l'après midi, j'étais arrêté par un aide-de-camp venant m'annoncer que le Comte avait quitté Meaux avec le Roi pour aller coucher à Ferrières. Nous nous étions croisés ; en revenant l'un et l'autre sur nos pas nous devions nous rencontrer.

Je rebroussai chemin, et descendis dans la cour d'une ferme entièrement saccagée, comme presque touts les maisons que j'ai vues sur ma route. Au bout d'une heure, M. de Bismarck m'y rejoignait. Il nous était difficile de causer dans un tel lieu. Une habitation, le château de la Haute-Maison, appartenant à M. le Comte de Rillac, était à notre proximité ; nous nous y rendîmes. Et la conversation s'engagea dans un salon où gisaient en désordre des débris de toute nature.

Cette conversation, je voudrais vous la rapporter toute entière, telle que le lendemain je l'ai dictée à un secrétaire. Chaque détail y a son importance. Je ne puis ici que l'analyser.

J'ai tout d'abord précisé le but de ma démarche. Ayant fait connaître par ma circulaire les intentions du Gouvernement Français, je voulais savoir celles du premier ministre Prussien. Il me semblait inadmissible que deux nations continuassent, sans s'expliquer préalablement, une guerre terrible qui, malgré ses avantages, infligeait au vainqueur des souffrances profondes. Née du pouvoir d'un seul, cette guerre n'avait plus de raison d'être, quand la France redevenait maîtresse d'elle-même ; je me portais garant de son amour pour la paix, en même temps de sa résolution inébranlable de n'accepter aucune condition qui ferait de cette paix une courte et menaçante trêve.

M. de Bismarck m'a répondu que, s'il avait la conviction qu'une pareille paix fût possible, il la signerait de suite. Il a reconnu que l'opposition avait toujours condamné la guerre. Mais le pouvoir que représente aujourd'hui cette opposition est plus que précaire. Si, dans quelques jours, Paris n'est pas pris, il sera renversé par la populace.

Je l'ai interrompu vivement pour lui dire que nous n'avions pas de populace à Paris, mais une population intelligente, dévouée, qui connaissait nos intentions et qui ne se ferait pas complice de l'ennemi en entravant notre mission de défense. Quant à notre pouvoir, nous étions prêts à le déposer entre les mains de l'assemblée déjà convoquée par nous.

"Cette assemblée," a repris le Comte, "aura des desseins que rien ne peut nous faire pressentir. Mais si elle obéit au sentiment Français, elle voudra la

guerre. Vous n'oublierez pas plus la capitulation de Sedan que Waterloo, que Sadowa qui ne vous regardait pas." Puis il a insisté longuement sur la volonté bien arrêtée de la nation Française d'attaquer l'Allemagne et de lui enlever une partie de son territoire. Depuis Louis XIV jusqu'à Napoléon III, ses tendances n'ont pas changé, et quand la guerre a été annoncée, le Corps Législatif a couvert les paroles du ministre d'acclamations.

Je lui ai fait observer que la majorité du Corps Législatif avait quelques semaines avant acclaimé la paix ; que cette majorité, choisie par le Prince, s'était malheureusement crue obligée de lui céder aveuglément, mais que, consultée deux fois, aux élections de 1869 et au vote du plébiscite, la nation avait énergiquement adhéré à une politique de paix et de liberté.

La conversation s'est prolongée sur ce sujet, le Comte maintenant son opinion alors que je défendais la mienne : et comme je le pressais vivement sur ses conditions, il m'a répondu nettement que la sécurité de son pays lui commandait de garder le territoire qui la garantissait. Il m'a répété plusieurs fois : "Strasbourg est la clé de la maison, je dois l'avoir." Je l'ai invité à être plus explicite encore : "C'est inutile," objectait-il, "puisque nous ne pouvons nous entendre ; c'est une affaire à régler plus tard." Je l'ai prié de le faire de suite ; il m'a dit alors que les deux départements du Bas et du Haut Rhin, une partie de celui de Moselle, avec Metz, Château-Salins, et Soissons, lui étaient indispensables, et qu'il ne pouvait y renoncer.

Je lui ai fait observer que l'assentiment des peuples dont il disposait ainsi était plus que douteux, et que le droit public Européen ne lui permettait pas de s'en passer. "Si fait," m'a-t-il répondu, "je sais fort bien qu'ils ne veulent pas de nous. Ils nous imposeront une rude corvée ; mais nous ne pouvons pas ne pas les prendre. Je suis sûr que dans un temps prochain nous aurons une nouvelle guerre avec vous. Nous voulons la faire avec tous nos avantages."

Je me suis récrié, comme je le devais, contre des telles solutions. J'ai dit qu'on me paraissait oublier deux éléments importants de discussion ; l'Europe d'abord, qui pourrait bien trouver ces prétentions exorbitantes et y mettre obstacle ; le droit nouveau ensuite, le progrès des mœurs, entièrement antipathique à de telles exigences. J'ai ajouté que, quant à nous, nous ne les accepterions jamais. Nous pouvions périr comme nation, mais non nous déshonorer ; d'ailleurs, le pays seul était compétent pour se prononcer sur une cession territoriale. Nous ne doutons pas de son sentiment, mais nous voulons le consulter. C'est donc vis-à-vis de lui que se trouve la Prusse. Et, pour être net, il est clair qu'entrainée par l'enivrement de la victoire, elle veut la destruction de la France.

Le Comte a protesté, se retranchant toujours derrière des nécessités absolues de garantie nationale. J'ai poursuivi : "Si ce n'est pas de votre part un abus de la force, cachant de secrets desseins, laisez-nous réunir l'assemblée, nous lui remettrous nos pouvoirs ; elle nommera un Gouvernement définitif, qui appréciera vos conditions."

"Pour l'exécution de ce plan," m'a répondu le Comte, "il faudrait un armistice, et je n'en veux à aucun prix."

La conversation prenait une tournure de plus en plus pénible. Le soir venait. Je demandai à M. Bismarck un second entretien à Ferrières, où il allait coucher, et nous partîmes chacun de notre côté.

Voulant remplir ma mission jusqu'au bout, je devais revenir sur plusieurs

des questions que nous avions traitées, et conclure. Aussi, en abordant le Comte vers neuf heures et demie du soir, je lui fit observer que les renseignements qui j'étais venu chercher près de lui étant destinés à être communiqués à mon Gouvernement et au public, je résumerais, en terminant, notre conversation pour n'en publier que se qui serait bien arrêté entre nous. "Ne prenez pas cette peine," me répondit-il, "je vous la livre tout entière; je ne vois aucun inconvénient à sa divulgation." Nous reprîmes alors la discussion, qui se prolongea jusqu'à minuit. J'insistai particulièrement sur la nécessité de convoquer une assemblée. Le Comte parut peu à peu se laisser convaincre, et revint à l'armistice. Je demandai quinze jours. Nous discutâmes les conditions. Il ne s'expliqua que d'une manière très-incomplète, se réservant de consulter le Roi. En conséquence, il m'ajourna au lendemain, onze heures.

Je n'ai plus qu'un mot à dire; car en reproduisant ce douloureux récit mon cœur est agité de toutes les émotions qui l'ont torturé pendant ces trois mortelles journées, et j'ai hâté de finir. J'étais au château de Ferrières à onze heures. Le Comte sortit de chez le Roi à midi moins le quart, et j'entendis de lui les conditions qu'il mettait à l'armistice; elles étaient consignées dans un texte écrit en langue Allemande, et dont il m'a été donné communication verbale.

Il demandait pour gage l'occupation de Strasbourg, de Toul, et de Phalsbourg; et comme, sur sa demande, j'avais dit la veille que l'assemblée devait être réunie à Paris, il voulait, dans ce cas, avoir un fort dominant la ville, celui du Mont Valérien, par exemple.

Je l'ai interrompu pour lui dire: "Il est bien plus simple de nous demander Paris. Comment voulez-vous admettre qu'une assemblée Française délibère sous votre canon? J'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire que je transmettrai fidèlement notre entretien au Gouvernement; je ne sais vraiment si j'oserai lui dire que vous m'avez fait une telle proposition."

"Cherchons une autre combinaison," m'a-t-il répondu. Je lui ai parlé de la réunion l'assemblée à Tours, en ne prenant aucun gage du côté de Paris.

Il m'a proposé d'en parler au Roi, et, revenant sur l'occupation de Strasbourg, il a ajouté: "La ville va tomber entre nos mains, ce n'est plus qu'une affaire de calcul d'ingénieur. Aussi je vous demande que la garnison se rende prisonnière de guerre."

A ces mots j'ai bondi de douleur, et me levant, je me suis écrié: "Vous oubliez que vous parlez à un Français, M. le Comte; sacrifier une garnison héroïque qui fait notre admiration et celle du monde, serait une lâcheté; et je ne vous promets pas de dire que vous m'avez posé une telle condition."

Le Comte m'a répondu qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de me blesser, qu'il se conformait aux lois de la guerre; qu'au surplus, si le Roi y consentait, cet article pourrait être modifié.

Il est rentré au bout d'un quart d'heure. Le Roi acceptait la combinaison de Tours, mais insistait pour que la garnison de Strasbourg fût prisonnière.

J'étais à bout de forces et craignit un instant de défaillir. Je me retournais pour dévorer les larmes qui m'étouffaient, et, excusant cette faiblesse involontaire, je prenais congé par ces paroles:

"Je me suis trompé, M. le Comte, en venant ici; je ne m'en repens pas,

j'ai assez souffert pour m'excuser à mes propres yeux ; d'ailleurs je n'ai cédé qu'au sentiment de mon devoir. Je reporterai à mon Gouvernement tout ce que vous m'avez dit ; et s'il juge à propos de me renvoyer près de vous, quelque cruelle que soit cette démarche, j'aurai l'honneur de revenir. Je vous suis reconnaissant de la bienveillance que vous m'avez témoignée, mais je crains qu'il n'y ait plus qu'à laisser les événements s'accomplir. La population de Paris est courageuse et résolue aux derniers sacrifices ; son héroïsme peut changer le cours des événements. Si vous avez l'honneur de la vaincre, vous ne la soumettrez pas. La nation tout entière est dans les mêmes sentiments. Tant que nous trouverons en elle un élément de résistance nous vous combattrons. C'est une lutte indéfinie entre deux peuples qui devraient se tendre le main. J'avais espéré une autre solution. Je pars bien malheureux, et néanmoins plein d'espoir."

Je n'ajoute rien à ce récit, trop éloquent par lui-même. Il me permet de conclure, et de vous dire quelle est à mon sens la portée de ces entrevues. Je cherchais la paix, j'ai rencontré une volonté inflexible de conquête et de guerre. Je demandais la possibilité d'interroger la France représentée par une assemblée librement élue, on m'a répondu en me montrant les fourches caudines sous lesquelles elle doit préalablement passer. Je ne récrimine point. Je me borne à constater les faits, à les signaler à mon pays et à l'Europe. J'ai voulu ardemment la paix, je ne m'en cache pas, et en voyant pendant trois jours la misère de nos campagnes infortunées, je sentais grandir en moi cet amour avec une telle violence, que j'étais forcé d'appeler tout mon courage à mon aide pour ne pas faillir à ma tâche. J'ai désiré non moins vivement un armistice, je l'avoue encore, je l'ai désiré, pour que la nation pût être consultée sur la redoubtable question que la fatalité pose devant nous.

Vous connaissez maintenant les conditions préalables qu'on prétend nous faire subir. Comme moi, et sans discussion, vous avez été unanimement d'avis qu'il fallait en repousser l'humiliation. J'ai la conviction profonde que, malgré les souffrances qu'elle endure et celles qu'elle prévoit, la France indignée partage notre résolution, et c'est de son cœur que j'ai cru m'inspirer en écrivant à M. de Bismarck la dépêche suivante qui clôt cette négociation :

"M. le Comte,—J'ai exposé fidèlement à mes collègues du Gouvernement de la défense nationale la déclaration que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire. J'ai le regret de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement n'a pu admettre vos propositions. Il accepterait un armistice ayant pour objet l'élection et la réunion d'une assemblée nationale. Mais il ne peut souscrire aux conditions auxquelles votre Excellence le subordonne. Quant à moi, j'ai la conscience d'avoir tout fait pour que l'effusion du sang cessât, et que la paix fût rendue à nos deux nations, pour lesquelles elle serait un grand bienfait. Je ne m'arrête qu'en face d'un devoir impérieux, m'ordonnant de ne pas sacrifier l'honneur de mon pays, déterminé à résister énergiquement. Je m'associe sans reserve à son vœu ainsi qu'à celui de mes collègues. Dieu qui nous juge décidera de nos destinées. J'ai foi dans sa justice.

21 *Septembre* 1870. J'ai, &c. JULES FAVRE."

J'ai fini, mes chers collègues, et vous penserez, comme moi, que si j'ai échoué, ma mission n'aura pas été cependant tout à fait inutile. Elle a prouvé que nous n'avons pas dévié. Comme les premiers jours nous maudissons une guerre par nous condamnée à l'avance ; comme les premiers jours aussi, nous l'acceptons plutôt que de nous déshonorer. Nous avons

fait plus : nous avons tué l'équivoque dans laquelle la Prusse s'enfermait, et que l'Europe ne nous aidait pas à dissiper.

En entrant sur notre sol, elle a donné le monde sa parole qu'elle attaquait Napoléon et ses soldats, mais qu'elle respectait la nation. Nous savons aujourd'hui ce qu'il faut en penser. La Prusse exige trois de nos départements, deux de ses forteresses, l'une de 100,000, l'autre de 75,000 âmes, huit à dix autres également fortifiées. Elle sait que les populations qu'elle veut nous ravir la repoussent, elle s'en saisit néanmoins, opposant le tranchant de son sabre aux protestations de leur liberté civique et de leur dignité morale.

A la nation qui demande la faculté de se consulter elle-même, elle propose la garantie de ses obusiers établis au Mont Valérien et protégeant la salle des séances où nos députés voteront. Voilà ce que nous savons, et ce qu'on m'a autorisé à vous dire. Que le pays nous entende, et qu'il se lève, ou pour nous désavouer quand nous lui conseillons de résister à outrance, ou pour subir avec nous cette dernière et décisive épreuve. Paris y est résolu.

Les départements s'organisent et vont venir à son secours. Le dernier mot n'est pas dit dans cette lutte où maintenant la force se rue contre le droit. Il dépend de notre constance qu'il appartienne à la justice et à la liberté.

Agréez, mes chers collègues, la fraternel hommage de mon inaltérable dévouement.

Le Vice-Président du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, JULES FAVRE.

Paris, le 21 *Septembre* 1870.'

COUNT BISMARCK'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH M. FAVRE, AND REPLY TO THE REPORT.

(*Undated.*)

'Monsieur le Comte,—Le Corps Diplomatique présent à Paris me charge de demander à votre Excellence d'être prévenu en cas de bombardement et mis à même de s'éloigner de la ville.

Il voudrait aussi pouvoir, une fois par semaine, faire partir un courrier, exclusivement diplomatique, en acceptant toutes les précautions que votre Excellence croirait devoir prendre.

En transmettant ce double vœu à votre Excellence, je la prie d'agréer les sentiments de haute considération avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être son très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur, JULES FAVRE.

A son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Bismarck, Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord, etc. etc. etc.'

'*Ferrières,* 26*th September* 1870.

'Excellency,—In reply to the letter which I had the honour to receive from you to-day, I regret that I am prohibited by considerations of a military character from giving any information regarding the time and mode of the impending attack on the fortress of Paris.

It is not the custom of a besieging army to permit the transmission of

correspondence from or to a beleaguered fortress; and though we do not object to the forwarding of open letters from diplomatic agents, so far as their contents are not objectionable in a military point of view, I must decline to admit or recognise the views of those who regard the interior of the fortifications of Paris as a suitable locality for diplomatic intercourse. This opinion of mine seems to be shared by those neutral Governments, whose representatives have removed from Paris to Tours.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of the high esteem with which I have the honour to be your Excellency's most obedient servant,

VON BISMARCK.

To his Excellency M. Jules Favre, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Government of National Defence.'

'*Ferrières, 27th September* 1870.

'The Report addressed by M. Jules Favre to his colleagues on 21st inst. regarding the conversations he had with me, induces me to make your Excellency a communication, which will enable you to form an accurate idea of the course these conversations took.

It must be acknowledged that, on the whole, M. Favre has endeavoured to render a correct account of what took place between us. If he has not been always quite successful, it must be ascribed to the length of our conferences and the peculiar circumstances under which they occurred. I must, however, object to the entire tendency of his exposition, and insist on the fact that the principal subject we had to discuss was, not the conclusion of a treaty of peace, but that of an armistice, by which it was to be preceded. In respect of the demands we should have to advance before signing a definitive treaty of peace, I expressly stated to M. Jules Favre that I declined to enter into the subject of the new frontier claimed by us till the principle of a cession of territory had been openly acknowledged by France. In connection with this declaration, the formation of a new department of the Moselle, containing the arrondissements of Saarbrück, Château Salins, Saargemünd, Metz, and Thionville, was mentioned by me as an arrangement in consonance with our intentions; but at the same time I in no way renounced our right to make additional stipulations in a treaty of peace, in proportion to the sacrifices imposed by a lengthening out of the war.

Strasburg, a place described by M. Favre as the key of the house—an expression which left it doubtful whether France was the house in question—was expressly declared by myself to be the key of *our* house, which we therefore did not desire to leave in foreign hands.

Our first conversation, in the castle of Haute Maison, near Montry, did not go beyond an academical disquisition on the present and the past, the pith and marrow of which were contained in a declaration on the part of M. J. Favre of his readiness to yield *tout l'argent que nous avons*, while he refused to entertain the idea of a cession of territory. When I spoke of such a cession as being quite indispensable, he declared that negotiations for peace would have no prospect of success, and maintained that to part with any portion of her territory would be humiliating and a dishonour to France. I was not able to convince him that conditions, the fulfilment of which France had obtained from Italy and demanded of Germany, without having been at

war with either of these countries—conditions which France would no doubt have imposed on us had we been conquered, and which had been an inevitable consequence of nearly every war, even in modern times—would not be ignominious to a country which had succumbed after a brave resistance; and besides, that the honour of France was not a something differing essentially from that of all other nations. I was equally unsuccessful in persuading M. Favre that the restoration of Strasburg no more implied dishonour than the cession of Landau or Saarlouis; and that the violent and unjust conquests of Louis XIV. were not more closely bound up with the honour of France than those of the first Republic or the first Empire.

Our conferences took a more practical turn in Ferrières, where we exclusively discussed the question of an armistice; a fact which refutes the statement that I had declared I would accept an armistice under no circumstances whatever. The manner in which M. Jules Favre represents me as saying, with reference to this and other questions, *il faudrait un armistice, et je n'en veux à aucun prix*, and other things of the same kind, obliges me to rectify his statements, and add, that in similar conversations I have never made use and never do employ such phraseology as that *I* personally wish or require or approve of anything. I constantly speak of the intentions and demands of the Governments whose representative I am.

In this conversation both parties agreed in looking upon an armistice as necessary to give the French nation an opportunity of choosing representatives, who alone would be in a position to grant the present Government powers sufficient to enable them to conclude a peace sanctioned by international law. I called attention to the fact that an armistice was always a military disadvantage to an army engaged in a victorious advance; that, in the present case, it was a most important gain in point of time for the defence of France and the reorganisation of her army; and that we therefore could not grant an armistice unless military equivalents were offered. As such I mentioned the surrender of the fortresses which impeded our communications with Germany; for, as a truce would prolong the period during which we had to support our army, concessions facilitating the transport of supplies must be the preliminary condition of granting it. Strasburg, Toul, and some smaller places, were referred to in this discussion. With respect to Strasburg, I urged that, since the glacis had been crowned, its capture must shortly be expected; and we therefore thought the military situation demanded the surrender of the garrison, while those who held the other fortresses would be permitted to march out with the honours of war.

Another difficult question referred to Paris. Since we had completely surrounded the city, we could only permit the admission of new supplies on condition that the new provisioning of the town did not weaken our own military position, and protract the period necessary to reduce the city by hunger. After consulting the military authorities, I accordingly offered, by command of his Majesty the King, the following alternatives with respect to Paris:

Either the military position of Paris must be conceded to us by the surrender of a commanding portion of the fortifications, in which case we were prepared to permit free intercourse with Paris, and not to hinder the new provisioning of the city;

Or the military position of Paris need *not* be conceded; in which case,

however, we could not consent to give up the investment, but must insist on the *continuation of the military status quo* before that city, as the basis of the armistice; as otherwise, at the end of that period, we should be opposed to Paris provisioned and armed anew.

M. Favre distinctly rejected the first alternative, containing the surrender of a part of the fortifications of Paris, as well as the condition that the garrison of Strasburg should be made prisoners of war. On the other hand, he promised to consult his colleagues as to the second alternative, containing the retention of the military *status quo* before Paris.

The programme which M. Favre took back with him to Paris as the result of our conversations, and which has been discussed there, accordingly did not contain anything whatever as to the terms of the future peace, but only the granting of an armistice of from a fortnight to three weeks, to prepare the way for the election of a National Assembly under the following conditions:

1. The continuation of the *status quo* in and before Paris.
2. The continuation of hostilities in and around Metz for a certain distance, the extent of which was to be determined.
3. The surrender of Strasburg, the garrison to be made prisoners of war; and of Toul and Bitsch, their garrisons being permitted to march out with the honours of war.

I believe our conviction that we had made very conciliatory offers will be shared by all the neutral Cabinets.

If the French Government has resolved not to use the opportunity offered of proceeding to the election of a National Assembly, even within the parts of France occupied by us, it thereby betrays a resolution not to remove the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a peace in accordance with international law, and not to listen to the public opinion of the French people. That free and general elections would lead to results favourable to peace, is a conviction which forces itself upon us here, and which can hardly have escaped the attention of those in power at Paris.

I take the liberty of requesting your Excellency to bring the present Circular to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

VON BISMARCK.'

COUNT BISMARCK ON THE TERMS OF PEACE.

'*Ferrières*, 1*st October* 1870.

'According to the newspapers, an official communication has been issued by the section of the French Government resident at Tours, in which the undersigned is represented as having declared to M. Favre that Prussia was resolved to continue the war, and reduce France to a second-rate Power. Though such an allegation is calculated to produce an effect only in circles unacquainted, not only with the customary language of diplomatic negotia-

tions, but even with the geography of France, I am induced by the circumstance that the document in question bears the signatures of Messrs. Crémieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon, members of the actual Government of a great European country, to request your Excellency to direct attention to the contents of this communication in your official conversations.

In my interviews with M. Favre the question of the conditions of peace was never formally introduced, and only at his repeated request I submitted to the French Minister, in general terms, the substance of my Circular dated Meaux, 16th Sept., since which time I have advanced no fresh demands. The cession of Strasburg and Metz desired by us would imply the loss of a portion of French territory pretty nearly equal in extent to that gained by the annexation of Savoy and Nice, but more populous than the latter provinces by about three-quarters of a million of inhabitants. If it be recollected that France, according to the census of 1866 (*Almanac of Gotha* for 1870, p. 514), contains upwards of thirty-eight millions without Algeria, or forty-two millions including the latter province, which furnishes at present a large quota of the French forces, it is self-evident that the subtraction of three-quarters of a million would not in the least affect her international position, as she would still possess in abundance the elements that have enabled her to exercise such a decisive influence on the destiny of Europe in the Crimean and Italian wars.

These few observations will suffice to confute by the logic of facts the exaggerations contained in the proclamation of the 24th ult. I will add, that in our conversations I carefully and expressly directed the attention of M. Jules Favre to the views here enunciated; and therefore, as your Excellency does not require to be assured by me, nothing could be farther from my intentions than to make any offensive allusion to the consequences of the present war on the future international position of France.

VON BISMARCK.'

M. DE CHAUDORDY'S REPLIES TO COUNT BISMARCK.

The following is the full text of Circulars addressed by the delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Tours to the French diplomatic agents abroad:

I.

'*Tours, October* 10.

'Sir,—We find in the *Times* of the 7th inst., a journal which is the habitual organ of Count Bismarck's policy, a despatch from Ferrières, dated October 1st, in which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation refutes the terms used by the Tours delegation, when it said that, from the substance of the conversations exchanged between M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck, it was evident that the latter was desirous to reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power. The Chancellor thereupon analyses the census,

in France, and, referring to the annexation of Savoy and Nice to our territory, observes that, deducting the population of these countries, France would lose about 750,000 inhabitants, should Alsace and Lorraine be wrested from her. In which case, he adds, a country of 38,000,000 of souls is not a second-rate Power.

Without wishing to dwell on the sad enumeration of the human beings whom they desire to sever from the national soil against their own will, and who are mentioned in a manner which would scarcely be employed in speaking of uncivilised tribes, we shall say that, in view of the aggrandisement obtained by Germany, and when the strength of our frontier would be considerably diminished or rather entirely destroyed, France would beyond dispute be immediately ranked among the second-rate Powers. Other countries may not perceive that they are in danger of suffering a similar fate. We cannot be so deceived.

What a nation gains by territorial aggrandisement is frequently but a poor equivalent for the peril which results from such a proceeding. What a nation loses, on the other hand, by conquest, inflicted by a victorious enemy, deprives it of its moral prestige, its material strength, and its tranquillity. Consequently such a nation is on the decline.

This is the situation of which we must not lose sight, if we wish to follow Count Bismarck in the comparison he institutes between the annexation to France of Savoy and Nice, voted by the inhabitants, and the separation of Alsace and Lorraine against their own will.

In reply to the observations made on his report by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, M. Favre writes: "I desire," Count Bismarck said, "a fort commanding Paris, as, for example, Mont Valérien;" and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs adds: "What M. de Bismarck desires is to destroy us." Such is the precise impression which M. Jules Favre derived from the interviews held at Ferrières. It is easy to judge, therefore, whether the terms "second-rate Power" are inaccurate.

Receive, sir, &c. For the Minister and by authorisation, the Plenipotentiary and Director of the Delegate Cabinet, CHAUDORDY.'

II.

'Sir,—Count Bismarck forwarded on the 13th and 16th ult., to the diplomatic agents of the North German Confederation abroad, two Circulars intended to justify in the eyes of Europe the pretensions of Prussia. The arguments of the Chancellor, which he subsequently preferred anew at Ferrières in his interview with M. Jules Favre, tend to prove that if Prussia desires the annexation of territories, it is not in a spirit of conquest, but merely in order to secure to Germany a solid peace, and to forearm her against a repetition of the attacks which have so long been directed against her by France. He desired, he said, to protect Germany against the invasions of a warlike neighbour, whose ambition had not ceased for centuries to threaten the security and independence of the German population.

It is not the first time that M. de Bismarck has attributed to those he desires to knock down designs which he himself entertains. Nor can we admit either the premises he lays down or the deductions he draws there-

from. France is not what he describes her. A biassed survey of her history is not likely to lead to accurate inferences.

Let us review the facts, and see what has been the desire of France during the last century—a period sufficient to make known the real feeling of a people.

It is the duty of nations to be responsible for their past. But this liability does not engage their honour; and progress would be a word devoid of meaning, were they condemned always to continue in a path at one time recommended by interests which have disappeared, or by passions henceforth without an object. Contemporary France is no more like the country governed by Louis XIV. than the Germany of 1870 resembles the Holy Roman Empire. A war of conquest was then, if not within the rights, at any rate within the common usages of monarchies. The Revolution of 1789 effected an alteration in the political code. Peace is a necessary condition of liberty. France at that time created for herself a new ideal. After this, feeling herself strong enough to remain an independent nation, she sought less to conquer foreigners than to enlighten them by her example. What she had just done in America for the United States, she was ready to do again in Europe. Who was it that sought to extinguish the light which France was then diffusing around? Who was it that took up arms to stop, even in its earliest stages, the genius of the French Revolution? No eloquence, no quibble, will ever prevail against the fact that the Revolution of 1789 was the opening of a new era and the breaking up of the traditions of the past, and that Prussia was the first to fight against it.

The invasion of 1792 initiated those baneful rivalries which were to lead to the present calamity. France repelled the aggressors; but she was carried away, we confess, beyond the limits of legitimate reprisals. She had suffered cruel injuries; she allowed herself to be intoxicated by victory. Jena was the revenge. This was followed by Leipsic and Waterloo, which reminded Frenchmen that if a people are permitted to give up their independence for a time, they cannot with impunity strike a blow against that of other nations.

France, however, recovered from her misfortunes. From the time when it became impossible that she should be involved without her own assent, what war has she provoked? Where did we evince that spirit of ambition and that desire for conquest which M. de Bismarck imputes to us? Who in Europe, during those prosperous years, has coöperated more eagerly than we have in the preservation of peace? France had been harshly treated, to atone for the faults committed by the first Empire. But modern ideas, trammelled as they were, made themselves felt in the foreign policy of the country. Wherever a people had to be rescued, liberty to be defended, moral grandeur to be acquired, France was found ready to act. The Government of the Restoration went to arms for Greece; the Monarchy of July secured the independence of Belgium. These ideas had taken such hold of the national conscience, that the second Empire perceived it must recognise them, and emphatically declared it would secure peace.

France believed it. The Empire, however, wanted military prestige, and sought to acquire it; but the wars it undertook were of a very different nature from those of Napoleon I. If every now and then the Empire lost sight of the peaceful disposition of the nation, it yet did not deviate from the prin-

ciples which France had adopted as her own. In the Crimea, France, in conjunction with two free nations, fought for the independence of Turkey. It was in order to rescue a friendly nation that our armies crossed the Alps in 1859. The adventurous Mexican expedition itself, which the Liberal party so emphatically and justly blamed and so energetically opposed, can be explained only by theories which, although chimerical, at least repudiated beforehand all idea of conquest.

What similarity is there between these principles acted upon during more than half a century, and under four different régimes, and the "blood and iron" policy which, since 1864, has been let loose in Europe? What act or what word of France can give anybody a right to associate her with it? Who was it that despoiled Denmark? Who compelled Austria to make war? Who annexed Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, &c.? Who stirred up dormant passions and disturbed Europe? Throughout those crises France intervened only to hasten and consolidate peace. Mention is made of the warlike tendencies of the nation, and of mean jealousies enkindled by the Prussian victories among us; but, on the morrow of Sadowa, at the time of the irritating Luxemburg complication, public opinion in France clearly manifested itself against war, and the German publicists themselves were obliged to confess the fact: moderation was found on our side.

Again, when war broke out in the month of July last, who could deny that Prussia had been doing all she could for the last four years to attain this end? Without dwelling on her general conduct or on her wilfully neglecting to carry out the Treaty of Prague, suffice it to say that she was formidably armed and ready within eight days to enter the field. Events have shown how she had been pushing on her preparations for a long time past. How much France, on the contrary, had neglected her preparations, is but too well known. But not the armaments of Prussia alone were completed, her alliances, too, were ready. Evidently her intentions were to drag us into a fearful conflict.

We can speak of this war without embarrassment. The members of the present Government did everything in their power to avert its horrors from the country. We emphatically declare, in spite of the conduct of Prussia, that the reason given for the struggle was an unjust one. M. de Bismarck cannot seriously allege the declamations of excited crowds. These were individual acts, which found no echo in the country, and which had no greater importance than attaches to any ordinary agitation in a large city. And besides, what people would not be excited when the war-cry resounds? Governments are always certain to arouse enthusiasm whenever they promise glory and triumphs. For this very reason their responsibility is so great. But at a first defeat, if they are not really at one with public opinion, their downfall is inevitable. This has occurred under the second as well as under the first Empire. Both were doomed to succumb, because the enterprises which they pursued were unjust. M. de Bismarck's assertion, that the Empire had been compelled by public opinion to act as it did, is contradicted by the events themselves. When consulted in the elections of 1869, the French people most energetically asserted their love of peace. At the *plébiscite* of the 8th of May 1870 the same tendencies were evidenced in a very manifest way, so much so that two months later the Government was obliged for the first time for many years to reduce the number of the year's recruits. This

concession, demanded by public opinion, proves how far France was in July last from meditating war.

The meeting of the Councils General a short time previously offered another opportunity for the manifestation of the same disposition; and we are in possession of an official document which affords the most positive proof that, far from having been led astray by public opinion, the Empire was, on the contrary, anxious to know whether it would be followed by it. So little convinced was the imperial Government that in declaring war it was only obeying the dictates of public opinion, that it considered itself obliged to make inquiries on the subject. The prefects were ordered to send to the Ministry of the Interior an account of the impressions caused in the departments by the news. Their replies, published in the *Journal Officiel* of the 2d of October, speak for themselves.

"The first impression has been amazement and surprise," wrote a prefect. Others said, "This news, breaking out in the midst of profound tranquillity, has caused considerable excitement." "War is considered to be such a scourge, that people will not believe that it is coming." The ardent wish to preserve peace appeared everywhere. "I believe that in reality war is dreaded," wrote the prefect of one of the most populous and enlightened departments. "Nobody," said another, "wishes for war, even were it to divert attention from the social uneasiness which pervades the country." "This country wishes for peace," another prefect reported; "it would accept war reluctantly." And elsewhere, "The population certainly do not wish to have war; they ardently wish for peace." Everywhere the sentiment broke forth that war would be accepted only for the honour of the country. But the people earnestly caught at every hope of peace up to the last moment. "When it is proved," a prefect expresses himself, "that everything has been attempted to attain this object, but in vain, people will make up their minds to suffer the consequences of the collision they are now dreading." The number of these quotations could easily be increased. Out of the reports of eighty-nine prefects, only eleven state that the public completely approve of the war policy. All the others show the same misgivings or the same reluctance. It is therefore an indisputable fact that the country submitted to war, but did not call for it.

Thus it is proved that France was not menacing the integrity of Germany. Indeed, every page of her history for the last half century testifies to this. She was not meditating conquest. Her aspirations went in quite an opposite direction. Even were she not urged by her genius to follow a pacific policy, interest would compel her to do so. The nature of our wealth has been changed since the beginning of this century. The immense development of investments in securities, the first-rate importance of credit render it an absolute condition of the welfare of the country that peace should be preserved. France has been the first to adopt the system of commercial freedom; and she has thus associated her prosperity with that of her neighbours.

Such is the nation against whose incursions M. de Bismarck wishes to protect Germany, and whose territorial dismemberment appears to him to be the sole efficient guarantee for the tranquillity of the German people. The line of the Rhine, as he says, is no longer sufficient; he wishes the line of the Vosges and the Moselle; he requires Alsace and Lorraine, at the very

moment when Germany has just completely altered her internal constitution. After 1815, Europe, already dreading the expansive strength of the Germanic race, exerted herself to give it a constitution the bases of which were meant for defensive aims only; and France, although the Vienna treaties were directed against her, was left in the state in which she now is. Her northern frontier is entirely open. The events of the present war are an indisputable evidence of that fact; and while France has made no alteration in her organisation, Germany has acquired the greatest strength ever reached by any Power—namely, an absolute military unity, a personal and direct action of the chief who commands, and a military service obligatory upon all. We ask, then, whether France or Germany is now the menacing Power.

Prussia needs not in 1870 any more than in 1792 to guard herself against attacks from France. Beyond all doubt the Prussian Government is seeking facilities for offensive designs rather than better defensive lines. How Germany would be better protected by advancing her frontier, is not indeed easily explained. In case of invasion, the invaded territory would be the territory annexed to Germany, and the seat of hostilities would be merely transferred from one province to another. And what would be the result of the forcible annexation of provinces which have no wish to cease to be French?

Not to mention the reluctant feeling with which every honest man would see populations annexed to a nationality having little in common with their aspirations and their past, suffice it to say that such a step would perpetuate war. Can the heart of France ever detach itself from countries which so many misfortunes nobly endured, and so much blood gloriously shed, have united to her by indissoluble ties? The consequence of annexation would be so disturbed a state of affairs, that Europe could not henceforth hope for a single moment of rest. In putting forth such pretensions and asking for such concessions, M. de Bismarck, is preparing for other wars contemplated by an unbridled ambition. The German people wish for national unity and political liberty, and liberal France has no objection to this. It is a just cause, and we should repudiate our own past if we opposed it. But a yawning gulf separates these legitimate aspirations from the doctrine advocated and practised by M. de Bismarck. If the events of the last six years are examined, it will be found that Prussia has latterly assumed the rôle she so unjustly attributes to us. It is impossible to entertain a doubt on this subject, after the manner in which M. de Bismarck responded to the noble step taken by M. Jules Favre. Should France succumb, Europe will be threatened by a new war, which will paralyse the spread of civilisation and the prosperity of nations. France is not only struggling for the integrity of her territory, for her honour and independence; she is also fighting for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

Receive, sir, &c. For the Minister and by authorisation, the Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Cabinet, and Delegate, CHAUDORDY.'

M. FAVRE'S REPLY TO COUNT BISMARCK.

The following Circular was addressed to the diplomatic representatives of France in foreign countries:

'*Tours, October* 18, 1870.

'Sir,—I do not know when this despatch may reach you. For thirty days Paris has been invested, and its firm resolution—a resolution to resist till it has obtained victory—may prolong the state of things which separates it from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, I would not for a single day delay the answer which is called for by M. de Bismarck's report on the Ferrières conference. I state at once that it confirms my own narrative on all points, except only as regards our conversing on the conditions of peace, which, according to M. de Bismarck, were not discussed between us. I have acknowledged that on this subject the Chancellor of the North German Confederation at first wished to observe silence, because I declared that "I would not assent to any cession of territory." But my interlocutor cannot have forgotten that on my insisting he categorically explained himself, and stated that in the eventuality of the principle of a territorial cession being admitted, the conditions would be those which I enumerated in my report—namely, the abandonment of Strasburg by France, the whole of Alsace, together with Metz and a portion of Lorraine.

The Chancellor remarks that those conditions might be aggravated by the continuance of war. So, indeed, he declared to me; and I am thankful to him for mentioning it himself. It is good that France should know how far the ambition of Prussia reaches. She does not stop at the conquest of two of our provinces; she coldly pursues her work of annihilating us. After having solemnly announced to the world through her King's words that she was fighting only against Napoleon, Prussia now shows a rabid wish to destroy the French nation. She ravages our soil, burns our villages, overwhelms our peasants with requisitions, has them shot when they cannot satisfy her requirements, and uses all the resources of science to aid a war of extermination.

France, therefore, can have no illusions left. For her the question is to be or not to be. Peace at the price of three departments united to her by close ties of affection would have involved dishonour. This she rejected. It is now proposed to punish her with death. This makes the situation quite clear. In vain she is told that to be vanquished is no dishonour, and that to submit to sacrifices rendered necessary by defeat is still less so. In vain it is added that Prussia is but recapturing the violent and unjust conquests of Louis XIV. Such objections mean nothing, and well may we be surprised at being called upon to answer them.

France does not seek consolation in the but too easy explanation of the causes which led to her disaster. She accepts her misfortunes, and does not discuss them with her enemy. On the day when she reassumed the direction of her own destinies she loyally offered reparation; but this reparation could not be a cession of territory. Why? Because it would have diminished her strength? No; because it would have been a violation of

justice and of right, which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation does not seem to take into account. He sends us back to Louis XIV.'s conquests. Does he wish to return to the *status quo* which immediately preceded them? Does he wish to reduce his master once more to wear a ducal crown under the suzerainty of the kings of Poland? If, in the course of the transformation which Europe has undergone, Prussia grew from an insignificant state to be a powerful monarchy, is it not to conquest that she owes it? But during the two centuries which witnessed this redistribution of power a change occurred deeper and of a higher order than any arrangement which till then had determined the partition of territories. The right of man emerged from the abstract region of philosophy. It is taking possession of the world, and it is this right upon which Prussia tramples when she endeavours to take from us two provinces, while confessing that the population energetically rejects her sway.

Nothing gives a more correct definition of her doctrines than the expression used by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation. "Strasburg," said he, "is the key to our house." It is, therefore, as an owner that Prussia stipulates, and this owner's right she exercises over human creatures whose moral freedom and personal dignity she presumes to allude to in such language. Respect for the freedom and dignity of these human beings forbids France to consent to abandon them, as she is asked. By abuse of force she may be subdued; but she will not incur the moral degradation which would result from acquiescence.

I am to blame in not having expressed myself with sufficient clearness, when I said that we could not give away Alsace and Lorraine without dishonour. By those words I meant to characterise, not the act that would be imposed upon the vanquished, but the weakness of an accomplice who would join hands with the oppressor, and consummate an iniquity in order to redeem himself. Count Bismarck will not find a Frenchman worthy of that name who thinks and acts otherwise than I have done.

For these reasons I do not acknowledge that an acceptable proposal for an armistice has been made to us. I ardently desired that honourable means should have been offered us for the suspension of hostilities and the convocation of an Assembly. But—I appeal to all impartial men—could the Government accept such a compromise as was proposed? The armistice would have been a mere mockery unless it rendered free elections possible, and for this purpose forty-four hours were granted. During the rest of the period of a fortnight or three weeks Prussia reserved to herself the right to continue hostilities; so that the Assembly would have held her deliberations on peace or war while the battle would have been going on which would have decided the fate of Paris. Moreover, the armistice would not have extended to Metz. It excluded revictualling, and condemned us to the consumption of our provisions, while the besieging army would have been chiefly living upon the pillage of our provinces. Lastly, Alsace and Lorraine would have nominated no representatives, for the really unheard-of reason that their fate was to be decided upon in the Assembly itself. Prussia, by not recognising their right, was, in fact, asking us to hold the handle of the sword with which she pierces it.

Such are the terms which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation does not hesitate to qualify as "very conciliatory," accusing us at the

same time "of not seizing the opportunity to convoke a National Assembly, thus showing" (he adds) "our resolution not to get rid of the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a peace in harmony with the national right," or "to listen to the public opinion of the French people." Well, we accept before our country, as well as before history, the responsibility of our refusal. Not to oppose the demands of Prussia would have been in our eyes an act of treason. I cannot foresee what our destiny may be; but what I deeply feel is, that were I to choose between the situation of France and that of Prussia, the first is the one which would be the object of my ambition. I prefer our sufferings, our perils, our sacrifices to the inflexible and cruel ambition of our enemy. I entertain the firm hope that France will be victorious. Were she vanquished, she would still remain so great in her misfortune that she would be an object of admiration and sympathy to the whole world. Therein lies her real strength, and therein she may find her revenge. The European Cabinets which have been making only empty demonstrations of cordiality will at a future day perceive it; but it will be too late then. Instead of advancing the doctrine of mediation, advised by justice and interest, they, by their inertness, authorise the continuance of a barbarous struggle, which is a disaster to all and an outrage to civilisation.

This bloody lesson will not be lost on nations; and who knows?—history teaches us that resuscitation to fresh life, through some mysterious law, sometimes follows dire misfortune. Perhaps France, now passing through a fiery trial, will issue from it transfigured, and her genius will shine with so much the more brightness, since it will have saved her from moral degradation by a powerful and implacable enemy.

Before you are able to communicate these remarks in your intercourse with the representative of the Government to which you are accredited, Fortune may have pronounced her judgment. Seeing that this large population of Paris, which has been besieged for one month, is so resolute, so calm, so united, I am awaiting the hour of her deliverance with a firm and hopeful heart.—Receive, &c. JULES FAVRE.'

II.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO M. THIERS' INTERVIEW WITH COUNT BISMARCK.

THE BRITISH PROPOSAL TO PRUSSIA.

EARL GRANVILLE TO LORD A. LOFTUS.

'*Foreign Office, October* 20.

'My Lord,—It is needless to state how deeply her Majesty's Government have deplored the outbreak and continuance of the great war which is still raging between Germany and France. They did their utmost to prevent it, and, since the declaration of hostilities and their own proclamation of neutrality, they have used their influence to prevent its extension; for if any of those nations which have remained neutral had taken a part, all Europe, it is probable, would have been gradually involved in the calamity, with doubtful advantage to either belligerent.

Nothing would have given more satisfaction to her Majesty's Government than to contribute in any manner to an honourable and permanent peace. Offers of mediation or of good offices would not have been wanting, if her Majesty's Government had at any time believed that such offers would have been acceptable to both the belligerents. They could not, however, shut their eyes to the fact that such a state of things had not arisen; and the course which they adopted themselves, and which they recommended to others, was to abstain from making unacceptable proposals, or giving ineffective advice, which could only weaken the chance of obtaining at some future time the object they had in view. They, indeed, recommended that Count Bismarck and M. Favre should personally communicate their respective views. Such a meeting did take place; but, unfortunately, with no immediate result, except to show how divergent were their opinions as to a possible basis of negotiation.

After uninterrupted and extraordinary successes on the part of Germany, what is the present phase of the war?

The main body of the German army is engaged in the investment of the French capital, and the reduction by famine and by bombardment of the city of Paris appears to be among the measures which are under discussion at the German head-quarters.

Count Bernstorff has communicated to me some of the Circulars which have been published by the North German Government on the war; and on the 11th instant he gave me the Circular in which it is stated that the inevitable consequences of the prolongation of the struggle before Paris will be, that hundreds of thousands will die of starvation. The communication of this opinion of the fearful results which may possibly, and even not improbably, arise from a long siege of Paris makes it a positive duty on the part of her Majesty's Government to leave nothing undone to avoid so great a calamity. It is also clear that the war has already exhibited, and if it is prolonged must increasingly present, features which concern not the two belligerents only, but Europe at large.

Her Majesty's Government are confident that the explanation of their views will not be construed as an unfriendly act. It is dictated by a most sincere anxiety for the present and future welfare of two nations with whom this country has long been on most friendly terms.

I am aware of the strong arguments which may be used in favour of extreme measures against Paris. I am, however, desirous of inquiring whether there are not considerations which appear perhaps stronger to spectators than to those who are under the influence of extraordinary military success, accompanied by the consciousness of great efforts and vast sacrifices. It is undoubted that such an operation as the reduction of Paris by famine or bombardment, although without precedent as to its magnitude, is authorised by the practice of war; but it is equally certain that, involving, as stated by Count Bismarck, not only the ruin but the death, with incidents of peculiar horror, of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants, every one would admit it should not be resorted to until all possible alternatives have been exhausted.

Presuming a successful issue to an attack on Paris at no distant time, it is not unreasonable to compare with its advantages the prospective disadvantages which may ensue; and the fact that some of these touch the feelings of mankind as much as their reason does not discourage her Majesty's Government from laying them before the King and his advisers. The bitter recollection of the past three months may be effaced by time and by a sense of the conduct and valour of the enemy in the field. There are degrees of exasperation, and the probability of a fresh and irreconcilable war must be greatly increased if a generation of Frenchmen behold the spectacle of the destruction of a capital; a spectacle associated with the deaths of large numbers of helpless and unarmed persons, and the destruction of treasures of arts, sciences, and historical association of inestimable value and incapable of being replaced. Frightful as such a catastrophe would be to France, and dangerous as I believe it would be to the chances of future peace to Europe, her Majesty's Government believe that to none would it be more painful than to Germany and its rulers.

The French Government, acting upon considerations which appear to them conclusive, have, since the meeting of Count Bismarck and M. Favre, declined to propose negotiations for peace. But her Majesty's Government have assumed the responsibility of urging the Provisional Government to agree to an armistice which might lead to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the reëstablishment of peace. Her Majesty's Government have also not failed to represent to them the importance of making every

concession compatible with their honour in the present circumstances of the war. Her Majesty's Government are not authorised to say so; but they cannot believe that such representations to the French Government will remain without effect.

During this war two moral causes have aided immensely the great material power of the Germans. They have been fighting to repel the threat of foreign invasion, and to assert the right of a great country to constitute itself in the way most conducive to the full development of its resources. The glory of these efforts will be increased, if it can be truly said in history that the King of Prussia had exhausted every attempt for peace before the orders for the attack on Paris were given, and that the conditions of peace were just, moderate, and in accordance with true policy and the sentiments of the age.

Her Majesty's Government wish that it should be clearly understood—which their conduct has hitherto plainly shown—that they have no wish to offer superfluous or unacceptable advice to the belligerents. The suggestions which they have now made in a most friendly spirit arise from their attention having been formally drawn to consequences of so formidable a character as, in the judgment of Count Bismarck, are likely to arise from the prolonged investment of Paris. They cannot remain silent, or leave anything untried which may have a tendency to avert such a fearful and unexampled catastrophe.—I am, &c. GRANVILLE.'

COUNT BISMARCK'S REPLY.

'*Versailles, October* 28, 1870.

'Lord Granville had the kindness to communicate to your Excellency the despatch which he addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 20th inst.; your Excellency is therefore acquainted with its contents.

I can at once assure you that the earnest desire to conclude a destructive contest between two great nations, and to avoid the employment of the extreme measures sanctioned by the international usages of war therein expressed, is fully shared by his Majesty: indeed, it is the more deeply felt by him, as Germany, by the sacrifices imposed by even a victorious war, is more deeply interested in the matter than a neutral country, which is in a position to view the struggle with philanthropic feelings of sympathy, the liberal and noble proofs of which we fully recognise.

Being animated by these feelings, his Majesty the King was especially pleased to see from Lord Granville's despatch that her Britannic Majesty's Government shares our conviction that, in order to render peace possible, the first and most necessary thing is to give the people of France an opportunity of electing a national representation. We have always felt this, from the time when we became acquainted with the events which happened at Paris on the 4th September, and we have given expression to our conviction on every occasion that offered.

I may remind you that, at the suggestion of the English Cabinet, his Majesty the King empowered me, at Meaux, more than a month ago, to treat with M. Jules Favre, as to the possibility of summoning a constituent

Assembly. The desire for the establishment of a legal representation of the French people induced his Majesty at Ferrières to offer conditions for an armistice so favourable that their moderation was universally acknowleged, and strikingly proved by the fall of Toul and Strasburg a few days later. That, and how they were then rejected, is known; and it is also known that, in spite of this, his Majesty the King was prepared to permit the elections, which were then fixed for the 2d October, to be carried out with the most perfect freedom in all the districts occupied by German troops, and to do everything in his power to further them, though the writs were issued by a Government we had not recognised. Our negotiations with the local and departmental authorities in France—those conducted with the *maire* of Versailles have found their way into the public papers—prove the willingness of the German authorities to further independent elections.

How little those in power at Paris really desired to allow the nation to elect representatives is proved by the fact that they not only postponed the elections, which were originally fixed for the 2d October, but afterwards expressly annulled the decision of the Tours Government, which had appointed the 16th inst. for that purpose. The decree in question has been published by the newspapers. The document, with the original signatures of the members of the Government, has fallen into our hands, together with a letter of M. Gambetta's, of which I cannot refrain from enclosing a copy, as it characterises the tone of feeling which now prevails in the Paris Cabinet.

These observations did not prevent us from holding out to the Parisian Government the prospect of our coöperation with it, in case it should desire to enable the French people to elect deputies, to give expression to their opinions, and to take part in the responsibility of Government, which those now in power had seized on their own responsibility alone.

The good offices kindly offered by distinguished persons belonging to a neutral nation, who visited Paris for the purpose of mediating, provided the Parisian Government with a fresh opportunity of freeing France, by means of the elections, from an anarchy which renders peace negotiations impossible. We declared ourselves ready to grant an armistice of sufficient length for the elections to take place, and at the same time to permit all the deputies of the nation to enter Paris unhindered, or the Parisian deputies to pass out of the city, in case another place should be chosen as the seat of the assembly.

This proposal, which, as I have said, was made by persons belonging to a neutral nation to the members of the Parisian Government, with our assent, on the 9th inst., was received in such a manner that the gentlemen in question declared they must abandon all the hopes they had entertained. Immediately afterwards, M. Gambetta left Paris in a balloon, and his first exclamation on reaching the earth was, as French accounts tell us, a protest against the popular elections. Experience shows that he has succeeded in preventing them, and in frustrating the efforts of Cremieux to bring them about.

From this statement of facts, it follows that it is not our assent, but that of the Parisian Government which is wanting for the means her British Majesty's Government recommend as the best way of bringing about a peace —the free election of a constituent Assembly; that we have from the first

been ready to further it, and have frequently made advances to the Government of National Defence, which have been invariably rejected.

We were therefore fully justified in refusing to bear the responsibility of the sad results which the resistance of the fortress of Paris may have for the inhabitants of that city, if it be persisted in till the last moment; as we did in our communication dated the 11th inst., to which the English Minister refers.

It was in accordance with our expectations that this communication could not fail to make an impression on the English Cabinet. We have proved how much we should regret the unavoidable consequences, if those now in power in Paris should continue resistance to the last extremity, by calling the attention of the public, and more especially of the neutral Powers, to them, in the hope that the representations of the latter might not remain without effect on those who are sacrificing the lives and the property of the people of Paris to their own ambition. We had the more reason to entertain these hopes as the present Governments of Paris and Tours undertook the guidance of the destinies of France on their own responsibility, and without any farther right than such as can be derived from a high-handed and forcible usurpation, together with an obstinate refusal to listen to the voice of the nation.

If her British Majesty's Government endeavours to induce these Governments to abandon the dangerous and tyrannical course they have adopted, and to consider the evils which must result to France from the progress of her political and social dissolution, and to her splendid capital from the destruction inseparable from a siege, we shall gratefully acknowledge its exertions.

At the same time, we cannot but fear, so great are the delusions under which the Parisian Government seems to labour, that the benevolent intentions of the English Cabinet may be misunderstood, and the humane considerations which have prompted this step be falsely interpreted as a sign of support on the part of the neutral Powers, which may encourage a farther resistance, and thus have an effect exactly contrary to that intended by Lord Granville.

From the substance of his despatch, it appears that Lord Granville himself is convinced that, after our past experience, it is impossible for us to take the initiative as to new negotiations. I request your Excellency, however, on communicating to him the whole contents of this despatch, to assure him that we shall most willingly accept, and carefully weigh, with a sincere desire for the reëstablishment of peace, any proposal made us on the part of the French, which is intended to pave the pay for definitive negotiations.

His Excellency Count von Bernstorff, London.' BISMARCK.

The following is the letter of M. Gambetta mentioned in the above despatch:

'*Paris, le 2 Octobre* 1870.

'Je vous adresse, M. Bonnet (Hippolyte), qui vous remettra le décret en minute du Gouvernement relatif à l'ajournement des élections pour la constituante. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire l'émotion unanime du Gouvernement en apprenant votre résolution du 29 Septembre. Les considérations

les plus graves l'ont décidé à maintenir l'ajournement fixé par le décret du 29 Septembre. Nous comptons sur votre zèle à faire obéir et respecter ses décisions.

Veuillez vous tenir au courant des affaires intérieures et extérieures, au point de vue militaire et politique.

Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,
(L. S.) L. GAMBETTA.'

The semi-official *North German Gazette* remarks on the British despatch:

'An armistice under very favourable conditions was offered to the French at Ferrières, but was rejected by them; and on the 9th of October General Burnside again on our behalf offered an armistice for the purpose of holding elections, even if only for forty-eight hours, which, however, would have been perfectly sufficient for that object; and this encountered a very decided and unanimous refusal. The present French Government has affirmed that it will not negotiate with us until the last German has been driven from the soil of France. The King is still ready to agree to an armistice for the election of a constituent Assembly, which we desire just as much as the people of France, and which we are ready to forward and facilitate in every way consistent with the carrying on of the war; but because we desire it, the Government of the National Defence does not desire it; and nothing therefore remains but to compel a satisfactory peace by force of arms, whatever may result therefrom to Paris.'

The *Cologne Gazette*, also commenting on the despatch, says:

'The Gladstone-Bright Ministry, and especially the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, unfortunately did not do its utmost to prevent the outbreak of this great war. Indeed, one may say not its least—viz. the public declaration that France had no right to commence this wanton war. This sin of omission is now, alas too late, admitted even by the English. We carry on this war in a certain degree for England; for had Imperial France conquered, Napoleon would certainly have seized on Belgium, which he coveted more than the left bank of the Rhine. It would then have been seen whether England was prepared to defend Belgium after formally assuming the protection of it, and Napoleon III. would certainly have gained what was his ultimate object in his powerful naval armaments—the humiliation of England, the revenge of Waterloo, of which the French are always thinking.

We willingly do justice to the considerations on the ground of which England now seeks to arrest the destruction of Paris. It is a pity that England's prestige suffered so grievously through her reserved attitude at the commencement of the affair. *Per se*, we should regret as much as anybody the destruction of a city inhabited by more than a million of women and children, and in which are so many treasures of art and science. To enter Paris, however, is, under present circumstances, a necessity for the German army. May the Parisians come to their senses, and by the acceptance of reasonable conditions of an armistice and peace release us from that lamentable necessity!'

Count Beust has addressed a despatch to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin in reply to Count Bismarck's Circular disclaiming the responsibility for the terrible consequences of a reduction of Paris by famine. The despatch says:

'I cannot withhold the expression of my fear, that in the judgment of history a part of this responsibility would fall on the neutrals, if they allowed the danger of an unparalleled disaster to be put before their eyes in mute indifference.

I therefore beg your Excellency, if the subject is mooted to you, openly to express our regret that in a situation in which the Prussian Government foresees a catastrophe like that indicated in the Circular, it nevertheless announces its determination to repel every mediating effort of third parties, as though it feared they would recommend an arrangement which might result in Germany's noble blood having been shed in vain; as though it wished to deprive neutrals of the thankless but not less laudable task of facilitating to the vanquished the acceptance of hard conditions. Such a determination is not likely to prevent the excess of horror which Prussia, on grounds of humanity to the enemy, wishes to be able to avoid. Rather than bear the punishment of the faults of the fallen Government, the republican rulers in France are inclined to the most extreme resolutions. To allow no other voice besides the imperious command of the victor to address them is hardly using the best means for dissuading them from extreme resolves.

It is not any interest of their own which makes the Austro-Hungarian Government lament that at the point at which things have arrived any pacific influence of the neutral Powers is wanting. It is impossible for us, however, to approve the absolute reserve recently evinced by the St. Petersburg Cabinet. The Austro-Hungarian Government deems it its duty to state that it still believes in a common European interest, and that it would prefer a peace effected by the impartial efforts of the neutrals to the destruction of hundreds of thousands more.

I repeat expressly that the above is only written in case occasion should be given to your Excellency to express yourself on the subject. Our interest is consistent with the most perfect reserve, and is little affected by the longer duration of the war. Nothing can be farther from us than an intention to offer advice or proposals. Only the neutral Powers are expected to speak out; it concerns us to place things in their true light.'

M. FAVRE'S CIRCULAR ON THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

'*Paris, November* 7, 1870.

'Prussia has just rejected the armistice proposed by the four great neutral Powers—England, Russia, Austria, and Italy—having for its object the convocation of a National Assembly. She has thus once more proved that she continues the war for a purely personal end, without in any way

regarding the true interest of her subjects and of those Germans whom she drags with her. She pretends, it is true, that she is compelled to do so by our refusal to yield to her two of our provinces. But these provinces, which we will not and cannot abandon to her, and whose inhabitants strenuously oppose her, she holds occupied even now; and it is not to conquer them that she ravages our land, drives before her armies our ruined families, and has held for more than fifty days Paris enclosed within the fiery circle of her batteries, behind which she is intrenching herself.

No. She wishes to destroy us to satisfy the ambition of the men who govern her. The sacrifice of the French nation is needful for the preservation of their power; and they coolly set about it, professing to be astonished that we should not become their accomplices by yielding to the weakness which their diplomacy recommends to us. Having entered upon this course, Prussia closes her ears against the opinion of the world. Conscious that she offends all equitable men, that she alarms all conservative interests, she chooses isolation, and thus withdraws herself from the condemnation which Europe, if admitted to discuss her conduct, would not fail to pronounce. Despite her refusal, four great neutral Powers have intervened, and have proposed to her a suspension of arms, with the definite object of allowing France to consult upon the election of an Assembly. What could be more rational, more equitable, more necessary?

It was under the Prussian blows that the imperial Government collapsed. Immediately afterwards the men whom the necessities of the moment invested with power proposed peace, and, with a view to arrange the conditions, demanded a truce, indispensable for the convention of a national representation. Prussia foiled the project of a truce by requiring impossible conditions, and her armies surrounded Paris. They had been told that speedy submission would follow their appearance. The sedition which had been anticipated had long to be waited for; it came at an opportune moment, the Prussian negotiator himself announcing it to our agent as an expected auxiliary. But in bursting forth it afforded the people of Paris an opportunity, by an imposing vote, of legalising the Government of the National Defence, which acquired thereby in the eyes of Europe a consecration of its authority. It had therefore a right to consider the proposition for an armistice made by the four great Powers, and it had a right to expect that the proposition would be accepted. Being desirous above all things of consulting the representatives of the country, and of concluding through their efforts an honourable peace, it accepted the negotiations, and entered upon them in accordance with the usages of the law of nations.

The armistice was to comprehend these points—the election of deputies throughout the territory of the Republic, inclusive of the invaded provinces; it was to last for twenty-five days, with a re-victualling proportioned to that term. Prussia raised no objection to the first two conditions beyond making some reservations in respect of the voting in Alsace and Lorraine, which we mention without farther examination, since the absolute refusal to allow the victualling of Paris rendered all discussion useless. Re-victualling is a necessary consequence of a suspension of arms in the case of an invested town. Provisions in such a case are an element of defence. To deprive it of provisions, is to create an inequality which is contrary

to justice. Would Prussia venture to ask us to be allowed to destroy a portion of our ramparts without permitting us to resist? She would place us in a still worse position by obliging us during a whole month to exhaust our provisions without fighting, while she, living upon our soil, would await the resumption of the war, when we should be weakened by famine. An armistice without re-victualling would be a capitulation at a fixed date, without honour and without hope. By refusing the re-victualling Prussia refused the armistice. And this time it is not only the army, it is the French nation which she seeks to annihilate by reducing Paris to the horrors of famine.

The real question was, whether France could assemble her representatives to deliberate concerning peace. Europe demanded such an assembly. Prussia refused it by imposing iniquitous conditions contrary to all law and right. And yet, if we are to give credit to a published document to which no contradiction has been given, and which proceeds from the Prussian Chancellor, she dares to accuse the Government of the National Defence of exposing Paris to a certain starvation. She complains of being forced by us to besiege us and to starve us. Europe will judge of the value of such imputations. They are the crowning feature of that policy which commenced by pledging the word of the Sovereign in favour of the French nation, and closes with a systematic rejection of all suggestions by means of which France would be allowed to express her wishes. We do not know what the neutral Powers will think of propositions set aside with such haughtiness. Perhaps they will perceive at last what they have to expect at the hands of Prussia, when victory will have raised her to a position in which she can accomplish her designs.

As regards ourselves, we obey an imperious and simple duty in maintaining that the proposal for an armistice is the only means of obtaining a solution by a National Assembly of the formidable questions which the crimes of the imperial Government have permitted the enemy to put to us. Prussia, knowing the odious character of her refusal, seeks to conceal it under a disguise which can deceive no one. To ask us for a month's deprivation of our provisions, is to ask of us our arms — arms which we resolutely hold in our hands, and will not lay down without fighting. We have done everything that men of honour could do to stop this conflict; our efforts have been foiled, and we can henceforth take counsel only of our courage, casting the responsibility upon those who systematically refuse all compromise. It is to their personal ambition that thousands of men are being immolated; and when Europe, moved by the spectacle, wishes to arrest the combatants marching to fresh fields of carnage, in order to gain time for the representatives of the nation to seek a basis for peace, they say, "Yes, but on condition that the population of this city who suffer, these women, children, and old men, the innocent victims of the war, shall receive no succour; so that, the truce having expired, it may be impossible for their defenders to fight us without causing them to die of hunger."

This is what the Prussian chiefs do not fear to reply to the propositions of four European Powers. We call right and justice to witness against them, and we are convinced that, if their army and their nation were able to give a vote, they would condemn this inhuman policy. Let it be well understood, that up to the last moment the Government of National Defence, absorbed

by the immense interests confided to it, will do everything in its power to render an honourable peace possible. The means of consulting France being refused to it, it has interrogated Paris. All Paris, in reply, rises to arms to show the country and the world what a great people can do when it defends its honour, its homes, and the independence of its country.

You will have no difficulty, Sir, in making the truth of these observations understood when opportunity shall arise.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs,

J. FAVRE.'

CIRCULAR OF COUNT BISMARCK ON THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

'*Versailles, November* 8, 1870.

'Your Excellency is aware that M. Thiers asked for permission to visit head-quarters for the negotiations which he wished to open after consulting the various members of the Government of National Defence. By order of the King, I consented to receive him. On the 30th of last month, before our interview, M. Thiers was allowed to go to Paris, whence he returned to head-quarters on the 31st. The fact of a statesman of M. Thiers' standing and experience accepting a commission from the Paris Government made me hope for propositions possible of acceptance, and likely to promote the restoration of peace.

I received M. Thiers with the respectful courtesy to which, independently of our former relations, he is so fully entitled by his distinguished antecedents. M. Thiers declared that, at the wish of the neutral Powers, France was ready to enter into an armistice. After duly considering this proposal, his Majesty arrived at the conclusion that any armistice would be fraught with those injuries to Germany which must result from the prolongation of war to an army whose provisions have to be brought from a great distance. An armistice would, moreover, oblige us to arrest the progress of the large body of the troops set free by the capitulation of Metz, and to forego the occupation of the vast territory which now may be taken possession of without striking a blow, or after overcoming but slight resistance. Again, the German armies are not likely to receive any very considerable reinforcements during the next few weeks; whereas an armistice would have enabled France to develop her resources, complete the organisation of her troops, and, in the event of hostilities being resumed on the expiry of the truce, to oppose to us forces capable of making resistance which at present are not in existence. Notwithstanding these considerations, his Majesty allowed himself to be influenced by his wish to receive the French propositions in a friendly spirit, and to promote the restoration of peace.

I was authorised to meet M. Thiers half-way, and to offer him at once an armistice of twenty-five, or, as he afterwards wished, twenty-eight days, on the basis of the military *status quo*. I proposed that a line of demarcation should be drawn between the positions held by the contending forces on the day of the conclusion of the armistice, that hostilities should be suspended for four weeks, and a representative Assembly elected and opened in

the interval. To the French the only military consequence of such an armistice would have been to deprive them of an opportunity of making small and unsuccessful sorties, and of throwing away their artillery ammunition in a manner which is as useless as it is incomprehensible. With regard to the elections in Alsace, I was in a position to declare that we should not insist upon any stipulations incompatible with the possession by France of her German departments until the conclusion of peace, and that we should hold no inhabitant of those departments responsible for representing his countrymen in a French National Assembly.

I was astonished at the French negotiator rejecting propositions so exclusively advantageous to him, and declaring that he would admit no armistice unless it involved an extensive provisioning of Paris. I replied, that to permit such a provisioning would be making a military concession so very much in excess of the *status quo* and of an equitable view of the case, that I must ask him whether he was empowered to offer some military equivalent, and if so—what? M. Thiers declared he had no authority to accord a military equivalent, and that he must insist upon the provisioning of Paris without offering anything in return, save the willingness of the Paris Government to permit the French nation to elect representatives who would probably institute some authority with which we might enter into negotiations for peace.

The transaction had reached this stage when it became my duty to submit the result to the King and his military advisers. His Majesty, justly surprised at such excessive military demands, was disappointed in the expectations he had cherished in regard to the negotiations with M. Thiers. The incredible demand, that we should give up the advantages obtained by an effort of two months, and allow matters to be brought back to the time of our first investing Paris, was another proof that the Paris Government only wanted a pretext for denying the nation the benefit to be derived from electing representatives, and had no wish to create an opportunity for the safe and undisturbed performance of this act.

In compliance with my wish that we should attempt an arrangement upon another basis before continuing hostilities, M. Thiers, on the 5th inst., met the members of the Paris Government in front of our advanced lines, to propose to them either a shorter armistice, on the basis of the *status quo*, or the holding of the elections without any armistice, in which latter case I would engage to offer all facilities compatible with the requirements of our military security. What passed at his interview with MM. Favre and Trochu, M. Thiers has not communicated to me. He only told me that, having failed to obtain an armistice involving the provisioning of Paris, he had been directed to break off negotiations and leave Versailles.

His departure for Tours followed on the morning of the 7th.

These negotiations have convinced me that the present rulers of France never intended to allow the French nation to speak out through its elected representatives, and that they as little wished to effect an armistice, but put forward a condition which they must have known would be unacceptable, merely to avoid giving a direct refusal to the neutral Powers, on whose assistance they count.

I authorise your Excellency to read this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and request you to comment upon it in accordance with the facts it contains. BISMARCK.'

REPORT OF M. THIERS.

The following is a summary of the report drawn up by M. Thiers, on the 9th November 1870, respecting his mission to the German head-quarters, which has been communicated to the representatives of the great Powers and of Turkey and Spain:

M. Thiers explains that the object of his journey was to obtain an armistice, and that Count Bismarck admitted the expediency of his mission, though at the same time he made certain reservations as to the intervention of the neutral Powers in these negotiations. These had for their object the conclusion of an armistice, to prevent farther bloodshed, and to permit France to establish, by means of elections freely held, a regular Government, by which a treaty might be signed in a legal manner. The Chancellor having alluded to the members of the late régime who were endeavouring to reconstitute themselves into a Government at Cassel, M. Thiers replied at once that that Government had for ever ceased to exist, and had no future chance of success. Count Bismarck then protested against any ideas of German interference in the internal affairs of France. The questions which were mooted during the first conference were: 1st, the principle of the armistice; 2d, its duration, the freedom of election in the occupied provinces; 3d, the positions to be retained, and relations to be observed by the belligerent armies; and lastly, the revictualling of all besieged places, and especially of Paris during the armistice.

Count Bismarck did not appear to perceive any insurmountable difficulties in these questions, and M. Thiers thought that an understanding would probably be arrived at on all the other points. The conferences followed one another, two being generally held each day.

The two first points having been agreed upon, and the duration of the armistice having been fixed at twenty-five days, it was also agreed that nothing would be prejudged by the conclusion of an armistice.

With regard to the questions raised relative to Alsace and Lorraine, Count Bismarck said he could not permit any electoral agitation in those provinces, but would not object to their being represented by influential persons without Germany interfering with the elections; and this point was agreed to by both parties.

On the fourth point there were several discussions between M. Thiers, Count Bismarck, and the Prussian generals; but the question of the revictualling did not at first give rise to any essential objection on the part of the Chancellor, who referred it to the military authorities.

On the 3d M. Thiers said that the re-victualling of the besieged places had become not a mere question of details, but a *sine quâ non*. Count Bismarck, on behalf of the Prussian generals, declared that the armistice was absolutely against the interests of the Prussians, and that he could only consent to the re-victualling of Paris if the Government of the National Defence was prepared to concede some military equivalent, as, for example, a military position round Paris. M. Thiers having insisted, Count Bismarck added that by a military position he meant 'a fort, and perhaps more than one.'

Thereupon M. Thiers stopped him immediately, and declared that to refuse to permit Paris to be re-victualled was equivalent to depriving her of her resources for resisting during a month, and that to demand a fort was nothing less than to demand the surrender of the ramparts.

M. Thiers then relates his interview with M. Jules Favre, the rupture of the negotiations, the refusal to proceed with the elections without an armistice, and concludes his report as follows:

'The time has now come for the neutral Powers to judge whether sufficient attention has been paid to their advice; but it is not we whom they can reproach with having disregarded it, and we make them judges of the conduct of both belligerent Powers. I have used all my efforts to recover for my country the blessings of peace, which it lost by the errors of a Government whose very existence was a mistake. France having accepted such a Government, and having unconditionally given herself up to it, has been guilty of a great and irreparable fault.'

M. DE CHAUDORDY ON THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

The following despatch has recently been addressed by the delegate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tours to its diplomatic agents abroad:

'*Tours, November* 12.

'Sir,—You have received the despatch which I addressed on the 7th of the present month to our agents abroad immediately that we ascertained the failure of the negotiations for an armistice. Since then I have taken an opportunity to transmit to you the Circular dated the 8th of November, in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs so eloquently details the course of the negotiations and the views of the Government of the National Defence. The memorandum which M. Thiers addressed the day before yesterday to the representatives of the neutral Powers, agreeably to the instructions which he had received from Paris, and which I forwarded to you, has informed you with the utmost precision of the history of the new mission which he had undertaken. I will not again enter upon those points already so completely disposed of. I desire to-day to call your attention to the reasons which have not permitted us to accept the propositions put forward by Count Bismarck. I mean, an armistice without re-victualling, or elections without an armistice.

The refusal of M. Bismarck to consent to the re-victualling of Paris being the principal cause of the rupture of the negotiations, we are naturally induced to consider whether this pretension of the Berlin Cabinet is legitimate, and in what light the question had been regarded by the British Government and the Prussian Minister in the *pourparlers* which preceded the negotiations. It appears from the despatch addressed on October 20 by Lord Granville to the English Ambassador at Berlin, that the armistice was to be purely military, and not in any way to prejudge the conditions of future peace. Lord Granville, in fact, confined himself to regarding it as "a means

of favouring a convocation of a constituent Assembly and the restoration of peace." On his part, M. Bismarck, in his despatch to M. Bernstorff, dated the 28th of October, reminded him that the Cabinet of Berlin had declared its readiness "to consent to an armistice for a sufficient period to enable regular elections to be held, and was disposed to allow free entrance into Paris to all the deputies of France, or to permit the free departure from the capital of the deputies of Paris, should the Assembly be convoked to meet in a provincial city." It was in this form that the proposition of England was made, and thus it was understood by us.

It was evident that the armistice had reference to the meeting of a National Assembly. Now, if it be difficult to admit, as we will presently show, that elections can be held without an armistice, is it possible to understand an armistice without re-victualling? In the language of the law of nations, terms have a value which cannot be perverted, and the principle of an armistice accepted by M. Bismarck implied necessarily, when a besieged city is in question, the re-victualling of the place. This is not a point of free interpretation, but is really a natural consequence of the very expression employed, and which we could not understand in any sense but that which is universally accepted. By all nations, indeed, the condition of re-victualling is implicitly contained in the principle of an armistice, since each belligerent ought to be, at the resumption of hostilities, in the same condition that he was at the commencement.

Now, how would France have been in the same position, when Paris, during twenty-five days, would have been sensibly diminishing the resources which enabled her to endure the siege? It is in vain that M. Bismarck, in his last Circular, dated the 8th of the present month, enumerates the advantages which we should have derived from an armistice thus concluded; for is it not obvious to every one that we should have been, on the contrary, weakened in an important degree? Was that really the "military *status quo*" of which the Chancellor of North Germany speaks? How? While the Prussians would have maintained their positions, we should have good-naturedly used up the means of preserving our own. We should, indeed, have saved the ammunition, "the useless and incomprehensible waste" of which is regretted by the Minister of King William with a wholly disinterested commiseration, but we should have abridged, by our own free will, the precious time during which we would have it in our power to expend it with a prodigality that causes us no uneasiness. For this reason, the longer the armistice, the more injurious it would have been to us; and if Prussia had indefinitely prolonged it, the capture of Paris, without the striking of a blow, would have been the inevitable result of her concession. Is it necessary to insist upon this point? and have our enemies ever entertained a belief that we would accept a condition tantamount to defeat?

Let us not deceive ourselves. In analogous circumstances principles have been established and accepted. When we found Prussia refusing to admit them, and calling that a concession which is but the plainest right, regarding even re-victualling as a demand "opposed to all military usages," we may well ask ourselves whether M. Bismarck considers Prussia to be in possession of a law of nations peculiar to herself, and which has nothing in common with that of other nations. In declining the condition which was imposed, independently of other motives of a superior order which determined its deci-

sion, the Government of the National Defence, therefore, limited itself to a simple application of the ordinary rules of law. Even had it perceived that, by consenting to an armistice, the re-victualling of Paris would follow as a necessary consequence, still it would have been bound to withhold its signature when it found a strange pretension raised which could not fail to lead to a position not contemplated by the terms. To separate the idea of re-victualling from that of an armistice would, in fact, be absolutely to change the character of the act it was pretended to agree to—in a word, it would no longer be an armistice.

As the Chancellor of the North German Confederation has stated, it was "at the desire of the neutral Powers" that France declared her willingness to conclude an armistice. We venture to hope that those same Powers, whose ideas were in conformity with right principles, and who doubtless are astonished to find Prussia arbitrarily substituting her personal interpretation for that which the law of nations had suggested to them, will not fail to impress upon Count Bismarck the singular contradiction which has cut short negotiations in which they had taken the initiative, and that they will endeavour to ascertain the cause of a difference of opinion by which they now find themselves placed upon ground so different from that upon which M. Bismarck pretended to place them.

As for us, faithful to the rules of right, we remain in the same disposition as at the moment when the negotiations were entered upon, and we adhere to the basis of an armistice with the re-victualling which is the natural consequence of it, and with general elections throughout the whole extent of our territory.

I come to the second proposition indicated by Count Bismarck in the interviews at Versailles. The Prussian Prime Minister appeared to think that elections might be held without its being necessary to conclude an armistice.

We have reason to believe that he is disposed to reply in this sense to the neutral Powers, and to put forward this opinion as an argument against their proceedings. You already know that the Government of the National Defence has not thought it its duty to agree to this; but it is right that you should be informed of the motives of that decision. In order to appreciate them, it is sufficient that you should contemplate our present situation, and the conditions necessary for the elections to be free and unbiassed.

France is at this moment in arms on all points of her territory, of which a part is occupied by foreign troops. Absorbed in the noble care of her defence, animated by an ardour justified by the extent of the perils which menace her, she ought not, in order to accomplish the work to which her resolution devotes a supreme effort, to let herself be distracted by any other thought. She should reserve all her resources, as well as all the energy of her intelligence and of her heart, to the difficult task imposed upon her, which task is not beyond her indomitable courage. Whether in the regular army, in separate corps, or in battalions of tirailleurs, all able-bodied men are collected under her flag. In a word, the electors, or at least a very large number of them, are engaged in the contest, and are dispersed far from their homes and even from their departments.

How, in this position, could a vote be taken in a country of universal suffrage? Count Bismarck knows as well as we do that a little time and

security are necessary to enable men's minds to recover a temporary calmness, and in some degree form parties and agree upon candidates. An Assembly called to express the will of the country in a solemn period of trial cannot be improvised amid the clang of arms and constant disquietude. The nation has need to commune with itself before pronouncing on its destiny, and solving problems which affect both its present and its future. Need it be added, that in the present state of things, the Government being in Paris, and the capital being unable to put itself in regular and constant communication with the electors, a vote thus taken might lack that character of a truly national manifestation which alone could make it valuable.

The French Government strongly desire the elections, which, putting the nation in the full possession of its rights, would tend to remove many difficulties, and lead to a pacification, which has never ceased to be the object of its dearest wishes. On this point Count Bismarck's denials in his last Circular cannot mislead anybody. But, at the same time, the Government desire that the elections should be carried out in a regular way.

Such, sir, are the grave reasons which, maturely weighed by the Government, dictated their resolution. However great their desire to pave the way for a better future, they cannot compromise the defence of Paris by a lamentable concession, nor decree elections which would not have been the exact expression of universal suffrage. To exhaust our provisions or to lose our time would have been to lay down our arms. The Government of the Defence residing at Paris were unanimous in refusing such an arrangement. At this grave moment there should remain no obscurity as to the facts which may arise; for this reason it is necessary that the conditions of peace and war should be consistent with right, and that the French people collected in its *comitia* should be able to decide on them in the fulness of its free sovereignty. We are quite confident that the neutral Powers will, in the common interest of all, take the same view as ourselves.—Accept, &c.

By authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Delegate,

CHAUDORDY.'

III.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE REPUDIATION BY RUSSIA OF THE PARIS TREATY OF 1856.

RUSSIAN CIRCULAR NOTE.

'*Zarskoe Selo, October* 31.

'SUCCESSIVE alterations in the treaties considered as the foundation of the European balance of power have rendered it necessary for the imperial Cabinet to inquire how far the political position of Russia has been and ought to be modified by these changes. Among the treaties alluded to, that which touches Russia more nearly than any other is the compact of March 30, 1856. The special convention between the two States bordering on the Black Sea, which forms an appendix to this treaty, obliges Russia to confine her naval forces to a minimum; at the same time this treaty establishes the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea. By laying down this principle the signatory Powers intended to remove the very possibility of a conflict between the Powers bordering on the Black Sea, or between either of them and the Maritime Powers. This arrangement was intended to increase the number of the territories which have been accorded the benefit of neutrality by common consent, and thus protect Russia herself from the danger of attack.

A fifteen years' experience has proved that this principle, on which the safety of the South Russian frontiers exclusively depends, is no more than a theory. In reality, while Russia disarmed in the Black Sea, and, by a declaration contained in the minutes of the Conference, likewise loyally deprived herself of the possibility of taking measures for an effectual maritime defence in the adjoining seas and ports, Turkey preserved her privilege of having an unlimited number of men-of-war in the Archipelago and the Straits, while France and England were also at liberty to assemble their squadrons in the Mediterranean. Again, under the treaty in question, the war-flag of all nations is formally and perpetually prohibited entry into the Black Sea, but the so-called Straits Treaty closes the Straits only in time of peace to men-of-war. Owing to this inconsistency, the shores of the Russian Empire are exposed to attack even from less powerful States, if they have some naval forces at their disposal. All that Russia could oppose to them would be some ships of small size.

The Treaty of March 30 has, moreover, been modified by some of those infringements to which most European transactions have been latterly exposed, and in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written law, founded upon the respect for treaties as the basis of public right

and the rule governing the relations between States, retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at other times. We have witnessed the principalities Moldavia and Wallachia, whose position had, under the guarantee of the great Powers, been defined in the Treaty of Peace and the appended protocols, accomplish a series of revolutions which are equally at variance with the letter and spirit of these transactions; arrangements which first led to their reunion, and subsequently to the installation of a foreign prince. These facts have obtained the sanction of the Porte and the consent of the great Powers—or, at any rate, the latter have not thought it necessary to enforce their objection. The representative of Russia was the only one who raised his voice to remind the Cabinets that by this tolerance they were departing from distinct treaty engagements. No doubt, if these concessions to one of the Christian nationalities of the East had proceeded from a general agreement between the Cabinets and the Porte, and if they had been based upon a principle alike applicable to all the Christian populations of Turkey, they would have been applauded by the imperial Cabinet; but they were exclusive.

The imperial Cabinet could not but be surprised at seeing a most essential stipulation of the Treaty of March 30, 1856, violated with impunity but a few years after the conclusion of the said compact, and this at a moment when the representatives of the great Powers, on whose collective authority the East relied for peace, were again assembled in conference at Paris. But this infraction was not the only one. Repeatedly, and under various pretexts, foreign men-of-war have been suffered to enter the Straits, and whole squadrons, whose presence in those waters was inconsistent with their unconditional neutralisation, admitted to the Black Sea. While all the guarantees contained in the treaty, and more especially those for the effective neutralisation of the Black Sea, were thus being gradually invalidated, the adoption of ironclad vessels, a craft unknown and unforeseen in 1856, increased the danger menacing Russia in the event of war. She was now more unable than ever to encounter an enemy in the Black Sea.

Under these circumstances, his Majesty could not but ask himself what are the rights and duties accruing to Russia from this modification of the general situation and the disregard shown to engagements which, although conceived in a spirit of distrust and levelled at herself, she has invariably and most conscientiously obeyed.

After maturely considering this question, his imperial Majesty arrived at the following conclusions, which you are instructed to bring to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited. Our illustrious master cannot admit, *de jure*, that treaties, violated in several of their general and essential clauses, should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of his empire. Nor can his imperial Majesty admit, *de facto*, that Russia should rely for safety on a fiction which has not stood the test of time; and that she should allow her safety to be imperilled by herself respecting a treaty partly set aside by others.

Confiding in the equitable sentiments of the Powers who have signed the Treaty of 1856, as well as in their consciousness of their own dignity, the Emperor commands you to declare that his imperial Majesty cannot any longer hold himself bound by those stipulations of the Treaty of March 30, 1856 which restrict the exercise of his sovereign rights in the Black Sea;

that his imperial Majesty deems himself both entitled and obliged to announce to his Majesty the Sultan that he will no longer regard as valid the special and additional convention appended to the said treaty, the latter of which fixes the number and size of the men-of-war which the two Powers bordering on the Black Sea shall keep in that sea; that his Majesty loyally informs of this the Powers who have signed and guaranteed the more comprehensive treaty, an integral part of which is the convention in question; and that his Majesty restores to the Sultan the full exercise of his sovereign rights in this respect, reclaiming the like full exercise of the same rights for himself.

In acquitting yourself of this duty, you will take care to point out that the only object of our illustrious master in this step is to protect the safety and dignity of his empire. His imperial Majesty has no wish to revive the Eastern question. His imperial Majesty sincerely desires to contribute towards the continuance and consolidation of peace in the East as well as everywhere else. His imperial Majesty fully adheres to his consent to the general principles of the Treaty of 1856, which have fixed the position of Turkey in the European system.

His imperial Majesty is ready to enter into an understanding with the Powers who have signed that transaction, for the purpose either of confirming its general stipulations or of renewing them, or of replacing them by some other equitable arrangement, calculated to secure the quiet of the East and the balance of power in Europe. His imperial Majesty is convinced that peace and the balance of power will receive a fresh guarantee, if they are based upon a more just and solid foundation than one involving a state of things which no great Power can accept as the normal condition of its existence.

You are requested to read this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and leave him a copy.—I avail myself, &c.

GORTSCHAKOFF.'

RUSSIAN SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

Prince Gortschakoff's Circular of October 31 was accompanied by the following despatches to the Russian representatives abroad:

TO BARON BRUNNOW, AT LONDON.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1, 1870.

'In making the communication to the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty, according to the orders of his Majesty the Emperor, you will take care to explain its sense and bearing. When, at the commencement of 1866, there was a question of conferences between the three Powers, with a view to prevent the war then imminent in Germany, by the assembly of a Congress, in discussing the basis of such conferences with Earl Russell you had the opportunity of pointing out to him the compensations and the guarantees of security which would be necessarily required by Russia in case of

certain eventualities occurring calculated to modify the *status quo* existing in the East. Lord Russell admitted this with perfect equity. He in no way disputed that any alteration made in the text and the spirit of the Treaty of 1856 must lead to the revision of that act. Although those eventualities have not occurred, Lord Granville will not contest the fact that already this treaty has undergone serious modifications in one of its essential provisions. That which must impress Russia in respect of these modifications is not the appearance of factitious hostility towards her which they seem to bear, nor is it the consequences which may ensue to a great country from the creation upon its frontiers of a small *quasi*-independent State; it is chiefly the facility with which, scarcely ten years after its conclusion, a solemn arrangement, clothed with a European guarantee, has been infringed both in letter and in spirit under the very eyes of the Powers who should have been its guardians. With such a precedent before us, what value can Russia attach to the efficacy of that arrangement, and to the pledge of security which she believed she had obtained in the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea? The balance of power established in the East by the Treaty of 1856 has therefore been disturbed, to the detriment of Russia. The resolution adopted by our august master has no other object than to restore that equilibrium.

The Government of her Britannic Majesty would never consent to leave the security of her shores to the mercy of an arrangement which was no longer respected. It is too equitable not to award us the same duties and the same rights. But what we especially desire to impress is, that this decision implies no change in the policy which his Majesty the Emperor has pursued in the East. You have already had on many occasions opportunities of discussing with the Cabinet of London the general views which the two Governments hold upon this important question; you have been able to establish a conformity of principles and interests, which we have noted with great satisfaction. From that we have drawn the conclusion, that at present it is neither from England nor Russia that can arise the dangers which may menace the Ottoman empire; that the two Cabinets have an equal desire to maintain its existence as long as possible by conciliation, and allaying differences between the Porte and the Christian subjects of the Sultan; and that in the event of any decisive crisis presenting itself despite their efforts, both were equally resolved to seek for its solution in the general agreement of the great European Powers.

We have not ceased to hold these views. We believe that their perfect analogy renders possible a thorough understanding between the Government of her Britannic Majesty and ourselves, and we attach the greatest value to it, as the best guarantee for the preservation of peace and the balance of power in Europe from dangers which may result from complications in the East.

By the order of his Majesty the Emperor your Excellency is authorised to repeat this assurance to Lord Granville. We shall sincerely congratulate ourselves if the frankness of these explanations may contribute to that end, by removing every possibility of misunderstanding between the Government of her Britannic Majesty and ourselves. GORTSCHAKOFF.'

To Monsieur de Novikoff, Vienna.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1.

'Together with this despatch your Excellency will receive a Circular which, by order of his Majesty the Emperor, you will officially communicate to Count Beust. I do not think it necessary to enumerate the reasons which have prompted our august master to denounce those clauses of the Treaty of 1856 which are incompatible with the dignity and safety of Russia. Those reasons are, in fact, manifest. When I had the honour of acting as Plenipotentiary at Vienna, I made no secret of my conviction, that it was neither to the interest of Europe, nor of Austria more particularly, to pursue a policy which, while unable to shake powerful Russia, yet permanently disquiets and offends the feelings of a great nation. This was fully admitted by the Vienna Government in 1859. On the occasion of his mission to Warsaw, Baron Werner expressed the belief of the Austrian Government that the situation in which Russia had been placed by the Treaty of 1856 was prejudicial to all Europe, because it prevented the imperial Government from exercising in matters of international import its due share of influence in favour of peace and conservative politics.

Of its own accord the Vienna Government proposed to communicate with the signatory Powers, and recommend a revision of the treaty, with a view to the abrogation of such clauses as might be considered oppressive by Russia. The better to enable you to remind Count Beust of this, I send you a copy of the correspondence which then passed between myself and Count Rechberg, as also of the despatches of the Russian representatives at Berlin and Paris. As consequences of this proposal, some years later, the like convictions were manifested by the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, when, soon after assuming the direction of Austrian affairs, he offered at a European Congress to move for a revision of those stipulations of the Treaty of 1856 offensive to us. He thought this a useful measure to adopt for the consolidation of peace, and one which, by promoting the intimacy of the various Cabinets, would remove a source of constant disquiet, and restore to Russia her due share of pacific and conservative influence in the council of Powers. Last year, at our interview at Ouchy, Count Beust expressed the same sentiments. I thanked him, and already, on that occasion, gave him to understand that in our view the validity of the Treaty of 1856 was partially impaired.

The time, however, had not then arrived for our august Sovereign to take the formal resolution now announced. As at present there is no question of the Vienna Cabinet taking the initiative, events have developed, and conferred upon Russia an indisputable right. Our august Sovereign deems it necessary to avail himself of this right, and put an end to a state of things the disadvantages of which his imperial Majesty does not think himself obliged to endure, now that the corresponding guarantees given him have lost their force.

This resolution does not, however, in any way affect the principles on which, in accordance with the Treaty of 1856, the existence of Turkey is founded. Those principles will be observed by our august Sovereign as long as they are observed by the other Powers. Altogether, his Majesty has no wish to modify the views in accordance with which his Eastern policy has

been long conducted. Those views still remain what I described them in my letter to Count Rechberg of 18th November 1859.

His Majesty aspires to no exclusive position in the East, neither with regard to accomplished facts nor to the events seemingly preparing there. His Majesty will readily coöperate with Europe for the solution, in a pacific sense, of the questions agitating the East; and he would be particularly gratified by entering into an understanding with Austria concerning these questions, which, after all, affect most nearly the two empires as Powers conterminous with Turkey. His imperial Majesty confines himself to the recovery of a right indispensable for the security of his realm; and his Majesty is convinced that the satisfaction thus given to Russia, restoring to it the full liberty of exercising her pacific influence, not only does not menace the existing state of things in the East, but, on the contrary, is particularly calculated to contribute to the attainment of a universal understanding.

The intentions announced by the Vienna Cabinet in 1859, and repeatedly confirmed by Count Beust, allow us to hope for a friendly reception of this communication. Count Beust will comprehend that this question is so very important to Russia, that the position assumed by the various Powers in the present instance will be regarded by her as foreshadowing the relations they wish to maintain with her in the future, and consequently will render it possible for herself to maintain with them. GORTSCHAKOFF.'

TO BARON D'ÜXKULL, AT FLORENCE.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1.

'I complete the important business of to-day by sending you sundry papers relative to the circular despatch enclosed. Of these papers, some are despatches sent to those of his Majesty's representatives instructed to make the like communication to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of 1856; others are copies of a portion of the correspondence which passed on the same subject in 1859. All these documents are destined for your personal information. You will learn from them all that has been done in the matter, and also the importance attached to it, in accordance with the intentions of our august Sovereign. They will supply you the arguments to be used in your conversations with M. Visconti Venosta. For the better explanation of his Majesty's intentions, you will tell him that we do not for a moment doubt the reception that will be given to our communication by the Italian Government. The Italian Government is too fully conscious of its own dignity not to recognise the duties imposed upon us by our dignity. No interests of Italy are bound up with the unnatural situation created by the Treaty of 1856 with regard to the Black Sea; while as to Italy's disposition towards ourselves, this inspires us with more than mere confidence, and we shall be happy if our good relations are still farther cemented.

GORTSCHAKOFF.'

TO HERR VON STAAL, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1.

'By order of his Majesty the Emperor, I transmit to you a despatch, which will be brought to the knowledge of all the Cabinets that have signed

the Treaty of 30th March 1856. You are authorised to communicate this despatch to Aali Pasha. You will endeavour to make his serene Highness appreciate the spirit in which this declaration of his Majesty is conceived. This declaration implies no menace against Turkey; on the contrary, the more deeply sensible we are that the Treaty of 1856 establishes such unnatural relations between Turkey and ourselves, that the whole state of the East is thereby injuriously affected, the more fully convinced we are that the removal of the offensive restrictions will possibly revive those relations of close amity between the two empires which have more than once subsisted in former times. It will only depend on the Porte whether these ancient traditions are to be renewed. We frankly call upon the Porte to give up the suspicion with which she has lately looked upon us, and enter upon a new and more confiding course of policy. GORTSCHAKOFF.'

TO MONSIEUR OKUNEFF, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT TOURS.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1.

'Enclosed you receive a circular despatch, which, by order of his Majesty the Emperor, I communicate to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of 30th March 1856. It sets forth the reasons which render it indispensable for our august Sovereign to free himself from the restrictions imposed by some clauses of the treaty in question. Although the Government now presiding over the affairs of France regards the national defence as the sole object of its activity, the imperial Cabinet, in consideration of the high position occupied by that country in Europe, does not think it right to postpone the communication to it of an alteration of a treaty among the signatories of which France is reckoned. You are, therefore, authorised to communicate the above-mentioned circular. I will only add a few words of comment. The war of 1854 and the Treaty of 1856 mark the first steps of a meddling policy which has unhinged all Europe, and led to such disastrous consequences. Whatever Government may be ultimately established in France, it will have to consider it its task to heal the wounds inflicted by so pernicious a system. We hope the existing Government will appreciate the spirit in which the declaration of our august Sovereign is conceived. All we desire is to restore to Russia the indisputable right of providing for her own security. The step we have been obliged to take threatens nobody. On the contrary, it contains a fresh guarantee for the quiet of the East, which experience has taught us cannot be permanently established upon unnatural relations between the Powers directly interested in it. GORTSCHAKOFF.'

PRIVATE LETTER FROM THE CHANCELLOR OF STATE TO HERR VON STAAL, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 1.

'I add a few words to the important packet just addressed to you. Besides the circular note, you receive copies of the despatches and letters addressed by me, by order of the Emperor, to our representatives at the various Courts to which this communication is made, and also a copy of the correspondence which passed on the subject in 1859. These papers are destined

solely for your information. They will acquaint you with all that has been done in the matter, as well as with the significance attaching to it, agreeably with the intentions of his Majesty. They will also furnish you the arguments to make Aali Pasha see the question in its real light.

But, dear Staal, by order of the Emperor, I have to give you also a special commission. Spare no effort to convince the Grand Vizier that the step which necessity and the duty of vindicating the dignity and security of his empire have compelled his Majesty to take does not imply any hostile or unfriendly intentions towards the Porte. I need not dwell upon this, as it is a point which has been treated at length in so many of our previous communications to you.

However, I will add one observation. The unnatural state of things established by the Treaty of 1856 not only mars the existing relations between Russia and Turkey, but also gives direct encouragement to those who hope for or reckon upon a rupture between these two Powers. While this state of things and the injurious condition to which we are subjected continue, it will always be regarded as a matter of course that it must cease some day; for no great Power will endure such a position for an indefinite time. The dread contingency of war will always be regarded as a mere question of time, and cast its shadow before it. There will be those who endeavour to bring it about and prepare for it; others will wait for it impatiently, and do their utmost to accelerate the day of the rupture. Obviously this is one of the reasons why agitation in the East does not subside, and why all endeavours to allay the prevailing excitement, which the imperial Cabinet has so incessantly made since 1856, have been of no avail.

The step taken by our august Sovereign tends to the removal in a friendly and pacific way of this stumbling-block. We trust that the Porte will look upon it as a pledge for a higher degree of quiet and safety than the clauses of a treaty which has not stood the test of experience have hitherto given her. I am sure this will not escape Aali Pasha's sagacity.

GORTSCHAKOFF.'

SIGNOR VISCONTI VENOSTA'S ANSWER TO THE RUSSIAN NOTE.

The following is the answer of Signor Visconti Venosta to the Russian note:

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE KING'S MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG.

'*Florence, November* 24, 1870.

'Monsieur le Marquis,—Baron d'Üxkull came a few days since to read to me a despatch of his Excellency Prince Gortschakoff of the 15th of October (November 1) 1870, which has equally been communicated to the other Powers who signed the Treaty of the 18th (30th) of March 1856. In this

circular, the Chancellor of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia examines the consequences that certain articles of this treaty have had for Russia, taking into consideration the successive alterations undergone by those transactions which are held to be the basis of the European balance of power, and also taking into consideration the modifications which the treaty itself of the 18th (30th) of March has received.

On the strength of this examination the Cabinet of St. Petersburg declares that it no longer holds itself bound by the obligations of the Treaty of the 18th-30th of March 1856, in so far as they limit Russia's rights of sovereignty in the Black Sea; that his imperial Majesty considers it his right and his duty to give notice to the Sultan of his withdrawal from the special convention annexed to the treaty, fixing the number and the dimensions of the men-of-war which the two Powers bordering on that sea are empowered to keep in its waters; that in this respect he gives back to the Sultan the fulness of his rights, as he resumes them for himself; and that he loyally informs of this the Powers who signed and guaranteed the general treaty, of which that convention is an integral part.

I have lost no time in laying before his Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, and before his Council, the important despatch of which I have just summed up the conclusions. The feelings of equity and national dignity to which his Excellency the Prince Chancellor appeals will always be recognised by the members of the Government of his Majesty the King of Italy. The friendly relations happily existing between the two Courts and the two States impose upon us the duty of examining with the most earnest attention the import of the despatch of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The simple perusal of the 7th and 14th articles of the Treaty of the 18th-30th of March 1856 is sufficient to show that Italy could not, without the consent of the other interested parties, take upon herself the right of freeing Russia from the engagements contracted by her with all the Powers who signed the treaty in question. We, therefore, regret our inability to entertain the argument which his Excellency Prince Gortschakoff wishes to develop. Our regret would be great, if the changes which have occurred in the East since 1856, and upon which the Prince's arguments rest, were of a nature to lessen the high position occupied by Russia. Happily such is not the case. The events which have occurred in the East since 1856 have tended to improve the condition of the Christian population, and this improvement is what Russia has never lost sight of. His Excellency the Prince Chancellor of the Empire has too lofty ideas and too nice a feeling of justice not to acknowledge this improvement. As a proof of this, I read the following words in the despatch of Prince Gortschakoff to General Ignatieff, dated November 8th (20th), 1866, in which Prince Charles of Hohenzollern is recognised as Prince of the United Principalities: "The imperial Cabinet can only applaud a result fully in harmony with the traditional sympathy which binds Russia to populations, professing her own religion, and also with her desire for the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire, founded on the wishes and wants of the Christian races which inhabit it."

The modifications introduced into the domestic privileges of Servia have been of the same character, and have produced the same beneficial effects. Possibly some partial violation of the principle of the exclusion of men-of-war from the Black Sea may have occurred; but these exceptional cases have

been of a temporary character, and a protest by Russia would have been sufficient to prevent their recurrence.

Our opinion is, therefore, that the spirit of the stipulations of 1856 has outlived the partial modifications which have affected them. It is desirable that the same concordant sentiments should still animate the Powers which took part in these memorable transactions. Our attention, therefore, dwells chiefly on the formal declarations which Prince Gortschakoff appends to his despatch. We are glad to be assured that his imperial Majesty entertains no thought of raising the Eastern question, and that he fully adheres to the general principles of the Treaty of 1856, and is ready to come to an understanding with the Powers who put their signatures to that act, either to confirm its general provisions or to renew them, or, finally, to come to any other arrangement calculated to insure the peace of the East and the European balance of power.

You are aware, M. le Marquis, of the ideas which guide the policy of Italy in the East. We look upon the agreement between the Powers bound to the stipulations of 1856 as the most efficient security for the Ottoman Empire. The greatest result of these transactions has been to establish, at least in the main points, a conformity of views among all the interested States. Previous unanimity is therefore, in our opinion, the necessary condition of any change that may be introduced; and, for our part, we should deem it impossible to sanction any proposal which, by its one-sided character, might tend to compromise the good understanding which has hitherto existed. We should be glad if the unquestionable impartiality of our views on these important questions and the friendly dispositions which animate us could contribute to keep up perfect harmony between Russia and the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of 1856.

Be so kind as to read this despatch to Prince Gortschakoff, and to leave a copy of it with him. VISCONTI VENOSTA.'

LORD GRANVILLE'S ANSWER TO THE RUSSIAN CIRCULAR.

The following is the answer returned by Lord Granville to the Russian Circular:

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR A. BUCHANAN.

'*Foreign Office, November* 10, 1870.

'Sir,—Baron Brunnow made to me yesterday the communication respecting the convention between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan limiting their naval forces in the Black Sea, signed at Paris on the 30th of March 1856, to which you allude in your telegram of yesterday afternoon.

In my despatch of yesterday I gave you an account of what passed between us, and I now propose to observe upon Prince Gortschakoff's despatches of the 19th and 20th ult., communicated to me by the Russian Ambassador on that occasion.

Prince Gortschakoff declares, on the part of his imperial Majesty, that the Treaty of 1856 has been infringed in various respects to the prejudice of Russia, and more especially in the case of the Principalities, against the explicit protest of his representative, and that, in consequence of these infractions, Russia is entitled to renounce those stipulations of the treaty which directly touch her interests.

It is then announced that she will no longer be bound by the treaties which restrict her rights of sovereignty in the Black Sea.

We have here an allegation that certain facts have occurred which, in the judgment of Russia, are at variance with certain stipulations of the treaty, and the assumption is made, that Russia, upon the strength of her own judgment as to the character of those facts, is entitled to release herself from certain other stipulations of that instrument.

This assumption is limited in its practical application to some of the provisions of the treaty, but the assumption of a right to renounce any one of its terms involves the assumption of a right to renounce the whole.

This statement is wholly independent of the reasonableness or unreasonableness, on its own merits, of the desire of Russia to be released from the observation of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856 respecting the Black Sea.

For the question is, in whose hand lies the power of releasing one or more of the parties from all or any of these stipulations?

It has always been held that that right belongs only to the Governments who have been parties to the original instrument.

The despatches of Prince Gortschakoff appear to assume that any one of the Powers who have signed the engagement may allege that occurrences have taken place which in its opinion are at variance with the provisions of the treaty; and, although this view is not shared nor admitted by the co-signatory Powers, may found upon that allegation, not a request to those Governments for the consideration of the case, but an announcement to them that it has emancipated itself, or holds itself emancipated, from any stipulations of the treaty which it thinks fit to disapprove. Yet it is quite evident that the effect of such doctrine, and of any proceeding which, with or without avowal, is founded upon it, is to bring the entire authority and efficacy of treaties under the discretionary control of each one of the Powers who may have signed them; the result of which would be the entire destruction of treaties in their essence. For whereas their whole object is to bind Powers to one another, and for this purpose each one of the parties surrenders a portion of its free agency, by the doctrine and proceeding now in question, one of the parties in its separate and individual capacity brings back the entire subject into its own control, and remains bound only to itself.

Accordingly, Prince Gortschakoff has announced in these despatches the intention of Russia to observe certain of the provisions of the treaty. However satisfactory this may be in itself, it is obviously an expression of the free will of that Power which it might at any time alter or withdraw; and in this it is thus open to the same objections as the other portions of the communications, because it implies the right of Russia to annul the treaty on the ground of allegations of which she constitutes herself the only judge.

The question therefore arises, not whether any desire expressed by Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the co-signatory

Powers, but whether they are to accept from her the announcement that, by her own act, without any consent from them, she has released herself from a solemn covenant.

I need scarcely say that her Majesty's Government have received this communication with deep regret, because it opens a discussion which might unsettle the cordial understanding it has been their earnest endeavour to maintain with the Russian Empire; and for the above-mentioned reasons it is impossible for her Majesty's Government to give any sanction, on their part, to the course announced by Prince Gortschakoff.

If, instead of such a declaration, the Russian Government had addressed her Majesty's Government and the other Powers who are parties to the Treaty of 1856, and had proposed for consideration with them whether anything has occurred which could be held to amount to an infraction of the treaty, or whether there is anything in the terms which, from altered circumstances, presses with undue severity upon Russia, or which, in the course of events, had become unnecessary for the due protection of Turkey, her Majesty's Government would not have refused to examine the question in concert with the co-signatories to the treaty. Whatever might have been the result of such communications, a risk of future complications, and a very dangerous precedent as to the validity of international obligations, would have been avoided.—I am, &c. GRANVILLE.

P.S.—You will read and give a copy of this despatch to Prince Gortschakoff.'

COUNT BEUST'S REPLY TO PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF.

(*Semi-official statement.*)

With regard to the last Russian Note, the Austrian Government considered it their duty to judge it with the earnestness necessary to the treatment of so important a question. The reply of Count Beust to the Circular of Prince Gortschakoff points out that there can be no doubt as to the mutual obligations involved in the Treaty of 1856, which cannot be modified or annulled by any one party singly. It is merely on account of the respect due to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that Count Beust proceeds to an analysis of the arguments advanced by Prince Gortschakoff. The fact that Turkey can maintain a fleet where Russia cannot might awaken a desire for a revision of the treaty, but could not justify its arbitrary repeal. Turkey is not responsible for the breach of treaty alleged to have been committed by the union of the Danubian Principalities. Turkey never demanded the sanction of this breach of treaty, which infringes upon her rights and interests. The entrance into the Black Sea of foreign men-of-war with certain Princes on board was a harmless proceeding, of which Russia should have complained at once, if she objected to it. The Austro-Hungarian Government learn with painful regret the resolve of Russia, and express deep surprise. They cannot but direct the serious attention of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the consequences of such a proceeding.

Another note of Count Beust addressed to the Austrian Ambassador, Count Chotek, at St. Petersburg, refutes the argument based upon Count

Beust's having taken the initiative in this matter in January 1857. At that time the Russian Chancellor himself deemed the action of Count Beust precipitate, as it would tend to excite the suspicion of the French Government, and as no satisfactory result could be expected from a Congress. Besides, according to the proposals of Count Beust at that time, the different co-signatories—but not a single Power by itself—were to proceed to a revision of the treaty. At that time, too, the proposal of Count Beust was not of a nature to call forth dangerous consequences; while the present isolated proceeding of Russia creates serious misgivings, as the Christian populations of the East will think that Russia imagines the present moment a good one for taking the Eastern question in hand.

RUSSIAN ANSWER TO AUSTRIA.

Prince Gortschakoff has addressed the following additional despatches to M. de Novikow, Vienna:

'*Zarskoe Selo, November* 10.

'Count Chotek has communicated to me two despatches from Count Beust, which refer to our Circular of the 19th of October. I have made it my duty to place them before his Majesty the Emperor. The more special object of the first is to express the opinion of the Cabinet of Vienna on our communications. It is with regret, I confess, that I approach the discussion into which the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor thought it expedient to enter. It can hardly lead to the good understanding which we intended to establish with the Cabinet of Vienna as well as with the other co-signatories of the Treaty of 1856. I must, however, contest some of his assertions, which do not correspond either with the opinion of the imperial Cabinet or with the situation.

Count Beust reminds us that Article 14 expressly stipulates that the special limitation Convention annexed to the treaty cannot be either annulled or modified without the consent of the signatory Powers. It is, of course, well understood that a transaction concluded in common cannot be modified but by common assent. But it is equally of course understood, that such a transaction preserves its obligatory value for all concerned only so far as its essential bases and conditions have been likewise observed and maintained. Such has not been the case as regards the Treaty of 1856. The bases of this transaction were the obligations contracted by Russia on the one side, and the engagements taken by the Porte and her allies on the other. Among these the principal one—the only one which counterbalanced the concessions made by Russia—the only one which could induce her to agree to those concessions—was the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea. This principle had no other basis but good faith in treaties. Well, we ask what has for these fifteen years become of most of the treaties upon which the political *status* of Europe was based? Count Beust could not assert that the changes effected in the equilibrium of the situations and forces in Europe are of slight account as regards the *status quo* created in the East by the Treaty of 1856. Treaty stipulations cannot be invali-

dated on several points, and yet be valid on one. On the other hand, the Europe of to-day is no longer the Europe which signed the Treaty of 1856. The political conditions under which this transaction was concluded are radically altered.

Surely it is not Russia who can be accused of setting aside the respect due to what is lawful and right. For forty years she has been the stanchest supporter of law and order in Europe, and this frequently against her own interests. If this principle has been weakened by the course of events, the responsibility cannot fall upon her. But when the most solemn treaties have been annihilated before her eyes; when the value of European guarantees is nullified by the very Cabinets which have tendered them; when to preserve some efficacy they must be renewed according to the circumstances of the time being—then it is impossible that Russia alone should be bound absolutely to respect a principle which has ceased to prevail in political transactions; and, above all, that she should make her safety depend upon it.

As regards the particular infringements to which the Treaty of 1856 has been subjected, Count Beust will allow me not to take into account the objection that the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were not signatories to that transaction. These provinces, bound to the Porte as vassals, could not be contracting parties to transactions concluded between great Powers. They had nothing to do with these transactions, and could not be responsible for violations of international agreements, indirectly brought on by their domestic dissensions.

The infringement lies in this, that the great Powers, assembled in Conference, after having in vain condemned accomplished facts, have tolerated and recognised them, though opposed to the spirit and letter of the treaty, and notwithstanding the protest couched by the Russian Plenipotentiary. This was not only contrary to right and justice, but also altered the entire state of things in the Black Sea. But I will not dilate on this subject. It is not the purpose of the imperial Cabinet to send recriminations to the co-signatory Courts, but it has honestly sought to establish an understanding with them, in order to place the situation in the East in harmony with the alterations effected by the course of events. It has frankly stated the motives which no longer permit our august master to find a sufficient guarantee of security in the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and which do not allow his imperial Majesty to accept the corresponding obligation of a limitation of his rights of sovereignty. At the same time, he has declared himself ready to consult his co-signatories as to the arrangements to be made to maintain the general stipulations of the treaty. If renewed or confirmed they secure the repose of the East and the European equilibrium.

Far from repudiating the mutual obligations which unite the co-signatories in a transaction concluded in common, the imperial Cabinet considered that it was paying them a fresh tribute of respect. It abides by its resolves, hoping that when better understood they will meet with juster appreciation.

You will read this despatch to, and leave a copy of it with, Count Beust.

Receive, &c. GORTSCHAKOFF.'

PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF TO M. DE NOVIKOW.

'In addition to the despatch intended to answer our Circular of the 19th of October, Count Chotek has communicated to me a despatch of Count Beust, which more especially refers to the confidential considerations which I thought it expedient should accompany that communication.

I regret to have to state that that special proof of the confidence which we reposed in the disposition of the Vienna Cabinet has not been better understood, as has been the spirit which animated our declaration.

It is difficult for me to account for the assertion of Count Beust, that our reception of the initiative of a proposition intended to bring about a revision of the Treaty of Paris, which he was pleased to take in 1867, was more than cold. I recollect, on the contrary, that that initiative was most warmly appreciated by us.

In November 1866, Count Stackelberg received orders to tell Count Beust, in reply to the friendly dispositions which he had manifested towards us, that we congratulated him on the inauguration of a new era of broad and elevated views in the Eastern policy of Austria, and that the spirit displayed met with our cordial approval. I regret if that impression has not been correctly transmitted to Vienna.

As regards the realisation of that wish, the moment may not have appeared favourable to us; and this impression was amply justified by previous experience. In 1859 the initiative taken by Count Rechberg led to no result. It was opposed by the susceptibilities of the French Government, and awoke the distrust of the Cabinet of London. We could therefore foresee that the step of Count Beust would have a similar result, and that, while thus testifying his friendly feeling towards us, instead of advancing the question, he would retard it.

I believe that those precedents were rather calculated to improve the relations between the two countries than the actual arguments of Count Beust. At any rate, they are an answer to the observations of the Chancellor as regards the form of our communication. It points out the essential difference between what he suggested in 1867 and what we have now chosen to do. Count Beust wished to remove the restraints imposed upon Russia's liberty of action in the Black Sea, in the way laid down in the treaty—that is, by consulting the signatory Powers—while the actual declaration of the St. Petersburg Cabinet solves the question by a unilateral act.

If Count Beust will call to mind the fruitless attempts made on several occasions to assemble the European Powers for a common deliberation, to remove complications threatening the general peace—if he will remember the failure of the initiative taken by Count Rechberg in 1859, and by himself in 1867, on those clauses of the Treaty of Paris which were a permanent grievance to Russia, he will acknowledge that, the way to a European Council as well as to separate interventions being closed, no other alternative remained for us than either indefinitely to accept a position known to be intolerable, or ourselves to take the initiative, and frankly state to the co-signatories of the Treaty of 1856 how impossible it was for us any longer to consent to be bound by the limitation clause.

Our despatch of the 19th of October positively declares that our august master does not wish to raise the Eastern question, and that his Majesty

adheres to the principles which have fixed the position of Turkey in Europe. In addition, it suggests that the co-signatories should arrive at an understanding respecting the abrogation of those points the repeal of which might be deemed necessary. If, according to our advice, that understanding be arrived at on the bases which we have enunciated, so far from stimulating the aspirations of the Eastern populations, it will be the best guarantee which could be given for the peace of the East. But peace might be disturbed if the loyal appeal of Russia to the signatory Powers should be received by them in a defiant spirit, and if they should allow a difference to spring up excluding the possibility of a good understanding. In such a case the responsibility would not rest with us.

Will you, Sir, communicate these observations to Count Beust, and read to him and give him a copy of this despatch?

I hope that a more attentive examination of our communications will convince him of the perfect loyalty, and, at the same time, of the conciliatory spirit, which have dictated them. We are, I repeat, ready to join in any agreement which shall have for its object the formation of general guarantees for the consolidation of peace in the East. Such an agreement appears to us both desirable and easy, should sentiments similar to those which inspire us animate the co-signatory Powers. We rejoice to find a token that such is the case in the assurance of Count Beust that he is convinced that the events of 1856 placed Russia in the Black Sea in a situation unworthy of a great Power, and that they have assigned to her a derogatory rôle in the waters washing her shores.

The Austro-Hungarian Chancellor has a mind too practical not to understand that the tranquillity of the East cannot rest upon such a basis, and he knows too well what is due to his own country not to appreciate the feelings which have suggested to us resolves, which we have been obliged to take in the interest of our dignity.'

PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF'S ANSWER TO ENGLAND.

PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF TO BARON BRUNNOW.

'*Zarskoe Selo, le* 8 (20) *Novembre* 1870.

'M. le Baron,—M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a donné lecture et copie d'une dépêche de Lord Granville relative à nos communications du 19 (31) Octobre.

Je me suis empressé de la placer sous les yeux de sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Notre auguste maître s'est plu à y relever d'abord l'expression du désir sérieux du Cabinet de Londres d'entretenir une cordiale intelligence entre l'Angleterre et la Russie; ensuite, l'assurance qu'il ne se serait point refusé à un examen des modifications que les circonstances ont apportées dans les effets du Traité de 1856.

Quant au point de vue de drott strict établi par Lord Granville, nous ne voulons entrer dans aucune discussion, rappeler aucun précédent, ni citer aucun exemple, parcequ'un pareil débat ne conduirait pas à l'entente que nous désirons.

Notre auguste maître a dû remplir un devoir impérieux envers son pays, sans vouloir blesser ni menacer aucun des Gouvernements signataires du Traité de 1856. Au contraire, sa Majesté impériale en appelle à leurs sentiments de justice et à la conscience de leur propre dignité.

Nous regrettons de voir que Lord Granville s'attache principalement à la forme de nos communications. Elle n'a pas été de notre choix. Certes nous n'aurions pas demandé mieux que d'arriver au résultat par un accord avec les signataires du Traité de 1856. Mais le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de sa Majesté Britannique sait bien que toutes les tentatives faites à diverses reprises pour réunir les Puissances en délibérations communes, afin d'écarter les causes de complication qui troublent la paix générale, ont constamment échoué. La prolongation de la crise actuelle et l'absence d'un pouvoir régulier en France éloignent encore la possibilité d'un pareil concert. En attendant, la position faite à la Russie par ce traité est devenue de plus en plus intolérable.

Lord Granville conviendra que l'Europe d'aujourd'hui est bien loin d'être celle qui a signé l'acte de 1856. Il était impossible que la Russie consentît à rester, seule, indéfiniment liée à une transaction qui, déjà onéreuse lorsqu'elle a été conclue, perdait de jour en jour ses garanties.

Notre auguste maître a trop la conscience de ce qu'il doit à son pays pour lui imposer plus longtemps une obligation contre laquelle proteste le sentiment national.

Nous ne saurions admettre que l'abrogation d'un principe théorique sans application immédiate, qui ne fait que restituer à la Russie un droit dont aucune grande Puissance ne saurait être privée, puisse être considérée comme une menace pour la paix, ni qu'en annulant un point du Traité de 1856 elle implique l'annulation du tout.

Telle n'a jamais été la pensée du Cabinet impérial. Nos communications du 19 (31) Octobre déclarent, au contraire, de la manière la plus explicite, que sa Majesté l'Empereur maintient entièrement son adhésion aux principes généraux du Traité de 1856, et qu'elle est prête à s'entendre avec les Puissances signataires de cette transaction, soit pour les renouveler, soit pour y substituer tout autre arrangement équitable qui serait jugé propre à assurer le repos de l'Orient et l'équilibre Européen.

Rien ne semble dès-lors s'opposer à ce que le Cabinet de Londres, si cela lui convient, entre en explications avec les signataires du Traité de 1856.

Pour notre part, nous sommes prêts à nous associer à toute délibération qui aurait pour objet les garanties générales destinées à consolider la paix de l'Orient.

Nous sommes persuadés qu'elle en recevrait de nouvelles, si une cause permanente d'irritation étant écartée entre les deux Puissances les plus directement intéressées, leurs mutuelles relations se raffermissaient sur la base d'une bonne et solide intelligence.

Vous êtes invité, M. le Baron, à donner lecture et à laisser copie de cette dépêche à Lord Granville.

M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de sa Majesté Britannique vous a exprimé le regret qu'il éprouverait si cette discussion devait altérer l'accord que le Gouvernement de sa Majesté la Reine s'est efforcé de maintenir entre les deux pays.

Veuillez exprimer à son Excellence combien ce regret serait partagé par le Cabinet impérial.

Nous croyons l'accord des deux Gourvernements essentiellement utile aux deux pays, aussi bien qu'à la paix du monde. C'est avec une vive satisfaction que nous l'avions vu durant les dernières années devenir de plus en plus intime et cordial.

Les circonstances graves où nous sommes nous semblent de nature à les rendre plus désirables que jamais.—Recevez, &c.

GORTSCHAKOFF.'

LORD GRANVILLE'S REPLY TO THE SECOND NOTE OF PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR A. BUCHANAN.

'*Foreign Office, November* 28.

'Sir,—The Russian Ambassador has read and given to me a copy of a despatch of Prince Gortschakoff of the date of 8-20th November.

'It is not necessary for her Majesty's Government to recur to the important question of international law raised by the circular of Prince Gortschakoff, as they have nothing to add to the declaration on that subject which they have already made.

His Excellency has been good enough to appeal to my knowledge of facts, which his Excellency states prevented that consultation and agreement with other parties to the treaty which Russia would have preferred.

I am aware that suggestions for congresses to settle other European questions have been made and not adopted.

It has also been stated to me, that intimations have been given to some of my predecessors that, in the case of certain contingencies, which, however, have never occurred, such as the possession of the Principalities by Austria, Russia would feel bound to call in question some of the provisions of the Treaty of 1856. But I am ignorant of any occasion on which Russia, the party most interested, has proposed in any way to this country that a relaxation of the treaty should be taken into consideration.

I cannot therefore admit that the imperial Government can justify this proceeding by the failure of efforts which have never been made.

The courteous language in which Prince Gortschakoff's despatch is written, his assurance of the manner in which he would have preferred to open this question, and his declaration of the strong desire for a confirmation of good relations between the two nations, particularly important at this time, encourage her Majesty's Government in the belief that the obstacle to such relations will be removed.

They observe that his Excellency describes the declaration which has been made by Russia as an abrogation of a theoretical principle without immediate application. If these words are to be construed into an announcement that Russia has formed and stated her own opinion of her rights, but has no intention of acting in conformity with it without due concert with the other Powers, they go far to close the controversy in which the two Governments have been engaged.

Her Majesty's Government have no objection to accept the invitation which has been made by Prussia to a Conference, upon the understanding that it is assembled without any foregone conclusion as to its results. In such case her Majesty's Government will be glad to consider with perfect fairness, and the respect due to a great and friendly Power, any proposals which Russia may have to make.

You will read and give a copy of this despatch to Prince Gortschakoff. —I am, &c. GRANVILLE.'

PRUSSIAN NOTE ON THE BLACK-SEA CONFERENCE.

The following despatch was addressed by Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff, the North German Ambassador in London:

'*Versailles, December* 3, 1870.

'I have communicated to your Excellency, in my telegram of the 26th ult., the invitation which I had on that day addressed by telegraph to the Courts of Vienna, Constantinople, Florence, and St. Petersburg, requesting them to empower their representatives in London to assemble at a Conference with the representatives of the Powers which signed the Paris Treaty of Peace of the 30th of March 1856, for the purpose of considering the questions connected with the declarations made by the Russian imperial Cabinet in its circular of the 19th (31st) of October. This invitation was issued after the Cabinet of Great Britain had assured me, through Mr. Odo Russell, of its concurrence, and after I had reason to believe that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was also prepared to accept it. I can now make to your Excellency the subjoined communication respecting the reception of our proposal by the various Cabinets.

The King's Ambassador at St. Petersburg was in a position on the 27th of November to announce by telegraph the acceptance of the invitation by the imperial Russian Cabinet. The Italian Government, on the 28th of November, authorised his Majesty's Ambassador at Florence to express their readiness to take part in the Conference in London. On the 1st of December the Grand Vizier announced to our Ambassador at Constantinople that the Turkish Ambassador in London was already in possession of telegraphic instructions as to the adhesion of the Porte to the Conference in London. On the 2d inst. the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, who was at the moment at Pesth, informed our Ambassador at Vienna that the Government concurred with England on the Conference question. I beg your Excellency to inform the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of these intimations, and to express to him our satisfaction at the unanimous acceptance of the proposal for a Conference, which I may regard as settled. Your Excellency will also express to him an expectation that the Cabinet of Great Britain, at whose seat the Conference will assemble, will now take in hand the farther management of the matter, and, naming a day for the opening, will invite the representatives of the Powers to the meeting.

VON BISMARCK.'

CIRCULAR NOTE TO THE FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AGENTS ABROAD.

'*Paris, January* 12, 1871.

'Sir,—The Government has hitherto felt it right to maintain a strict reserve upon the negotiations which have been set on foot for a revision of the Treaties of 1856. That such revision, should it be necessary, belongs exclusively to the Powers which were signataries of those treaties is a truth so evident that it is needless to dwell upon it. There can be no doubt upon the point. Thus, when one of those Powers demanded a modification of the conventions which were equally binding upon all the signataries, the idea of a Conference, at which the question could be discussed, was adopted without difficulty. France had a seat in that Conference allotted to her necessarily. But could she think of occupying it at a moment when she was entirely absorbed by the defence of her territory? Such was the grave question which the Government has had to consider under the circumstances which I am about briefly to recount.

It was by a despatch, dated Tours, 11th of November, received in Paris on the 17th, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was informed, by M. de Chaudordy, of Prince Gortschakoff's circular. This intelligence was communicated to him by a telegram from our Minister at Vienna in the following terms: "The Russian Minister yesterday made a communication from which it appears that his Government considers itself as no longer bound by the stipulations of the Treaties of 1856." On the same day, November 17th, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to M. de Chaudordy, recommending the strictest reserve. We had up to that time received no official communication, and we were bound to confine ourselves to a policy of observation, without omitting to maintain on all occasions our formal right to take part in a resolution which, without our participation, would be absolutely devoid of value. Europe could not entertain any other view; and in the conversations and notes which have been interchanged between the various Powers and ourselves, it has always been understood that France was necessary to the deliberation, and that she ought to be invited to join.

I should hold myself guilty of an unpardonable indiscretion, if I were now to reveal the details of these *pourparlers*. Our effort has been to take advantage of the friendly dispositions manifested towards us, and to bring the representatives of the Powers to acknowledge that, without detracting from the extreme importance which the discussion of the Treaties of 1856 would have for us, yet we were bound upon entering the Conference to introduce another discussion of a most important character, which on no account could be met by a plea of incompetency. However, it must be admitted that, while fully sharing this view, the Delegation at Tours has always been of opinion that we should accept the invitation of Europe, if it should be addressed to us. Summing up this opinion, M. de Chaudordy wrote in his despatch of the 10th of December, "The Delegation is of opinion, after having examined with me all the despatches, that we should join the Conference, even without previous promise or subsequent armistice."

The opinion of the members of the Delegation has never changed. M. Gambetta strongly expresses it in his last despatches of the 31st December 1870 to the 3d January 1871. Addressing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he writes, "You must be on the point of quitting Paris to repair to the Conference at London, if, as I am assured, England has succeeded in obtaining a safe-conduct for you. I can imagine the pangs which you will experience in leaving Paris and our colleagues. I can hear the expression of your grief and your refusal at first; and yet I must tell you in the interests of our cause it must be so." Before M. Gambetta had written these lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, following, as well as the imperfections and the delays in communication allowed him to do, the negotiations entered upon at Tours, and continued afterwards at Bordeaux, had intimated to M. de Chaudordy that the Government had decided that, if regularly invited, France would send a representative to the Conference at London; but on condition that England, who had sent a verbal invitation, would undertake to obtain the necessary safe-conduct for our representative, if selected from the statesmen in Paris.

This arrangement was accepted by the English Cabinet. M. de Chaudordy informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of it in a despatch, dated Bordeaux, December 26th, 1870, received on the 8th of January. He informed him at the same time that the Delegation of the Government had selected him as the fitting representative of France at the Conference. This communication was confirmed by the following letter written by Lord Granville on the 29th of December, and transmitted to us on the 10th of the present month through the United States Minister:

LORD GRANVILLE TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT PARIS.

"*London, December* 29, 1870.

"Monsieur le Ministre,—M. de Chaudordy has informed Lord Lyons that your Excellency was proposed to represent France at the Conference which it has been agreed to hold in London concerning the neutralisation of the Black Sea; and he has at the same time requested me to obtain a safe-conduct which will enable your Excellency to pass through the Prussian lines. I immediately requested Count Bernstorff to apply for the safe-conduct, and to transmit it to your Excellency by a German officer dispatched with a flag of truce. M. de Bernstorff yesterday informed me that a safe-conduct would be placed at your Excellency's disposition whenever it should be applied for by an officer sent from Paris to the German head-quarters, seeing that satisfaction had not been given for the officer bearing a flag of truce upon whom the French had fired. I have been informed by M. Tissot that much time would elapse before this information could be transmitted to you by the Delegation at Bordeaux, and I have consequently suggested to Count Bernstorff another means by which it could reach you, by taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States to acquaint you with what has passed. It had been agreed that the Conference shall assemble this week; but in order to afford time for the arrival of the French Plenipotentiary, the day of meeting has been fixed for the 3d of January. I trust that your Excellency will authorise M. Tissot to represent you at the first meeting, at which I will place upon the order of the day only questions of form; and if your Excellency is in a position to inform me of your arrival, I would propose to adjourn the Conference for a week to obtain the valuable advantage of your experience. I trust that your Excellency will permit me to take the opportunity of expressing my gratification at entering upon personal relations with yourself, and the pleasure I shall have in seeing you in London.

I have the honour, &c. GRANVILLE."

Being summoned by this despatch, the Government could not, without abdicating the rights of France, reject the invitation received. Undoubtedly it might be objected, that the moment is not favourable for France to discuss the neutrality of the Black Sea. But it is precisely because at this supreme moment France is fighting for honour and existence that the official proposition made the French Republic by the European Cabinets acquires an exceptional importance. It is a tardy tribute to justice, a promise which cannot be withdrawn. It consecrates with the authority of public law the change of government in this country, and brings upon a stage where the destinies of the world are being discussed this free nation, free despite her wounds, free at last from the Chief who plunged her into peril, and of the pretenders who thought her an easy prey. Besides, who does not feel that, once permitted to face the representatives of Europe, France has an incontestable right to lift up her voice? Who can arrest her when, relying upon the eternal laws of justice, she will defend the principles which guarantee her independence and her dignity? She will abandon nothing which we have maintained. Our programme is unchanged; and Europe, who invites those who framed it, knows well that they are bound and are prepared to maintain it. There was no room, therefore, for hesitation, and the Government would have committed a grave fault in rejecting the overture made."

But while recognising that fact, the Government thought, with myself, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not, without some reason of paramount importance, quit Paris in the midst of a bombardment which the enemy is directing upon our city. For a week past, suddenly, without warning to the inoffensive inhabitants and neutrals, the Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian army showers his murderous projectiles upon our buildings. It seems that he selects in preference our hospitals, our schools, our churches, our benevolent institutions. Women are killed in their beds, children in the arms of their parents, or under the eyes of their teachers. Yesterday we accompanied to their last resting places five little coffins of young pupils crushed under the weight of a shell weighing 200lb. The church, where their remains were blessed by the priest and watered by the tears of their parents, testified by its walls, shattered even at night, to the fury of the assailants. I know not how long these inhuman measures will continue. Useless for the purposes of attack, they are only acts of depredation and murder meant to excite terror.

Our brave population of Paris feels its courage increase with the danger. Firm, irritated, resolute, it is indignant and does not bend. It means more than ever to fight and conquer, and we mean it also. I cannot think of separating myself from it at this crisis. Perhaps our protests addressed to Europe, the protest of the Ambassadors present in Paris, will soon put an end to it. Till then England will understand that my place is in the midst of my fellow-citizens. This is what I explained to the Foreign Minister of Great Britain in the reply which is subjoined, and which fitly closes this statement:

"*Paris, January* 10.

"M. le Comte,—I received only to-day, the 10th of January, at 9 P.M., through the Minister of the United States, the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour of writing to me, dated the 20th of December 1870, whereby I am informed that you have requested Count Bernstorff to place at my disposal the safe-conduct necessary for my passing through the Prussian lines, and attending, as

representative of France, the Conference which is to be opened at London. I thank your Excellency for this communication, and for the kindness shown me in facilitating the accomplishment of the duty imposed on me. It is, however, difficult for me to depart immediately from Paris, which for eight days has been given up to the horrors of a bombardment carried on against its inoffensive population, without the warning which is usual according to the law of nations. I do not feel it right to abandon my fellow-citizens at the moment when they are victims of this violence.

Moreover, the communications between Paris and London are, by the act of the Commander-in-chief of the besieging army, so slow and uncertain, that I cannot, notwithstanding my good wishes, reply to your appeal in the terms of your despatch. You kindly informed me that the Conference would meet on the 3d of January, and would then probably adjourn for a week. Apprised of this on the evening of the 10th, I could not profit by your invitation in proper time.

Moreover, Count Bismarck, although allowing the letter to reach me, has not accompanied it with a safe-conduct, which is yet indispensable. He requests that a French officer should repair to the Prussian head-quarters to ask for the safe-conduct. To account for this demand he refers to complaints which he addressed to the Governor of Paris on the occasion of an incident reported by a *parlementaire* on the 23d of December; and he adds that, until satisfaction has been given him, the Prussian Commander-in-chief forbids any communication by *parlementaires*. I do not inquire whether such a resolution, contrary to the laws of war, would not be the absolute negation of superior rights which necessity and humanity have always maintained for the benefit of belligerents. I content myself with remarking, that the Governor of Paris promptly ordered an inquiry, and in announcing this to Count Bismarck brought to his knowledge acts of the same kind, much more numerous, of which Prussian sentinels had been guilty—acts which we had never thought of making a pretext for interrupting ordinary relations. Count Bismarck seems to have admitted, at least partially, the justice of these observations; for this very day he charged the United States Ambassador to inform me that, pending further inquiries, he reëstablishes relations by *parlementaires*.

There is no necessity, then, for a French officer to repair to the Prussian head-quarters, and I am about to enter into communication with the United States Ambassador in order to obtain the safe-conduct which you have kindly procured. As soon as I have this document in my hands, and the situation of Paris permits, I shall proceed to London, sure of not invoking in vain the principles of right and morality which Europe has so great an interest in causing to be respected.—Accept, &c. JULES FAVRE."

I beg you, Sir, to bring this despatch to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited. It is fit that Europe should be enlightened on our intentions and our acts; it is to her equity that we submit them.—Accept, &c. The Minister of Foreign Affairs,

JULES FAVRE.'

IV.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO BRITISH NEUTRALITY.

MUNITIONS OF WAR.

In the beginning of August the following Circular was addressed to her British Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular representatives in Germany:

'*Foreign Office, August* 11, 1870.

'Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much regret, that an impression exists in Germany that Great Britain is deviating from the attitude of neutrality which she has announced her resolution to observe, by giving France facilities for obtaining certain articles useful to her for war purposes, such as munitions of war, horses, and coal, while such facilities are not accorded in an equal degree to the allied German States.

It is not unnatural that, in a moment of excitement like the present, the German people should be more than ordinarily sensitive in watching the attitude of nations which are taking no part in the struggle; and it cannot be wondered at that they should for a time accept as facts unfounded rumours, and that they should somewhat hastily condemn, as breaches of neutrality, proceedings which, at a calmer season, they would not hesitate to pronounce, with that impartiality of judgment for which they are distinguished, to be strictly in accordance with the usages of international law and comity.

Her Majesty's Government lost no time, after the declarations of war had been exchanged, in announcing the determination of Great Britain to maintain a position of neutrality between the contending parties; and this position has been hitherto faithfully observed. It is not true that any facilities have been given, or any restrictions imposed, which are not equally applicable to both belligerents.

The steps taken by her Majesty's Government have been strictly in accordance with precedent, and with the principles by which neutral nations, including Prussia herself, have been guided in recent wars. But it now appears to be wished that Great Britain should go farther, and that she should not only enjoin upon British subjects the obligations of neutrality, but that she should take it upon herself to enforce those obligations in a manner and to an extent wholly unusual. It is demanded that she should not only forbid, but absolutely prevent, the exportation of articles contraband of war;

that is to say, that she should decide herself what articles are to be considered as contraband of war, and that she should keep such a watch upon her ports as to make it impossible for such articles to be exported from them.

It requires but little consideration to be convinced that this is a task which a neutral Power can hardly be called upon to perform. Different nations take different views at different times as to what articles are to be ranked as contraband of war, and no general decision has been come to on the subject. Strong remonstrances, for instance, are made against the export of coal to France; but it has been held by Prussian authors of high reputation that coal is not contraband, and that no one Power, either neutral or belligerent, can pronounce it to be so. But even if this point were clearly defined, it is beyond dispute that the contraband character would depend upon the destination. The neutral Power could hardly be called upon to prevent the exportation of such cargoes to a neutral port; and if this be the case, how could it be decided, at the time of departure of a vessel, whether the alleged neutral destination were real or colourable? The question of the destination of the cargo must be decided in the Prize Court of a belligerent, and Prussia could hardly seriously propose to hold the British Government responsible whenever a British ship, carrying a contraband cargo, should be captured while attempting to enter a French port.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that, when the present excitement has subsided, the German nation will give them credit for having honestly acted up to the duties of neutrality to the best of their power; and they are confirmed in this conviction by the recollection that, when Prussia was in the same position as that in which Great Britain now finds herself, her line of conduct was similar, and she found herself equally unable to enforce upon her subjects stringent obligations against the exportation even of unquestionable munitions of war.

During the Crimean War, arms and munitions were freely exported from Prussia to Russia, and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian Government prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign States.

Reflection upon these points may make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position now occupied by her Majesty's Government.

As regards the export from this country of horses and ammunition, it appears, from the latest tables which have been obtained from the British Customs, that the number of horses exported during the months of July and August to Germany and Belgium is approximately 413, and to France 583. As regards the amount of munitions of war exported during the same period, it appears from the official reports that none at all have been exported to France; and only the following exports have been made to German, Belgian, and Dutch ports: To Belgium, ordnance stores, &c. to the value of 369*l.*; shot-lead, or iron, 1 cwt.; to Hamburg, shot-lead, or iron, 5 cwt.; to Holland, shot-lead, or iron, 32 cwt.

It is not irrelevant to this matter to quote the views recently expressed to a foreign Minister at Washington by the Secretary of State of the United States, respecting the duties of neutrals in regard to trade in articles contraband of war. He is reported to have said, that arms and ammunition had

always been considered to be articles of legitimate commerce by neutrals during war, and that the United States claimed the right to supply them to all belligerents without distinction; adding, that during the Civil War in America quantities of these articles had been brought from England, France, and Belgium.

'It may be well also to observe that the Belgian Government, though by a recent decree it has provisionally prohibited the transit and exportation of arms and munitions of war, excepts from this prohibition articles which can be clearly shown to be destined for a neutral Government, and reserves formally the right of free exportation for the future.—I am, with great truth, your most obedient, humble servant, GRANVILLE.'

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BERNSTORFF TO EARL GRANVILLE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1870.

'*Prussia House, August* 30, 1870.

'It would be waste of time at the present crisis to enter upon an exhaustive juridical examination of the existing neutrality laws and their ultimate bearing and scope. It is not too late, however, to glance in a practical manner at a question which every hour may cause fresh and momentous complications, especially as affecting national susceptibilities.

In the first instance, there is no question that France has wantonly made war on Germany. The verdict of the world, and especially the verdict of the statesmen as well as of the public of England, has unanimously pronounced the Emperor of the French guilty of a most flagitious breach of the peace. Germany, on the other hand, entered into the contest with the consciousness of a good cause. She was therefore led to expect that the neutrality of Great Britain, her former ally against Napoleonic aggression, however strict in form, would at least be benevolent in spirit to Germany; for it is impossible for the human mind not to side with one or the other party in a conflict like the present one. What is the use of being right or wrong in the eyes of the world, if the public remains insensible to the merits of a cause? Those who deny the necessity of such a distinction forego the appeal to public opinion, which we are daily taught to consider as the foremost of the great Powers.

In examining from this point of view whether the neutrality of Great Britain has been practically benevolent as regards Germany, it is best to reverse the question and to put it in this shape: If Germany had been the aggressor, and consequently condemned by public opinion, in what way could the Government and the people of the United Kingdom have been able to avoid taking an active part in the struggle, and, at the same time, to prove to France their benevolent intentions? Being short of coal, the French would have been allowed to find here all they needed for their naval expeditions. Their preparations for war not being so far advanced and not so complete as they first thought, the French would have found the manufacturers of arms and ammunition in this country ready to supply them with, and the British Government willing not to prevent their obtaining here, all

the material they wanted. This, we think, would have been the utmost aid which Great Britain could have granted to France, without transgressing the letter of the existing neutrality laws, had the parts of aggressor and attacked, of right and wrong, been the reverse of the present condition.

In the face of the continuous export of arms, ammunition, coal, and other war material from this country to France; in the face of facts openly made a boast of by the French Minister of War, and not denied by the British Government, it is not necessary to prove that the neutrality of Great Britain, far from being impartial towards that party which has been pronounced to be in the right, is, on the contrary, such as it might possibly have been if that party had been wrong in the eyes of the British people and Government. When defending the new Foreign Enlistment Act in Parliament, the representatives of the Government declared that the law empowered the Executive to prevent the export of contraband of war; but that in order to make it effectual towards the belligerents, it ought to be generally enforced, and would thus even affect the commerce of this country with other neutrals. This statement, however, cannot be admitted; for there is no necessity to hamper the trade with neutral countries by preventing the exportation of contraband of war to the belligerents. Had the Government declared such exportation to the belligerents to be illegal, it would have remained an exception, subject to penalty if detected. The *bonâ fide* trade with neutrals would not in the least have been affected thereby.

But the Government, far from doing this, refused even to accept such propositions as might have prevented direct or clandestine exportation of contraband of war to France; besides, it cannot be admitted that such prohibitive measures could in reality damage the regular and lawful trade of the English people at large. They would merely prevent some rapacious individuals from disregarding the verdict of the nation, and realising enormous profits which never would have legitimately been made under ordinary circumstances. The rapid increase of the private fortunes of a few tradesmen by such ventures could not appreciably add to the national wealth of the country. But, on the other hand, the nation will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed through the agency of those individuals. It will be said that the war would have ended sooner, and that less German soldiers would have been killed and wounded, had not the people and Government of England permitted such abuses.

It hardly could be seriously meant to say that the Germans are at liberty to bring each case before their Prize Courts; for it would be out of place thus to taunt Germany with not being mistress of the seas. The question is, whether England may escape the just reproach on the part of Germany of having greatly increased the advantage France already possesses at sea, by fitting out her navy with the requisite material to attack the seaboards of Germany and annihilate its commerce, as well as of arming the French Garde Mobile with English breech-loaders, to be used against the German soldiers in the field.

England will thus be accused of feeding a war which would have ended sooner, had France been left dependent on her own resources. Hence the policy of the British Government, notwithstanding the verdict of public opinion in this country in favour of the German cause, is, if not intentionally, at least practically, benevolent to France, without there being any real

foundation for the excuse that the commercial interests of this country would be seriously affected by a different course.

There is still another reason put forward by the British Government in reference to their line of action. It is, the allusion to Prussian neutrality during the Crimean war. Germany is told to consider that, at that time, "arms and ammunition were freely exported from Prussia to Russia; and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian Government prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign States." Lord Granville says, in his circular of the 11th inst., "that reflection upon these points may make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position now occcupied by her Majesty's Government."

All who recollect the political aspect of that time will admit that there is no real analogy between the two cases. At the period alluded to, public opinion in Germany was very doubtful as to the wisdom of helping a Napoleon to become once more the arbiter of Europe. Besides, it was not a struggle for life and death between two nations equally matched; but it was a war waged in remote regions for remote interests by four Powers against one, without the national existence of England being the least endangered. Had England alone been the enemy of Russia, the comparison of the two cases would be less wanting in point.

However, it will be remembered how strongly Great Britain remonstrated at the time against the alleged wrong of Prussia. There is but one possible alternative. Either the complaints of the British Government were founded, or they were not. If they really were, how can it be maintained at present that the complaints of Germany are unfounded, should even the great difference of the two cases be entirely disregarded? By declaring the present grievances of Germany devoid of foundation, the British Government disavow implicitly the bitter charges they preferred at the time, and condemn the ill-feeling created by them, and partly entertained ever since in this country against Prussia. It is absolutely impossible to conciliate, with any show of reason and logic, defending the justice of those charges on one side, and refusing on the other to acknowledge the present grievances of Germany to be well-founded.

This being true, there is but one motive which might be alleged as an excuse for the present policy of the British Government towards Germany. That is, to apply the principle of retaliation for an alleged wrong done a long time ago, under circumstances completely different from the present situation in every possible respect. To establish in our times such a principle as a rule for the policy of a great nation, would be too inconsistent with the general feeling and moral disposition of this country to admit of its being the intention of the British Government.

Should the position now occupied by the British Government in regard to Germany, notwithstanding the admitted justice of her cause, continue to be maintained, it would be difficult, even for the stanchest advocate of friendship between England and Germany, to persuade the German nation that they had been fairly dealt by.'

EARL GRANVILLE TO COUNT BERNSTORFF.

'*Foreign Office, September* 15, 1870.

'M. l'Ambassadeur,—I have the honour to assure your Excellency that her Majesty's Government have not failed to consider most carefully the arguments contained in the Memorandum which you did me the honour to place in my hands on the 1st inst., and have studied them the more attentively as they contain matter which has not hitherto been imported into discussions upon the duties of neutrals.

The two principal positions assumed by your Excellency are, first, that the attitude of Great Britain towards Prussia in the present war should be that of a "benevolent neutrality;" and, secondly, that there is no analogy between the course adopted by Prussia when Great Britain was at war with Russia and that adopted by Great Britain now that Prussia is at war with France.

In examining these propositions, her Majesty's Government are relieved from the necessity of entering at present into the question whether Great Britain is honestly fulfilling her duties as a neutral. The point raised by you goes far beyond this. It amounts to a demand that her neutrality should be, both in spirit and in practice, benevolent towards Prussia, and consequently, as it would seem, unfavourable towards France.

Upon the declaration of hostilities, her Majesty's Government publicly declared that they were desirous of maintaining their good relations with, and tendering their good offices to, both the belligerents, as far as was consistent with perfect neutrality. But the idea of a "benevolent neutrality," as explained by your Excellency, is new, and it consequently becomes necessary to consider what is its meaning, and what would be its practical effect.

It is obvious that your Excellency cannot intend to lay down a principle applicable only to the present war; rules of international law cannot be confined to individual or exceptional cases; and this principle, if accepted, can only be so as a principle of international law, and, as such, susceptible of general application. Thus applied, then, its effect would be as follows: that on the outbreak of a war between two nations, it would be the duty of each neutral to ascertain which belligerent was favoured by the public opinion of its subjects, and to assume an attitude of neutrality benevolent towards that belligerent. But such neutrality should not, as I gather from your Excellency's Memorandum, be confined to sympathy, but should be exhibited in practice—that is to say, the measures adopted by each neutral should be favourable to one belligerent and proportionately unfavourable to the other. It seems hardly possible to push the examination farther without finding ourselves met by insuperable difficulties. Where could the line be drawn between a departure from the usual practice, in order to confer material advantages on one belligerent State to the exclusion of the other, and a participation in hostilities? The sympathies of nations, as of individuals, are not invariably influenced by abstract considerations of right or wrong, but are swayed by material interests and other causes. Neutrals would probably, therefore, be found ranged on different sides. What would be the

material relations of such neutrals? what their relations with the belligerent to whom they were opposed? It seems hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departs from strict impartiality, runs the risk of altering its essence, and that the moment a neutral allows his proceedings to be biased by predilection for one of two belligerents, he ceases to be a neutral. The idea, therefore, of benevolent neutrality can mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.

Passing to the second proposition laid down by your Excellency, that there is no real analogy between the conduct of Prussia in the Crimean war and that of Great Britain in the present war, I find that this proposition is mainly rested on the ground that Great Britain in the former war was not fighting single-handed, and that public opinion in Germany was not enlisted in favour of the cause for which she was contending. These two reasons may be brought under the same head, as both can only be adduced with any weight in justification of a position of benevolent neutrality; but, as this justification was not preferred at the time by Prussian statesmen in discussing this question, it will be useful to consider what was the attitude of Prussia during the war waged by Great Britain and her allies against Russia, and what were the motives alleged at the time for her assuming that attitude.

During the whole of the war arms and other contraband of war were copiously supplied to Russia by the States of the Zollverein; regular agents for traffic were established at Berlin, Magdeburg, Thorn, Königsberg, Posen, Bromberg, and other places, and no restraint was put upon their operations. But besides this, although a decree was published in March 1854, prohibiting the transit of arms from other countries, and a farther decree in March 1855, prohibiting also the transit of other contraband of war, the transit trade from Belgium continued in full activity throughout the war. The Prussian Government, when this state of things was brought to its notice affirmed, not that it was justified in permitting these exports on the principle of "benevolent neutrality," but that it could not interfere with the course of trade; an answer which would seem to have been based rather on the principle that the first duty of Prussia, as a neutral, was to consider the interests of her own subjects, not those of the subjects of a country which had engaged itself in a war with which Prussia had no concern.

Such was the attitude of Prussia at that time, and such her justification of that attitude. In what point does the analogy fail? Prussia was neutral then, as Great Britain is now. Your Excellency alludes to the magnitude of the respective wars. A war in which the energies of five European Powers were taxed to the utmost can perhaps hardly be justly described as a war waged in remote regions for remote interests; but this point seems scarcely worthy of contention. Your Excellency can hardly mean to say that principles of this importance are to be decided on questions of degree. If no weightier objection than this can be adduced, the analogy would appear to be complete.

I now come to the dilemma in which your Excellency would place her Majesty's Government. You observe that Great Britain remonstrated strongly against the state of things above described; and you add, that either those remonstrances were founded, or they were not. If founded, how, you ask, can the present complaints of Germany be held to be unfounded?

Her Majesty's Government do not complain of the Prussian Government making an effort to alter a state of things which they conceive to be at this moment disadvantageous to them; but her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the answers which the Prussian Government made during the Crimean war more than justify the reply which, to my great regret, I have been obliged on several occasions to make, and now again to repeat, to your Excellency. The nature of those answers will be seen on referring to the correspondence which passed at the time between the two Governments, which shows also the nature of the remonstrances addressed to Prussia by Great Britain. On ascertaining that the Prussian Government did not mean to restrict the export of arms or contraband of war of native origin, but intended to prohibit the transit of such articles, her Majesty's Government consulted the legal advisers of the Crown as to the extent to which they would be justified in making representations founded on their rights as belligerents. The answer was clear—that her Majesty's Government would be entitled to remonstrate only in the event of violation of Prussian law; and it will be found on reference to the correspondence, that, though the large direct exportations from the States of the Zollverein certainly formed occasionally the subject of representations and discussions, the strong remonstrances to which your Excellency alludes were, with few exceptions, made on the subject of the continuous violation of the injunctions of the decrees forbidding the transit of arms; which violation was so systematic, that in only one case, of the stoppage at Aix-la-Chapelle of some revolvers concealed in bales of cotton, were the Customs authorities successful in interposing a check on it. It is true, that remonstrances were made on the receipt of a report, to which a full and complete contradiction was given, that rifles belonging to the Prussian Government had been sold to Russia, and of a report that wagons loaded with gunpowder had been escorted to the frontier by Prussian police: but the distinction is obvious between these cases and cases affecting private individuals.

I would, therefore, venture to remark that your Excellency's dilemma is more apparent than real. The course of Great Britain then and now is perfectly consistent. As she then remonstrated against infractions of Prussian law, so she now admits the justice of remonstrances against infractions of British law, such as storeships, enlistments, and others; and any cases of such infraction which your Excellency may bring under my notice shall receive the most prompt attention.

Your Excellency now requires alterations of practice and the creation of restrictions on trade in a sense favourable to Prussian interests. In face of these demands, I would put to your Excellency this question: "When did Prussia renounce the principles on which she acted in 1854 and 1855, to which she adhered, so far as I am aware, when she again occupied the position of a neutral in the war waged by Austria with France and Italy in 1859, and in the war between the Northern and Southern States of America, and to which she has formally given her sanction in the treaties with the United States of 1799 and 1828?"

So far I have confined my reply to the examination of what may appear to me to be the novel elements in your Excellency's arguments; but it now becomes my duty to address myself to the consideration of the statement made, that the policy of her Majesty's Government has been practically be-

nevolent to France, and that the British nation, which has not prevented the export to France of contraband of war and supplies useful for warlike purposes, will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed.

I am glad to observe that your Excellency acquits her Majesty's Government of adopting intentionally such a policy as you describe; and I have consequently only to deal with the practical point of view which brings me to consider the following question: Did Great Britain, when she found herself in the position of a neutral in face of a sudden and unexpected war, adopt an unusual policy and one unwarranted by precedent? Was her attitude in any way exceptional? There can be but one answer to this question. She adopted the course for which she had the clearest and most unbroken precedent and authority, foreign as well as British; and which Prussia herself, as I have shown above, has invariably adopted in similar cases.

I am ready to admit to the fullest extent the difficulty of defining the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutrals, and I fully recognise that the present feeling of the German nation is, under the circumstances, not unnatural. I could not deny it, considering the feelings which we ourselves entertained in times of great excitement; but I do not for a moment doubt that Germany will, at a calmer season, readily admit that, even if it had been desirable, this country could not have been expected, without general consent, to have altered the hitherto received rules by which the duties of neutrals have been defined and regulated. Both belligerents entered on the war with a full knowledge of the rules of international law, and of what has been the almost uniform practice of neutrals; and each belligerent had consequently a right to expect that the existing rules and former practice would be maintained, and might with reason have complained if any change had been made.

It must be remembered that obligations upon neutrals have become more strict with the progress of civilisation; but the present question is one which was not raised or discussed at the Congress of Paris of 1856; and the Royal Commission, composed of some of the most eminent jurisconsults in this country, who inquired into the neutrality laws in 1867, decided that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic.

Your Excellency, turning from generality to details, has made certain specific demands as to the course which Great Britain should pursue. I think it right, therefore, to lay before you some considerations with reference to these demands, which may convince you of the difficulty, if not impracticability, of acceding to them.

You demand that the export to France of arms, ammunition, coal, and other contraband of war should be prevented; and you observe that her Majesty's Government have declared that the law empowered the Executive to take this step.

There is no doubt that the Executive has, under the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, the legal power to prohibit the export of contraband of war; but the highest authority can be adduced to show that such exportation is not forbidden by our municipal law; and it has not been the practice to prohibit it except when the interests of this country, as in the case of self-defence, are directly and immediately concerned in the prohibition; and even in some of these cases, such as the Crimean war, considerable doubts arose during its continuance whether the prohibition, when actually at-

tempted to be enforced, was as disadvantageous to the enemy as it was inconvenient to ourselves.

Such, then, being the state of the case as regards existing practice, I would venture to ask your Excellency's serious attention to the following specimens of the difficulties which would, at the outset, have to be met in an attempt to alter existing practice.

The export of arms and contraband of war may be open or clandestine. Her Majesty's Government, though they regret it, do not for a moment deny that there is at present a certain exportation of arms to France; but this exportation is open and undisguised. Since the dispatch of my note of the 9th inst. fuller Customs returns have been received, from which it appears that in the week immediately following the declaration of war 11,000 rifles were shipped to France. None are known to have been shipped since, with the exception of the 4,512 taken by the Fannie from Southampton on the 6th inst.; but it is possible that farther purchases have been made by French agents, though, from the reports received as to the number in the market and the state of the gun trade, it is certain that the purchases must have been very limited. But whatever the amount, there has been no secrecy in the export, and the returns of every rifle shipped are as well known to your Excellency as to her Majesty's Government. Exportations, if prohibited, would be entirely clandestine; the nature of a cargo and the destination of a vessel would be equally concealed. It would be necessary to alter the present system of exportation under which (except in the port of London) cargoes, in order to insure rapidity of shipment, are not examined by the Customs authorities, who receive the account of them from the shippers, generally after the ship has sailed. It would require the establishment of an expensive, intricate, and inquisitorial Customs system, under which all suspicious packages, no matter what their assumed destination, would be opened and examined. Finally, though it may certainly diminish the profits of certain merchants with whose proceedings her Majesty's Government, in common with your Excellency, have no sympathy, it would also cause infinite delay and obstruction to innocent trade.

Your Excellency would not interfere with the trade to neutral countries; but how would it be possible to avoid this? A ship carrying prohibited articles would invariably have a colourable neutral destination. How is this to be detected without interfering with the trade with neutrals, if even then? During the Crimean war Prussia had no such difficulty. There could be no doubt of the destination of goods arriving on the Russian frontier; and yet the Customs authorities were practically powerless. But Great Britain has no frontier; a ship leaving her ports may shape her course where she pleases. Your Excellency has suggested the exaction of a bond from shippers; but such a measure would be most onerous to the mercantile community, would be easily evaded, and at the best would be no security against ultimate destination. It would be necessary, too, to take these bonds, not only from foreign-bound ships, but from coasting vessels, which are at present subject to little or no Customs supervision; for what could hinder a coasting vessel from crossing the Channel and delivering her cargo at a French port?

Again, your Excellency includes coal among the articles to be prohibited, on the ground that coal is more useful to France than to Germany during

the present war. This raises the question of the prohibition of all articles, not contraband of war, which might be of service to a belligerent. But if this principle were admitted, where is it to stop? In the American war no cargoes would have been more useful to the Southern States than cloth, leather, and quinine. It would be difficult for a neutral, and obviously inadmissible for a belligerent, to draw the line.

It must be remembered, too, that the features of the war may change. Articles invaluable to a belligerent at one period may be valueless at another, and *vice versâ*. Is the neutral to watch the shifting phases, and vary his restrictions in accordance with them?

Again, the 11th article of the Treaty of Commerce between this country and France expressly provides that the contracting parties shall not prohibit the exportation of coal. Can this solemn treaty stipulation be lightly disregarded as long as we remain neutral?

I have pointed out these difficulties to your Excellency, as the consideration of them may tend to efface the impression that Great Britain has hastily and inconsiderately, or upon grounds of a narrow selfishness, refused to accede to your demands; and I need hardly assure you, that at the outbreak of hostilities her Majesty's Government were actuated in the course adopted by them by no feeling of hostility towards a nation with which Great Britain has always been on terms of intimate friendship, and by no unworthy motive of retaliation for past conduct; but by the honest desire to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, in accordance with precedent and in conformity with the law of nations.

I trust that I have shown that our conduct has been of the nature indicated. I have shown that we have conformed to existing practice, and I have pointed out the difficulties standing in the way of the alteration of existing practice. I have alluded to the difficulties which the Prussian Government encountered when placed in a position analogous to that now occupied by Great Britain, and I have shown that these difficulties were chiefly owing to their having so far departed from existing practice as to prohibit the transit trade; a concession which gave Great Britain a standing ground for complaint which she would not otherwise have possessed, and which, notwithstanding, was powerless in its results. I have also fully recognised that the sensitiveness of the Prussian people and the complaints of the Government are natural.

Her Majesty's Government fear that no means could be devised for securing at this moment a calm discussion of the subject. They by no means desire to claim exceptional rights for this country. They would be prepared to enter into consultation with other nations as to the possibility of adopting in common a stricter rule, although their expectations of a practical result in the sense indicated by the North German Government are not sanguine.

We took the course which appeared to be according to the dictates of practice and precedent, at a time when it was impossible to know how the fortune of war would turn. Since then France, notwithstanding the display of her usual courage and gallantry, has met with nothing but reverses. Germany has, on the other hand, given extraordinary proofs of her military ability and power, accompanied, as it has been, by continuous success. Your Excellency, as the representative of a great and chivalrous nation, must agree with me that it would not be possible that we should now change the policy

which we declared to our Parliament to be usual, just, and expedient, because it was stated by the victorious belligerent to be in some degree favourable to the defeated enemy.—I am, &c. GRANVILLE.'

COUNT BERNSTORFF TO LORD GRANVILLE.

'*Prussia House, October* 8, 1870.

'My Lord,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th ult. in reply to my Memorandum of the 30th August concerning British neutrality. I have left it unanswered for a time, because for the moment hopes of peace appeared to offer, and as I should have much preferred to discontinue the controversy altogether. These hopes having, however, I sincerely regret, disappeared for the present, I cannot but reply to your Excellency's note.

Before entering upon its contents, I ask your Excellency's permission to say a few words regarding the form and origin of this correspondence.

The Memorandum of the 30th of August, which I had the honour to transmit to your Excellency with a private letter of the 31st of the same month, was originally not intended for publicity, as may easily be perceived by some of its passages. I afterwards, indeed, acceded to your Excellency's wish to deal with it officially, and will therefore not complain of your Excellency's having immediately caused your reply to be published by the press simultaneously with my memorandum, before I had been allowed time to remove certain evident misconceptions, and hence before the correspondence could be regarded as closed.

The circumstances under which the Memorandum was written were as follows:

My verbal and written remonstrances on account of the direct supply of the French fleet with coals, and on account of the export of arms and ammunition to France, had remained without any practical result.

Your Excellency had, it is true, promised that as soon as I could adduce proofs of a certain vessel being hired by or for the French Government, in order to be used as a storeship in its service, the case should receive consideration. Notwithstanding this promise, your Excellency declined acceding to my request of the 19th of August to proceed against the vessels Hypathia and Norseman, merely on the ground that these vessels had sailed before the Foreign Enlistment Act had come into operation. The two other points, however, proved by undeniable evidence—namely, that both vessels had sailed under the British flag after conclusion of the sale, and that, even up to the 8th ult., the transfer of the property to the French owners had not been entered on the ships' books, while the sale had taken place about the middle of the month of July—have been passed over in silence by your Excellency, although the twofold violation of the international law and of the English law had been clearly established.

The notes in which I had submitted to your Excellency several cases which had become known of contemplated or already accomplished open and clandestine consignments of arms and ammunition to France, in order to

afford an opportunity to her Britannic Majesty's Government of preventing them, or obviating the farther extension of the mischief, met with the same fate. Your Excellency had assured me, in the replies to my communications on the subject, that they should be taken into immediate consideration, or that inquiries should be made at once. But none of your Excellency's notes contained a positive statement to the effect that her Britannic Majesty's Government regarded the traffic in contraband of war compatible with their neutrality, and that they could not interfere. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly left to me to search after particular cases with the means at my disposal in order to bring them under the notice of her Majesty's Government.

I should have been glad, indeed, if your Excellency had, by a categorical official declaration, placed me in a position to release the consular agents of the North German Confederation in the United Kingdom from the laborious and unpleasant task of controlling this illegitimate traffic.

Your Excellency will especially please to recollect, that subsequent to the indiscretion of Count Palikao, which created a great sensation, not only in Germany, but also in this country, your Excellency, far from declaring the dispatch of 40,000 breech-loaders for the French army to be compatible with strict neutrality, stated that it would be impossible to interfere unless I adduced positive proofs that these consignments had really been made; at least, your Excellency's notes of the 25th and 26th of August, in reply to my note of the 25th, justified such conclusion on my part; for, in the first note your Excellency expressed the apprehension that my communications, not containing more precise statements of the name of the ship having on board part of the arms in question, and of the particular place in the river where the vessel was lying, the inquiry would be difficult; and in the second note your Excellency informed me that the investigations had remained without result.

After waiting in vain for the promulgation of an "Order in Council," or for any official announcement on the part of her Britannic Majesty's Government, or for instructions to the police, customs, and harbour authorities of the United Kingdom, but having meanwhile ascertained, by means of reliable communications, that the consignments announced by Count Palikao were being actively carried on, I embodied my views of the political bearing of the question in the Memorandum, in order to show distinctly to the British Cabinet, in a most unofficial form, the impression necessarily created in Germany by the toleration of the export of arms to France. I have since then been almost daily in a position to draw your Excellency's attention to various instances of consignments of arms. In reply to my notes on the subject, I for a long time either received no answers at all, or only such as were dilatory, although the cases acknowledged in your Excellency's subsequent notes of the 13th and 19th ult. prove that her Britannic Majesty's Government would have had time to prevent the dispatch of many a thousand of rifles to France.

It is true your Excellency, on the 5th ult., in reply to my note of the 2d ult., informed me that some of the packages in a certain truck on a railway pointed out by me contained bacon. But besides the possibility of other packages which had not been opened having contained arms, and of my having been misinformed only in regard to the particular number of the railway truck, I could, *e contrario*, draw the conclusion from your Excellency's

communication, that her Britannic Majesty's Government would have complied with my request, if those packages had contained arms instead of bacon. However, after I had succeeded by my notes of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th ult., in bringing a series of irrefutable facts before her Britannic Majesty's Government, a sudden change occurred. In your note of the 13th ult., while acknowledging the correctness of a large number of cases pointed out by me, your Excellency declared that the traffic, which had been quite openly carried on, was legitimate, and that the Customs authorities had no power to stop it. Had her Majesty's Government from the commencement of the discussion taken this standing-ground, they would certainly not have induced me to institute the above inquiries, and far less would they have had reason to subject the correctness of my informations to a practical test.

I therefore consider myself justified in concluding that her Britannic Majesty's Government, since the receipt of my Memorandum, has materially changed the position previously occupied in regard of our complaints. It was unavoidable that this change should be reflected in the answer to my Memorandum, penned under different conditions; for I had started with the supposition that the legal means at the disposal of the Executive had hitherto not been applied simply from motives of convenience. I had been under the impression that it would only be necessary to prove the serious extent of the supply of France with arms and ammunition on the part of England, in order to convince the British Government that the time had arrived to make use of their powers. I had therefore not entered upon a judicial examination of the question of English neutrality, not because I had reason to shun its discussion, but merely because I had hoped that, by abstaining from it, I should be bringing about a more rapid practical decision, and therefore considered it sufficient to restrict myself to the practical and political aspect of the question.

I now have the honour to refer to your Excellency's note of the 15th ult., and must begin by contradicting the supposition that I had expressed a desire on the part of my Government that the attitude of Great Britain towards Germany in this war should be that of a "benevolent neutrality." On the contrary, as a repeated and careful examination of my arguments in their mutual connection will convince your Excellency, I have, on the one hand, merely given expression to my satisfaction that public opinion had ranged itself on our side in this war, wantonly thrust upon us; and had, on the other hand, combined with it the reflection, how difficult it is to reconcile the faith in the practical value of public opinion with the neutrality policy actually pursued by her Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have by no means asked, and far less claimed on our part, that England should transgress the bounds of a strict neutrality in our favour and to the detriment of France. But I have asserted—and in the face of the experiences of the last few weeks, as well as in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ult., must maintain my assertion—that the neutrality of England, while, as I am most willing to admit, intended to be impartial, in its practical effects assumes the form of a neutrality which is benevolent and partial towards France. For my part, I have only wished a return from a lax neutrality whereby one party is benefited, to a strict and really impartial neutrality; for I am unable to admit that it is compatible with strict neutrality that French agents should be permitted to buy up in this country,

under the eyes and with the cognisance of her Britannic Majesty's Government, many thousands of breech-loaders, revolvers, and pistols, with the requisite ammunition, in order to arm therewith the French people, and make the formation of fresh army corps possible after the regular armies of France have been defeated and surrounded.

Your Excellency admits that the export of arms and ammunition to France has latterly assumed larger proportions than had hitherto appeared credible. I have the honour to remark that, according to my information, which may be partly tested upon oath, if this should appear desirable, the number of firearms shipped from England to France since my Memorandum of the 30th ult. is treble and fourfold the number of 40,000 announced by Count Palikao, and that a number of manufactories, especially in Birmingham and London, are working day and night for French agents and their men of straw. I am in possession of authenticated copies of contracts concluded between the French Government and English contractors. The events of the war have quite recently delivered into our hands an official letter of the present French Minister of War, dated the 18th ult., to a French officer at the French Embassy in London, and in which the then-expected dispatch of 25,000 Snider rifles is mentioned, and reference is made for the payment to the funds at the disposal of the French Chargé d'Affaires for the purchase of arms in general. In like manner, authentic proofs lie before me that the export of firearms and ammunition to France has been thoroughly organised in some British ports.

Since, however, as already alluded to, her Britannic Majesty's Government, relinquishing its former standing-ground, does not doubt the actual legitimacy of these consignments of arms, but disputes the validity of our complaints concerning the toleration of these facts from a judicial and political point of view, I shall now proceed to an enumeration of the arguments contained in your Excellency's note of the 15th ult.

According to your Excellency's own admission, the Executive has the power to prohibit the export of contraband of war; but you state the practice is to make use of this right only in the interest of England, as in the case of self-defence. A letter of the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated the 30th of August 1825, and reprinted in a London newspaper immediately after the indiscretion of Count Palikao, refutes this assumption, proving that England as a neutral has repeatedly prohibited the export of arms by an Order in Council, "according to the usual practice," as the renowned Duke says. In one part of this letter the words occur, "I am afraid, then, that the world will not entirely acquit us of at least not doing our utmost to prevent this breach of neutrality, of which the Porte will accuse us."

Practice, consequently, is in itself not opposed to the adoption of a measure desired by us for the prohibition of the sale of arms to our enemy. But the law allows Government a certain latitude of consideration to make use of their power according to circumstances. Your Excellency is, however, of opinion, that the present Customs system would require a radical reform in order to prevent the export of contraband of war. I gladly concede that the lax method of dispatch and control on the part of the Custom-house authorities, which has become usual in the interest of an unfettered commercial intercourse, bars the energetic carrying out of a measure prohibiting the exportation of contraband of war. But, on the other hand, I think the very

fact of such laxity tends to show that, for the purpose of rendering an Order in Council effectual, no new organisation would be required, but simply more stringent instructions for the customs and harbour authorities, reminding them of the existing regulations. The correctness of this opinion is founded upon the numerous official reports and other partly-sworn evidence lying before me. They clearly prove that many thousands of boxes containing rifles, well known to be such by the Custom-house authorities, have been shipped for France without challenge. I know several instances where the cases have not even been registered in the books, but have been openly shipped as passengers' luggage by the French agents. When our consular agents protested against such proceedings, the Custom-house officers invariably replied, that they had no instructions to detain the packages.

I hope, however, to be able to prove by the following passages in English statutes, that her Britannic Majesty's Government have at their disposal, in case they should wish to avail themselves of them, the means to put a stop to this traffic, without the necessity of introducing a new machinery of officials for the purpose.

By the 150th section of chapter 107 of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853 (16 and 17 Victoria), it is enacted that:

'The following goods may, by proclamation or Order in Council, be prohibited, either to be exported or carried coastwise: arms, ammunition, and gunpowder, &c.; and if any goods so prohibited shall be exported from the United Kingdom, or carried coastwise or by water borne to be so exported, they shall be forfeited."

Section 125 of the same act enacts:

"That the exporter of British manufactures, or his agents, has to declare in a shipping-bill the marks, numbers, description of packages, and the quantity, quality, and description of goods about to be shipped for exportation."

Section 5 of the 122d chapter of the 17 and 18 Victoria (1854) enacts:

"That on the entry at the Customs of arms and ammunition of war, whether for home use, exportation, or in transit, the number of articles of each description, as denominated in Table A (swords, bayonets, muskets, rifles, carbines, cannons, mortars, &c.), shall be stated in the import, export, or transit entry."

The passage, therefore, in your Excellency's note, that "such exportation is not forbidden by our municipal law," can but have the meaning that a positive declaration is still required on the part of her Britannic Majesty's Government, before the power with which it is invested comes into operation.

The second passage of the quoted enactment proves that the means for an efficient control have likewise been provided by the law itself. It is true the intention must exist to apply the remedy. That, however, the action of her Majesty's Government does not always remain the same under all circumstances, I may be permitted to prove by two instructions issued to the Customs authorities of the United Kingdom on the 2d of June 1848, and the 8th of September 1870 respectively.

The first originated at the time of the Danish-German complications, when Sir Charles Trevelyan, one of the secretaries to the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, informed the Commissioners of Customs, in a Treasury Minute, that "in transmitting to them copies of a letter received by their Lordships from the Foreign Office, and of its enclosures from the Danish Minister to this Court, he has been commanded by their Lord-

ships to desire, that if the Commissioners shall be satisfied that any arms or warlike stores are embarked to be sent from this country, for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish Government, they will give instructions to their officers to prevent their exportation." In pursuance of this Order of the Lords of the Treasury, the Commissioners of the Customs issued directions to their officers at the several departments in the port of London, and to all the collectors and controllers of all the ports throughout the kingdom, to take care that the same be duly obeyed; with instructions to make a special "report to the Board of any circumstances that may arise fit for their cognisance."

On the other hand, the present instructions, notwithstanding my continued complaints since the middle of July in this year, are as follows:

"*The Examining-officers' Custom-house, London, September* 8, 1870.

"In pursuance of instructions from the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, the Board directs you, when it is supposed that arms and ammunition are being exported, to ascertain the facts; and if so, what is the nature of the arms and ammunitions, and in what quantities, by whom and to what destination they are to be shipped; but you are not in any case to delay the shipment longer than is sufficient to obtain the above particulars. A report to be made to the Board in each case.—I am, sir, your obedient servant, J. B. HALE.

The Collector at ——."

This contrast in the treatment of analogous cases is self-evident, and calls for no comment on my part. At the time I wrote my Memorandum and the above-mentioned numerous notes to your Excellency, I was naturally not acquainted with the instructions of the 8th ult. I think, however, that I am entitled to contend that they prove conclusively how easy it would have been for her Britannic Majesty's Government to render the control which has been ordered for their own information effective also with regard to my complaints, without damaging the usual and legitimate trade of the country.

I had, on a former occasion, taken the liberty to propose to your Excellency still another remedy, which appeared to me appropriate for guarding the *bonâ fide* commerce with other neutral countries against unnecessary annoyance, without in its interest setting aside all and every control.

This measure would consist in demanding securities that articles cleared for a neutral port should really be delivered there. Your Excellency considers this proposal impracticable; I beg permission, however, to quote a passage from a French law of the 14th of July 1860: "Law concerning the manufacture and sale of arms for war purposes," which has been reprinted in the appendix to the *Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners* of 1867.

It says, at p. 48 of the Report, under the head of Title 2, No. 9:

"The export of arms or pieces of arms for warfare is free, under the conditions laid down by the law, or by the regulations of the administrative authorities.

An imperial decree may, however, forbid this exportation beyond the frontiers for a fixed destination and limited period.

The Custom-house officers through which the export may be made are named by decrees for the purpose.

When the export is prohibited for certain points of destination, the exporters must, under the penalties imposed by article 4 of section 3 of the law of August 22, 1791, certify the arrival of the arms at a legitimate point of destination by means

of bonds, which on departure are delivered to them by the Customs authorities, and cancelled on arrival at the port of destination by the consular agents of France."

My proposal therefore, if it has not the merit of originality, enjoys at least the advantage of being recognised as practicable by the French Legislature. France could consequently least of all have been in the position to see any kind of unfriendliness in the application of the remedy.

Notwithstanding a careful study of the quoted *Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners*, I have not been able to find the proof in it that this Commission had come to the decision that a prohibition of the export of arms and ammunition was indeed impracticable or impolitic. Besides, the authority of the Commission would scarcely have extended far enough to prejudice (by such a decision) all future contingencies and the rights of other nations. I believe, however, I have proved that a prohibition of export is legally admissible, and practicable as well as possible, in the usual course of administration. Whether it is politic or not, that is the very question on which a difference of opinion exists between us up to the present time.

The second objection of your Excellency to the legitimacy of our complaints is the alleged wrong on the part of Prussia during the Crimean war. I do not wish to recur to the greater or less degree of analogy between both the cases in question, as a continuation of this controversy, especially before the public, might create feelings in one or other of the two nations which I am most anxious to avoid.

However that may be, and even if the most complete analogy existed and had been acknowledged by me, I still could not refrain from upholding the alternative that, if the complaints of England against Prussia at the time of the Crimean war were warranted, those of Germany against England at the present time are at least equally well founded.

As regards your Excellency's arguments by which the dilemma is to be obviated, I wish to make a single reply. Your Excellency remarks:

"The course of Great Britain then and now is perfectly consistent. As she then remonstrated against infractions of Prussian law, so she now admits the justice of remonstrances against infractions of British law, such as storeships, enlistments, and others."

In another place your Excellency says:

"I have alluded to the difficulties which the Prussian Government encountered when placed in a position analogous to that occupied by Great Britain, and I have shown that those difficulties were chiefly owing to their having so far departed from existing practice as to prohibit the transit trade; a concession which gave Great Britain a standing ground for complaints which she would not otherwise have possessed, and which notwithstanding was powerless in its results."

It is evident that the justice of former complaints against us is deduced from a concession made by Prussia to England and her allies in excess of its strict obligations as a neutral, while our present grievances are stated to be unfounded because England has not made concessions of any kind in excess of its bare duties of neutrality, and merely concedes to us a right of complaint in so far as the violation of English law is concerned.

If I should at all draw a conclusion from this line of argument, it could only be that Prussia did at that time more in principle for the observation of neutrality than England does at present, and therefore evinced at that time

a more friendly neutrality towards England than the latter now observes towards us, and that therefore the complaints of England were then less warranted than ours now are.

As regards the practical observation of the existing laws and regulations, I shall not revert to the numerous complaints of England on account of alleged transport of arms through Prussia, of which I have still a perfect recollection, and which at the time were proved unfounded.

On the other hand, I must draw attention to the infractions of British law, as shown above, even in its present state, in order to prove that our complaints certainly have, in this respect also, a foundation based on facts.

In addition, I cannot refrain from opposing the principle involved in your Excellency's argument. For I am of opinion that the right of the belligerent Powers to complain about the attitude of a neutral State does not so much originate in its accidental municipal law as in the international law with which it is the duty of every Government to bring its own laws into harmony.

This is the very standing ground of Germany. According to the existing principles of international law, arms and ammunition rank first among the articles which are regarded as contraband of war, and the sale of which to the belligerent Powers contributes most towards feeding and protracting the war.

The reference to the Crimean war could therefore only be considered an argument for the position of her Britannic Majesty's Government if they should insist upon the analogy denied by me, and deduce therefrom the right to return our alleged former wrong by a positive wrong at the present moment.

I have in my Memorandum already too strongly declared the possibility of such a supposition to be at variance with the liberal and conciliatory ideas of the English people and statesmen to make any particular allusion necessary to the injurious effects which the reintroduction of the principle of retaliation would necessarily have upon the progress and the peace of Europe. I may the more readily refrain from doing so, as your Excellency has, on your own part, emphatically repudiated such an idea.

In the same manner I may abstain from entering at present upon the question whether it would be more in the interest of all to extend or restrict the duties of neutrals in the future.

That Germany inclines to every progress in the field of increasing active freedom, it has already proved in the course of three wars by applying, reciprocally in the Danish and the Austrian wars, and without regard to reciprocity in the present war, the principle aimed at by the majority of the whole commercial world—namely, the security of private property at sea; a principle the adoption of which proved to be unattainable at the Congress of Paris in 1856. Germany has therefore the more reason to expect from the other Powers that they should not selfishly alter the existing international rights to its detriment and their own advantage.

The present controversy simply centres in the question, whether the refusal of her Majesty's Government to prohibit the export of arms is not at variance with the still unaltered rules of international law regarding the duties of neutrals towards belligerents, and with the laws of this country not yet repealed by the Legislature for the better fulfilment of these duties. That such is the case, I believe I have proved by the existing facts and the laws themselves.

I will now try and remove the final obstacle which, according to the concluding paragraph of your Excellency's note, dated the 15th ult., has prevented her Britannic Majesty's Government from issuing an order prohibiting the export of arms.

Your Excellency remarks that France has suffered only defeats, while Germany, on the other hand, exhibits uninterrupted successes; and you connect therewith the reflection, that it would be contrary to the feelings of her Britannic Majesty's Government now to change a line of policy entered upon at a time when they could not know which side would be favoured by the fortune of war.

In the first instance I should wish to raise the objection hereto, that the Government of her Britannic Majesty brought the new Foreign Enlistment Act before Parliament after the outbreak of the war, and that when advocating the bill, they emphatically declared that the laws hitherto in force would not be altered thereby, but merely supplemented.

If, however, it cannot be doubtful on the one hand, that in existing circumstances the new law is only beneficial to France, rendering it impossible for Germany to get ships, which she needed most urgently, while on the other hand the Executive now refuses to apply the old laws for the prevention of export of arms and ammunition to France, and hereby the United Kingdom becomes a great arsenal for our enemy, the new law assumes, in consequence of this, a character as regards Germany, which, if not hostile, is practically malevolent. But this, as I have the satisfaction to know, and as is proved by the parliamentary debates, was not the intention of the Legislature.

I have farther the honour to remark, that our complaints of the manner in which the English neutrality laws are being administered date from a time when we had not yet gained any victories, and that they were in nowise first raised by my Memorandum of the 30th of August. Moreover, at the time the Memorandum was penned, France still possessed two powerful armies, while her fleets commanded the Baltic and North Sea; so that it could not possibly be a matter of indifference to us whether England, by the exercise of her neutrality, materially increased the advantages which France derived from our want of control of the sea.

But even under the present circumstances, the German people would not easily be persuaded that it was wanting in chivalry because it complains that by an unrestricted export of arms, the enemy—who had been overcome only by its own great sacrifices—is furnished with the means of prolonging a struggle which, even if its final result should not thereby be materially affected, still in any case must lead to more bloodshed and more sacrifices for both belligerents. Even the most eloquent defender of the position taken by her Britannic Majesty's Government will not succeed, in the eyes of Germany, in bringing such a neutrality policy into harmony with the considerations of humanity and the wishes for peace so frequently advocated by England.

As for the hope expressed by your Excellency, that the German people will, in a cooler moment, judge less severely the attitude of the Government of Great Britain in this question than now in the heat of action, I regret that, in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ult., added to the knowledge that our enemy is being daily equipped with British arms—I cannot share it.

Should this state of things continue, I could only look forward to the soothing influence which the numerous and actual proofs of sympathy given by the English people, and the manifold testimonies of public opinion in favour of Germany and its good right, may have upon the feelings of the German nation.—I have the honour, &c. BERNSTORFF.'

LORD GRANVILLE TO COUNT BERNSTORFF.

'*Foreign Office, October* 21.

'M. l'Ambassadeur,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 8th inst.

The friendly spirit of your reply to the observations which I addressed to you on the 15th ult. on the subject of the attitude of this country as a neutral, and the attention which you have evidently given to the arguments and explanations which I placed before you, encourage her Majesty's Government in the belief that the calm discussion by the two Governments of the difficult question of the claims of belligerents upon neutrals is calculated to remove present misunderstandings, and possibly to pave the way for an eventual solution. I have also to thank your Excellency for having pointed out certain apparent breaches in the chain of practice which I had described as forming an unbroken precedent for the course now adopted, and thus afford me an opportunity for giving such farther explanations as will establish beyond a doubt its consistency.

The policy of her Majesty's Government and the grounds on which it is based were so fully explained in my former note, that I need not again advert to the subject, farther than to observe that your Excellency is wrong in supposing that at any time a change took place in that policy. From the date of the outbreak of the war, the Cabinet has never hesitated as to the course which should be pursued. The views of the House of Commons were clearly manifested when, on the 4th of August, an amendment, by which it was proposed to insert in the Foreign Enlistment Act, then under discussion, a clause prohibiting the exportation to belligerents of arms or munitions of war, was rejected by a large majority; and the same opinions were shown to be held in the House of Lords in the debate on the 8th of August on the same bill, in which the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, and Lord Cairns took part. I myself, in answer to a question addressed to me in the House of Lords by the Marquis of Clanricarde on the 22d of July, went so far as to express some doubts whether a policy of prohibition was advisable even in self-defence; and in the constant conversations on the subject which I have had with your Excellency since the commencement of the war, I have invariably explained to you that the new Foreign Enlistment Act neither diminished nor added to the powers of the Government as regarded the exportation of munitions of war, and that it was our intention to adhere on that point to the usual practice of this country, which practice we believe to be in conformity with the established principles of public law.

I had supposed that from those various sources of information your Excellency would have been in a position fully to acquaint the North German Government with the attitude which this country might be expected to maintain; and it is therefore with surprise that I have learnt that, previously

to the receipt of my note of the 15th ultimo, you had doubts upon the subject. I can find nothing in my earlier notes to which you refer which could lead to the inference that there was any hesitation on the part of her Majesty's Government; those notes, written in reply to specific statements made by your Excellency respecting alleged exportations of munitions of war, contained merely the acknowledgments which were due to your Excellency as a matter of courtesy, promises of inquiry into facts, and brief reports of the results of investigations.

Your Excellency appears to take exception to my having instituted inquiries at all; but upon this point I most respectfully differ. Whatever view may be taken of the principle on which the Government has acted, it is right that the facts should be correctly ascertained. Wild rumours have been in circulation as to the extent to which arms are being supplied by this country to France; bitter articles founded on these rumours have been inserted in the German newspapers; your Excellency based upon them frequent and strong representations; and her Majesty's Government might, in my opinion, fairly be accused of supineness and neglect if, at the meeting of Parliament, they should be so ill-informed as to be unable to supply any information upon this point. It was possible, moreover, that the shipments of arms might have been of such a nature as to bring them within the operation of the clauses of the Foreign Enlistment Act forbidding the dispatch of store-ships or the fitting out of military or naval expeditions. It was for these reasons that I felt it to be my duty to investigate any statements brought to my notice by your Excellency, and not to allow them, if unsupported, to pass unchallenged.

The necessity for this inquiry will be the more obvious when the complaints made from time to time by your Excellency are compared with the answers which I have returned to them; and I may here observe that, before returning those answers, I have taken exhaustive steps to test their accuracy, by obtaining independent information from the Customs officials, from the Board of Trade, from the police, and from the Small Arms Department of the War Office. I am not aware of the sources from which your Excellency's information is derived. I do not, of course, suppose that any importance would be attached by you to reports given in return for pecuniary rewards, such as have been offered in newspaper advertisements; but I think it cannot be doubted, that the sources which I have above enumerated are likely to be more trustworthy than those to which the able and active Consuls of the North German Confederation have access.

Your Excellency observes that in your notes from the 1st to the 9th of September you brought to my notice a series of irrefutable facts. It must have escaped your notice, that in my answer of the 9th of that month I showed that the majority of those alleged facts were unfounded.

In your note to which I am now replying, you make two farther specific statements, the truth of which I have also felt it to be my duty to investigate: that respecting the order supposed to have been given by Count Palikao to a firm in this country on the 23d of August for 40,000 rifles to be delivered within a week; and that in which the number of firearms shipped from this country to France between the 30th August and the 8th inst. is calculated at from 120,000 to 160,000. As regards the former, while observing in passing that Count Palikao's statement, as reported in the *Journal Officiel*,

was merely that these arms had been ordered *à l'étranger*, I have to state that no trace can be discovered of the order ever having been received in this country, and that it is certain that, if it was received, it was not executed; and as regards the latter, that the full returns now before me show that the supplies of arms drawn by France from this country between the two specified dates are less than those drawn by her from the United States, whence no exports have been made approaching the figures mentioned by your Excellency. It is indeed understood that there is now some activity at Birmingham in the manufacture of firearms, owing to the increasing demand; but experienced persons are of opinion that, in consequence of the recent stagnation of the trade, its present producing power is very limited.

I may here remark, that her Majesty's Government have learnt with some surprise that, while your Excellency has been instructed to make such constant complaints on the subject of the exports of munitions of war from this country, no such instructions had, up to a very recent date, been addressed to your colleague in the United States, who had only made personal representations to the United States Government, although the latter have adhered in the same manner as her Majesty's Government to the principle and practice of neutrals, and have consequently not interfered with the exports to which I have above referred. The President of the United States, in his Proclamation of the 22d of August last, expressly states that "the laws of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the open manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest."

I will next proceed to examine the fresh complaint preferred by you against her Majesty's Government of violation of international and British law, of which I trust that I can briefly dispose. Your complaint refers to the sale of the Hypatia and Norseman to the French Government to be used as store-ships. Previously to the receipt of your present note, I had received but one communication from you on this subject, that of the 19th of August, in reply to which I informed you, on the 29th of the same month, that the attention of her Majesty's Government had been already drawn by their own officials to the circumstances of these sales, and that on investigation it had been ascertained that in both cases the vessels were dispatched from England before the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 came into operation, and that consequently the owners, who were not liable to penalties under the previous Enlistment Act, could not be successfully prosecuted under the provisions of the new act. Having heard nothing farther from your Excellency on the subject, I concluded that you were satisfied with this explanation; but as I now learn that you are dissatisfied on certain points, I think it due to you that I should explain that the information in possession of her Majesty's Government shows that the vessels sailed from England under the British flag because the actual sale was effected at Cherbourg, at which port the vessels were handed over to the purchasers before the passing of the new act. I do not understand to what process your Excellency refers in stating that "up to the 8th ult. the transfer of the property to the French owners had not been entered on the ships' books;" but the steps which the law requires were duly complied with by the vendors, the certificates of registry having been given up in the month of August to the proper officers, with the notifications that the

vessels had been sold abroad. To your Excellency's remark, therefore, that I "declined to proceed" against these vessels, I have only to reply, that there was and is no ground whatsoever upon which a prosecution could be based.

I will not follow your Excellency through the passages of your note in which you show that her Majesty's Government have the power to prohibit the export of arms—a fact which I have constantly stated to you; nor do I think it necessary to refer to the passage in which you quote the French law of the 14th of July 1860, farther than to observe that the clauses of that law are, like those possessed by the British Executive, merely permissive, and that a system of bonds is necessarily open to the objection, that it merely serves to enhance the price of the arms—a matter of little account when their acquisition is of national importance.

I may refer incidentally to your Excellency's remark, that you do not find in the printed Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners any confirmation of my statement, that the opinion of those Commissioners was, that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic. It is true, that that opinion was not embodied in their report; but it is none the less true that the subject was discussed by the Commission, and that the opinion pronounced upon it was that which I have recorded, as is shown by the report not containing any recommendation of the alteration of the law in this respect.

I now come to the points in your Excellency's note which appear to me to demand a full explanation. I had stated in my note of the 15th, that the practice of Great Britain as a neutral had always been that which she now follows. Your Excellency disputes this position, and in support of your arguments you adduce two documents—a letter from the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated the 30th of August 1825; and an instruction from the Board of Treasury to the Customs, dated the 2d of June 1848. I have not failed to examine most carefully the instances which you specify, and the following is the result of the examination;

A laborious search has failed to discover any trace of a letter from the Duke of Wellington, of the 30th of August 1825; but a paper has been found, dated August 3, 1826, which contains the passage quoted by you. This paper is a minute written by the Duke of Wellington upon a draught despatch addressed by Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Stratford Canning, then British Ambassador at Constantinople, at the time of the war between Turkey and Greece, in which—with reference to a rumour that arms were being sent from England for the purpose of equipping abroad vessels to be commanded by Lord Cochrane in the service of Greece—Mr. Canning stated that such a proceeding was not contrary to law, and could not be prevented by her Majesty's Government. To the latter part of this statement the Duke of Wellington demurred, referring to the fact that, when Spain was at war with her colonies, England had prohibited exports to both belligerents, and making use of the words quoted by your Excellency.

Mr. Canning, however, insisted on his view, stating in his rejoinder, "the law does permit the exportation of arms as merchandise; and I must authorise Stratford so to say, if he is to state the case of his country truly." The Duke gave way, and no Order in Council prohibiting the export of arms was issued by the Government.

It is also incidentally important to observe, that the precedent for such a

prohibition, to which reference was made by the Duke, was one in which Great Britain had no option in the matter. She had bound herself, by Article 3 of the Additional Articles, signed at Madrid on August 28, 1814, to the Treaty with Spain of the 5th of July of the same year, to "take the most effectual measures for preventing her subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America;" and being thus compelled, when Spain was at war with her colonies, to prohibit the exportation of arms to the latter, she subsequently extended the prohibition to Spain herself, in order to avoid the imputation of favouring one belligerent to the exclusion of the other.

The second apparent instance adduced by your Excellency, of departure from what I have stated to be the ordinary practice of Great Britain, is the issue of orders to the Customs officials on the 2d of June 1848, instructing them to prevent the exportation of arms for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish Government. I shall have no difficulty in showing that there were exceptional causes which made the issue of these instructions imperative on her Majesty's Government.

On the 25th of May 1848, the Danish Minister in London drew attention to the fact, that preparations were being made in this country for sending cannon to Hamburg, and called on her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark of 1670, to prevent those shipments being made. The Treaty appealed to was signed at Copenhagen on the 11th of July 1670, was supplemented by an explanatory article on July 4, 1780, and was confirmed by the 13th Article of the Treaty signed at Kiel on the 14th of January 1814; it provided that "the aforesaid Kings, for themselves, their heirs and successors, mutually do undertake and promise that they will not aid or furnish the enemies of either party that shall be aggressors with any provisions of war, as soldiers, arms, engines, guns, ships, or other necessaries for the use of war, or suffer any to be furnished by their subjects." It is clear that, under the provisions of this stipulation, her Majesty's Government had no alternative but to issue the orders to which your Excellency has drawn attention.

I have thus shown that the practice of Great Britain has not been different from that which I originally stated it to be; and that, on the contrary, two cases of apparent divergence, on being examined prove that the departure from the usual practice, when it existed, was dictated by exceptional causes, and thus indirectly confirm the accuracy of my statement, that the course now adopted is founded on unbroken precedent.

In conclusion, I should wish to make a few general remarks.

Your Excellency will, I think, admit that, though her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change the practice of the country in regard to neutrality, they have been vigilant in watching and checking any symptoms of violation by British subjects of existing law. Some weeks before your Excellency drew attention to the cases of the Hypatia and Norseman, the proper authorities of this country had been engaged in investigating them; and the watchfulness shown on those occasions has doubtless been the reason that no attempt has been made to sell or dispatch vessels in contravention of the Foreign Enlistment Act. A report which had reached her Majesty's Government, that attempts were being made to enlist Irishmen for military service in France, was acted upon with the greatest promptitude by the

authorities of the Home Office, even at a time when—as it appears from the note which you addressed to me on the 11th inst.—it did not appear to you that much importance was to be attached to the rumours. I can assure your Excellency, that no effort shall hereafter be spared to deal promptly with any actual or contemplated infractions of the law.

I am glad to find that your Excellency now not only does not insist upon, but disclaims, the doctrine of benevolent neutrality, which appeared to her Majesty's Government, after a most careful examination of your Memorandum of the 30th of August, to be the principal basis on which your representations were founded. That such a doctrine is untenable will now be universally admitted; while it must be as generally admitted, that it would be a real departure from neutrality for a neutral to change—without general consent—its practice; a practice, be it observed, in conformity with the views of all writers on international law, because such practice might incidentally be more or less favourable to one of the two belligerents.

Good offices may be benevolent, but neutrality, like arbitration, cannot be so.

It would be a serious violation of neutrality, if a neutral nation guided itself by any principle or rule of conduct, however just or meritorious in itself, which had not been previously recognised and sanctioned by the usage of nations.

I sincerely rejoice that Prussia, who, as a neutral, has always been a strenuous champion of the rights of neutrals, now, as your Excellency points out, shows a desire to "incline to every progress in the field of increasing the active freedom" of commercial interests in time of war; though I cannot but observe that the special point which your Excellency adduces as evidence of this desire is a question which may be viewed differently by independent Powers in proportion to their maritime strength.

Her Majesty's Government, at the outset of a war which they deplored, and after an appeal to the belligerents to act in accordance with the 24th Protocol of the Treaty of Paris had been refused by them, declared their neutrality, in the earnest desire to maintain friendly relations with both. It was their wish to exercise all friendly offices compatible with perfect impartiality. They farther expressed their determination to exercise their duties and maintain their rights as neutrals. It gave me great satisfaction when your Excellency was good enough to inform me, in conversation, that you knew of no other subject but the one under discussion on which Germany had any foundation for complaining of the attitude of this country as a neutral. It is not for the first time that I inform your Excellency that her Majesty's Government have no jealousy of German unity. They believe it to be a great and worthy object for Germany to endeavour, with the consent of all its members, to consolidate its vast moral, intellectual, and physical powers. An ardent desire that not only the Governments, but the people of Great Britain and Germany should be in the most friendly relations, induces me to repeat my belief that so just and thoughtful a nation as yours will not permanently entertain feelings of rancour against England, or, I might add, the United States, for adhering, as neutrals, to the practice which they had always adopted, and which, up to the outbreak of the present war, has been the theory and practice of both the belligerents.—I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.'

V.

THE DESPATCHES FOUND IN ST. CLOUD.

IN the Palace of St. Cloud, where the Emperor Napoleon resided before his departure for the seat of war, the German troops found a number of despatches and copies of despatches. They were officially published at Berlin, classified according to their contents:

FIRST SERIES, FROM JUNE 29 TO JULY 28.

DIPLOMATIC TRANSACTIONS.

The Spanish Ambassador to the Minister of War at Madrid.

'Paris, July 6.

'Far from having exaggerated the effect of the first impression, the declaration of the Government and the attitude of the Legislative body may be regarded as a sure presage of a war with Prussia, should a Prussian Prince become King of Spain. [Then follow ciphers.] OLOZAGA.'

Foreign Affairs.—M. Benedetti, French Ambassador, Wildbad.

'Paris, July 7.

'Go to Ems. An attaché whom I shall send off early to-morrow will bring you instructions there. He will arrive at Ems at 11 o'clock. Tell the station-master where you put up. GRAMONT.'

Foreign Affairs.—To Count Benedetti, French Ambassador at Ems.

'Paris, July 8.

'Inform me of your arrival. Give me your address, and be sure not to leave Ems without letting me know. GRAMONT.'

To Havas at Paris.

'Berlin, July 9.

'The King of Prussia, who, by the way, is not the head of the princely House of Hohenzollern, at first advised Prince Leopold not to accept the Spanish throne; since then he has not been asked about the project. We

are assured that the federal Government refuse to give any opinion on the subject until the Cortes has expressed itself respecting the candidate.

FRANCIS.'

From the President of the Council of Ministers to the Spanish Minister at Paris.

'Madrid, July 14.

'The following telegram is about to be dispatched immediately to Prince Hohenzollern:

"I have the honour of replying to the despatch in which your Royal Highness, in the name of your son Prince Leopold, withdraws his name from the list of candidates for the throne of Spain. This Government feels grateful to your Royal Highness for your flattering opinion of the Spanish character, and, taking into consideration the exalted reasons which have induced your Royal Highness to come to this decision, will regard the affair as settled."'

To the Minister of War at Paris.

'Jeumont, July 20.

'I arrived this evening in Paris, a day sooner than the other members of the Berlin Embassy. STOFFEL.'

To his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris.

'St. Cloud, July 26.

'Have you contradicted the draught of Benedetti's treaty published in the *Times*? NAPOLEON.'

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris.

'Florence, July 26.

'Visconti-Venosta, in his answer to Signor Nicotera, who had repeated on the tribune the declaration he had formerly made concerning the neutrality of Italy, said yesterday in the Chamber that the Government of the King did not as yet know exactly the intentions of the Imperial Government touching the French garrison at Civita Vecchia. This question was not to influence the attitude of the Cabinet. The Government were convinced, and declare openly, that it would be bad policy to make use of the present situation of affairs in France forcibly to settle the Roman question. MALARET.'

PUBLIC FEELING IN FRANCE.

To his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, July 6.*

'Receive my most ardent congratulations. All France is with you. The enthusiasm is universal. PERSIGNY.'

* On July 6 the Duke of Gramont took the opportunity of making known to the Legislative body that Prince Hohenzollern had become a candidate for the throne of Spain.

To his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, July 6.

'Gramont's declaration has been received by the House with great agitation and immense applause. Even the Opposition, with the exception of a very small number, has declared that it will support the Government. The agitation indeed was at first greater than was intended. They said it was a declaration of war. I made use of a statement of Crémieux to explain how matters stood. I would not allow of our being represented as deliberately hastening on war; we only wanted to maintain an honourable peace. The agitation too among the people is very great, but it is a noble patriotic emotion. One heart beats in this nation. EM. OLLIVIER.'

The Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Perpignan, July 15.

'Great excitement prevails here in consequence of the last intelligence. War with Prussia is fervently wished for by the whole population. The Republicans even declare that in a week hostilities will have begun, and that our soldiers will this time celebrate the Emperor's festival of the 15th of August in Berlin. No one doubts the favourable issue of the war. Confidence prevails everywhere, in the towns as well as in the smallest villages.'

From the Emperor's Private Secretary to the Minister of Fine Arts at Paris.

'St. Cloud, July 15.

'You may permit the singing of the "Marseillaise." The Emperor has commissioned me to tell you this. It will be as well for you to inform the Prefects of Police of this beforehand.'

The Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Marseilles, July 16.

'A great manifestation has just taken place. The people are parading the streets with drums beating and flaming torches. About 10,000 or 15,000 people are singing "Reine Hortense" and the "Marseillaise." The cry of "Long live the Emperor!" "Down with Prussia!" "To Berlin!" resounds on all sides. The multitude is as if electrified. No disorder.'

The Minister of the Interior to the Prefect of the North at Lille.

'Paris, July 17.

'You may allow the "Marseillaise" to be sung in public concert-halls.'

The Under-Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Toulon, July 17.

'A telegram sent to the naval prefects, announcing that "the Prussians have violated the soil of this our native land," has called forth great patriotic

enthusiasm. Young men carrying banners have gone to the Sous-Prefecture to hear more particulars, singing the "Marseillaise" and crying out "Long live the Emperor!" "Down with the Prussians!" These demonstrations produce the most favourable impression; but farther intelligence is necessary to satisfy the longings of the people.'

From the Minister of the Interior to M. Pietri, the Emperor's Private Secretary, Palace of St. Cloud.

(VERY PRESSING.) 'Paris, July 22.

'In the last clause but one of the proclamation it ought to be "j'amène," or "j'emmène," my son. I read in the draught sent me "j'ammène." I await an answer before sending the proclamation to the press.'

To his Majesty the Emperor at Paris.

'Paris, July 22.

'Be careful not to allow any German to approach your person. Think of Kant [most likely should be "Sand"], Kotzebue. G. A.'

The sender of this left his card behind, on which was printed 'C. J. W. Wiggers van Kerchem, Hôtel du Louvre, 242 Rue Rivoli.'

To Havas at Paris. 'Marseilles, July 22.

'Kabylia supplies a great number of Turcos, and displays great zeal for the war; numerous volunteers. Soldiers from Algiers who come through Marseilles are enthusiastically received. Receive all kinds of presents. The peasant women at the market distribute wine, fruit, and other things. The wounded Turcos call out "Bono Marseille!" DELEUZE.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Aurillon, July 23.

'The proclamation of the Emperor has created unprecedented enthusiasm. It will be dispatched by the next mail, and to-morrow, Sunday, will be posted up in all the communes.

From the Minister of the Interior to the Prefects of the Lower Rhine at Strasbury. 'Paris, July 23.

'(Private cipher.) Have the accompanying proclamation of the Emperor translated into German, and a large number of copies printed, and try to get them distributed in Germany by way of Switzerland. Have them likewise posted up in your department in French and German, and send them to your German colleagues in the Upper Rhine, Meurthe, and Moselle."

Here follows the well-known proclamation.

To his Majesty the Emperor at the Palace of St. Cloud.

'Cerçay, July 27.

'Sire,—I learn that your Majesty will leave St. Cloud to-morrow; but being in the country there will not be time for me to go to St. Cloud. May your Majesty be graciously pleased to accept my sincere regret that I am not able to express in person my wishes and hopes on the occasion.

ROUHER.'

PUBLIC FEELING IN BERLIN AND GERMANY.

To Letellier, 16 *Quai Mégisserie, Paris.*

'Berlin, July 4.

'Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, proposed King of Spain, born 1831; brother of Charles of Roumania, nephew of the Marquis of Pepoli, and grandson of the Empress Josephine. Details follow letter. The definitive programme of the Catholic party says: "The maintenance of marriage according to ecclesiastical law, opposition to the centralised state, support of the Confederacy, &c. Diminution of the military expenses." At the banquet given to the soldiers of Sadowa by the Prussian Ladies' Committee, General Baron Troschke proposed the health of the King, and laid great stress on the importance of the King and Crown Prince having been decorated with the Russian Order of St. George.'

To Letellier, 16 *Quai Mégisserie, Paris.*

'Berlin, July 9.

'The *Correspondance de Berlin*, ministerial organ, expresses itself very peacefully. It says the Cortes alone would have to settle the matter, and the German people would respect the autonomy of the Spaniards, who have the power to decide for themselves and choose their King. The business world hopes Bismarck will dispose of the affair. French news about Luxembourg is incorrect. [Then follow some illegible words.]

VAUDENESSE.'

To Letellier, 16 *Quai Mégisserie, Paris.*

'King still at Ems. German *Chauvins* say the affair may be a second Olmütz to Prussia. The well-informed look upon the matter as settled. Bismarck will return to Varzin after having dispatched Eulenburg to Ems. Gortschakoff has started for St. Petersburg. Funds rising. It is reported that Prussia has required the dismissal of Gramont. *Kreuz Zeitung* says: "The question is, whether France wishes for war; if so, she will have all the Powers against her." It announces that Baden and Bavaria answered the Federal Circular in a conciliatory tone; Würtemberg tries evasion. This I believe. *Nord Deutsche Zeitung* says: "It will be quite interesting to see the French Cabinet beating a retreat." *Provinzial Correspondenz* complains of Gramont, and adds, the whole of Germany is ready. CORRES.'

To the 'Paris Journal' at Paris.

'Ems, July 14.

'The King leaves to-morrow. Chambers convened. Fruitless endeavours of the Ambassador to obtain a last meeting. Panic.

MARC FOURNIER.'

To the 'Correspondance Germania,' 31 Rue Fontaines, St. Georges, Paris.

'Munich, July 20.

'The patriotic party in the Chamber is determined not to grant a sous towards the mobilisation of the troops ordered by Prussia.

SIGL.

Editor of the Munich *Republican Vaterland.*'

PUBLIC FEELING IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

To Leonhardt, 1 Quai Mégisserie, Paris.

'Vienna, July 17.

'Papers nearly all anti-Prussian. Vengeance for 1866. Intelligence in the *Tagespresse* that Austria has given no declaration of neutrality either to Russia or any other State; but will observe neutrality, if not violated by others.

Beust will shortly proceed to Gastein. In South Germany the *casus fœderis* is by no means certain. The mobilisation of the troops is probably an act of precaution. Warren's *Weekly Journal* (Beust's personal organ) declares France to be the enemy of Prussia, but not at all of Germany.

MILOWICZ.'

The Prefect of the North to the Minister of the Interior and of War at Paris.

'Lille, July 18.

'Extract of a Report of the Commissioners of Baisieux: "The Belgian captain who blew up the two railway bridges between Blondain and Tournai was at once cashiered. The whole Belgian army is moving towards Antwerp and the Belgian frontier. They are full of enthusiasm, and would willingly try their strength against the Prussians, whom they abhor. Never since the existence of Belgium has such excitement been seen in the army. Travellers coming from Hanover state that an insurrection is impending there."'

To the Journal 'Presse,' New York.*

'Paris, July 20.

'The *Liberté* says: "Should Denmark ally herself with France, the Princes of Orleans would serve in the Danish army."'

'Basle, July 19.

'A general and several Swiss officers of rank arrested in Denmark. Reported—Prussia purposely refuses to answer the declaration of neutrality of Switzerland.

CRAMER.'

* Translated from English.

To Tarbé, Journal 'Gaulois,' 13 Helder, Paris.

'Metz, July 21.

'The day before yesterday the meeting put off. Luxembourg decidedly neutral, but with French leanings; for she has ordered that all the money at her disposal be employed for the destruction of the fortifications of Luxembourg, which might be disadvantageous to us, if we had to retreat to Metz. Neutrality of France and Prussia acknowledged and placarded in Luxembourg, where people can go in and out freely. Great difficulty in calling in the Prussian Landwehr. The men weep, are terribly afraid of the French, particularly of the Turcos; they have to be forcibly driven into the railway carriages. A false report in Luxembourg of the march of the French into Saarbrücken. Difficulties in sending off and receiving despatches. Intelligence from Herbinville, and your despatch received through Estor. Kind regards.

CHARLES MAREUIL.'

To the Editor of the 'Gaulois,' 13 Rue du Helder, at Paris.

'St. Gervais, July 23.

'The *Gaulois* of the 22d of July, which I have just received, asserts that the Roumanian Prussian spies at Châlons and Rheims had by them passports, furnished by the Roumanian agent in Paris. Should this prove true, the Roumanians will have reason to be grateful to the French Government, should they make use of strong measures against a Government who so dishonour the country they represent. Let those who draw up these passports—if they are the enemies of France—fight in the ranks of the Prussian army, or if their courage fail them, let them become spies; but let them not injure their country by giving the sanction of their official seal to such dishonest practices. I assert that the feelings of the Roumanians themselves are very different to those people we hear of, who—becoming secret agents of the Hohenzollerns—cease to defend the interests of Roumania. We shall not fail to prove this. I beg you to be good enough to publish my telegram.

GEORG STERIADI,
Formerly Secretary to the Roumanian Agency at Paris, under Prince Couza.'

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Lisbon.

'Paris, July 25.

'The Prince of La Tour d'Auvergne, on his entrance into Vienna, was received by the inhabitants with great applause. General Fleury remains in St. Petersburg, loaded with favours by the Czar. It is said that Berlin, with six other places, has been placed in a state of siege. It is asserted that Prevost-Paradol has committed suicide at Washington. Viscount Treilhard takes his post. French attack is not confirmed. Nothing new.

LANCASTRE.'

Mr. Leonhardt, Paris.

'Vienna, July 25.

'From private despatches we learn that, as the price of her adhesion to the Confederacy, the Prussian Government has promised Bavaria the North of Tyrol, Salzburg, and Upper Austria.

Warren's *Weekly Journal* says that the Vienna papers edited under Prussian auspices give a false idea of public opinion in Austria. The Austrian population are hostile to Prussia. The —— met on the 16th; the —— at the end of August. The —— in Pesth will be in the middle of September. The *Neu Fremdenblatt* announces that the Crown Prince commands the Southern Army, head-quarters Rastadt; Frederick Charles the Central, Hanover; Steinmetz the Northern Army, Coblenz; Falckenstein the Coast Army, Hanover. *New Press* despatch from Florence: "Vimercati leaves Vienna with an Austro-Italian-French proposal of alliance." *Morning Post*, *Neu Fremdenblatt*, *Tagespresse*, and *Morning Review* very friendly to France.

MILOWICZ.'

To General Türr, Paris, Rue Taitboux, Hôtel Espagne and Hongric.

'Pesth, July 27.

'The Hungarian newspapers receive all the telegrams from Berlin. If the French Government were to send telegrams daily to Pesth to Kapolnai, I would insert them. Very important question to gain over public opinion, now influenced by the Prussian telegrams, as well as the Vienna press in Prussia's pay. Be good enough to answer. KAPOLNAI.'

THE FLEET.

The Minister of Marine to the Sea-Prefect at Cherbourg.

'Paris, June 29.

'What have you in the way of boots, stockings, gloves, jackets, hats, &c. for an expedition to the North Sea?'

The Sea-Prefect to the Marine Minister.

'Cherbourg, June 30.

'For the troops in the North Sea there are in store the following articles: 340 woollen socks for sailors, the like number for the cabin-boys; seven pairs of sea-boots for sailors, 338 ditto for the cabin-boys; 45 under-vests for sailors, 571 ditto for the cabin-boys; 1,724 woollen gloves; 1,813 sou'-wester hats for sailors.'

The Chief of the Port to the Minister at Paris.

'Dunkirk, July 17.

'Packet-boats from Dunkirk go to St. Petersburg through the Sound, north of the island of Bornholm and Gothland only; their captains and

officers do not know the Baltic nor the German coast, except by this route, and do not consider themselves as capable of piloting the ships of war through these waters.'

The Sea-Prefect to the Head of the Admiralty at Paris.

'Cherbourg, July 21.

'The Danish and other special charts of the Baltic demanded by Admiral Bouet from Paris have not yet arrived. If not already on the road, please send them at once.'

The Port-Admiral to the Head of the Admiralty at Paris.

'Le Havre, July 22.

'There are no pilots in Havre who know the North Sea and the Baltic, and who would undertake to pilot our ships of war. Such might be found more easily at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. I have sent orders to Rouen. I am awaiting an answer.'

The Empress to the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Cherbourg, July 24.

'We have seen the squadron under sail; I accompanied it to the open sea. Great enthusiasm. It was glorious. I return to set off at once. Beautiful weather. EUGENIE.'

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

To Herrn Beucke, Mayor of Seltz, Lower Rhine.

'Paris, July 8.

'Send an intelligent man to Rastadt across the Rhine, and telegraph to me what the Baden pontonniers are doing.

DE LEUSSE, Deputy, 16 Avenue de Villers.'

The Prefect of the Lower Rhine to the Minister of the Interior and of War, Paris.

'Strasburg, July 17.

'Would it not be advisable to organise and arm a solid National Guard in Strasburg and the principal towns, and turn out suspicious workmen and strangers?'

Countess Montijo, Caza del Angel at Madrid.

(REGISTERED.). 'St. Cloud, July 17.

'Louis will in a few days go to the army with his father. I wish you to send him your blessing before his departure. Do not be uneasy. I am perfectly quiet. He must do his duty, and bring honour to his name. I write to you by post. EUGENIE.'

To the Emperor Napoleon III., St. Cloud.

'Clermont-Ferrand, July 18.

'Grant me an audience, and I will place at your disposal an infallible and immediate means of conquering the Prussians. MAUDEMENT.'

To Reuter, London.

'It is said Wimpffen left for Berlin yesterday evening with the declaration of war. The Empress will be the head of the Regency during the absence of the Emperor, as during the Italian war. It is positively asserted the Imperial Prince will accompany the Emperor. King George is expected at Paris, to form a Hanoverian Legion. General Failly in Bitsche, Moselle; Bazaine in Metz. Trains are constantly forwarding troops to Metz, Nancy, Strasburg, Mülhausen, Thionville. All regiments of the line have now left Paris.

Admiral Dieudonné, with five ironclads, leaves Cherbourg on Saturday. The French troops assembled near the frontier are estimated at 250,000. The *Peuple Français* says it will be about a fortnight before the whole army can be collected for the intended operations. HAVAS.'

The Prefect of the Lower Rhine to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Strasburg, July 18.

'Please send me 4,000f. for the secret police. For the last week I have been obliged to have people on both sides the Rhine, to watch the enemy.'

The Prince of Monaco to her Majesty the Empress at St. Cloud.

'Château de Marchais, July 19.

'Some days ago my father, the Prince, requested of the Emperor as a favour that I might be appointed lieutenant on board one of the men-of-war, or that I might join Admiral de la Gravière. Having received no answer, and being desirous of immediately taking part in the war, I beseech your Majesty to remind the Emperor of my request, that I may forthwith report myself, and receive his orders. ALBERT, Hereditary Prince.'

The General of the 4th Division to the Minister of War.

'Châlons, July 20.

'Numbers of Hanoverians will pledge themselves to serve during the war on the Rhine, but not to go to Africa. Can they be draughted into the legion which, according to the papers, is assembling at Besançon, or shall they be placed in some French regiment until the arrival of the foreign legion?'

To the Journal 'Presse' in New York.*

'Paris, July 20 (evening).

'*Liberté* asserts that Vimercati has started for Florence with the Treaty of Alliance between France and Italy. A rich manufacturer of Mülhausen will equip and maintain a body of 500 volunteers during the war.

Deputies from the Upper and Lower Rhine, the Moselle, and Meurthe learn the movements of the Prussian army through the telegraph. They say Bismarck is very uneasy at the dilatoriness with which the Landwehr assembles. CRAMER.'

From the Minister of the Interior to the Sous-Prefects of Pontarlier, Doubs.

'Paris, July 20.

'Permit the Barons Freidrich von Düring and Arnold von Reding to move about as they please.'

To his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

PRIVATE. 'St. Germain, July 21.

'I beseech your Majesty, notwithstanding your important occupations, to grant me another audience, on account of the new and particular details I have to relate respecting the arrival of Bismarck and the King in Paris.

AVENEL.'

From the Sous-Prefect to the Ministers of War, for Foreign Affairs, and of the Interior, at Paris, and to the Prefects at Strasburg.

'Wissembourg, July 21.

'From a communication which I have just received from a Bavarian, a Frenchman born, and the husband of a Frenchwoman, who assures me of his hatred to Prussia, it appears that to-night a corps of from 14,000 to 16,000 Prussians, by means of the Bavarian railway, are to be forwarded to Schaidt, and, marching through the woods between Salmbach and Nieder-Lauterbach, to enter French territory. The gentleman from whom this communication proceeds says that he became acquainted with this plan from a conversation, conducted in a low voice, between two Prussian officers and a Bavarian forester. The number of Bavarian light horsemen in Schweigen is increasing every moment.'

From the General of Division to the Minister of War at Paris.

'Marseilles, July 21.

'The Consul of the United States announces that several of his countrymen wish to enter the French army. What shall I answer?'

From the Prefect of the Lower Rhine to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

'Strasburg, July 21.

'Have you received the despatch in cipher from Count Mosburg which I sent off yesterday evening, and is that the despatch you expected? The

* Translated from English.

messenger was exposed to great danger; he was searched, maltreated, and threatened with death. What legal amends can I make him? I propose 300f.'

From the Sous-Prefect to the Minister of War, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, and to the Prefects at Strasburg.

'Wissembourg, July 21.

'What measures would be best to take against the Badeners and Bavarians who are now, under various pretexts, travelling about the provinces, especially along the Rhine?'

From the Prefect of the Haute-Marne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Chaumont, July 21.

'A Hanoverian refugee, living in Haute-Marne, demands a passport and money for travelling expenses, intending to go to Paris to join the Hanoverian Legion. May I give him the passport? It is probable that many Hanoverians will prefer the same request.'

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*To the Minister of War, Paris.** 'Trieste, July 21.

'I have a new mechanical apparatus, patented in Austria, applicable to all electric fluids, allowing [two illegible words] any one to telegraph at any moment. I consider it right to recommend the same to the French Government, that they may be able to command the electric power whenever they will. Pray instruct the French Consul. BOCCARDI MORPURGO.'

To M. Pietri, Private Secretary of the Emperor at the Tuileries.

'St. Cloud, July 22.

'This evening I shall send you a communication respecting the events of the 19th. Bank of the Netherlands sends 221,500,000f., the house of Offroy 400,000f., and advices from the house of Rothschild inform us they will forward 7,000,000f. this evening to Belgium. MARIANI.'

From the Chief of the Staff to the Emperor, Paris.

'Metz, July 26.

'I have received the following intelligence from General Frossard. At least 60,000 men are marching from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle to Trèves and the country beyond the Saar. They will arrive there to-day, 26th. The Prussians are in good order. The Bavarians will certainly not be armed with the new weapons. The country is all astir.' (Ciphers follow.)

To the Newspaper 'Gironde,' Bordeaux. 'Metz, July 28.

'Acts of violence from the Prussians on the frontiers towards the French. The surveyor of the ironworks at Ars gashed all over with stabs from

* Translated from Italian.

knives; magistrates, merchants on their return from Firenznach, arrested, abused, have reached this place with difficulty. Frontier villages request arms. The young men of Metz wish to form a National Guard—praiseworthy but useless zeal. Railway service in admirable activity; regular communication between Luxemburg, Thionville; spies arrested; fortresses Metz, Bitsch, Thionville. Landwehr from Saarbrück marched out unwillingly; wish for a French garrison.'

From the Sous-Prefect to the Prefects in Vannes, and to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Lorient (without date).

'Two Prussians—Dr. Lothar Heffter and the chemist George Schneider[c]—have been in Port Louis the last ten days, under the pretext of sardelles-fishing, and were rowed out to sea in front of the fortifications. They must have arrived at Paris—one early yesterday, the other this morning. They come from Berlin, provided with a pass visé by our Ambassador there.'

SECOND SERIES, FROM 8TH TO 14TH OF JULY.

MANIFESTATIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE IN FAVOUR OF THE WAR.

From the Prefect of the Eastern Pyrenees to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Perpignan, July 8.

'The bold demeanour the Imperial Government has assumed upon the Prince of Hohenzollern becoming a candidate for the throne of Spain has made a very good impression in Perpignan. All parties have by this time agreed to do homage to the truly French energy displayed by the Government. This universal applause may perhaps not be lasting; for the Republicans blindly follow the suggestions received from Paris, and often blame one day what they approve the next. Be this as it may, the thing is applauded by the immense majority; and if we are to have war, the Government will not only be supported, but even driven to it by public opinion. The numerous Spaniards now living in the Pyrenees are not more favourable to the Prussian Prince than are the French. It may be taken for granted, that on the other side of the frontier the same feelings predominate; at least, travellers from Barcelona tell us as much. They do not think that Marshal Prim will be able to force his candidate on Spain.'

From the Prefect of the Mouth of the Rhone to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Marseilles, July 9.

'Public opinion in the town of Marseilles is perfectly favourable to the declaration of the Government, and approves their attitude. War will be

* Well-known naturalists, advanced Liberals, and opponents to the existing Administration.

accepted without disapproval. The trading world, thinking that sooner or later a conflict is unavoidable, wish for the speedy termination of a state of things which has for a long time past oppressed business. Apart from the question of trade, war with Prussia would be exceedingly popular, national feeling completely agreeing with the politics of the Imperial Government. The speeches of the Ministers in the Chamber have been for the last two days received in society and in places of public resort with tokens of sympathy.'

From the Prefect of Corsica to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Ajaccio, July 10.

'Public opinion applauds the declaration of Government on the Spanish question, whatever the consequences of the same may be.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Limoges, July 11.

'Public opinion shows itself more and more favourable to the attitude the Government has assumed towards Prussia. With extreme anxiety the solution of this important question is awaited.'

To the 'Journal de Bordeaux.'

'Paris, July 11.

'The delay requested by the King of Prussia renders the situation particularly exciting. The "Marseillaise" was yesterday distributed among the different military bands of the troops in Paris.

Yesterday evening the Rente closed on the Boulevard Exchange at 67f. 90c. It is believed the French Government has required guarantees to secure the inviolability of the Treaty of Prague. RICHER.'

From the Prefect of the Loiret to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Orleans, July 15.

'The *Journal du Loiret* publishes a despatch from Paris, which announces that war is declared. Patriotic feeling runs high in Orleans. Universal confidence and *élan*. The cafés are hung with flags and Imperial banners. A communication from the Imperial Government is expected.'

From the Prefect of the Loiret to the Minister of the Interior.

'Orleans, July 15 (evening).

'I received your circular at 9 o'clock, and with the approbation of the Mayor of Orleans have had it read by the head of the police by torchlight, in the principal squares of the town. The crowd was immense. The enthusiasm found vent in the patriotic cry, "Long live the Emperor!" The circular will be posted up to-morrow as early as possible.'

The Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Digne, July 15.

'The cessation of the negotiations is most earnestly desired; public opinion is always more and more in favour of war, and would not be satisfied by the mere renunciation of the Prussian Prince. The last declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been very coldly received, which causes a feeling of disappointment. On the other hand, the order to march has produced a very good impression. The Government may be assured of public approbation, if they show themselves energetic and exacting.

Such a grand effect has never been before produced in the country.'

The Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Dijon, July 15.

'The declaration of war against Prussia has been received with immense enthusiasm at Dijon. An enormous crowd ran to the Prefecture, shouting, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "*A bas les Prussiens!*" and in this way they rushed through the whole town. The citizens and all parties were represented in this crowd. Not the least disorder was observable.'

From the Sous-Prefect to the Prefects at Quimper, and to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Brest, July 15.

'The communication of the Government, which I have had copied and posted on the door of the Sous-Prefecture, was read aloud by one of the inhabitants by gas-light, and received with shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*"'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Rennes, July 15.

'This evening, to the beating of drums, there was a patriotic demonstration. An immense crowd, consisting principally of students and workmen, proceeded to the barracks with drums and trumpets, shouting, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The inhabitants fraternised with the soldiers, who are most enthusiastic. Sailors who passed through the town to-day have been most warmly received; they were conducted to the station, where they were greeted with loud hurrahs.'

From the Prefect of Aube to the Minister of the Interior in Paris.

'Troyes, July 15.

'The declaration of the Government has been received by the inhabitants of the town of Troyes with the warmest enthusiasm.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

PRIVATE CIPHER. 'Tarbes, July 15.

'A telegram of the *Havas* announces the declaration of war. The inhabitants manifest the most unexampled enthusiasm, and entreat me to give them more news.'

From the Prefect of Meurthe to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Nancy, July 15.

'The news of the declaration of war against Prussia, anticipated beforehand, has been received with patriotic enthusiasm in Nancy. All the squares swarm with the inhabitants; the schoolboys, the workmen run about the town singing the "Marseillaise," and crying out "Long live the Emperor!" The old patriotism of the Lorrainer is awakened; the demonstrations become more enthusiastic every minute.'

To the Newspaper 'Le Gaulois,' Paris.

'Havre, July 15.

'Glorious anti-Prussian demonstrations. 3,000 people are astir and on foot in Havre. No disorder. BAZIGNAN.'

To the 'Havas,' 31 J. J. Rousseau, Paris.

'Havre, July 16.

'The declaration of war taken up with great warmth, drums beating, soldiers enthusiastically received by the inhabitants, wreaths. Yesterday demonstrations in front of Prussian Consulate. Cries of "Down with Bismarck!" "Long live the Emperor!" ALEXANDRE.'

From the Prefect of Aisne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Laon, July 16.

'The great news of the day has been received by the inhabitants with the most fervid patriotism.'

From the Prefect of the Isère to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Grenoble, July 16.

'Yesterday evening, from 9 to 11 o'clock, crowds of people paraded the streets of Grenoble, singing verses of the "Marseillaise," and shouting "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "*Vive la guerre!*" "Down with Bismarck!"'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Melun, July 16.

'The declaration of the Government and the vote of the Legislative body have been well received by the inhabitants of Melun.'

The Prefect of the Haute-Garonne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Toulouse, July 16.

'I have had your telegrams printed, and posted up all over the place. The behaviour of the inhabitants of Toulouse is excellent. Yesterday evening warlike songs were sung in the theatre and the streets, without the least disturbance.'

From the Procurator-General to the Minister of Justice, Paris.

'Toulouse, July 16.

'The energetic resolve of the Government has been received with unbounded enthusiasm and outbursts of patriotic feeling in Toulouse, which last night reached its climax. Great enthusiasm, without the least disturbance. The Imperial Government has never been so popular.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior.

'Chaumont, July 16.

'There was a demonstration yesterday evening against Prussia. A numerous body of people of all classes assembled at 9 o'clock before the town-hall, and, accompanied by an immense crowd, went to the Prefecture, singing the "Marseillaise" and the "Girondins." When the Prefect—who had the gates opened—appeared, there resounded loud shouts of applause from all sides, and cries of "*Vive la France!*" "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "Down with Prussia!" I hear that a similar demonstration occurred at St. Dizier.'

To the Newspaper 'Gaulois' at Paris.

'Dunkerque, July 16.

'The Prussian squadron on its way to the North Sea was seen off Dunkerque. The declaration of war received here with great enthusiasm.

'PAULEUX.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Auch, July 16.

'Public feeling has been excited for some days. The whole country has been awaiting the declarations of the Government with great agitation. Those published yesterday have been received at Gers with patriotic enthusiasm.'

From the Prefect of Lot to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Cahors, July 16.

'The declaration of war against Prussia received at Cahors with the shout of "Long live the Emperor!" Genuine enthusiasm. Despatches published and sent into all parts of the department.'

From the Prefect of Mayenne to the Minister of the Interior.

'Laval, July 16.

'I have had yesterday's declaration of the Cabinet of the Legislative body posted up in all parts of my department, as well as the numerous resolutions passed by that assembly. The declaration of the Cabinet is well received in Mayenne; the war is considered necessary, called forth by the provocation given by Prussia.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Maçon, July 16.

'The communication the Government made yesterday to the Chambers has been very well received throughout the department.

When read aloud in different places of public resort, loud applause followed, and shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*"'

From the Prefect of the Rhone to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Lyons, July 16.

'Indignation and wrath against Prussia. The attitude of the Government highly approved; complete confidence; this is the true expression of public feeling in Lyons.'

From the Prefect of Meurthe to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Nancy, July 16.

'A battalion of the 60th, accompanied to the station by an immense crowd on their way to Metz. Both the army and the populace display indescribable enthusiasm.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Limoges, July 16.

'The ministerial despatch sent last night produced a stirring and patriotic effect this morning. A warlike solution was expected. It was even wished. This evening much life in the streets, without shouting; no unfavourable demonstrations.'

From the Prefect of the Mouth of the Rhone to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Marseilles, July 16.

'Exchange this day, Three per Cents, 66f. 50c.; Italian, 49f. 50c.

The war has been received with an enthusiasm never before known in these parts. Crowds of people traversed the principal streets yesterday, singing the "Marseillaise" and shouting "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "*Vive la guerre!*" "*A Berlin!*" They stopped before the monastery of the Jesuit Fathers, and abused and insulted the whole community in the person of the Director, Father Tissié. In the Casino and the Alcazar the "Marseillaise" and the "War March" were sung on the stage, flag in hand. A patriotic piece has been announced for this evening. I shall station a watch at the Prussian Consulate, it having at midnight been the object of hostile demonstrations.'

From the Prefect of the North to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Lille, July 17.

'The same patriotic manifestations in the whole department, especially at Valenciennes, Lille, Cambrai, and Dunkerque; the army full of fiery zeal.'

From the Prefect of Mayenne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Laval, July 17 (second telegram).

'Immediate.—The intelligence which I receive from the different towns of the department is astonishing. The greater portion of the population approve the war. They write me that such a national, popular war is far

preferable to an armed peace. In the large central localities most enthusiastic demonstrations. I will let you know exactly the impressions made on public feeling.'

From the Prefect of Aisne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Laon, July 17.

'Continued good news about the opinions of the inhabitants, especially in St. Quentin. Yesterday many of the most considerable farmers of their own accord offered their horses, should circumstances be such as to require them.'

From the Special Commissary to the Minister of the Interior and the Police President at Paris, as also to the Prefect at Arras.

'Boulogne, July 17.

'The publication of the declaration of war has been received with the greatest enthusiasm. Captains of English steamboats coming from the Thames assure me that the Prussian squadron sailed yesterday from the Downs and went northwards.'

To M. Dalloz, Director of the 'Moniteur,' 13 Quai Voltaire, Paris.

'Bordeaux, July 17.

'Last night, at 8 o'clock, 4,000 persons went to the Prefecture, and sang the "Marseillaise" chorus of Girondin; the Prefect harangued the multitude three times from the balcony, gave them a flag, when they shouted "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "*Vive l'Armée!*" Singing continued till midnight. GRALEY.'

The Prefect to the Minister of the Interior.

'Clermont-Ferrand, July 19.

'At the last two evenings' proclamations a great number of young people were present, shouting "*A Berlin!*" "*A bas la Prusse!*" "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The like proclamations at Ambert and other localities. The District Council at Thiers voted an address to the Emperor.'

From the Prefect of Gard to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Nimes, July 19.

'Addresses voted by the District Council of Uzès and the Municipal Council of Alais. Important demonstration in the mines of Bessèges. Three thousand persons accompanied the soldiers to the station, led by the Mayors of the Canton, the delegates of the city, and the directors of companies. Patriotic shouts. Collection of 300f. for the soldiers.'

From the Minister of Justice to his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, July 20.

'The budget was voted to-day, but there are several laws which will make a sitting necessary to-morrow. I have suspended the *Cloche* and the *Réveil*. But in my opinion the police accounts exaggerate the revolutionary danger. I rather see a tendency in favour of war in certain quarters. I have convoked the Council at half-past nine to-morrow at St. Cloud.

EMILE OLLIVIER.'

The Minister of Justice to his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, July 22.

'One cry of admiration prevails at the manifesto of your Majesty; the effect is most satisfactory—unusually so. I shall be at St. Cloud at nine o'clock this evening. EMILE OLLIVIER.'

From the Prefect of Aisne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Laon, July 22.

'The war companies of the garrison have just left Laon; the whole population repaired to the station; their departure was effected in the midst of enthusiastic demonstrations.'

From the Prefect of Herault to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Montpellier, July 23.

'Prodigious manifestations yesterday evening at Montpellier. More than 12,000 persons sang in chorus the "Marseillaise" and patriotic songs at the departure of the 87th Regiment of the Line and the detachment of the 2d Génies. Indescribable enthusiasm.'

From the Prefect of Haute-Garonne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Toulouse, July 23.

'The Emperor's proclamation was remarkably well received in Toulouse. It has been sent to all the communes; the feeling in general excellent.'

From the Prefect of the East Pyrenees to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Perpignan, July 23.

'The proclamation of the Emperor to the French people, which I have had printed and immediately posted up, has been received with enthusiasm. Every one is delighted at the departure of the Imperial Prince.'

From the Prefect of Aisne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Laon, July 24.

'The feeling in Aisne unusually good; the proclamation of the Emperor has been excellently received; the enthusiasm increases and becomes daily more universal.'

From the Prefect of Vaucluse to the Minister of the Interior.

'Avignon, July 23.

'The Emperor's proclamation has been read with eagerness, and has made a great impression.'

From the Prefect of the North to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Lille, July 24.

'The news which reaches me from all parts of the department speaks of the great impression made by the Emperor's proclamation. This general

impression again proves how entirely the Emperor is master of a clear, simple, and pithy language, in accordance with the logic and feeling of the masses.'

From the Prefect of the Mouth of the Rhone to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Marseilles, July 24.

'The Emperor's proclamation has since yesterday been read with eagerness in the streets; its effect in every respect is complete. The enthusiasm in Marseilles continues; patriotic subscriptions flow in largely. With the exception of some small disturbances when the troops were marching off, all goes on well.'

From the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Gueret, July 24.

'The Imperial proclamation immediately published and posted up. Universal approbation, patriotic enthusiasm. The Empress and the Imperial Prince share the warm admiration of the public.'

Third Series.

This series contains a large number of congratulatory addresses to the Emperor, voted by the District Councils (a sort of departmental parliaments) on the declaration of war. As they all closely resemble each other, we select only a few:

To his Majesty the Emperor at Paris.

'Mauléon, July 18.

'The District Council of Mauléon (Lower Pyrenees) consider it their duty to become the interpreter of the patriotic feelings of the Basque population, and congratulate the Emperor and his Government on their noble and courageous bearing towards a nation whose insolent conduct requires chastisement. God defend the Emperor and our arms!'

From the Sous-Prefect to the Minister of the Interior at Paris.

'Marmande, July 18.

'The District Council has determined to send the following address to his Majesty Napoleon III.:

"Sire,—The District Council of Marmande, filled with enthusiasm at the dignified and patriotic line of policy pursued by your Majesty on the occasion of the opening of Parliament, cannot resist the expression of their warmest feeling and sincere hopes that our arms may be triumphant, and that your Majesty may long be preserved to us. Long live the Emperor!"'

The Prefect of Orne to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Alençon, July 18.

'The District Assemblies in the towns of Alençon, Argentan, and Mortagne have determined to forward their congratulations and grateful thanks to the Emperor, the Senate, and the Legislative body. The members, before separating, have subscribed the following sums for the army: the District Council of Alençon, 600f.; the District Council of Argentan, 260f.; of Mortagne, 400f.'

To the Emperor at Paris.

'Compiègne, July 18.

'The District Council of Compiègne, and also the Sous-Préfet, wish to convince the Emperor before the opening of the session of the patriotic feelings which inspire the population they represent. To avenge the insult done to France and secure rapid and complete triumph to our arms they are ready to make any sacrifice. The Emperor may in this difficult position of affairs more than ever rely upon our devoted loyalty.'

From the Sous-Préfet to the Minister of the Interior, Paris.

'Sedan, July 18.

'The District Council at Sedan have adopted the following resolution:

"Before entering upon the affairs which relate to the arrondissement, the council hasten to express their unqualified approbation of the firm and bold attitude the Government has assumed under the difficult circumstances in which the country is placed. Every patriotic Frenchman acknowledges that, notwithstanding her love of peace, France could no longer put up with the insolent and offensive language of the Prussian Government, without forfeiting her honour and being humiliated in the eyes of all Europe.

Under these circumstances, every constituted body, especially such as are elected by the voice of the people, ought to lend their powerful and unconditional assistance. The District Council of the frontier, whose love for their country is proverbial, would regard it as a gross dereliction of duty if they did not with all their heart sympathise in the patriotic demonstration of the nation and the great Legislative bodies of the kingdom. They hope that the God of France will stand by her in this combat, which she has been compelled to undertake to maintain her honour and the cause of right and justice."'

The District Council and the Sous-Préfet of Epernay to the Emperor.

'Epernay, July 10.

'Sire,—The great Legislative bodies have given to your Majesty and the nation proof of their sincere and active coöperation. It now is the duty of the Assemblies in the provinces to assure you that the whole country belongs both heart and soul to the Emperor and the army. We thank you, Sire, for desiring that France should remain for ever *la grande nation*. The population of the district of Epernay have preserved entire those fervid patriotic feelings which have inspired them during our past campaigns. We, who live among them, are the true interpreters of their sentiments when we assure the Emperor that he may demand any sacrifice of them. We know that the sol-

diers of the Second Empire, the combatants of the Crimea and Italy, will show themselves worthy of their fathers, and in this new Prussian campaign know how to emulate the heroic deeds of Jena and Auerstadt.

A. BARBIER.'

From the Town-Council of Réthel to his Majesty the Emperor of the French.

'Réthel, July 19.

'Sire,—For four years has the policy of Prussia threatened the interests of France, and very recently the insult offered to our Ambassador has outraged the feelings of the whole country. As the chief of a great nation, and as one earnestly jealous of her honour and her rights, you could not allow such excessive ambition and such infamous conduct to pass unnoticed. You have declared war. All France is ready to support you, and the Common Council of Réthel would be wanting in their duty to you, if they did not hasten to express their patriotic feelings.

REBEROTTE LEBESSE, Mayor; VAUCHER, Deputy; JOLY, RETEF, PURNOT, DE BELLEMONT, LESSIEUX, DIVIER, PIREAU, MARECHAL, PRONAIT, FAYNOT, HUBIGNON, Town-Councillors.

FOURTH SERIES.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Mercier of Lostende, French Ambassador at Madrid.

'Paris, July 7.

'In spite of Marshal Prim's circular, and the communication just received from M. Olozaga, we have too much confidence in the right feeling of the Spanish nation to suppose that they will insist upon solving the question in a way so detrimental to our interests, and derogatory to our dignity. We shall therefore continue to maintain the same friendly demeanour, and watch the Spanish frontier as closely as is necessary to keep away from that peninsula everything that could disturb its peace. We shall remain to the last true to our former sympathies, and certainly we shall not be the first to rend asunder the bond so dear to us, and which we fondly hoped was indissoluble.

GRAMONT.'

The Minister of State to the Spanish Ambassador, Paris.

'Madrid, July 8.

'Your Excellency will contradict the statement, that the nomination of Prince Leopold (Hohenzollern) was conceived in a feeling antagonistic either to France or to the French Government. You will also contradict the statement, that General Prim has applied to Count Bismarck in order to obtain the consent of the King of Prussia. The negotiations were exclusively with Prince Leopold, without any communication on our part on the subject with Count Bismarck.'

Circular Despatch of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of France abroad.

'Paris, July 9.

'Be good enough to draw the attention of the members of the Government to which you are accredited to the fact that we require nothing but what in similar cases has been recognised as the established right of European nations. Our principles are those which, in 1831, were vindicated by the great Powers when the Duke de Nemours was nominated King of Belguim; those which, in 1862, were indicated by France and Russia in Greece, when Prince Alfred was chosen King of the Hellenes; those which, in 1862, united England and France in reference to the Duke of Leuchtenberg, the Russian candidate for the throne of Greece; those which the Emperor Napoleon III. himself made use of on the occasion of the nomination of Prince Murat to the throne of Naples.

We cannot understand that we should be refused the advantage of a doctrine which the Powers have already sanctioned and accepted.

GRAMONT.'

To Marshal Prim, Madrid.

'Sigmaringen, July 12.

'Considering the difficulties the nomination of my son Leopold to the Spanish throne encounters; considering also the painful situation in which late occurrences have placed the Spanish nation, leaving it no alternative but to consult its own feeling of independence; and being convinced that under existing circumstances its vote could not be so sincere and unbiased as my son had reason to expect it would be when he became a candidate for the throne, I herewith withdraw his candidature in his name.

Prince of HOHENZOLLERN.'

From the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Prince of La Tour d'Auvergne, Vichy.

'Paris, July 14.

'The Emperor inquires if you are ready to go to Vienna immediately.

GRAMONT.'

PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE.

To his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, June 30.

'I know nothing of this abominable article. The matter shall be investigated to-morrow. To-day there was a fierce debate in the Chamber between Jules Favre and myself about the army. Le Bœuf spoke well. Thiers interrupted us, apparently for us; but I do not approve of that sort of defence.

EMILE OLLIVIER.'

To his Excellency the Ambassador of the North German Confederation, Paris.

'Le Havre, July 16.

'Hostile demonstrations, which will be still more marked this evening if I do not take down the Royal arms. I have seen the Sous-Prefect and the authorities, who fear if a disturbance break out, they may not be able to con-

trol the multitude. To avoid an unnecessary conflict, I intend to take down the arms, and I reckon on your consent.

LANGE,
Consul of the North German Confederation, Havre.'

From the Minister of Justice to the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'Paris, July 18.

'The Chamber has unanimously accepted all your propositions.

The intrigue for the prolongation of the Chamber with Drôlle and Duvernois at the head has obtained as yet but forty-five signatures, and I believe they will get no more. I suppose the Chamber will close in the evening of the day after to-morrow. I shall assemble my colleagues at noon.

EMILE OLLIVIER.'

From the Keeper of the Seals to his Reverence the Bishop of Constantine, Aix-les-Bains.

'Paris, July 22.

'Prayers, yes; Te Deum, no. Thanks for your letter.

EMILE OLLIVIER.'

To his Majesty the Emperor at St. Cloud.

'St. Germain-en-Laye, July 16.

'The undersigned begs an audience of his Majesty to-day in order to inform him of a journey *incognito* undertaken by Count Bismarck and two Prussian Ministers, and of a meeting which then took place between one of the French deputies and Count Bismarck.

Your most obedient humble servant, AVENEL, Professor,
12 Rue St. Thomas, St. Germain.'

From the Minister of the Interior to the Prefects.

CIRCULAR. 'Paris, July 22.

'A certain number of German subjects living in France have been called home to serve in the reserve or Landwehr. I communicate to you the orders calling them in. They must not be allowed to quit France to take up arms against her. In France they will be protected by the law and by you, if they continue to show themselves worthy* of it. If, on the contrary, they allow themselves to be stirred up to undertake anything against the security of the State, it will be your duty to prevent them, and you are to take care and let me know of it. CHEVANDIER DE VALDROME.'

PUBLIC OPINION IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

To the Duke of Gramont, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

'Cleve (Prussia), July 10.†

'In consequence of your speech (declaration of the 6th) in the Legislative body, the rifle battalion was immediately put on a war footing in Cleve.

* A fortnight later all the Germans were driven out of France.

† The original of this telegram is in German.

To-morrow they will march off from head-quarters. Unusual enthusiasm on the shooting-ground. Town decked with flags.'

From the Prefect of the North to the Ministers of the Interior and of War, Paris.

'Lille, July 13.

'Thinking it might be useful, I send you the following letter of the Sous-Prefect of Valenciennes, which contains several reports. It is good that the Government should know them. I communicate the letter to General L'Admirault.

This morning there were reports that the Belgian Government had sent soldiers to Quiévrain to protect the frontier. I sent a reliable person to Quiévrain; he returned with the following intelligence: Twenty-five men of the Belgian *Génie* have been at Quiévrain since yesterday, to blow-up, they say, the railway-bridge at a moment's notice. 1,500 troops are expected at the same place. The presence of the twenty-five soldiers is certain; the rest is only rumour.'

FLEET.

From the Admiralty to the Head of the Naval Department, Dunkerque.

'Paris, July 7.

'I have given orders in Auzon to send you, till farther notice, 300 tons of coal every day.

Hire as many coasting vessels as you can, to deliver the coal as quickly as possible in Cherbourg, and pack as much as you can in your dépôt. Send me an account of the arrangements when complete.'

From the Admiralty to M. Beau, Director of Mines at Grande Combe.

'Paris, July 7.

'Make such arrangements that you can deliver daily, till farther notice, 150 tons of combustibles; even as much as 200 tons would be acceptable. Send an answer.'

From the Admiralty to M. Bonnet, Naval Agent, 32 Rue de Lille, Valenciennes.

'Paris, July 7.

'Communicate with M. de Marcilly, to whom I will telegraph that he shall send daily 300 tons of combustibles at the very least. Reply by telegraph.'

From the Admiralty to M. de Marcilly, the Director of Mines at Auzon.

'Paris, July 7.

'You must be ready to send daily to Dunkerque 300 tons of coal, and even more if you can. Reply by telegraph.'

From the Sea Prefect to the Admiralty, Paris.

'Cherbourg, July 8.

'The Marne is fitted up expressly to receive troops. In the upper battery the horses of superior officers might be placed. This would have to be arranged, and require some time and work.'

From the Naval Commissary to the Admiralty, Paris.

'Boulogne, July 12.

'In Boulogne at this present moment there are neither captains nor mates of coasting vessels who could pilot vessels in the North Sea and the Baltic. I know only of one old sailor, whom I have already mentioned to the Port Admiral at Dunkerque, who would be able to act as pilot in the Baltic Sea.'

To the Journal 'La Sarthe,' at Le Mans.

'Paris, July 13.

'The Prussian squadron has disappeared. It is feared they are going to inflict a blow at Copenhagen and in Jutland.'

From the Port Admiral to the Admiralty, Paris.

'Dunkerque, July 18.

'Most of the captains of the sous-arrondissements are gone on fishing excursions to Iceland and Scotland.

Among those now here whom I have seen there is not one competent to act as pilot of the navy in the Baltic Sea.'

To De Pène, 2 Rue Favart, Paris.

'Brest, July 18.

'Population quiet. The Admiralty has written that the fishing-smacks are to be protected during the war. I have other news to relate, but it is impossible to telegraph it. Prussian squadron is in Torbay; an engagement imminent. Yesterday the roadstead of Brest was placed in a state of defence. The navy delighted at the important *rôle* they have to play in this campaign.'

From the Empress to the Emperor, Paris.

'Cherbourg, July 24.

'On board the Savoie. I arrived in good health, and was received with enthusiasm. The proclamation was received with shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" I shall accompany the squadron out to sea a short distance, and return at the hour stated. I embrace you both. EUGENIE.'

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

To the 'Presse' Newspaper, Vienna. 'Paris, July 7.

'Immense activity in the War Department. Regiments recalled to France from Algiers. Soldiers on furlough called back to join the forces.

HOFF.'

From the Minister of War to the Marshal Governor-General of Algeria, Algiers. 'Paris, July 9.

'Will you order the Generals in command of infantry corps in the provinces of Algeria to have lists prepared, without the least delay, containing proposals for appointments to the rank of captain, lieutenant, second lieutenant, adjutant of the regiment, paymaster, army clothier, under-paymaster, and ensign. The Generals to send me these lists in the shortest possible time.'

To General Frossard, Commander-in-Chief of the Camp of Châlons.

'Paris, July 14.

(Two lines of cipher, followed by these words): 'If you have any desire to keep the command of your army corps, answer me. NAPOLEON.'

To his Excellency the Naval Minister, Paris.

'St. Cloud, July 16.

'I beg you to hand over to the War Department the twenty-five mitrailleuses which you have had made. I require them greatly.

I see that the squadron has sailed. What orders have been given? We cannot begin hostilities until war is declared. NAPOLEON.'

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*To the Countess of Montijo, Madrid.**

'St. Cloud, July 18.

'Thank you, dear grandmamma, for your telegram. I hope it will bring me luck. I write by post to-day. LOUIS NAPOLEON.'

BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

From the Intendant-General to the Minister of War, Paris.

'Metz, July 20.

'In Metz there is neither sugar nor coffee, rice, brandy, salt; but little bacon and biscuit. Send me at once at least a million rations *viâ* Thionville.'

* In consequence of the Empress Eugénie's request, Countess Montijo sent her grandson, the Imperial Prince, her blessing.

From Marshal Bazaine to the Minister of War, Paris.

'Metz, July 20.

'I have received the following notice: "The Prussians mean to fight a decisive battle between this town and Coblentz."

The troops live sparely, and fear it will become even worse.

Opinion in Prussia in fear of a long war, which would ruin the country, and in two or three months throw it into complete confusion. The Prussians place their cripples in the bureaux, and order all ablebodied men from nineteen to thirty-six years to march out.

Sugar and coffee are rare in Metz; it is important the Parisian tradesmen should send supplies immediately. BAZAINE.'

From the Chief of the Commissariat to the Minister of War, Paris.

'Metz, July 24.

'The 3d Corps will leave Metz entirely to-morrow. I have neither attendants to nurse the sick, nor administrative clerks, nor ambulances, field-stoves, baggage-wagons, weighing-machines. In the 4th Division and the Cavalry Division I have no officials at all. I beg your Excellency to help me out of this difficulty: the great head-quarters cannot come to my assistance, although there are more than ten officials there.'

From the Chief of the Commissariat to the Minister of War, Paris.

'Metz, July 24.

'Metz, which has to supply the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th corps, has neither biscuit nor oats. Send at once 3,000 kilogrammes to this place; they are wanted by the 18th. Hasten the supply of oats. Hay is wanting: impossible to find rations for the campaign for the 3d Corps. Chief superintendent seizes the biscuit in all fortified places: will return it.'

From the Sous-Préfet to the Ministers of War, of Foreign Affairs, and the Interior, Paris.

'Wissembourg, July 24.

'The night passed without any accident, without movement of the troops visible upon the Bavarian and Baden frontiers. A certain discouragement and uneasiness have been noticed among the Bavarian and Baden outposts at Wissembourg. It is thought the cause lay in the withdrawal of the Prussian troops, which, it is asserted, have left the Palatinate.'

From the General in command of the 4th Corps to the Chief of the Staff, Paris.

'Thionville, July 24.

'The 4th Corps have neither ambulances nor field-canteens, nor train-wagons for the troops and the Staff. Toul is entirely without garrison.'

THE END.

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